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Abstract 
 
The Reformation Suits: Litigation as Constitution-Making  
in a German Imperial Court, 1521-1555 
 
by 
 
Sarah Monira Ludin 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Jurisprudence and Social Policy 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor David Lieberman, Chair 
 
Martin Luther was declared a heretic and outlaw in 1521. In the years that followed, 
dozens of city councils and princely rulers nevertheless undertook changes in their domains to 
reform church and polity in the Lutheran manner. In practice, introducing reformation in a 
particular place involved violations of local customary law, canon law, civil law, or imperial law. 
Thus, reformation spawned litigation. Attempts throughout the first half of the sixteenth century 
to resolve disputes that had arisen out of local reformations through arbitration, imperial-level 
negotiations, religious colloquies, and a church council did little to stop “old-faith” (altgläubig) 
clergy and church authorities from suing proto-Protestant princes and cities. The most 
consequential litigation of this period took place in the Imperial Chamber Court, a Roman civil 
law court that had been established in 1495. With a stable location (that did not travel with the 
Emperor), and judges appointed by both Emperor and Estates, the Imperial Chamber Court was 
the first Empire-wide judicial forum that aspired to be independent of the personal justice of the 
Emperor. In this relatively new, and initially unstable, Roman law court, old-faith litigants sued 
princes and cities for violating the Land-Peace, confiscating church property, seizing jurisdiction, 
and other illegal acts. Because its first-instance litigants were primarily princes and cities directly 
subject to the Emperor, the litigation also had the character of public law. 
 This dissertation is a socio-legal history of Reformation-related litigation that appeared in 
the Imperial Chamber Court prior to the 1555 Augsburg Religion-Peace. It offers a new kind of 
legal history of the Reformation. The legal history of the early German Reformation has 
primarily been the territory of intellectual historians, theologians, and scholars of public law. 
Their focus on political negotiations, watershed treaties, theological writings, and top-down 
legislative output, while invaluable, tell us only part of the story. My work, by contrast, elevates 
the importance of civil litigation as a distinctly important forum in which the Reformation 
unfolded. I show that legal praxis—the work of classification, of performative speech acts, and 
of experimentation in high-stakes contexts—are just as important, if not more important, than 
politics and doctrine for understanding the legal significance of the Reformation.  
The Reformation holds a particular potency in the historiography of the Christian West as 
an originary moment for forms of political arrangement and social life that would recognize and 
acknowledge internal Christian difference, and, eventually, an ever-expanding circle of 
worldviews. In particular, historians have tended to look to the Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555 
as the headwaters variously of modern secularism, religious freedom, the rule of law, and 
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sovereignty. I argue that we need to look to the early decades of the Reformation to understand 
what precisely the Peace was aiming to settle and contain. A careful examination of civil 
litigation can help us account for the most consequential legal transformation of the early 
Reformation period: while in 1521 Lutheranism was outlawed as a heresy (in the Edict of 
Worms), in 1555 it was recognized as a legal confession (in the Augsburg Peace). Put another 
way, we cannot understand how the Holy Roman Empire got from Worms to Augsburg without 
understanding the Reformation cases.  
 This dissertation also provides a new genealogy for “religion” as a secular legal category. 
While historians have tended to look to the Enlightenment for a point of origins of “religion” as 
an academic category, or to the Augsburg Peace as its origins as a political-legal category, in 
fact, the question of what counted as a “matter of religion” was a key issue as early as the 1520s 
in the context of Reformation litigation. My research shows how the deep ambiguity of the term 
“religion” in these cases was decisive in shaping the Augsburg Peace and imperial public law. 
 Finally, my dissertation offers a new way of understanding the impact of Protestantism 
on modern law. Rather than examining how Protestant rulers reformed law in their domains, or 
the writings of theologians like Luther and Melanchthon on law, my dissertation analyzes the 
ways in which Protestant litigants experimented with imperial law in the context of high-stakes 
litigation. I identify certain patterns of usage that can help explain some of the features of the 
post-1555 imperial system—including its recognition of multiple “religious parties,” its 
increased investment in the consolidation of state institutions to manage agonistic difference, and 
the formation of two distinct legal interpretive universes along confessional lines which 
eventually destabilized the Augsburg system in the seventeenth century. 
 For readers interested in law and legal history, they will find an exposition of 
fundamental questions of lawmaking in the Holy Roman Empire, and the way this legal culture 
shaped how the Reformation unfolded in the German lands. For readers interested in the 
Reformation, they will find a new approach to considering the role of law in this period, and its 
consequences on modern law. For readers interested in secularism, they will find a fresh scene in 
which the religion category gets re-invented, and a detailed examination of the role of the 
Reformation in producing the particular intractability of “religion” as we have inherited it in late 
modernity.  
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USAGES 
 
The most common monetary denomination used in the case files is “marks lötigen golds.” 
“Mark” is a unit of weight for valuable metals.1 “Löthig” means unmixed, having the full 
weight.2 
 
The transcriptions and translations of case files contained in footnotes are my own, and 
are not completed to editorial standard. Some of my notations and abbreviations include: 
g.h. = gnediger Herr 
e.g. = euer Gnaden 
f.g. = fürstliche Gnaden 
e.f.g. = euer fürstliche Gnaden 
key. or kay. mt. = kaiserliche Majestät 
# indicates illegible in case file 
(?) indicates a transcription I was not certain about  
  
I often refer to the “litis contestatio” stage as “settling the litis.” Though “lites” 
(accusative) would be a more accurate translation, I decided to use “litis” to facilitate reader 
recognition. 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Beginning in the sixteenth century, “Mark” began to be used as a denomination of currency. Deutsches 
Rechtswörterbuch Online, s.v. “Mark,” definition 3, accessed July 2, 2019, https://drw-www.adw.uni-
heidelberg.de/drw-cgi/zeige?index=lemmata&term=Mark-3&darstellung=u#Mark-3-1.0. 
2 Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “löthig,” accessed July 2, 2019,  
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=loethig; Deutsches Rechtswörterbuch Online, s.v. “lotig,” accessed 
July 2, 2019, https://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~cd2/drw/e/lo/lotig.htm. On the variety of currencies and 
measures in the German lands, see Whaley, Germany, xiv, and the literature cited there; and Brady, German 
Histories, xv, for equivalents   
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CHAPTER ONE 
SITUATING THE STUDY: LITERATURE, METHODOLOGY, AND SOURCES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Martin Luther was declared a heretic and outlaw in 1521.1 In the years that followed, 
dozens of city councils and princely rulers nevertheless undertook changes in their domains to 
reform church and polity in the Lutheran manner. Local reformations were sometimes spurred by 
clergy (like the monks in Lindau in 1522),2 sometimes by popular or powerful lay will (like the 
guilds in Goslar in 1528),3 sometimes by city councils whose majority favored the new teachings 
(like Ulm’s in 1530),4 and sometimes by individual princes (like the Landgrave of Hessen, who 
began reforming his territory by appointing a Lutheran preacher in 1523).5 Embedded in long-
standing and complex feudal, dynastic, and constitutional relations with the Church, the 
Emperor, nearby rulers, and imperial estates, each locality produced a unique “negotiated 
reformation.”6  
 In practice, introducing reformation in a particular place involved violations of local 
customary law, canon law, civil law, or imperial law. For example, the assignment by a prince or 
city council of Lutheran preachers to clerical posts violated the canon law duty (cum right) of a 
bishop to appoint.7 The endowment, in turn, that funded that clerical office’s incomes might have 
come with conditions attached, such as performing the mass at certain times of year on behalf of 
the benefactor. If those conditions were neglected (or outlawed, as the case may be) the 
benefactor’s relations, or the church institution away from which that endowment was directed, 
might sue for breach of the terms of the endowment.8 Using church incomes from tithes, feudal 
                                               
1 On the Edict of Worms and the Papal Bulls of 1521, see Chapter 2. 
2 Karl Wolfart, “Lindau im Zeitalter der Reformation,” in Geschichte der Stadt Lindau im Bodensee, vol. 1, 
ed. Karl Wolfart (Lindau: Kommissionsverlag von Joh. Thomas Stettner, 1909), 251-6. 
3 Gundmar Blume, Goslar und der Schmalkaldische Bund 1527/31-1547 (Goslar: Selbstverlag des 
Geschichts- und Heimatschutzvereins, 1969), 10-11. 
4 Theodor Keim, Die Reformation der Reichsstadt Ulm: ein Beitrag zur schwäbischen und deutschen 
Reformationsgeschichte (Stuttgart: C. Belser, 1851), 33-152. 
5 Friedrich Wilhelm Hassencamp, Hessische Kirchengeschichte seit dem Zeitalter der Reformation, vol. 1 
(Marburg: Elwert, 1852), 36-64. 
6 Christopher W. Close, The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 
1525–1550 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3-8. The term “Imperial Estates” (Reichstände) refers 
to the various status groups that had a voice in the imperial constitutional order. The most important Estates were the 
Electors (the Holy Roman Empire had been an elective monarchy since the thirteenth century), a clearly defined 
group of seven secular and ecclesiastical princes. Other princes, prince-bishops, and lower rulers also constituted 
Estates. Hence, the constitutional order of the Empire is conventionally called “dualistic” referring to the way in 
which both Emperor and Estates had a role in its governance. See Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman 
Empire. Volume I: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia, 1493-1648 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
26; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes: Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of 
the Holy Roman Empire, trans. Thomas Dunlap (New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 32. 
7 e.g. Landeshauptarchiv Sachsenanhalt Standort Wernigerode Rep. A 53 (RKG) H71 [“Wernigerode 
H71”]: case in which Magdeburg city council was sued by St. Peter monastery for having appointed a preacher at St. 
Jacob church and paying him with incomes of the parish, 1529-1538. 
8 e.g. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 14233 [“Munich 14233”]: case in which the Bishop of 
Würzburg sued the city of Schweinfurt for using an endowment—that had a condition that the preacher who 
received the incomes be appointed by the Bishop—for a Lutheran preacher that the city appointed, 1543-1544. 
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profits, or wealth-yielding properties to support Lutheran clergy and institutions (including 
hospitals and schools managed by worldly rulers) amounted to confiscation, dispossession, or 
conversion of church property.9 Criminally trying and punishing clergy for moral infractions 
violated the jurisdictional competence of spiritual authorities, and clergy immunity privileges.10 
Prescribing evangelical liturgy, permitting clergy marriage, and mandating communion “under 
both kinds” transgressed long-standing canon law maxims, as did prohibiting the mass and 
proscribing other traditional religious rites.11 Destroying monasteries and sacred objects, 
imprisoning or banishing clergy, and plundering church institutions amounted to a violation of 
the Land-Peace.12 Over the course of the first half of the sixteenth century, a number of Recesses 
promulgated by imperial assemblies continually modified yet another layer of imperial law that 
cities and princes might overstep.13 
 Thus, reformation spawned litigation. Attempts throughout the first half of the sixteenth 
century to resolve disputes that had arisen out of local reformations through arbitration, imperial-
level negotiations, religious colloquies, and a church council did little to stop “old-faith” 
(altgläubig) clergy and church authorities from suing evangelical princes and cities.14 The most 
consequential litigation of this period took place in the Imperial Chamber Court, a Roman civil 
law court that had been established in 1495.15 With a stable location (that did not travel with the 
                                               
9 e.g. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 4524 [“Stuttgart 4524”]: case in which the Provost of a 
collegiate church in Ulm sued the city of Ulm when the city refused to cease payments out of the church’s tithes and 
incomes towards salaries of convent members who had abandoned the old faith, 1532-1533. 
10 e.g. Frankfurt Stadtarchiv (RKG) 1035 (M1b/213) [“Frankfurt 1035”]: case in which the Archbishop 
sued the city of Frankfurt for promulgating a mandate that threatened to punish clergy for blasphemy, adultery, and 
excesses, 1529-1535. In another case, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 14217 [“Munich 14217”], a Bishop 
sued a Count for having executed an Anabaptist, as this violated his spiritual jurisdiction. 
11 e.g. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 1476 [“Munich 1476”]: case in which one Count sued another 
Count for his having ordered a servant to confiscate the keys of the parish church in Öttingen, locked the doors of 
the church, and forbade any practices of the old faith therein, resulting in, among other things, newborns being 
denied baptism, 1540-1541. 
12 e.g. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 1732 [“Munich 1732”]: case in which sisters of the Franciscan 
order in Heilbronn along with the imperial prosecutor sued the city of Heilbronn for plundering the house and 
garden there, confiscating its effects, and expelling the sisters out of the city; and for forbidding town residents from 
testifying against the town council in the hearing. 
13 The term “recess” refers to the document produced at the end of an Imperial Diet; “Abschied” means 
departure, i.e. the document produced at departure (Stollberg-Rilinger, Old Clothes, 62-3). For more, see Chapter 2. 
14 It is anachronistic to use the names “Protestants” and “Catholics” in this period, as confessions were still 
in formation. Throughout the dissertation, I use a variety of terms to refer to these proto-formations, including “old-
faith,” “the majority of estates,” or “proto-Catholic” and “evangelical,” “protesting estates” or “proto-Protestant.” 
See Armin Kohnle, Reichstag und Reformation: kaiserliche und ständische Religionspolitik von den Anfängen der 
Causa Lutheri bis zum Nürnberger Religionsfrieden (Heidelberg: Gütersloher, 2001), 20. On the perils of naming, 
see Axel Gotthard, Der Augsburger Religionsfrieden (Münster: Aschendorff, 2004), 124-6 and 247-9. 
15 Reformation cases appeared in other courts such as church courts, city, territorial, and regional courts, 
among others. See Christopher Ocker, Church Robbers and Reformers in Germany, 1525-1547: Confiscation and 
Religious Purpose in the Holy Roman Empire (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 114. For an example of scholarship that 
looks at Reformation cases at a variety of judicial levels, see Hermann Buck, Die Anfänge der Konstanzer 
Reformationsprozesse: Osterreich, Eidgenossenschaft, und Schmalkaldischer Bund 1510/22-1531 (Tübingen: 
Osiandersche Buchhandlung in Kommission, 1964). There were two competing “supreme courts” in the Empire at 
this time: the Reichshofrat (Aulic Council) in Vienna and the Hofgericht at Rottweil. The Aulic Council was 
established in 1497 by Emperor Maximilian I in order “to safeguard the judicial aspects of his imperial prerogatives” 
(Wilson, 627). It was the court tied to the personal justice of the Emperor and its judges were all Habsburg 
appointees, operating as a counterpoint to the primarily Estates-led Imperial Chamber Court. It was not functioning 
between 1519 and 1559. The Hofgericht at Rottweil was established in the thirteenth century as a patrimonial court 
3 
Emperor), and judges appointed by both Emperor and Estates, the Imperial Chamber Court was 
the first Empire-wide judicial forum that aspired to be independent of the personal justice of the 
Emperor. In this relatively new, and initially unstable, Roman law court, old-faith litigants sued 
princes and cities for violating the Land-Peace, confiscating church property, seizing jurisdiction, 
and other illegal acts. Because its first-instance litigants were primarily those directly subject to 
the Emperor, the litigation also had the character of public law.16 
 This dissertation is a socio-legal history of Reformation-related litigation that appeared in 
the Imperial Chamber Court prior to the 1555 Augsburg Religion-Peace. This is the first study in 
the English language to use these court records as a primary source. It offers a new kind of legal 
history of the Reformation. The legal history of the early German Reformation has primarily 
been the territory of intellectual historians, theologians, and scholars of public law. Their focus 
on political negotiations, watershed treaties, theological writings, and top-down legislative 
output, while invaluable, tell us only part of the story. My work, by contrast, elevates the 
importance of civil litigation as a distinctly important forum in which the Reformation unfolded. 
I suggest that historiographical focus on legal declaration—in the form of legislation such as the 
Worms Edict and the Augsburg Religion-Peace—over quotidian aspects of legal practice is the 
consequence of law’s tendency to conceal the messy, contingent, performative aspects that in 
fact constitute its authority.17  
 To the extent scholars have studied the Reformation cases, they have tended to focus on 
the political backdrop, who wins and who loses, or the Court’s developing jurisprudence. My 
work, by contrast, shows that legal praxis—the work of classification, of performative speech 
acts, and of experimentation in high-stakes contexts—are just as important, if not more 
important, than politics and doctrine for understanding the legal significance of the Reformation.  
 The Reformation holds a particular potency in the historiography of the Christian West as 
an originary moment for forms of political arrangement and social life that would recognize and 
acknowledge internal Christian difference, and, eventually, an ever-expanding circle of 
worldviews.18 In particular, historians have tended to look to the Augsburg Religion-Peace of 
1555—however imperfect and incomplete—as the headwaters variously of modern secularism, 
religious freedom, the rule of law, and sovereignty. I argue that we need to look to the early 
decades of the Reformation to understand what precisely the Peace was aiming to settle and 
                                               
over Habsburg domains and subjects in the south and southwest. Over time it came to be spoken of as an “imperial 
court,” adjudicating disputes involving direct imperial subjects well beyond this region into the eighteenth century. 
Though not in direct competition with the Imperial Chamber Court, as the Aulic Council was, the Hofgericht at 
Rottweil represented a potent judicial alternative and became one of the most important instances from which 
litigants would appeal to the Imperial Chamber Court. See Ulrike Schillinger, “Die Neue Rottweiler 
Hofgerichtsordnung von 1572,” in Prozessakten, Parteien, Partikularinteressen: Höchstgerichtsbarkeit in der Mitte 
Europas vom 15. bis 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Alexander Denzler et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 55-59; Edgar 
Liebmann, "Reichskammergericht und Reichshofrat in der historischen Forschung von 1866 bis zur Gegenwart," 
Jahrbuch der juristichen Zeitgeschichte 6 (2004/2005): 81-103; Scheurmann, Frieden durch Recht,” 184-7. 
16 On the personal jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber Court, and the relationship between public and 
private law, see Chapter 2. 
17 Justin B. Richland, “Jurisdiction: Grounding Law in Language,” Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 42 (2013): 212-
214. 
18 This focus on Western Christianity can come at the expense of understanding long-standing 
arrangements of coexistence and the range of hybrid affiliations that have existed historically throughout other parts 
of Europe, and the world. See e.g. Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 
200-1000 (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). For early modern central Europe, see e.g. Howard Louthan, Gary 
B. Cohen, Franz A.J. Szabo, eds., Diversity and Dissent: Negotiating Religious Difference in Central Europe, 1500-
1800 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011). 
4 
contain. A careful examination of civil litigation can help us account for the most consequential 
legal transformation of the early Reformation period: while in 1521 Lutheranism was outlawed 
as a heresy (in the Edict of Worms), in 1555 it was recognized as a legal confession (in the 
Augsburg Peace).19 Put another way, we cannot understand how the Holy Roman Empire got 
from Worms to Augsburg without understanding the Reformation cases.  
 This dissertation also provides a new genealogy for “religion” as a secular legal category. 
While historians have tended to look to the Enlightenment for a point of origins of “religion” as 
an academic category, or to the Augsburg Peace as its origins as a political-legal category, in 
fact, the question of what counted as a “matter of religion” was a key issue as early as the 1520s 
in the context of Reformation litigation. My research shows how the deep ambiguity of the term 
“religion” in these cases was decisive in shaping the Augsburg Peace and imperial public law. 
 Finally, my dissertation offers a new way of understanding the impact of Protestantism 
on modern law. Rather than examining how Protestant rulers reformed law in their domains, or 
the writings of theologians like Luther and Melanchthon on law, my dissertation analyzes the 
ways in which Protestant litigants experimented with imperial law in the context of high-stakes 
litigation. I identify certain patterns of usage that can help explain some of the features of the 
post-1555 imperial system—including its recognition of multiple “religious parties,” its 
increased investment in the consolidation of state institutions to manage agonistic difference, and 
the formation of two distinct legal interpretive universes along confessional lines which 
eventually destabilized the Augsburg system in the seventeenth century. 
 For readers interested in law and legal history, they will find an exposition of 
fundamental questions of lawmaking in the Holy Roman Empire, and the way this legal culture 
shaped how the Reformation unfolded in the German lands. For readers interested in the 
Reformation, they will find a new approach to considering the role of law in this period, and its 
consequences on modern law. For readers interested in secularism, they will find a fresh scene in 
which religion gets re-invented, and a detailed examination of the status of the Reformation in 
producing the particular intractability of “religion” as we have inherited it in late modernity.  
*** 
 On Sunday January 8, 1531, after attending an early sermon for Three Kings’ Day and 
sharing breakfast, Ludwig Vogelmann, the lay administrator of the Antonier monastery in 
Memmingen, heard a scream.20 The stewardess, who happened to be his sister, had responded to 
a knock at the door and was met by a large group of official-looking men. Having quietly and 
secretly climbed the steps to the preceptory, their sudden appearance caused her enough alarm 
that she “screamed woefully” at the sight of them.21  
 Perhaps Vogelmann understood what the scream signaled; he quickly closed two inner 
doors—those to the parlor and bedchamber—barricading himself in.22 When the officials finally 
broke through the doors with the use of axes and other instruments, they arrested Vogelmann. 
Witness testimony, gathered several years later, described a telling moment: 
 
                                               
19 On the definition of “confession,” see Jaroslav Pelikan, Jaroslav, Credo: Historical and Theological 
Guide to Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2003), 1-5. 
20 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 5657 [“Munich 5657”]. 
21 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionrotulus, 1538. Laurentz Stoffel’s testimony regarding article 22: 
“jemerlich geschrihen.” 
22 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionrotulus, 1538. Laurentz Stoffel’s testimony. 
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The ninth witness from Dillingen testifies that he himself heard Vogelmann demand 
his satchel from the officials and, holding a pearl pater noster in his hand, say to 
them: “by imperial rights, you shall leave me alone.”23 
 
One of them responded: “dear father, do not fear, we will do nothing to you that is 
against the law.”24 
 
By the next afternoon, Vogelmann had been publicly executed in the Memmingen market 
square. The events that preceded, and the litigation in the Imperial Chamber Court that followed 
Vogelmann’s arrest and execution would span a 25-year long period (1523-1548) that coincided 
with the twists and turns of the early decades of the Reformation in the German lands.25 This 
brief exchange between Vogelmann and one of the city officials at the time of his arrest captures 
some of the legal complexity that reform unleashed. 
 One is the image of Vogelmann, a lay administrator of a monastery, holding a pater 
noster (rosary)—a quintessential symbol of old-faith piety—while demanding that imperial law 
be obeyed. The “imperial rights” that Vogelmann referred to had come up that morning over 
breakfast with the farmhand Paul Kutter.26 Vogelmann had recently returned to Memmingen for 
the first time since the Augsburg Imperial Diet of 1530, where he had succeeded in persuading 
the Emperor to give him an imperial safe passage letter because he felt in danger from the city 
officials of Memmingen.27 Kutter warned Vogelmann of rumors that the city planned to arrest 
him after his return from Augsburg, but Vogelmann did not seem worried: 
 
The witness [Paul Kutter] says that he, on that Sunday on which Vogelmann was 
arrested, ate breakfast with him, Vogelmann, in the preceptory, when, among other 
things, one came to speak about the city servants (Stattknecht) wanting to 
capture/arrest him, to which Vogelmann said “for that, the imperial safe passage in 
my bosom (im puesen) is good for me,” and with the hand he tapped on the bosom.28 
 
Vogelmann was depicted here as blending old-faith piety with noble confidence in the imperial 
legal order, in the idea that the imperial safe passage letter would protect him. Gripping his pater 
noster and barricading himself into the room also indicated the precariousness of imperial law. 
The ambiguity of Kutter’s last sentence was also suggestive—was Vogelmann tapping the actual 
                                               
23 Munich 5657, Q44, Probation unnd in eventum conclusion schrifft, 1540. Summary of witness 
testimony, as to article 24, how the Memmingers handled Vogelmannn: “bringt des 9. Thillingischen zeugen sag 
myt sich, dem er Vogelmannn seynen Wetschkar befolhen und eyn corallen pater noster inn der handt halttendt zu 
den schergen gesagt, ir werdt mich doch bey key. rechtenn bleiben lassenn, hatt solchs der zeug selbs gehort.”  
24 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionsrotulus 1538, Laurentz Stoffel’s testimony regarding article 24: “Auff 
den vierundzwanntzigisten beweiß articul geanntwurt, Nit one, eines Raths verordnete diener, haben den 
Burggraven, aus der preceptorei heraus fur ine ge- zeugen vancklich gefuert, alda er Burggraf ime seinen wetzger 
bevolhen, und zu denen so ine gefurt gesagt, ir werdet mich doch bei kayserlichen Rechten beleiben lassen, hab 
ainer aus inen, geanntwurt, lieber vatter, erschreckend nit, wir wollen euch nit wider recht thun. Ob solhs, wie oblaut 
wider Recht und unbewart irer Ehren beschehen, sei im nit wissendt.” 
25 More on this case in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
26 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionrotulus, 1538. Paul Kutter’s testimony, listed as a Pawknecht 
(Bauknecht). 
27 For more on this case, see Chapter 4.  
28 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionrotulus, 1538. Paul Kutter’s testimony. 
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letter of imperial safe passage stored near his chest? Or was he indicating the spiritual site of a 
higher form of safety?  
 The response by the city official—“dear father, do not fear, we will do nothing to you 
that is against the law”—combined a strangely endearing consolation with the heightened 
ambiguity that at this historical moment was carried within that phrase “to go against the law.” 
Local reformations had entailed breaking all kinds of existing laws, norms, and customs; whose 
law would they not violate? Imperial law? Local law? God’s law? It was precisely the meaning 
of law-breaking, and the impact of that law-breaking on the coherence of the constitutional order, 
and of the Empire as corpus mysticum, that was at stake in the Reformation. 
 The excerpt also draws our attention to the discursive aspect of the case file itself. What 
counted as a legal event? Did the record of this brief exchange between Vogelmann and the city 
official carry any legal significance for the commissioner who gathered witness testimony, or for 
the judges who would weigh it? Or was the significance something altogether different? Indeed, 
the excerpt above about the pater noster is taken from a 1540 document in which the lawyers for 
Vogelmann’s family provided a summary of the witness testimony for the judges. It referred to 
the testimony of the ninth witness from Dillingen, Laurenz Stoffel (Lorenz Stoeffel), Priest at the 
Antonier monastery chapel. But Stoffel’s original testimony, recorded in 1538, and on which the 
1540 document was based, reads: 
 
In response to the twenty-fourth article, the witness answered that he saw the official 
appointed by the city council arrest the Burggrave [Vogelmann] and lead him out of 
the preceptory, when the Burggrave demanded from him his satchel, and said to those 
who were so leading him: “by imperial rights, you shall leave me alone.”29 
 
 There is no mention here of a pearl pater noster, and I have been unable to find any 
reference to a pater noster anywhere else in the 400-page document. Did the lawyers for 
Vogelmann’s family insert this object into the story? If so, why? Like so much of the litigation 
that emerged from Reformation-related disputes, the legal issue in the case was the rather narrow 
question of whether the city violated the imperial safe passage letter when it executed 
Vogelmann. It was the defendant city of Memmingen that sought to recast the legal issue as one 
“concerning the religion,” and therefore not subject to the civil jurisdiction of the Imperial 
Chamber Court. But perhaps the lawyers for Vogelmann’s family wanted to use the pater noster 
in order to highlight the context of the religious controversy, without sacrificing the narrow legal 
issue that would ensure they would win the case. Or perhaps the lawyers for Vogelmann’s family 
were trying to settle the depiction of Vogelmann’s character, and to fix his motivations for 
speaking out against the city at the Augsburg Diet of 1530; the pater noster signaled that it was 
pious zeal and loyal conservatism that led Vogelmann to transform from one of the city’s most 
trusted city officials prior to its introduction of the Reformation, to its seditious enemy after. The 
pater noster clarified, perhaps, that Vogelmann was not a public criminal, but a martyr. 
 
                                               
29 Munich 5657, Q30, Kommissionrotulus, 1538: “Auff den vierundzwanntzigisten beweiß articul 
geanntwurt, Nit one, eines Raths verordnete diener, haben den Burggraven, aus der preceptorei heraus fur ine 
gezeugen vancklich gefuert, alda er Burggraf ime seinen wetzger bevolhen, und zu denen so ine gefurt gesagt, ir 
werdet mich doch bei kayserlichen Rechten beleiben lassen, hab ainer aus inen, geanntwurt, lieber vatter, 
erschreckend nit, wir wollen euch nit wider recht thun.” 
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Brief Chapter Summary 
 
Cases like the one involving the family of Ludwig Vogelmann and the city of 
Memmingen are at the heart of this dissertation. A close look at Reformation-related litigation 
changes the familiar ways in which we have understood the legal history of the Reformation as a 
whole. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides the legislative backdrop for the 
litigation story that will follow. In the first part of the chapter, I track the events surrounding the 
causa Lutheri with a special focus on three legal frameworks that emerged as a result—the Papal 
Bull, the Edict of Worms, and the lesser-known Regiment Mandate. Historians have tended to 
focus on the trials against Luther and the judgments and legislation of 1521 as decisive for the 
creation of a legal regime that aimed to snuff out the new heresy. Yet none of them were 
particularly effective in doing so. I show the conditions in which the unilateral nature of the Bull, 
the Edict, and the Mandate ensured their ineffectiveness. I also explain why the legal category of 
“heresy” was not particularly effective in this moment. In the second part of the chapter, I 
describe the constitutional conditions and decision-making culture to which legislation was 
subject. Not the unilateral forms, but those that were the subject of negotiations and deliberations 
involving Estates, in and outside of imperial assemblies, proved to be touchstones in the first half 
of the sixteenth century. I elevate the importance of courts in this context as another kind of 
forum for deliberating the Reformation, through the proxies of specific disputes; in other words, 
these civil law disputes took on the character of public law. This leads into a discussion about the 
founding of the Imperial Chamber Court and the fortuitous timing of its formative years with the 
early Reformation. In the process, readers will learn about the legal culture of the Holy Roman 
Empire and the relationship between constitution, legislation, and litigation in this moment.  
Chapter 3 builds upon this description of the legal culture of the Holy Roman Empire, by 
describing the main jurisprudential regimes that were called upon and tested in the Reformation 
cases. With rare exception (such as one case that cites the Worms Edict, discussed in the chapter) 
the Reformation cases in the Imperial Chamber Court made hardly any reference to the three 
sources of law of the early 1520s—the Bulls, the Worms Edict, and the Regiment Mandate. 
Instead, plaintiffs sued for violations of laws concerning property, jurisdiction, and peace. I 
discuss the varied sources of the laws underneath these broad headings. Together these, along 
with imperial recesses, formed a patchwork jurisprudence to deal with the realities of the 
Reformation. Moreover, I show the varied calculations involved in making the Reformation 
context of a dispute legible in the course of litigation. Reasons for eliding the Reformation 
context changed over the course of our period. Nonetheless, litigants often found ways to bring 
the Reformation context of a dispute to the surface through pious rebuke—sometimes subtle, 
sometimes vivid in its language. I show the kinds of arguments and description litigants used to 
talk about the Reformation within the confines of the Court’s substantive jurisdiction and 
procedures. 
 In Chapter 4, I track a shift in the way proto-Protestant litigants were approaching these 
cases. Whereas in the previous chapter, I considered the ad hoc thematization of the religious 
controversy, which nonetheless kept stable the original legal issue of property, peace or 
jurisdiction, in this chapter, we see proto-Protestant litigants experimentally translating this 
backdrop into a matter of legal classification and jurisdiction. In particular, they argued that a 
given property, jurisdiction, or land-peace dispute was a “matter of religion” (Religionssache) 
and therefore did not belong within the jurisdiction of the Court. In the sixteenth century, 
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notwithstanding the use of “religion” in Roman law sources, the term was used generically, 
standing outside of the centuries-old jurisdictional binary of “spiritual” (geistlich) and “worldly” 
(weltlich). Thus, it was the intention of the proto-Protestants in saying that something was “a 
matter of religion” to place it in a jurisdictional no-man’s-land, requiring the extraordinary forum 
of a Christian Council to resolve the core disagreements that, they said, gave rise to these 
disputes in the first place. In this chapter, I scrutinize moments of articulation in which parties 
offered more language on the meaning of “matter of religion,” from a variety of sources, 
including case files, correspondences, and judges’ notes. I track the claims of the protesting 
estates; the responses of opposing litigants; the responses of the judges; the involvement of the 
Emperor and King; and disagreements among the protesting estates themselves about what 
counted as a matter of religion. These moments did not yield reflective, second-order 
deliberation or debate. Rather, the meaning of the phrase “matter of religion” was being worked, 
reworked, and reworked again by interested parties in high-stakes disputes. I argue that we 
cannot understand the facets of this emergent legal category, and its status as a terminus 
technicus in the Augsburg Religion-Peace, without understanding its bricolage character.  
  In Chapter 5, I shift from a focus on substantive law to a focus on legal procedure. I 
advance the argument that experimental uses of mundane, formulaic legal instruments of Roman 
law civil procedure operated as unexpected proxies for the most pressing constitutional questions 
of the early Reformation. I do this by closely analyzing the repeated use, especially by proto-
Protestant litigants, of several legal instruments in the Reformation suits—namely, the power of 
attorney, the protestation, and the recusation—as “performative” and “passionate” legal speech 
acts.30 I show that, first, the evangelical estates’ usage of the protestation instrument was drawing 
on centuries worth of customary legal practice, while at the same time mobilizing it in order to 
articulate a new way of relating law and conscience. The protestation instrument became a mode 
of “veridiction,” a kind of bearing truth about the event and about oneself in a high-stakes 
context. Second, the protesting estates’ usage of the “power of attorney” document was drawing 
on a legal culture of combination and corporatism, and in the process proposing a new form of 
legally legible group identification and belonging in terms of confession—the beginning of the 
idea of a “religious party” as a legal category. Finally, the recusation instrument, though tapping 
into familiar principles and doctrines against judge bias, became a means of making accusations 
of confessional partisanship, and making legible a whole set of suspicions linked to questions of 
authority and legal validity, paving the way for confessionally-distinct jurisprudences within the 
imperial legal system—an instability that contributed to the wars of the seventeenth century.  
 In Chapter 6, I closely read the first Imperial Chamber Court case in which the Augsburg 
Religion-Peace was the ruling law. Even in the pre-trial stage of this case, the first that tested the 
meaning of a “violation of the Religion-Peace,” parties were debating the most fundamental 
doctrinal questions of the relationship between the “two powers”—spiritual and temporal—citing 
authoritative texts from the Church fathers to Justinian.31 One does not see this level of debate 
and citation in the pre-1555 cases. I embed the Augsburg Peace in its litigative context, and 
highlight the ways in which it was crafted with future litigation in mind. I show that, far from 
clarifying the boundaries of this new jurisdictional category, the Peace at once opened up, 
ossified, and indexed all of the paradoxes and conundra that had characterized the pre-1555 
litigation. I link this containment move with the legal culture and juridical technique of 
                                               
30 Marianne Constable, Our Word is Our Bond: How Legal Speech Acts (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 21, 34-36. 
31 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 264 [“Munich 264”]. 
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dissimulation. I argue that the character of the Peace as essentially dissimulative and ambiguous 
shaped the way that this new category of legal issue, this newly justiciable object, was 
conceptualized at its conception. In other words, “religion” as an imperial civil law category did 
not have a simple noun-like referent (like faith, worship, or confession), rather, it gestured to a 
certain “problem-space.”32  
 In summary, while Chapters 1 and 2 provide background, Chapter 3 describes the ad hoc, 
patchwork jurisprudence under which Reformation disputes were litigated; Chapter 4 describes 
the experimentation especially by proto- Protestant litigants to create new categories and use 
conventional instruments in unconventional ways; and Chapter 5 describes the containment of 
these disputes in imperial law under the “religion” category. In the conclusion, I consider how 
this study revises conventional historiographies of secularism and religious freedom, that treat 
the Reformation as its headwaters. 
 
What is “the Reformation”? 
 
 The study of the Reformation has generated a vast literature, which has undergone 
transformations in line with general trends of historical writing over the past five centuries. The 
most notable relatively recent shifts have involved a move away from approaches that attribute 
historical change to a single causal engine (such as materialist or idealist accounts), or oriented to 
a single telos (such as the nation-state). These grand narratives have given way to accounts that 
favor the complexity of factors, and the contingency of outcomes; causality is thought of not in 
terms of long arcs of human change or divine purpose, but as a mechanism whereby one event 
follows another in a chain of possibilities, and where the turn or preference towards one possible 
path over another is contingent, inviting “thick description” rather than systematic explanation.33  
 For centuries, “the Reformation” has been a term used to refer to a Europe-wide event 
that spanned the first half of the sixteenth century, and had lasting consequences at the level of 
ideas, faith, society, law, economy, and government. At its core, it was a revolution of the 
institution of the Church, its theology and practices, that resulted in the splintering of Western 
Christendom into a variety of confessions. It began with the “Luther affair” in 1517, represented 
symbolically through the image of Martin Luther posting his ninety-five theses to the Wittenberg 
castle church door,34 and ended in the 1550s, as the Catholic Church’s response took a more 
intensive and coherent form in the period conventionally called the Counter-Reformation. This 
chronology represents a dialectical pattern in which the progressive Reformation (thesis) evoked 
a reactionary Counter-Reformation (antithesis), the contradiction of which led to destructive 
violence in the Thirty Years War, which produced, as a consequence, the absolutist early modern 
                                               
32 David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 4. 
33 Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 3-30. 
34 “In fact, it is unlikely that such an event ever took place. The contents of the theses became known with 
astonishing speed to a wider public in the Reich [Empire] during November 1517, but it seems clear that Luther 
himself was not responsible” (Whaley, Germany, 143). See Erwin Iserloh, The Theses were Not Posted: Luther 
Between Reform and Reformation (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1968), 76-97. 
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state (synthesis), and in turn the nation-state, “the culmination point of world history.”35  This 
account tells either a story of progress or one of decline—depending on the historian’s leanings.  
 Reformation historiography was—and, in some cases, still remains—highly polemical.36 
These polemics reflected not only confessional lines, but also the politics of the moment. For 
instance, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the historiography was dominated by debates 
about whether the Reformation facilitated the full expression and emancipation of the German 
Spirit, or fractured specifically Germanic forms of communalism that Romantics idealized.37 
Later, Cold War historiography emphasized the ways in which the Reformation intertwined with 
the Peasants’ War of 1525, which some saw as together constituting a failed early bourgeois 
revolution, the “final stage of a revolutionary situation, which arose from the disintegration of 
the feudal mode of production.”38 
 Though mostly evacuated of heavy-handed teleology, the nation-state remained a 
powerful organizing category in the discipline, as historians continued, by and large, to approach 
the study of the Reformation from within the boundaries of, and at the scale of, future nation-
states. In the 1960s, however, scholars began to study urban settings as the heart of the 
Reformation, seeing in them the earliest sites of conflict, preaching, and reform. These studies 
inaugurated the sociohistorical study of the Reformation, constituting the earliest attempts to 
“resolve ‘the Reformation’ into its various forms and find the social and political principles 
which seem to have determined the proliferation of forms of Reformation thought and 
religion.”39 Some newer work looks at developments across these boundaries by identifying 
faithful networks that crossed conventional borders,40 or by situating the Reformation within 
anti-Turkish polemics41 and the emerging global consciousness created through the encounter 
with “the New World.”42  
 In the 1970s, scholars began to question the inherited periodization of the Reformation. 
Where an earlier historiography saw epoch breaks, the newer historiography began to see 
                                               
35 Wolfgang Reinhard, “Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State a Reassessment,” 
The Catholic Historical Review 75, no. 3 (1989): 383-4. 
36 See series of essays on this subject in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 97 (2006): Philip Benedict 
“What is Post-Confessional Reformation History,” 277-83; Scott Hendrix “Post-confessional Research and 
Confessional Commitment,” 284-8; Lyndal Roper “Allegiance and Reformation History,” 289-97; Ethan Shagan 
“Can Historians End the Reformation?” 298-306. 
37 Roland H. Bainton, “Interpretations of the Reformation,” American Historical Review 66, no. 1 (Oct. 
1960), 75-6. See also Thomas A. Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489-1553) and the German Reformation 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995), 3-4; and Whaley, Germany, 3. 
38 Brady, Protestant Politics, 8. 
39 Thomas A Brady, Communities, Politics, and Reformation in Early Modern Europe (Leiden: Brill, 
1998), 2. See also Susan C. Karant-Nunn, “Changing One’s Mind: Transformations in Reformation History from a 
Germanist’s Perspective,” Renaissance Quarterly 58, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 1104-5. 
40 On Anglo-German Lutheran relations in the sixteenth century, for instance, see: Rory McEntegart, Henry 
VIII, the League of Schmalkalden, and the English Reformation (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2002); also 
David Scott Gehring, “From the Strange Death to the Odd Afterlife of Lutheran England,” The Historical Journal 
57, no. 3 (September 2014): 825–44. For work on the birth of the Jesuits in the 1540s, see: John O’Malley, The First 
Jesuits (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1993). See also Brady, Protestant Politics, 150ff. 
41 See e.g. Hartmut Bobzin, Der Koran im Zeitalter der Reformation (Stuttgart: In Kommission bei Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1995); and Gregory J. Miller, The Turks and Islam in Reformation Germany (London: Routledge, 
2017). 
42 See e.g. Lee Palmer Wandel, The Reformation: Towards a New History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 39-62. 
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continuities.43 Scholars increasingly excavated the late medieval conditions in which reform 
found fertile ground, such as humanism,44 print culture,45 anticlericalism,46 and 
territorialization.47 They showed that certain developments hitherto associated with the 
Reformation had been taking place already decades before—such as secularization of church 
property, local forms of church communalism, and rivalries between Rome and the “liberties of 
German princes.” Where an earlier historiography drove their accounts on the basis of a rarefied 
theory of change over time, the newer historiography reveled in the discovery of empirical 
evidence of exceptions, counter-examples, and anomalies. In 1989, for instance, Reinhard argued 
against the dialectical periodization described above, in part by drawing together a literature that 
provided evidence that “the labels ‘Reformation’ and ‘Counter-Reformation’ simply did not 
correspond, either chronologically or materially, to the images of ‘progressive action’ and 
‘reactionary reaction’ that once seemed so self-evident.”48 Where an earlier historiography saw 
singularity, the newer historiography saw plurality. In 2004, for instance, Brady identified a long 
“age of Reformations” that spanned roughly 1450-1650. He argued that insofar as “reform” had 
been a watchword across multiple domains of life in the German lands—religious, legal, social, 
political, and economic—since at least the mid-fifteenth century, the Protestant Reformation 
represented just one in a “complex amalgam of parallel movements.”49 Across lines of 
confession, estate, and geography, persons of all walks of life were imbricated in the very same 
set of processes. In Brady’s view, “the narrative of the German Reformation becomes a cluster of 
interrelated stories, played out by different sorts of actors on different stages, connected at some 
levels, but not all, by a common religious tradition, common traditions of governance, and at 
least some elements of a common language.”50  
 Some scholars go even further to pull apart what they regard as a monolithic view of the 
Reformation by thinking about it as a period that produced not new confessions, but a new 
outlook on religious revision. It would be wrong, they argue, to think of the varieties of churches 
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45 See e.g. Lee Palmer Wandel, The Reformation, 63-86; also Whaley, Germany, 117-121; and Elizabeth L. 
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also Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998).  
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Early Modern Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Robert Bireley, The Refashioning of 
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49 Whaley, Germany, 63. 
50 Brady, Protestant Politics, 7. See Klaus Fitschen, et al., eds., Kulturelle Wirkungen der Reformation / 
Cultural Impact of the Reformation, Leucorea-Studien zur Geschichte der Reformation und der lutherischen 
Orthodoxie 36, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Evangelisches Verlagshaus, 2018). 
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and forms of Christianity that have developed globally since the sixteenth-century as outgrowths 
of early modern German Protestantism. Rather, the sheer variety among these churches indicates 
that what was set in motion in that period was not “one tradition” but instead “permanent 
processes of adaptation, development, consolidation, and the questioning of religious practices 
and ideas which we actively discover and interpret from our particular position in the present.”51 
The 2016 Oxford handbook on the Reformations, for instance, “traces processes rather than fixed 
identities and points to rather more eclectic intellectual trajectories.”52 This newer scholarship 
explores “how past legacies—which include a broad spectrum of ideas and practices ranging 
from mysticism to millenarianism—link to contemporary Protestantisms, or how they are 
constructed in memory cultures.”53 When “Reformation” is used not simply as a demarcation of 
a certain period, but rather as a particular kind of genealogy or discourse containing a particular 
ethos vis-a-vis the divine, spiritual authority, and spiritual knowledges, then the historiography 
of the Reformation moves far beyond early modern Europe, and includes “questions about 
continuities and change in relation to much larger chronologies and geographies.”54 On these 
accounts, “Reformation” denotes the emergence of particular ideational possibilities that 
transcend the historical specificity and lineages of sixteenth-century Europe. 
 Notwithstanding these newer, more multi-faceted articulations of “Reformation,” few, if 
any, historians have been willing to abandon the Reformation as a meaningful term by dissolving 
it within the broader transformations characteristic of that other contentious period with which it 
is largely coincident: the Early Modern.55 Rublack writes, for instance: “The early modern period 
was characterized by renewed demographic growth, state building and new forms of popular 
politics, the beginnings of a ‘global age,’ areas of significant economic expansion and diversified 
material cultures, new technologies, such as printing, the expansion of learning, and proliferation 
of new intellectual trends as well as new challenges to the status of women and distinct 
languages of self-awareness. The religious transformations interlinked with these huge and 
varied political, social, economic, and mental changes across the globe.”56 This excerpt 
illustrates that, notwithstanding the historiography’s push towards continuities, contingencies 
and complexities, the study of the Reformation continues to have as its core differentiating 
quality something that is “irreducibly religious,” entailing transformations at institutional, 
intellectual, and doctrinal levels that impacted the Church and Christianity in the sixteenth 
century.57 Hence, some scholars embrace this periodization because it signifies a point of origin 
in the history of Protestantism, giving rise to new confessions and churches.58 One strand of this 
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historiography that was especially popular in the first half of the twentieth-century—which some 
have disparagingly described as a period of “Luther-mania”59—orients the Reformation period 
entirely around the writings of leading theological reformers, placing them “above and beyond 
mortal time.”60 While newer intellectual historians of the Reformation contextualize these 
thinkers, and reflect on their situatedness in a particular political, social, and cultural landscape, 
they nonetheless take it as self-explanatory that the Reformation period is defined by the writings 
of this group of mostly men.61 
 Others embrace this periodization because they see in the sixteenth century a certain 
acceleration, a specific intensity or breadth to the reform efforts, as opposed to other periods in 
which “reform” operated as something of a cliché. For yet others, the original periodization has 
tended to stick as a matter of disciplinary organization, convenience, or shorthand. John Bossy, 
for instance, advocates using the term ‘Reformation’ “as sparingly as possible.” First, because “it 
goes along too easily with the notion that a bad form of Christianity was being replaced by a 
good one.” Second, because the term itself is too narrow, having been adopted “from the 
vocabulary of ecclesiastical discipline,” and meaning “the restoration to some ideal norm, by the 
action of superiors, of the conduct of institutions and persons.” Reformation, he says, is a 
concept that gets at “the history of the Church as an institution,” but what does it describe “in the 
history of Christianity,” at the level of “actual social behaviour, [...] thought, feeling, or culture”? 
The term “sits awkwardly across the subject without directing one’s attention anywhere in 
particular.” Still, he says, “something important happened to Western Christianity in the 
sixteenth century” and “the term ‘Reformation’ is probably as good a guide as any to 
investigating” what happened; “I,” Bossy concludes, “certainly have no superior alternative to 
propose.”62  
 Inevitably, embedded within a given study are historical judgements about the kinds of 
events and factors that matter. Some of these judgments are simply disciplinary, some are rooted 
in ethical or political commitments, such as those linked to the growth of social history in the 
1960s and 1970s, and some are “metaphysical.”63 For political historians, for instance, it would 
be impossible to tell a story about the Reformation without attending to the power-political 
constellations that existed between the Pope, the Emperor and his dynastic ambitions; estates and 
their leveraging of money to pay for wars as a bargaining tool; and various foreign powers such 
as the Ottoman Empire or the French.64 Other historians point to the material, demographic, 
intellectual, and technological conditions that made the spread of certain kinds of ideas thinkable 
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and formations possible.65 Yet others excavate storylines from the “common” lives of peasants, 
preachers,66 and women67 who represent the blend of aspirations, interests, conditions and 
discourses that constituted the most subaltern expression of the Reformation.68  
 Many historians also explore the motivations of the Reformation’s various actors, wading 
sometimes into evaluative or polemical arguments about the “authenticity” of the Reformation, a 
debate about what the tumult of these decades “really” was about. Did the peasants rally around 
the reformed teachings because they saw it as their best hope for attaining freedom from 
serfdom? Did the princes support Luther because they saw it as their best chance for securing 
territorial sovereignty and expropriation of Church property? These approaches sometimes rely 
on the unstated assumptions that it is possible to accurately identify, or disambiguate, the 
purposes of historical actors, and that any purposes other than those deemed purely pious are 
automatically suspicious.69  
 Many scholars of the Reformation make some version of a “but for” argument as a tool of 
explanation: but for German political decentralization, or but for the theologies articulated by 
Luther, Zwingli or Calvin, or but for popular mobilization after a period of plague and intense 
economic hardship, or but for the powerful princes who protected Luther, or but for the “already 
shattered” status of late medieval Catholicism, or but for the spread of vernacular Bibles in the 
fifteenth century—the Reformation might not have happened. Reformation historians who 
incline towards sociological theory have offered heuristics to account for these blends of 
coincident factors in terms of a larger process or unifying dynamic, such as “normative 
centering,”70 “revolution,”71 “confessionalization”72—not to mention, “modernization” and 
“secularization.” 
 One of the reasons the Reformation as a period of historical study has persisted is 
because of the powerful links that historians, political theorists, and social theorists, beginning 
with the likes of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, have made between Protestantism and key 
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elements of “modernity” such as secularism, capitalism, freedom of conscience, sovereignty, 
social welfare, and human rights. The legal historiography of the Reformation, in particular, has 
been oriented around these hallmarks; it is to that subject we now turn. 
 
The Legal Historiography of the Reformation 
 
 The study of law and the German Reformation has yielded as multi-faceted a set of 
approaches as the study of the Reformation as a whole. Oriented to their own sub-disciplines and 
different objects of historical inquiry, historians who look at law and Reformation together often 
speak past each other. Scholars who specialize in Luther’s writings on law, for instance, find 
little reception among historians interested in the jurisdictional politics of a multi-confessional 
city. Those interested in tracing the doctrinal origins of Germany’s public law on religion 
(Staatskirchenrecht) do not typically engage those who closely read the output of the Peasants’ 
movement on “godly law.”  
 As much as the sub-disciplinary homes of these scholars inform the sources they use and 
how they think and write about law and Reformation together, their approaches are also deeply 
shaped by their understandings of the relationship between law and society, and what accounts 
for legal transformation. These underlying premises are often implicit, revealed through their 
choice of sources, and their reliance on apparently self-explanatory mechanisms.73  
If Reformation history begins with the publication of Luther’s 95 Theses, we might say 
its legal history begins with Luther’s trial in Rome. The account of the disciplinary and legal 
proceedings that followed Luther’s public letter to the Archbishop of Mainz in 1517, which had 
outlined the problematic theological implications of the sale of indulgences, provides a useful 
vantage point from which to think about the structural relationship triangle of Pope (and papal 
Curia), Emperor, and Imperial Estates. Kohnle, for instance, shows how university synods, 
monastic disciplinary proceedings, arbitration attempts, imperial assemblies, papal trials, and 
other legal and quasi-legal mechanisms together—though often in competition with one another, 
or working at cross purposes—shaped the unfolding of events.74 Collectively, these forums 
“forced Luther to clarify his ideas. His aim throughout was to prove his orthodoxy. The result 
was a basis for a new theology.”75  
 A subject of sustained attention has been what Luther said and wrote about law.76 “All of 
Luther’s major doctrines contain decisive judicial elements.”77 Skinner, for example, looks 
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carefully at Luther’s view on the relationship between law and salvation, and the premises 
underlying what some describe as an antinomianism. Beginning with the premise of “man’s 
complete unworthiness,”78 Luther argued that man could never, through his powers of reasoning, 
understand how God wanted him to act. Two implications followed. The first was that, insofar as 
our reasoning powers are utterly defective, we cannot hope to understand God’s nature and will. 
God’s commands “appear entirely inscrutable,” so the best we can do is obey them, not because 
we think them to be just, but because they are God’s commands.79 The second implication of this 
conception of human nature was that “since all our actions inexorably express our fallen natures, 
there is nothing we can ever hope to do which will justify us in the sight of God and so help us to 
be saved.”80 This agonistic bind, and its resolution, were represented through Luther’s 
description of the progression from the Old to the New Testament. The Old Testament’s law, 
both mandatory and impossible to follow, “teach[es] man to know himself,” to see his inability 
to achieve salvation through his own work. The New Testament catches the Christian in that 
moment of despair and reassures him that salvation comes not through adherence to law but 
through faith alone.81 The Christian’s aim, then, is “to achieve fiducia—a totally passive faith in 
the righteousness of God and in the consequent possibility of being redeemed and justified by 
His merciful grace.”82 For Luther, the freedom of the Christian meant his freedom from the law, 
that is, from all pretensions that salvation is achieved through works.  
 Unlike authors who study Luther’s writings sui generis, Skinner and other intellectual 
historians closely read him alongside contemporary and prior sources to identify influences. 
Much of this scholarship is concerned with the set of ideas Skinner raises: the separation of law 
and Gospel; the doctrine of justification through faith alone; the concomitant devaluing of 
‘works,’ whether by way of Judaic legalism or the human-made canon law; the meaning of 
Christian freedom; the status of worldly government as the only rightful authority to constrain 
human inherent sinfulness; the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; the end of the Gelasian two 
swords doctrine; variations on the two kingdoms doctrine; the rationale for obedience to worldly 
authority if law is not tied to salvation; the status of resistance to authority; the relationship 
between scripture, conscience, and law’s legitimacy; the meaning of natural law; and the 
inability of reason to access God’s will, among others. 
 Another related area of research investigates how Lutheran theology translated, in 
practice, into the laws of Lutheran territories, including in the areas of criminal law, marriage 
and family law, church administration, welfare systems, education systems, laws on usury, 
property, and commerce, among others.83 They ask: how did Lutheran rulers and theologians 
develop legal systems that reflected the Lutheran confession, given the apparent antinomianism 
of its founder? Witte, for instance, describes the “move from theology to law” in the 
Reformation not as “a corruption of the original Lutheran message, but a bolstering of it […] not 
a betrayal of the founding ideals of liberty and equality, but a balancing of them with the need 
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for responsibility and authority” in that moment.84 Berman discusses the “three uses of law” 
envisioned by Lutheran theologians: civil/political, theological, and pedagogical.85 Some 
scholars, in studying the laws of Lutheran domains, draw our attention instead to the heavy 
adoption of canon law in the evangelical territories, indicating that, to the extent there were legal 
innovations, theology alone does not account for them.86 
 These studies on the relationship between Lutheran theology, Lutheran legal philosophy, 
and the kinds of laws and legal systems they gave rise to, also lead into the literature about the 
formation of the territorial state, and its relationship to confession-formation. Zeeden’s 1965 
study on confession-formation—the intellectual and organizational stabilization of the Christian 
confessions after their division, that led to stable church forms with distinct dogmas and 
conceptions of religious virtue—launched the field.87 When, in the 1970s, Reinhard and 
Schilling developed his thesis, they added the dimension of state formation, arguing that 
confession-formation was in part a social disciplining process for purposes of Staatsräson.88 In 
the voluminous confessionalization literature that has followed, law features as an essential tool 
in the social disciplining, confession formation, and state-building processes.89  
 Many subjects within the study of the Reformation touch on matters of law indirectly, or 
as a small part of their overall study. Local Reformation histories, for instance, often provide rich 
legal and constitutional context.90 Studies on multiconfessional cities provide details of the 
unique arrangements that made coexistence possible.91 Scholars on the Peasants’ War investigate 
lay writings on godly law; the forms of legal life envisioned by its leaders; and the consequences 
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of the War at the level of territorial and imperial law.92 Historians who study the subalterns of 
Reformation history—such as Jews and Anabaptists—often describe the legal backdrop.93  
 
Historiography of the Reformation Cases  
 
 Though the basic contours of the Reformation cases (die Reformationsprozesse) is widely 
known among German historians, its study constitutes a niche historiography and, to date, no 
English-language study engages closely with them. This dissertation was initially inspired by 
two tantalizing references, made separately by Joachim Whaley and Thomas Brady.94 On the one 
hand, notes Whaley, “the all too obvious fact that the process of reformation (especially 
reformation from above) had involved acts that were illegal under the law of the Reich [Empire] 
led Protestants to claim that their actions were justified by the higher laws of God.” The Imperial 
Chamber Court, on the other hand, “refused to regard cases involving secularizations or 
abrogation of ecclesiastical jurisdictions as religious, and simply treated them as breaches of the 
public peace.”95 According to Brady, “the very definition of ‘religious matters’ lay at the heart of 
the struggle,” to the extent that the Protestants would eventually argue that “the mere existence 
of a difference in religion [...] made all suits into matters ‘concerning the religion.’”96 These brief 
but suggestive depictions of these legal disputes indicate an area of the history of the 
Reformation that was high stakes in concrete matters, while at the same time deeply 
consequential for the major theological and constitutional questions of the day.   
 The beginning of the modern study of the Reformation cases coincided with the modern 
study of the Imperial Chamber Court. Rudolf Smend, whose 1911 book Das 
Reichskammergericht: Geschichte und Verfassung (The Imperial Chamber Court: History and 
Constitution) inaugurated the modern institutional historiography of the Imperial Chamber 
Court, regarded the Reformation cases as among the most consequential in the history of the 
Court, shaping the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire and the religio-political topography of 
the German lands for centuries to come.97 Smend continued a familiar trope of Protestant 
historiography that these cases constituted a “legal war” against the Protestants. On this view, the 
Court was instrumentalized and its original aspiration, to be an independent judicial forum, 
remained incomplete in this period as negotiations between Estates and the Emperor continued to 
color the Court’s jurisprudence. Not only the Emperor and litigants, but the judges themselves 
were participants in this “legal war,” transparently biased in favor of old-faith litigants, and 
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captured by the political interests of the Estates who had appointed them. Others highlight the 
radical instrumentalization of law by the evangelical estates in order to postpone the 
consequences of their illegal acts, and to destabilize the judicature.  
 As both Brady and Whaley point out, however, the “legal war” thesis is too simplistic. 
For one, these cases show “how clearly [the Protestants] understood the necessity of their 
illegality to the survival of their faith.”98 Their systematic prosecution could hardly, then, be seen 
as partisan targeting. For another, judges’ notes that date back to the 1530s and 1540s show that 
a variety of motives were at play, and that judges had apparently good faith disagreements and 
debates in which it was not always a foregone conclusion that the proto-Protestants would lose.99  
The debate about whether the Reformation cases constituted a “legal war” against the 
Protestants or not has lost steam, as Reformation historiography as a whole has become more 
aware of how little we gain by attempting to settle motivations in this fraught context. Still, 
historians use the term as a shorthand to indicate the politicized nature of the cases,100 while 
sometimes acknowledging the caveats indicated above.101 Even more importantly, it has become 
clear that the instrumentalization of the Court was not so efficacious, and that the proto-
Protestants were strategically involved in this litigation, too, not just its victims. 
 The 1960s saw a burst of interest in the Reformation cases, corresponding to the 
beginning of a collaborative effort to create repertories for Imperial Chamber Court case files 
held in dozens of archives.102 A series edited by Ekkehart Fabian in that decade accounts for a 
large number of these works. The ambition of Fabian and the scholars who wrote for his series 
was systematic comprehensiveness in their use of archival materials to tell the many stories of 
Reformation cases. Some of the books in the series were composed entirely of edited 
transcriptions of key source texts.103 These authors were committed to creating complete 
accounts of these cases based on all archival sources that were available to them; the 
introductions to these books stress comprehensiveness and a systematic approach to tackling the 
challenge of creating a total account of the Reformation cases based on the sources. This 
ambitious publication agenda, however, fizzled out by the end of the decade.104 
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 Wilhelm Jensen’s 1961 book on two reformation cases involving the Cathedral Chapter 
of Hamburg earned the criticism of Fabian, because most of his book is an edited transcription of 
the witness testimonies from the cases. Jensen’s stated ambitions were simply to “shed new light 
on that great turn” in Hamburg called the Reformation.105 Fabian said that Jensen’s efforts did 
not do much to build upon a preliminary treatment of the Hamburg Reformation cases already 
done in a 1903 essay by Spitzer.106 Still, works like Jensen’s were important because they were 
an attempt to return to the legal cases themselves as primary sources in order to move away from 
reliance on the one-sided narratives of these events contained in city chronicles. 
 Hermann Buck’s 1964 book on the Constance Reformation cases was part of Fabian’s 
series. Buck was not only interested in Reformation cases that appeared in the Imperial Chamber 
Court, but also those that occurred in local worldly and spiritual courts.107 Another key 
dimension of Fabian’s series was its focus on the Schmalkaldic League, and the specific position 
of individual localities—with a special focus on imperial cities—with respect to that League. 
Buck began with Constance, for instance, because it was the southwest cities, which leaned 
towards Zwingli’s teachings, that were the earliest targets of Reformation litigation.  
 In his 1965 book on the Strassburg Reformation cases, Robert Schelp called his work a 
“parallel study” to those already undertaken by Fabian and Buck.108 Schelp followed their 
approach by aspiring to archival comprehensiveness, and by having a focus on the relationship of 
Strassburg to the Schmalkaldic League. But unlike Buck’s inclusion of local court cases, Schelp 
was interested in the imperial constitutional factor, considering how the cases shed light on the 
nature of the juridical relationship between Strassburg as its own political entity (a free imperial 
city) and imperial courts and jurisdiction.109 
 Gundmar Blume’s 1969 book on Goslar likewise sought to make a link between the 
Reformation cases, the Schmalkaldic League, and the city of Goslar. He noted the lack of 
anything more than a cursory mention of the League in previous histories of the city’s 
Reformation, and in some cases, he said, those accounts got the facts wrong. He stressed not only 
the importance of membership in the League for the unfolding of the Reformation cases pending 
at the Imperial Chamber Court against Goslar during the 1530s and 1540s, but also the outsized 
impact of Goslar’s Reformation cases on imperial level matters.110  
 Sigrid Jahns’ 1976 book on Frankfurt offered a similar corrective to the historiography of 
that city’s Reformation. In particular, she investigated Frankfurt’s motives for refusing to join 
the Schmalkaldic League until 1536, ten years after the city council began undertaking reforms. 
Her book, like others before it, points to the “tight interweaving of politics, religion and law in 
this time, the interdependencies between political and reform events, and between city and 
imperial history.”111 Jahns argued that the cases launched against the city as a result of their 
reforms eventually pushed the city to join the Schmalkaldic League for the legal protection it 
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offered, though doing so compromised their special standing as an imperial city that hosted large 
trade fairs. Like Blume, Schelp, Buck, and others, she provided a detailed account of the cases of 
that locality using the case files themselves. Other similar, though shorter, accounts followed for 
other localities.112 A more recent treatment of the Frankfurt Reformation cases by Friedrich 
discusses larger questions on the relationship between the politics of territorialization and 
imperial justice.113 
 Not all authors who have studied the Reformation cases since the 1960s have focused on 
the local, however. Dommasch (1961), Schlütter-Schindler (1986), and Haug-Moritz (2002) used 
the Reformation cases to better understand the Schmalkaldic League as an institution, a political 
formation, and a decision-making body. Dommasch, for instance, made a causal argument that 
the persistence of Reformation litigation despite the proto-Protestants’ 1534 Recusation of some 
of the Court’s judges (on the accusation of bias) led to the renewal of the Schmalkaldic League 
in 1536.114 Dommasch’s project helped settle the idea that the Schmalkaldic League was at basis 
a protective league against anti-Reformation decisions especially at the Imperial Chamber 
Court—rather than first of all a military alliance.115  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, with ever greater numbers of Imperial Chamber Court case files 
recorded in standardized archive repertories, a new scholarly agenda began to take shape.116 In 
1973, the Sources and Research on the Highest Jurisdiction in the Old Empire series (Quellen 
und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich) was established, and it continues 
to publish path-breaking work on the Court and other high courts of the Holy Roman Empire.117 
In 1985, the Center for the Study of the Imperial Chamber Court (Gesellschaft für 
Reichskammergerichtsforschung) was established in Wetzlar, facilitating such research.118  
 In this literature, though the Reformation cases continue to be regarded as an inflection 
point in the history of the Imperial Chamber Court, overall, the historiography of the Court has 
seemed to move on without the Reformation cases. Instead, the Reformation cases are regarded 
as partaking in larger processes having to do with the boom of litigation in the sixteenth 
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century,119 the professionalization of jurists,120 the judicialization of social conflicts,121 and 
studying early modern courts in terms of the social function, especially as a tactic for forcing or 
motivating negotiations out of court.122  
 While the study of religion and litigation has remained of interest, most of these studies 
focus on the period after 1555. Ruthmann’s study of thirty Imperial Chamber Court cases 
between 1555 and 1648 are explicitly about cases that have as the legal referent point the 
Augsburg Peace of 1555.123 In Peter Oestmann’s study of litigation in which worldly and 
spiritual jurisdictions are under dispute, he explicitly avoids the Reformation cases, saying that, 
being highly politicized, they cannot tell us much about law.124 Dietrich Kratsch’s book is about 
church property cases after 1555.125  
More recent work has looked at the Reformation cases in order to understand important 
doctrinal developments in public law. Most recently, Anette Baumann analyzed judges’ notes 
and visitation records to identify the legal elements of the Land-Peace and Religion-Peace, and 
what constituted a violation of these.126 Tobias Branz’s dissertation scrutinized case files in order 
to identify the legal elements of Religion-Peace law.127 In the 1990s, Martin Heckel refreshed the 
historiography of the Reformation cases in terms of constitutional significance for what would 
become the public law on churches (Staatskirchenrecht). Many of these scholars’ work will be 
cited throughout the dissertation. 
In summary, the use of the court records of Reformation cases has focused on three areas 
of scholarship: (1) attempts to piece together important legal doctrines such as the meaning of a 
Land-Peace or Religion-Peace violation; (2) the Schmalkaldic League and its role in the 
Reformation cases and the political negotiations surrounding them; and (3) the ways in which the 
Reformation cases were an inflection point in the history of the Court, and how they contributed 
to or undermined the constitutional status of the Court. 
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The Holy Empire 
 
 How did the Holy Roman Empire survive the Reformation intact? In particular, if it is the 
case that the basis of the imperial order was its mythology as corpus mysticum, which relied on a 
unity of religion, how did that order survive when confessional unity fell apart? While the 
Knights’ Uprising of 1522, the Peasants’ War of 1524-25, the Schmalkaldic War of 1547, and 
the Prince’s Rebellion of 1552 certainly threatened the existing order, their durations were 
relatively short, and the winners and losers were clear within an overall system in which 
violence, on its own, did not necessarily signal constitutional collapse.128 It was not until a 
century later, in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that the Empire saw extended internal war. 
Put another way, what constituted precisely the continuity of “the Empire” over the course of the 
sixteenth century; what was “it” that “survived” the Reformation? 
 The claim of the Empire to be “holy” has its origins in evolving Christian formulations of 
the relationship between secular and spiritual authority. Just as the human combines soul and 
body or spirit and flesh, wrote St. Augustine in The City of God (426 C.E.) so the universal 
Christian empire combines the spiritual and the worldly to form one body, with Christ as its 
mystical head. By the ninth century, secular imperial powers were treated as a reflection or 
effusion of papal power, acted out in the coronation ceremony in which the Pope lent the sword 
of public authority to the Emperor.129 While the legitimacy of the Emperor was bolstered and 
secured through this consecration, the Church, in turn, benefitted from and depended upon the 
coercive power of secular authority.130 But the practical relation of the leaders of this Christian 
Empire—kings and bishops, Emperor and Pope—was left imprecise in these formulations, so 
“disputes about hierarchy were inevitable.”131 This mutual dependence became particularly 
unstable in the late medieval period.132  
 Whatever the precise relationship between secular and spiritual authority—theoretically, 
practically, and historically—the view that imperial authority was on some level sacred and 
divine was never in doubt. Since the Middle Ages, contemporaries believed that the Holy Roman 
Empire had “a key role in the divine plan of salvation” and that the Emperor embodied the 
Empire’s holiness.133 As Stollberg-Rilinger succinctly summarizes it:  
 
The Redeemer had been born under the Roman Empire; the Roman Empire had 
been the framework for the spread of the Gospel; the Roman Empire was the last 
of the global empires revealed to the prophet Daniel in a dream; and at the fall of 
the Roman Empire the eschatological return of the Redeemer was expected.134  
 
This was especially prescient during a time of increasing Ottoman power; a crusade against the 
Turks was best led by the universal ruler of western Christendom. 
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 While the scope of this claim was never actualized in concrete political or territorial 
terms, when Charles V became Emperor in 1519, the extent of his dynastic holdings was 
unprecedented. But rather than evoking pious consent to his worldly rulership over all of 
Christendom, the courts of Europe were deeply concerned by this development, seeing in it not 
the confirmation of a prophecy but the dynastic superiority of a competing family.135  
 Indeed, within the German lands of the Empire, the Electors and Estates saw the 
Habsburgs as a threat to their own “liberty,” for a variety of reasons: because he was foreign, 
because his interests seemed aimed at expansion and consolidation at the expense of maintaining 
unity and peace within the German lands as its lordly protector, and because of demands upon 
them to pay into Habsburg war coffers for dangerous and costly dynastic ventures. The Electoral 
Capitulation (Wahlkapitulation) was just the first expression of this concern to limit his power 
over them.136 Drawing on arguments that had been developing since the twelfth century, it was 
within the imaginary of these rulers to argue that the Emperor was not the supreme ruler of the 
world, that in some cases resistance to his authority was justified, and that they should have the 
same kind of authority in their domains that the Emperor had with respect to his Empire. These 
theories developed further in the sixteenth century.137 
 Despite all of this, the Estates of the German lands of the Holy Roman Empire benefitted 
from the myth not only of the Empire being Holy, but of the Emperor being an embodiment of 
that holiness. “Whoever participated in the Empire could feel like and represent himself as a 
member of an overall hierarchical order whose sanctity and dignity radiated from the top down 
into the smallest branches.”138 Until the late 1520s, Estates collectively participated in the “all-
encompassing symbolic universe” that followed from this belief.139 The substance, form, and 
procedures of the constitutional order in many ways relied on this myth. In substance, the entire 
political system was “symmetrically doubled,” reflecting the temporal and spiritual dimensions 
of this corpus mysticum: “alongside secular electors stood ecclesiastical electors, alongside 
worldly princes stood religious princes, alongside counts and lords stood princely abbotts and 
abbesses and provosts.”140 They were even arranged symmetrically in assembly sessions, with 
the Emperor seated at the head. Images, objects, and official solemnities all confirmed and 
exhibited the sacredness of the Empire. Imperial regalia were treated as sacral objects.141 Every 
ritual of rulership, like coronation, investiture, homage, and oaths of office was accompanied by 
liturgical acts, during which “divine authority itself was being invoked as the third element in the 
covenant to authenticate the obligation and sanction potential violations.”142 
 What would become of a political community that was so reliant on the myth of the 
corpus mysticum when a substantial portion of this community challenged the very meaning of 
holiness in substance, form, and procedure?  
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 Scholars have long attempted to answer this question.143 For polemical confessional 
historiography, the structures in the Empire that made theological and ecclesiological unity 
impossible indicated a dysfunction. For liberal historiography, the constitutional, legal and 
political mechanisms of the Empire that made peaceful disagreement possible are seen as 
praiseworthy, and indications of proto-rule of law, or proto-secularization. More recent 
historiography has moved away from these evaluative and teleological approaches, instead trying 
to excavate the internal logics of the Empire through which the conflicts thrown up by the 
Reformation found expression and organization, if not resolution.  
 We can divide this historiography into three clusters of arguments. First, there is an 
argument that the political fragmentation of the Empire played a key role not just in making 
agonistic division possible, but also in containing it peacefully. The layered constitutional 
geography of the Holy Roman Empire had in the nineteenth century been regarded primarily as a 
hindrance on Germany’s pathway to nation-statehood.144 More nuanced, if not affirmative, views 
of this fragmentation have developed in recent years. Whaley for instance, writes that the 
“fragmented territorial structure of the Reich [...] turned out to provide mechanisms […] for 
dealing with the [confessional] conflict and ultimately for institutionalizing the differences that 
caused it.”145 In other words, it was this fragmented political landscape that both facilitated the 
rise of confessional difference, and had the capacity to contain and institutionalize it. 
 Heckel also regards the uniquely segmented political landscape as central to 
understanding how the early outcomes of the Reformation unfolded as they did—for better or 
worse.146 It was this landscape that made it possible for there to develop, on the one hand, two 
sets of territorial church law (Landeskirchenrecht), Catholic and Lutheran, in which the 
traditional unity of faith, law, and authority was able to play out, and, on the other hand, an 
imperial church law (Reichskirchenrecht) the primary aim of which was securing the peace 
among these confessionally-defined territories.147 As he points out, this segregation and layering 
of legal orderings came with inherent tensions, because the territorial church laws, though 
operating from a theologically-grounded claim to absolute truth and authority within their 
territories, were at the same time participating in an overall imperial church constitution that 
relegated each confession to a particularistic “religious party” (Religionspartei).148 Thus, Heckel 
articulates one of the key characteristics of the imperial constitutional order that made such an 
inherently unstable arrangement nonetheless possible, namely its ability to conjoin many 
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antagonistic traits without rationally harmonizing them.149 Nonetheless, he suggests that these 
tensions had a corrosive effect over time. Another dimension Heckel points to is that two great 
reform movements separated by a generation—the 1495 imperial reforms, and the Lutheran 
Reformation—in turn created two dualisms that operated in structurally linked ways. While the 
1495 reforms strengthened the status of Estates in the overall constitutional order vis-a-vis the 
Emperor (dualism 1), the Reformation, and in particular its legal containment in 1555, 
established two legal confessions, Catholic and Lutheran (dualism 2). The constitutional 
transformations engendered by these two dualisms mutually cleared a pathway for and 
strengthened the other in ways that could not have been anticipated. The Eternal Land-Peace of 
1495, for instance, ended up playing a key role in the Reformation, and was extended in 1555 to 
govern the hairy matter of the confessional agonism; in other words, a reform originally made in 
favor of Estate power ended up eventually also making the existential survival of multiple 
confessions possible.150 The Reformation, in turn, undermined the concentration of power in the 
Emperor, and relocated divine legitimacy of rulership of churches within territories to secular 
rulers—thus bolstering the 1495 reform efforts to strengthen Estates.151 Finally, Heckel argues 
that the “federalism” of the Holy Roman Empire, and in general the dispersal of power among 
many hands,152 made it possible for there to be a spatial separation of confessions into distinct 
territories.153 This, in turn, made it possible to avoid a war for absolute religious supremacy in 
the Empire, because rulers were able to secure religious supremacy in their domains.154 
The second cluster of arguments regarding what kept the Empire together despite the 
Reformation stresses the role of symbolic-cultural acts in both indexing and smoothing over 
Reformation-related conflicts and schisms. These scholars contend that the continuity of the 
Empire and its resilience was bound up with enactments of its unity through ritual. Stollberg-
Rilinger for instance argues that pre-modern constitutionalism must be understood in terms of 
the ways in which the symbolic and the substantive operated together—breaking through the 
modernist binary of symbolic-ceremonial, and technical-instrumental functions.155 In her close 
analysis of the events surrounding the 1530 Augsburg imperial diet, for instance, Stollberg-
Rilinger considers the ways in which symbolic forms made the religious division visible, while 
at the same time integrating it into the symbolic order and its political processes.156 Certain 
institutionalized rituals of imperial diets, though having lost their salvific capacity for the early 
Protestant movement, came to be seen as sites of disparagement and public disengagement. In 
acting out these attitudes towards certain rituals, ceremonies, and objects throughout the imperial 
assembly, though intending to “disenchant” these as “purely the work of man,” they also acted 
out their difference, their being set apart constitutionally. As for the Emperor, these ceremonies 
and objects became means through which he could both display his traditional authority, and at 
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the same time “force the Protestants to participate ceremonially in their own marginalization.”157 
Collectively, these changed the Empire without breaking it apart. 
Third, yet others argue that post-1495 imperial institutions provided a framework for 
normalizing conflict. Some call this a proto-Rechtsstaat (rule of law) framework. Others stress 
the importance of courts in particular as channeling potentially explosive conflict. Some scholars 
suggest that the reforms of the late fifteenth century had established a robust constitutional order 
that was based in proto rule of law principles. Heckel, for instance, writing in the 1980s, says 
that “the Rechtsstaat has a proud tradition in Germany, already established in the Old 
Empire.”158 In his newest work on law in the Reformation, Heckel does not use the anachronistic 
term “Rechtsstaat” to describe this, but instead “Friedens- und Rechtsverband” (a union of peace 
and law).159 On this account, the Reformation variously strengthened these institutions and 
procedures through crucible, proved their effectiveness, and called some of them into being.160  
 Courts have been regarded as one of the key institutions through which this normalization 
of conflict happened, a process often called judicialization or juridification (Verrechtlichung).161 
In the case of early modern Germany, much of this literature has focused on the role of courts in 
managing “socioeconomic conflicts between rulers and subjects.”162 
 Otto Brunner argued that in the late medieval period, there were two ways to seek justice: 
either the feud or the court of law. The legal, social, and moral meaning of friendship and enmity 
played out in courtrooms well into the sixteenth century.163 The logics that undergirded the 
feud—that bound individuals together in peace associations of friendship, in which members had 
duties to each other in situations of rights violations by others—were channeled into a law court. 
The conditions for the decline of the feud was that there would be “structures that would make 
the feud superfluous [...] while at the same time satisfying the prevailing sense of right.”164 This 
was effected through the relocation of many of these disputes into the domain of public 
jurisdiction which, he says, was largely achieved by 1555.165 Luebke makes this argument for the 
post-1555 period. Speaking of the Augsburg Peace he writes, “the fundamental achievement of 
the Religious Peace [...] was to ‘judicialize’ religious conflict. Concretely, judicialization meant 
that conflicts over religion were transformed into legal battles over the proper interpretation of 
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the 1555 settlement,”166 “blunt[ing] the violent edge of religious conflicts by transforming them 
into objects of diplomatic negotiations and legal wrangling.”167 
 Others have shown that peace was delivered by the Court not necessarily by rendering a 
verdict; indeed, many cases were left unresolved. The pacifying effect followed from the way in 
which the prospect of litigation encouraged parties to seek resolution out of court, or in other 
epiphenomenal factors, like the slow pace of litigation.168 Luebke, for instance, writes that “in 
functional terms, judicialization neutralized religious conflicts by subjecting them to the slow, 
deliberate pace of litigation. Indeed, for many litigants, the appeal of imperial tribunals lay not in 
their consistency, but in the fact that lawsuits could attenuate the status quo for years, even 
decades.”169  
 Some scholars have seen judicialization at work in the channeling of confessional conflict 
through legislative, rather than litigative, disagreement.170 Heckel, for instance, shows how 
interpretive wrangling about imperial legislation was the core framing for religious disputes 
throughout the early Reformation and beyond.171 Kratsch likewise highlights the ways in which 
Reformation-era divisions were often framed in terms of interpretive differences of a common 
set of laws.172  
 Notably, the Reformation cases are often treated within this historiography as a blip, a 
temporary failure of those mechanisms of judicial channeling. It was a failure, on this view, 
because the Court was instrumentalized and politicized: either the Court was instrumentalized by 
the Emperor and the majority of Estates to prosecute the evangelical estates in a “legal war,” or it 
was misused by the evangelical estates to make radical and a-legal claims, to postpone the 
consequences of their illegal acts, and to destabilize the judicature. On this view, it was precisely 
this failure that had indirect constitutional consequences. Heckel writes that to the extent that the 
Reformation cases led to a suspension of both extra-judicial and judicial mechanisms, they 
represent the failure of the old Empire’s rule of law: “Not the luster (Glanz) but rather the misery 
(Elend) of rule-of-law-ness (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) in the Old Empire is evident in them.”173 Heckel 
tellingly does not discuss the Reformation cases at any length in his almost 1000-page magnum 
opus on the Reformation and law, only mentioning it in the context of listing other executive 
actions by imperial authority, indicating his gloss of the cases as a “legal war.”174 Diestelkamp, 
in an essay discussing the impact of the Imperial Chamber Court on the imperial constitution, 
writes that in order to update our knowledge of the Court in the sixteenth century, we must 
identify the moments in which it operated as an “independent factor in the historical process.” 
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Even during the “legal war” against the Protestants, when, he says, the Court became an explicit 
instrument of the Emperor’s interests, we can nonetheless identify the Court’s constitutional 
significance in this period by identifying moments in which the Court sought to maintain its 
independence from the Emperor.175 Thus, for Diestelkamp, the Reformation cases posed an 
extreme challenge to judicial independence. This challenge elicited a set of responses that aimed 
to secure judicial independence and therefore the rule of law—and therein lies the constitutional 
significance of the Reformation cases. 
This dissertation contributes to this long-standing debate about how to account for the 
Holy Roman Empire’s weathering of the Reformation by adding to this mix of factors the unique 
context of litigation and legal procedure. The experimental ad hoc use of familiar and apparently 
nondescript legal instruments and juridical techniques of litigation that pre-dated the 
Reformation formed one level of the substantive, ideological, symbolic, constitutional, and civil 
life of the Holy Roman Empire since at least the thirteenth century; in many ways, these 
exceeded the Christian basis that was so central to its constitutional identity. These instruments 
and techniques were not static, and were not legislated top-down suddenly in the sixteenth 
century as part of a secularization trajectory. Rather, they were continuous with a legal culture 
characterized by play with these ubiquitous, formulaic legal instruments. Civil litigation in the 
messy years between 1521 and 1555 was a distinctly important forum in which the Reformation 
unfolded. We cannot fully understand the Reformation as an event in the history of law without 
understanding civil litigation, like that which took place in the Imperial Chamber Court. 
 
 
Many Ways to Read a Case File: Uses of Imperial Chamber Court Records 
 
 Scholars who have studied the Reformation cases tend, ironically, to keep the case files 
themselves at arm’s-length.176 Typically, the Reformation cases are studied as an object of 
political negotiations. The standard view is that the Reformation cases are so evidently political 
in their nature that scholars assume that they can reveal much less to us about law than cases that 
are more routine. Oestmann, in the introduction to a book in which he demonstrates the value of 
closely reading Imperial Chamber Court case files for a later period, states specifically that the 
case files of Reformation litigation can tell us so little because the actions that gave rise to them 
were “politically spectacular,” instigated precisely to push forward political conversations 
outside of the courtroom.177 Indeed, it is the political nature of the Reformation cases, rather than 
their legal attributes, that has captured the attention of scholars.178 
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 To the extent historians have considered the case files of Reformation-related litigation a 
source for probing the Reformation’s legal history, certain methodological habits regarding the 
use of case files as a source dominate the field.  Most scholars use Reformation case files to 
corroborate a chronology in the political history of a certain locality; the Reformation cases are 
discussed briefly as one event in a local political saga.179 Most historians give just a sentence or 
two to the facts of the cases, and turn totally to their reception and political framing, as 
documented in city protocols and other documents external to case files. Even where authors 
outline the cases in great detail, discussion of the cases remains formal, elaborating the order of 
historical events alongside other sources including materials from the personal archives of 
various rulers embroiled in the conflict, or from the archives of church institutions that were 
involved in the cases.180  
 Another use of case files for the history of the Reformation cases focuses on 
reconstructing the Court's jurisprudence—a positivist approach to the use of court records, 
according to which the rulings of judges, as delegates of sovereignty, are an authorized and 
authentic expression of what constitutes “the Law.” A positivist historiography tends to use case 
files and court records in order to understand law at the level of jurisprudence and doctrine. The 
work of reconstructing the Court's jurisprudence, especially in the sixteenth century, is not so 
clear-cut, not least because the reasoning behind the judges' decisions was supposed to remain 
secret, and all pre-1684 Court decisions were lost in a fire.181 Thus, in his dissertation Branz 
relied on the Mandates and Summons produced by the Court at the beginning of a proceeding, 
documents that reproduced almost verbatim the language of the plaintiff’s petition, to piece 
together the elements of an important legal doctrine.182 
 Another use of case files that has contributed to our understanding of the history of the 
Reformation cases relies on case file repertories to code for quantitative analyses along variables 
like length of case, type of issue, location of dispute, or status of litigants. This method aims to 
say something about the priorities of the Court, about patterns in litigation across space and time 
in terms of issues, geographies, and types of litigants, and the relevance of the Court in broader 
society.183  
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As methods for using Imperial Chamber Court case files in general proliferate, these 
methods have not been used to increase our understanding of the Reformation cases. In recent 
decades the cultural and social historical uses of Court case files has blossomed.184 Scholars use 
the various sorts of documents in the case files—especially litigant narrations, which often make 
reference to the things of everyday life, and the contents of the evidentiary proceedings, which 
can include maps, lists of possessions, and even artifacts—to access aspects of early modern 
German life outside of the courtroom, such as economic landscapes, familial patterns, and 
technologies.185 Often social historians use case files to write “histories from below,” because it 
is in the paper trail of everyday legal disputes that the lives of ordinary people—who otherwise 
would be lost to history—leave their traces.  
 Scholars also use Court records to extract prosopographical details of judges, procurators,  
and other court personnel, to understand their training, social status, and intellectual bearing at 
various points in the Court’s history, and something like a sociology of knowledge of the Court 
at its intersection with other imperial and educational institutions.186 Others study the social 
history of the Court as an institution, including its impact on the cities in which it was at various 
points in its history based.187  
Less common in the study of Imperial Chamber Court case files have been 
methodologies informed by insights from the “hermeneutic turn” in legal studies. One of the 
central insights of this approach is that all texts are shot through with the choices of authors; 
legal texts, in particular, are produced in a power constellation that always filters and distorts 
“social facts.” On this view, one must learn to read case files without becoming a “prisoner” to 
the text. One way for example is to look for “ruptures” in the text—moments in which the action 
of the case file seems to go off script: when an inquisitor, for example, begins to ask questions 
that stray from the targeted legal issue, we can glimpse, by means of the inquisitors’ raw 
curiosity, past the filters of an admittedly heavily conditioned legal text.188  
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Another central insights of this approach is that in texts we can detect conceptual and 
epistemic patterns that can tell us something about the thought world of the people involved in 
the production of a case file: what counted as a believable narrative, what counted as an 
authoritative form of keeping track of past events, and what constituted a human, and their place 
in a community, for example.189 By moving away from a functionalist, positivist view of law, to 
a phenomenological, socio-linguistic view of law, we can see law as “meaning, not 
machinery.”190  
 Thus, the value of a case file is not just to provide evidence of, or to corroborate, or to tell 
a story about something else—economic conditions, political chronologies, social life, a 
particular institution or person, for example—but rather, its value is internal to the case file itself. 
The case file—both as a material object and as legal discourse—is the site of worthwhile 
historical examination.191 The result is a study in the history of legal ideas that, while born close 
to the ground of social action (in the form of litigation), prioritizes the “content and internal 
structure of legal thought,”192 and sees the ways in which law is constitutive of consciousness,193 
the ways in which legal relations are constitutive of social life,194 variously constraining people, 
shaping their desires, and channeling the expression of those desires.195 
 Legal historians have shown that stable legal orders can take shape not just through legal 
rationality, or through the legislation of a sovereign, or the authoritative jurisprudence of a court, 
but through conflict, even by those who do not have any claim to sovereignty. In her study on the 
origins of international law, for instance, Lauren Benton argues that while the conventional 
historiography has seen its origins in the writings of sixteenth and seventeenth century jurists or 
in legislation and interimperial agreements, her work shows that international law derived from 
“proliferating practices and shared expectations about legal processes” in the context of 
“anomalous legal zones.” She calls this view of the formation of law in the context of 
jurisdictional conflict, “modified positivism.” While the conventional, command theory of 
positivism claims that law is the command of the sovereign, in Benton’s modified positivism, the 
positing agents are multiple and contradictory, and what sticks does so for many historically 
specific reasons.196  
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 In this dissertation, I rarely triangulate the case file with other primary sources. I do not 
go into great detail about the local backdrop of a case, or the biographies of those involved. And 
rarely does it matter to my analysis what the outcome of the case was. Instead, I focus on the 
case file as a text; what kinds of laws and authorities were cited? What kind of argumentation 
was made? What went without saying? While the particularism of the disputes that underlie each 
case file pulls one into their specificity, the uniformity of form imposed by the legal context in 
terms of materiality, narrative, and procedure invites one to see repetitions and patterns, but also 
ruptures and surprising usages. I show that while outcomes that are significant for the history of 
law may have been highly contingent, emerging in a context of great indeterminacy, repetition 
and patterns are clues to us of legal significance. Though the process I describe is contingent and 
ad hoc, it was happening according to especially legal logics of classification, debates about 
which facts, persons, causes of action, and moral issues should be included and excluded in this 
highly specialized form of social discourse, disciplining, and dispute-resolution we call law.197 
 Language—“as both an empirical and hermeneutic phenomenon”198—is central to this 
story.  I attend to “the details of legal practice” and to the ways in which law is “spoken into 
existence not only through foundational legal speech acts” such as decrees, edicts, and recesses 
“but also in more mundane moments,” such as standard litigant petitions and the boilerplate 
language of summons, mandates, powers of attorney, and other workaday documents. To 
understand law’s social force in these moments, we have to see the “reflexive, metalinguistic 
qualities” of even the most technical and formalistic legal practices, and to not reproduce the 
artificial divide between “constitutional moments and the quotidian practices of everyday legal 
language.”199 The legal and constitutional significance of the Reformation is not only to be found 
in landmark legislation, but in the “unfolding, unstable pragmatics” of litigation.200 Language 
uttered in courtroom contexts, even by those unauthorized to “decide,” can become a way of 
performing into existence the authority of one’s view and interpretation, while at the same time 
reinscribing the logic of sovereignty that makes that courtroom a space of authority in the first 
place. 
 I also attend to the performative and passionate dimensions of legal speech acts. The 
“performative” aspect gets at the circumstances of an utterance, the conventions and formal rules 
that make it so that something is effected precisely in being said.201 The “passionate” dimension 
is an extension of the performative.202 It gets at the unruly and imaginative dimensions of a legal 
speech act, the aspect that appeals not to formal authority and rules but to others whom one 
singles out as standing with one in meaningful relation.203 The passionate dimension gets at the 
way in which speakers make “claims on their hearers to acknowledge their truth or their right,” 
and the measure of their effectiveness is not whether they are invalid or valid, but rather whether 
they are persuasive, or whether they stick.204 In a passionate utterance, “I declare my standing 
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with you and single you out, demanding a response in kind from you, and a response now, so 
making myself vulnerable to your rebuke, thus staking our future.”205  
 I show that litigation was a highly generative discursive space of legal and constitutional 
creativity. In particular, I argue that litigants and lawyers mobilized certain aspects of the Roman 
law trial form, and fused these with long-standing aspects of the legal culture of the Empire, such 
that mundane procedural instruments could operate as unexpected proxies for some of the most 
pressing constitutional questions of the early Reformation—about who or what “we” are; about 
legally legible forms of belonging; about the relationship between law, conscience, and authority; 
and about the future of constitutional and legal unity in the context of confessional division.  
 Methodologically, my focus on language also involves issues of scale and scope.206 Law 
demands that particularistic stories become “facts” recognizable as a certain legal-narrative type. 
It also demands that the dimensions of a case that render it comparable with another, or that 
deliver it within the parameters of a certain category, be elevated across cases with diverse, 
origins. In this way, “instances of legal language use are […] linked or sundered across moments 
of their production.”207 By analyzing these links and splits, we can observe the ways in which 
law organizes its own social world and its own social force at the hands of multitudes of actors 
with a wide range of motivations and interests. By looking closely at the language of litigation 
and case files, we access “a way of analyzing law in both its microlinguistic details and its 
macrosociological effects without sacrificing to questions of scale either the observational rigor 
afforded by the former or the broader interpretive interventions implied by the latter.”208 By 
interpreting case files both empirically and hermeneutically, we can see the “macrosociological 
force” of law within the “microlinguistic details”209—put another way, we can see the 
constitution-making in litigation. 
 
 
On Sources: Case File Production and Judicial Procedure of the Imperial Chamber Court 
  
Over the course of its three centuries-long existence, from 1495-1806, it is estimated that 
around 100,000 cases were processed in the Court, and of those over 70,000 files still exist. In 
the early nineteenth century, a federal commission was formed to manage the archive, sending 
relevant materials to courts in which pending cases would be adjudicated, since no single central 
court served the same function that the Imperial Chamber Court had.210 Between 1847 and 1852, 
the commission delegated the management of case files to localities, distributing tens of 
thousands of case files among 39 local archives. Some archives received just over 100 case files, 
while others received several thousand. In general, the cases were sent to the residence of the 
plaintiffs or to the location of the lower court in appeals cases. Starting in the 1960s, various state 
and federal commissions were created to index the archives of the Imperial Chamber Court in a 
consistent manner. Most of about 100 volumes of these inventories and finding aids are 
published.211 
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 In the course of my research, I visited fifteen archives, and gathered around 100 cases, 
not all of which are cited in this dissertation.212 My selection procedure consisted of three 
methods. First, I worked backwards from references in secondary sources. Sometimes, these 
leaned on the lists created by the protesting estates themselves, either formally to be submitted to 
the Emperor and the Court, or informally discussed in correspondences and protocols. Second, I 
scoured the finding aids produced by archives; my research was thus mediated by the description 
choices made by archivists. If the finding aid had an index, I would begin by using it to look for 
key terms such as “Reformation” or “protesting estates.” To be thorough, though, I would also 
use the chronology guide to identify all cases held in that archive that occurred in the period 
1521 to 1555, and would read the description of each one to identify potential Reformation-
related subjects. Through this method, I gathered many cases that were not regarded as “matters 
of religion” by the protesting estates and therefore appeared on none of the lists I mentioned 
above, nor in the extant Reformation cases historiography. Some of these cases are discussed in 
chapter 3. Finally, I benefitted from suggestions made by archivists and historians of the 
Court.213  
 There are certain features of an Imperial Chamber Court case file which are useful to 
know before reading later chapters. To understand these features of the case file, it is necessary 
to understand the basics of the court's legal procedure, as well as the process of the collation of a 
case file. 
 First, the entire proceeding was mediated by writing, in accordance with the doctrine 
quod non est in actis non est in mundo (what is not in the file does not exist in the world).214 
Second, the Court operated according to a system of appointments (Terminsystem) such that each 
relevant action in a proceeding was assigned a distinctive date; thus, there was an orderly rhythm 
of mutual response, in which litigants took turns making claims, and responding to claims. The 
dispersal of the dates in this regular way was linked to the imperative of text, as each stage 
required the written response from the relevant litigant, in order for the next stage to come about. 
Third, key documents were to be “articulated,” or put into article form. That is, litigants would 
write facts, claims, and allegations in the form of a numbered list to which parties would respond 
one by one with “true” or “not true” and a corresponding explanation. The idea was that in the 
processual responses of the parties to each other, the important facts and perhaps evident 
outcome would reveal themselves.215 This “articulated” form was also a pillar of witness 
testimony gathering, which was designed simply to elicit “true” or “not true” responses from 
witnesses, as well as a brief statement as to how the witness knows. For instance, did the witness 
have first-hand knowledge, having witnessed the act him- or herself? Did the witness hear this 
from someone else? Or was it common knowledge, a general rumor? The construction of the list 
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of questions was therefore central to the testimony procedure, mostly relying on the Positions 
and Articles document submitted by the plaintiff. 
 These features of Roman-canonist procedure meant that the chancery of the Court played 
an essential role in the proceeding, and these procedural features are reflected in the case files 
themselves.216 A case began in one of two ways: either when the imperial prosecutor (Fiscal) 
sued, or when a private party sued. The Fiscal was an agent of the Emperor in his capacity as 
protector of the Peace.217 It was not until the 1555 reforms of the Court that the Fiscal became 
increasingly separate from the person of the Emperor, regarded as a member of the Imperial 
Chamber Court personnel, rather than an appointee of the Emperor.218  
There were three kinds of pleading that could launch a proceeding in the Court. First, a 
normal suit, in which the Imperial Chamber Court had original, first-instance jurisdiction. 
Second, a request for a Mandate, if there was an urgent danger of activity on the part of the 
defendant that the complainant sought to prevent.219 Third, an appeal, if there was an existing 
case pending elsewhere, or a ruling from another court.  
 The pleading (called a petitio summaria) would be drafted by a notary in the litigant’s 
own chancery, or by a secretary, or a public notary, to whom he would dictate his plea. The 
pleading was in folded letter form, with a seal on the outside. Sent along with it was the power of 
attorney document (mandatum constitutionis generalis), naming the procurators and advocates 
who would represent the plaintiff in the case.  There was a public shelf (Regal) at the entrance of 
the chancery where such submissions were made. There, the Chancery Administrator 
(Kanzleiverwalter) would receive the document. The Administrator had to be legally educated 
and occupied the top rung of the chancery hierarchy, on the same level as the judges; indeed, 
some sixteenth-century judges took this role. Until 1530, he was appointed by the Emperor; after 
1530, when the Court chancery became independent of the imperial chancery (Reichskanzlei), it 
was the Archchancellor (the Elector of Mainz) who appointed him.220 
 The Taxator (assessor) would determine how much the plaintiff would need to pay for the 
production of the required documents.221 Depending on the type of pleading, and the number of 
defendants, the cost and form could vary. A normal suit would require the production of a 
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Summons (Ladung); a request for a mandate would require the production of a Mandatum 
Executorialis; and an appeal would require both a summons for the original plaintiff, as well as 
an order from the Imperial Chamber Court for the original court to deliver all relevant documents 
to the case (Kompulsorialbrief). It was the Chancery Administrator—not a judge or the Court 
President—who would set the deadline by which the recipient had to respond or appear in public 
audience, and who would determine the penalty for failure to respond.222 It is not exactly clear on 
what basis the Administrator made these determinations. Some of the variation we see in the 
cases in terms of stakes is difficult to comprehend—similar fact patterns might have as their 
threatened consequence simply a financial penalty, or something as severe as declaration in the 
Acht (outlawry). In most respects, as the case files bear out, these summons and mandates simply 
reproduced the claims and requests of the petitio summaria, almost word for word.  
 The Chancery Administrator assigned the drafting of the summons, mandate, or order for 
lower court documents to a notary (Notar or Protonotar).223 A basic formula governed the 
structure of these documents. It began with the Intitular, indicating it was written in the name of 
the Emperor, and listing the lands over which he had dominion. It then stated who the document 
was directed towards; who was bringing the suit, mandate, or appeal; and on what grounds. 
Then, it stated what the recipient must do (for example, respond and appear in Court, and, if it 
was a mandate, to cease the alleged actions), by what deadline, and the threatened penalty or 
consequences of not doing so. A copy was produced for the chancery’s files. The original 
document was then sealed, and given to the Delivery Master (Botenmeister), the person in charge 
of court document delivery. He would select a court messenger (Kammerbote) to deliver. Most 
court documents would be delivered within a few weeks of production. The messenger would 
hand the original to the person or persons summoned, and he would write a brief report about 
what happened at the time of delivery on the back of a copy of the summons or mandate, noting 
when, where, and who received the document, and anything unusual about the encounter, 
including behaviors that could indicate recalcitrance.224 This copy was then returned to the 
Chancery Administrator.  
 These, as well as all other documents, were then archived in chronological order in the 
Court's archive (Leserei). That is, the documents were not immediately organized according to 
dispute, but according to date. Compilation of a case file did not happen until it came time for the 
judges to discuss the case. Until compilation, all documents relevant to all pending cases were 
filed chronologically. An index of all of these documents was kept in books called Repertorien, 
organized by year and alphabetically ordered according to the name of the plaintiff.   
 In addition to the documents produced in the chancery and stored in the court archive, 
court clerks (Gerichtsschreiber) maintained a running protocol of all proceedings of the court 
sessions (Audienz), in chronological order called the Session Protocol (Audienzprotokoll or 
Sitzungsprotokoll). Most of what was recorded in the protocol had a corresponding document 
that would later be collated in the case file. These were documents that, rather than being 
submitted and produced in the chancery, like the petitio summaria, the summons, the mandate, or 
the Kompulsorialbrief, would instead be submitted and presented in public audience in the 
course of litigation. The oral statements of these submissions were called Rezesse. The oral 
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statements would be recorded in the Session Protocol, and the corresponding documents would 
be copied, and collected for filing in the court archive in chronological order. A production 
notation (Produktionsvermerk) would be written on the verso of each document, indicating the 
names of the parties involved, the location and date of submission.  
 The Session Protocol also, however, recorded courtroom speech that had no 
corresponding document in the case file. Because of the imperative of writing, there were 
restrictions on what kinds of speech could be made without a corresponding document; therefore, 
the nature of courtroom speech as we see it recorded in the protocol were tied to matters of 
procedure. As we will see, especially in Chapters 4 and 5, sometimes matters of procedure and 
substance were linked; in those cases, exchanges recorded in the protocol can become very 
illuminating. “The Audienz was much more than simply a forum for the delivery of judgments 
and the quick submission of case documents. It was the central, public venue of disputed 
imperial matters in front of an empire-wide public.”225 Another type of courtroom speech 
recorded in these Session Protocols were the administrative judgments (Beiurteile or 
Zwischenurteile) of the judges. These were decisions that settled matters of court procedure.  
 A case file would not be compiled until a request for compilation was submitted to the 
chancery. These requests came from the judges when they required the case file in order to have 
a deliberation meeting (Plenum) about it. All requests were recorded in a register, called the 
Submissionsregister.  
 A notary would begin the process of compilation by creating a Special Protocol 
(Spezialprotokoll). This was a new protocol that was specific to this case file. It was the core 
organizing feature of a case file, placed at the front, and functioning much like a table of 
contents. The Special Protocol was created through the inspection of two sources. First, the 
notary would examine the Session Protocol, and excerpt those parts relevant to the particular 
case. Second, the notary would examine the indexes (Repertorien) for all of the years that the 
proceeding had been pending in the court. Since the indexes were in alphabetical order, the 
notary would look under the name of the plaintiff, and identify all of the documents relevant to 
the case that were listed there, and therefore all of the corresponding documents that had been 
held in the court archive. To each document, he would attach a number, which he would write in 
the margins of the Special Protocol, next to the Rezesse excerpt that corresponded to the date of 
submission. The number is called a quadrangle, because it was embellished with a square around 
it for quick identification. The quadrangling numbering system was another key organizing 
principle of the case file. With the special protocol complete and in hand, the notary would 
search for the documents stored in the court archive. He would then mark each one with its 
corresponding quadrangle number, placing it above or below the production notation (which, as 
noted before, recorded the names of the litigants, and the date and location of submission).  
 The complicated and convoluted nature of this process can be explained by the fact that 
the mechanisms of the chancery’s functioning took forms based on the custom of the imperial 
chancery (Reichskanzlei), rather than being created to suit the procedure of the Court.226 The 
process gives a sense of the passive relationship the judges had to pending matters; without any 
way to orient themselves, it was impossible for the Court to exercise any influence over the 
progress of a case; litigants and their lawyers were responsible for moving matters forward. The 
convoluted process also led inevitably to errors. The court archive was chaotic and brimming; 
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very often, individual documents were lost.227 Nonetheless, the predictable sequence of court 
sessions, and the documents that would correspond to each stage of a trial, facilitated the 
collation of a case file.  
 Before litigating the substance of a dispute, parties had to “settle the legal issue” 
(Kriegsbefestigung, litis contestatio). The litis contestatio was a formal, verbal act in which a 
defendant party confirmed that the legal issue identified by the plaintiff was, in fact, the object of 
dispute.228 Before the legal issue was settled, the defendant party could raise objections of all 
kinds—about the forum, the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s description of the facts, and whether 
the plaintiff had correctly identified the legal issue—and could submit counter-claims, thereby 
protracting the length of a case greatly.229 These acts constituted the pre-trial stage of the 
proceedings.230 Many Reformation cases never moved past the litis contestatio stage. Or if they 
did, it was done in contumacy (in contumatiam); that is, because the defendant party refused to 
settle the legal issue, the Court announced an administrative judgment stating that the case would 
proceed on the basis of the legal issue identified by the plaintiff.231  
 Once the litis contestatio stage had passed, the first document submitted to the Court was 
a complete account by the plaintiffs of their claims against the defendant. These would often 
include new accusations based on the behavior of the defendant in the pre-trial stage, especially 
if the defendant had failed to comply with a mandate, had undertaken new justiciable actions, or 
had been contumacious by failing to respond to Court instructions within the allotted time. This 
document was called the Positions and Articles (positiones et articulata).  
 The defendant’s response was called the Replik. The plaintiff's response to that was called 
the Duplik; followed by the Triplik, and so forth, until a party would write a proposed conclusion 
to the case, adding to the title of the document “et in eventum Conclusiones.” 
 A variety of other kinds of documents, procedural in nature, are sprinkled throughout a 
case, such as a letter of excuse (Entschuldigung) which usually requested time extensions, or 
petitions that nudged the judges to declare a particular administrative judgment. Other procedural 
documents include substitutions, which replaced one attorney for another, as well as 
protestations and recusations, which will be discussed more closely in Chapter 5. 
 Another major category of documents found in a case file are evidentiary in nature. In 
appeals cases, the entire case file of a local, territorial, or ecclesiastical court would be contained 
in the file, as well as relevant correspondences between lower courts, territorial regimes, and 
faculties of law.232 In addition, it is very common in case files that a given document will cite to 
an appended official document (Urkunde) labeled with a letter (A, B, C, and so forth) to prove 
the existence, for instance, of a certain imperial privilege, or a past agreement of which the other 
party was in violation. Often, these were written on vellum.  
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 Witness testimony was gathered through an entirely separate procedure.233 A 
commissioner was appointed by the Court, often on the recommendation of one or both litigating 
parties, who would be responsible for summoning witnesses, interviewing, and recording their 
responses, among other things. The list of questions was usually closely based on the plaintiff's 
Positions and Articles.234 All of this was recorded in an often very lengthy document contained in 
the case file called a Zeugenrotulus. This document may contain not only witness testimony but 
also maps, sketches, drawing of buildings, genealogical charts, caricatures of nobles, and even 
artifacts such as the knife used in a crime--though nothing so interesting appears in the case files 
used in this dissertation.  
  
 
Judges' Notes 
 
 Though the majority of this dissertation leans on the case files themselves, in some cases 
I use judges’ notes. The minutes of judges’ deliberation sessions were not part of the case file. 
Nor were the final judgments, the votes of judges, or their reasoning included in a case file. 
Nonetheless, there are certain kinds of records left over that indicate the views of judges.  
 A deliberation (Plenum) began with the appointment of one judge as the speaker 
(Referent). It was he who received the case file of the pending litigation, read it, and made notes 
about it. Some of the documents of a case file contain marginalia made by the Referent judge. 
These Latin notations were almost always abbreviated summaries of the salient points made. We 
also see underlining, that can be useful indications of the arguments that stood out to the Referent 
judge. The judge then wrote a summary (Relation), which consisted of a narration of the alleged 
facts, an examination of formalities and procedure, the legal argumentation of both sides, and his 
recommended decision (Votum). The judge would present his summary to the subset of judges 
who had been appointed to the case, and they would begin deliberations.235 All Relation 
documents prior to 1711 have been lost, except for those belonging to a few cases in the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, contained in the Federal Archive in Berlin-Lichterfelde, that 
were serendipitously discovered by Ruthmann in the 1990s,236 as well as those that happened to 
be preserved in the form of excerpts in published cameral literature, of which there are only a 
handful of sixteenth century entries.237  
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 Judges would often take notes in these sessions, some of which have been preserved in 
archives. There are two published works on the notebooks of two Imperial Chamber Court 
judges from the first half of the sixteenth century—Viglius van Aytta and Mathias Alber.238 They 
are structured as registers, providing detailed summaries of the individual notebook entries, and 
cross-referencing those entries with relevant case files, cameral literature, and modern secondary 
literature. 
 In 2009, a previously untapped cache of judges’ notes was discovered at the Federal 
Archive in Berlin. These notes were highly idiosyncratic showing wide variation both in 
substance and in the comprehensibility of the handwriting.; many words are illegible, bouncing 
between abbreviated Latin and German, reflecting the personal style of the judge, and whatever 
stood out to him as useful or necessary to jot down for his reflection and notes. The finding aid 
produced for these notes contains approximately 250 pages from the sixteenth century that 
indicate discussion of Reformation cases.239  
 The judgments for a case would be recorded in a judgment book (Urteilsbuch), which 
simply recorded the final judgment, along with identifying information such as litigant names, 
years, and the legal issue. These recorded in effect the information that the Court would make 
public regarding its final judgments in a case, and did not discuss the judges’ reasoning. All 
judgment books produced prior to 1684, however, were destroyed in a fire.240  
 Beginning in the late sixteenth century, retired judges began to publish compilations of 
judges’ discussions in committee, including their Relations and Votes, and final judgments 
(Endurteile). The first to do so was Joachim Mynsinger von Frundeck, judge in the Imperial 
Chamber Court from 1538 to 1556. At first, he kept a record of judge deliberations for his own 
reference. After he retired, though, other judges asked to use his writings. Though it was illegal 
to publicize, he nonetheless decided to publish his writings, marking the birth of a new genre of 
professionalizing and pedagogical legal text, called cameral literature.241 These texts are massive, 
some (like Frundeck’s) are mostly in Latin, but with quotations from original case files in 
German, while others (like Gail’s) are mostly in German. Some are anonymized, focused on 
extrapolating general rules from the disputes, but others include litigant names and years.242   
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Published Primary Sources 
 
Finally, there are several volumes of edited primary source materials that came out in the 
1960s that had to do with the Reformation cases. Most prominent here was Ekkehart Fabian’s 
1961 Urkunden und Akten der Reformationsprozesse.243 He also published in 1967 sources 
relevant to the Constance Reformation cases (1529-1548).244 His other volumes were all 
documents and correspondences surrounding the Schmalkaldic League (Die Beschlüsse der 
Oberdeutschen Schmalkaldischen Städtetage, 3 vols, 1530-36;245 and Die schmalkaldischen 
Bundesabschiede, 2 vols, 1530-36).246 Another useful primary source compilation contains 
political correspondences of the city of Strassburg during the Reformation (1517-1545).247 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 So far, we have reviewed the literature on “the Reformation,” the legal history of the 
Reformation, and the historiography of the Reformation cases. We discussed the various 
methodologies scholars have used in reading case files, and those that have influenced this 
project. And we outlined the structure of the case file by reviewing the basics of the Court’s 
procedure. In the next chapter, we will begin to gain an understanding of the legal culture of the 
Holy Roman Empire by analyzing the case of Martin Luther and the high-profile legislation that 
grew out of it.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEGISLATION, DELIBERATION, AND LITIGATION: 
LEGAL CULTURE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE REFORMATION 
 
In 1521, Pope Leo X declared Luther’s teachings heretical and excommunicated him 
from the Church. In the same year, Charles V outlawed Luther, his followers, and his teachings 
from the Holy Roman Empire. In 1522, the Imperial Regiment, a short-lived central imperial 
government, promulgated a Mandate calling on rulers to forbid the new worship in their 
domains.1 These high-profile legislative events might suggest a clear enforcement mechanism; in 
fact, the story is much more complicated. The first part of the chapter tracks the events 
surrounding the so-called causa Lutheri, and the legislation that aimed to snuff out the new 
heresy, namely: the Papal Bulls, the Edict of Worms, and the lesser-known Regiment Mandate. 
Ultimately these laws, though promulgated by the most authoritative offices of Western 
Christendom, proved ineffective in carrying out their stated aims. Indeed, heresy proved to be a 
relatively peripheral category. One purpose of this chapter is to explain the conditions in which 
this was so. The analysis here accounts for the ineffectiveness of these laws and legal regimes by 
elaborating the legal culture of the Holy Roman Empire in this moment.  
 The second part of the chapter describes the constitutional conditions in which these 
measures failed to create a unified legal regime of anti-Lutheran enforcement, by looking at two 
other law-making modalities: imperial assemblies, and courts. Not the unilateral forms of 
legislation and law-making but those that were the subject of negotiations involving Estates 
proved to be touchstones in the first half of the sixteenth century. As we will see in the next 
chapter, it was not the Worms Edict on its own, but the imperial recesses that either confirmed or 
relativized it that were among the key sources of law tested in the Reformation cases. I discuss 
the deliberative as well as performative methods of law- and constitution-making in imperial 
assemblies that made its Recesses perhaps not more effective than edicts, bulls, and mandates, 
but at least more central to debate and negotiations, and certainly more central in Reformation 
litigation.  
 Finally, I propose that we elevate the importance of courts as a site of constitution-
making in the sixteenth-century Holy Roman Empire. I show that there are good reasons to do 
this, beyond the methodological benefits discussed in the last chapter. First, the wide range of 
courts in the German lands meant that questions of jurisdiction—and therefore questions of the 
distribution of authority—were always on the table at the start of litigation, whatever the subject 
matter. Second, courts were one place in which such jurisdictional disputes, themselves, were 
addressed. Courts stood in an important relationship to the institution of feuding among 
sovereigns and its inherited logics in the sixteenth century. Third, the procedures of courtrooms 
were not hermetically sealed from the broader context; strategies and instruments familiar within 
judicial proceedings often had counterparts in forums such as assemblies that were more 
explicitly about constitution-making, and vice versa. 
 These discussions will supply helpful background for the final section, in which I 
describe the specific role of the Imperial Chamber Court. To understand the Imperial Chamber 
                                               
1 The Imperial Regiment (Reichsregiment), also translated as “Governing Council” (see Brady, German 
Histories, 208) was a short-lived (1521-1531) central imperial institution based in Nuremberg with certain executive 
and legislative functions. See Heinz Angermeier, Das alte Reich in der deutschen Geschichte: Studien über 
Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 283-340. 
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Court’s importance, we must first understand the importance of courts overall in the 
constitutional order of the Holy Roman Empire. It also places its emergence in the context of the 
so-called “reception” of Roman law. By understanding its founding context and impetus, we can 
understand the varieties of legal sources that would contribute to its jurisprudence, which we will 
explore in Chapter 3.  
Thus, the chapter moves from questions of unilateral legislation, to inquisitorial 
prosecution, to deliberation, and finally to litigation in order to survey and scrutinize the legal 
culture of the Holy Roman Empire in this moment, and to provide an account of the socio-legal 
conditions in which a range of laws and legal forums could be so differentially effective. This 
chapter invites us to decenter the Worms Edict and the Papal Bull in the legal historiography of 
the Reformation, and to investigate instead the constitutionally productive context of courtrooms, 
and the way in which imperial assemblies were often responding to and legislating with litigation 
in mind. 
 
The Causa Lutheri and the Legal Status of Reform post-1521: the Papal Bulls, the Edict, 
and the Mandate 
 
 On October 31, 1517, Luther—then a monk and university professor at Wittenberg—sent 
a letter to the Archbishop of Mainz. His “criticism of indulgences was initially formulated […] 
as a pastoral problem”; the letter in 1517 laid out a “warning that people were being led astray in 
the belief that they could buy their salvation.” Soon after, Luther’s ninety-five theses “elaborated 
on their theological implications.” Luther’s statements had been the outcome of several years of 
teaching, preaching and writing, which had already drawn him a large following locally. But this 
letter to one of the most powerful secular rulers in the German lands was a very public defiant 
act. Though it is not clear how Luther’s theses became publicized, “the fact that they did […] 
illustrates how the medium of print transformed a clerical dispute that might have played itself 
out in a local disciplinary procedure into a major issue that soon plunged both the Church and the 
Reich [Empire] into a profound crisis.”2 The theses contained “provocative and even moderately 
heretical” ideas but the significance they assumed has to do more with the frenzied reaction, first 
because of the publicity and the public anticipation of how the Church—in particular the Pope, 
his delegates, and the Curia—would respond, and second, because the Dominican friar (Johann 
Tetzel) named in the theses for heavily pushing these indulgences immediately went on the 
offensive and called Luther a heretic. “This furious reaction […] forced Luther to clarify his 
ideas. His aim throughout was to prove his orthodoxy. The result was a basis for a new 
theology.”3  
 The Church itself was slow at first to deal with Luther. The Pope anticipated that the 
normal disciplinary proceedings of Luther’s Augustinian order would be sufficient. In fact, 
Luther enjoyed protection from his monastic order, and soon after, by the powerful Elector of 
Saxony. As publicity escalated, the Pope’s delegates made a series of informal attempts to get 
Luther to recant his views. But when these did not work, they pursued formal proceedings.4 The 
formal accusation of heresy, or even the claim to be proceeding against Luther or punishing or 
                                               
2 Whaley, Germany, 148. 
3 Whaley, Germany, 149. 
4 Whaley, Germany, 151. 
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disciplining him for specifically heretical teachings, was not immediate. The key challenges to 
Luther’s teachings early on were that they limited papal authority, spread unauthorized new 
teachings, and hindered promulgation of indulgences in the Electorate of Saxony.5  
 It was first in early 1518 that the issue escalated in the eyes of the Pope and Curia to one 
of heresy, based on the expert opinion of a committee of jurists and bishops convened to 
consider the matter.6 On August 7, 1518 Luther received a summons from Rome accusing him of 
heresy, including a general response to his ninety-five theses. It ordered that he come to Rome 
within sixty days or else face excommunication.7 Luther requested that the Elector of Saxony 
work to ensure that Luther have a trial in a German forum, because he believed Roman judges 
would be biased.8 In late August 1518 the Pope declared Luther a notorious heretic.9 In October 
1518, Emperor Maximilian I arranged a meeting between Luther and the papal legate Cajetan in 
Augsburg. The papal legate’s expectation was that Luther would recant. But Luther did not 
recant; in fact, he wanted to debate.10 So Cajetan again ordered that the Elector send Luther to 
Rome for trial, or expel him; and that the process against Luther would continue in Rome.  
 Throughout all of this, the Elector of Saxony did not defend his protection of Luther on 
the basis of supporting his theological views—indeed, he never became a follower of Luther’s 
teachings. Rather, he attempted to carve out the position that Luther deserved a fair hearing, 
stating that though he did not count himself as a follower of Luther, neither was he equipped to 
judge Luther’s statements. Indeed, he said, some of the most learned men in the universities of 
his lands rejected the notion that Luther’s ideas constituted heresy. They also rejected, he said, 
the way in which the Church simply declared him a notorious heretic; to do so required process, 
argumentation, and proof.  
 Then, in November 1518, a decretal fixed the Church’s teachings about indulgences, 
rendering Luther’s statements and theses a clear heresy.11 In early 1519, a papal delegate, Miltitz, 
came to negotiate with the Elector of Saxony. Eventually they agreed to appoint the Archbishop 
of Trier to be an arbitrator in Luther’s case at the next imperial assembly.12 All the while, the 
Pope and Curia were pursuing a trial of Luther in Rome, in absentia. It may seem remarkable 
that at the same time that Rome was undertaking a trial against Luther, a papal delegate was 
negotiating an alternative resolution procedure involving the Archbishop of Trier as arbitrator. 
Yet Kohnle notes that these two paths were not seen as contradictory, because at any moment the 
Pope could call the case to himself; the Pope’s ultimate authority relative to the work of the 
papal delegate Miltitz, or the papal court, was never in question,13 though there were a variety of 
mechanisms for resolution, debate, and settlement available to those involved. 
 
The Papal Bulls 
  
                                               
5 Kohnle, 22-3. 
6 Kohnle, 24. 
7 Kohnle, 25. 
8 Kohnle, 27. On “notoriety” in canon law, see Joanna Carraway Vitiello, Public Justice and the Criminal 
Trial in Late Medieval Italy: Reggio Emilia in the Visconti Age (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2016), 104-13. 
9 Kohnle, 26. 
10 Kohnle, 29. 
11 Kohnle, 33. 
12 Kohnle 34-5, 39. 
13 Kohnle, 42. 
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These attempts at a negotiated pathway fell through when in June 1520, the Papal Bull 
Exsurge Domine was promulgated. The Exsurge Domine listed 41 sentences of Luther’s writings 
that the Church deemed heretical, scandalous, in error, violating, and misleading. Any books, it 
said, containing these errors were to be publicly burned. It ordered Luther to appear before the 
Pope within sixty days of the Bull’s publication in Rome, otherwise he and his followers would 
be declared notorious and stubborn heretics.14 Three weeks later, the Elector of Saxony received 
a letter from the Curia saying that they considered his protection of Luther support of heresy.15 
The Elector’s embrace of an allegedly neutral position in the matter had lost its value; any 
acknowledgment of the perspectives of learned persons or theologians who viewed Luther’s 
teachings as potentially Christian would now directly contradict the Pope’s clear declaration.16  
 Two papal nuncios (Aleander and Eck) were tasked to spread the word of this Papal Bull 
in the German lands, to punish violations of the Bull, to absolve those who renounced the heresy, 
to publicly burn books, and to work against their authors. The Bull was to be distributed to 
archbishops, prince-bishops, universities and down through the hierarchy.17  
 To be effective, the efforts of these nuncios presupposed readiness to cooperate on the 
part of the German episcopacy. In fact, what they encountered was passivity, some obstruction, 
and very little active cooperation.18 It is difficult to generalize about the motivations for these 
various reactions. As Kohnle notes, a well-defined position regarding Luther and his teachings 
was the exception among the German episcopacy at this time. Though no bishop expressed doubt 
about the authority of the Pope’s heresy judgment, very few had really considered Luther’s 
substantive views and their theological implications before 1520, and when they began to do so, 
their reactions reflected the specificity of their individual circumstances and views. Some 
blended parts of Luther’s teachings with older visions of reform that presumed loyalty to the 
Church. Indeed, over time, a significant portion of the German clergy would come to adopt the 
Lutheran teachings. The Exsurge Domine was really only the beginning of the process of the 
clergy considering where they stood on Luther.19  
 In terms of acting on the Bulls, the bishops tended only to act with direct pressure from 
above; until the papal nuncios directly demanded it, the Exsurge Bull was not actually publicized 
anywhere.20 This is only in part explained by the mixed attitudes towards Luther’s teachings. 
There were also political, legal, and practical considerations that led to a “politics of conflict 
avoidance”: they had concerns about disturbing stable church order and pastoral care, and a 
general timidity in the face of potential conflicts with worldly princes, cities, and cathedral 
chapters.21 Beyond just announcing the Bull, the episcopacy was subdued about carrying out its 
terms in concrete measures, while bearing a general respect for papal representatives, and an 
awareness that members of the German episcopacy could themselves be disciplined for 
disobedience.  
In December 1520, Luther publicly burned the Papal Bull Exsurge Domine, along with 
texts of Canon Law.22 This defiant act was made possible in part through a glut of publicity in 
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previous months. While political energies were absorbed by the tense electoral politics following 
Emperor Maximilan I’s death in 1519, reform propagandists capitalized on the opportunity to 
popularize Luther and render him a hero.23 Luther also wrote three consequential tracts in 1520 
that circulated widely: “Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the 
Reform of the Christian Estate”; “Of the Babylonian Captivity of the Church”; and “Of the 
Freedom of a Christian.”  
 In January 1521, another Papal Bull (Decet Romanum Pontificem, It Pleases the Roman 
Pontiff) formally excommunicated Luther. Yet this papal bull faced the same barriers that 
Exsurge Domine had, and it barely circulated.24 As we will see below, by the early sixteenth 
century, though papal bulls would have seriously raised the question of outlawry in imperial law, 
it did not lead to it automatically.  
 
The Edict of Worms 
  
The Electors and Estates initially exercised pressure towards the Emperor in an entirely 
different direction.25 The election of Charles V in 1519 was an unusually intense and public 
affair.26 In part, this was due to the Electoral Capitulation (Wahlkapitulation) “that the Electors 
negotiated as a precondition of his election.” The 1519 capitulation was the first of its kind in the 
Empire, and it “set a lasting precedent, for all subsequent emperors were obliged to subscribe to 
such a document” that “summarize[d] the constitutional position as it had developed over the last 
few decades, naturally with a strong bias towards the interests of the Electors.”27 The main aims 
of the documents were to “tie royal prerogatives to the consent of the Electors and Estates, and to 
minimize the possibility of non-German influence on the Reich.”28 It stipulated, for instance, that 
no Estate or subject may be tried before a foreign court.29 This included the papal court. 
Although Luther was not an Estate, there was a generalized discomfort among the Estates of the 
German lands regarding the trial of Luther in absentia in Rome, as well as the activism of papal 
legates and nuncios to ensure the enforcement of the terms of the papal bulls. Thus, negotiations 
led to an agreement with the Emperor that Luther would have a hearing at an imperial assembly; 
in other words, it was an “attempt at a German solution to the Luther affair.”30  
 While for bishops, the publication of the Papal Bull in 1520 was their first contact with 
the Luther question, for most worldly princes, the 1521 Worms Diet was their first contact. 
While a very small number of princes came to Worms with fully developed ideas for or against 
Luther,31 most Estates thought of Luther as falling somewhere on the familiar spectrum of anti-
                                               
23 Whaley, Germany, 168. 
24 Whaley, Germany, 152. 
25 On the status of Electors, see Gross, 14-6. 
26 Whaley, Germany, 158. On electoral capitulations generally, see Gross, 42-7. 
27 Whaley, Germany, 160. 
28 Whaley, Germany, 160. 
29 Whaley, Germany, 161. See “Wahlkapitulation Karls V.—1519, Juli 3” in Quellensammlung zur 
Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, ed. Karl Zeumer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
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30 Whaley, Germany, 171. 
31 Kohnle, 85. 
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Roman and anti-clerical sentiment, in line with the Gravamina of the Estates.32 Even the 
Emperor came to Worms not having declared a clear political path forward; he was committed to 
following the Pope’s decision as to the substance of Luther’s heresy, but maintained some 
flexibility at the level of politics.33 Not everyone wanted to discuss the Luther issue, but 
eventually it was put on the agenda.34 
 Debates among the Estate groups and in the larger assembly produced many proposals 
about how to proceed with Luther, and the expression of a variety of concerns. There were 
concerns about taking too strong measures against Luther, whose popularity might instigate an 
uprising of the common man.35 Also there were concerns that a German forum—whether a 
council, or colloquy of theologians and jurists—should convene to hear his case, that the matter 
should not be left to Roman authority, or to the Emperor’s unilateral decision.36  
 When Luther’s appearance before the Emperor and Estates failed to lead to resolution, 
Luther left Worms on April 26, 1521 and remained in hiding in the Wartburg Castle for ten 
months under the protection of the Elector of Saxony.37 The Emperor’s secretaries and 
councilors got to work drafting an edict; the Emperor wanted to have it presented before the 
Estates before the assembly adjourned.38 On May 25, the few remaining estates and delegates 
heard a public reading of the Edict. This was not an official sitting of the assembly, however; key 
electors, worldly princes, and bishops were already gone. But the “edict” as a legal typology was 
a unilateral legal order from the Emperor that did not require the consensus of Estates to be 
legally valid.39 Furthermore, declaring someone in the Acht counted in the legal tradition of the 
Empire without question among the competences of the Emperor and the Imperial Chamber 
Court alone.40 The Edict of Worms was not an ordinary decision of the assembly, and therefore 
did not need to conform to the requirements of Estate involvement; it was promulgated according 
to the exclusive prerogative of the Emperor, though with the advice of Aleander (a papal nuncio) 
and the imperial chancery. The Edict began with an extensive narratio. In it a mix of purposes 
                                               
32 The Gravamina movement was led by German princes who, beginning in the late fifteenth century, 
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and authorial voices was evident. While the text stressed the enormities of Luther’s actions 
leading up to and including the Worms Diet, it also strove to exhibit that the Emperor’s reasons 
for acting were not simply to conform with the Pope’s wishes, but rather, to align with the 
desires of the Estates and the procedures of the Empire. At the same time, the document 
underlined the Emperor’s ambition to expand the Empire through extermination of nonbelievers 
and his supreme protective status vis-à-vis the Church against heretics.41  
After the narrative portion, the Edict then listed several grounds for the punishment: to 
preserve praise of the Almighty; to protect the Christian faith; to honor the Pope; to preserve the 
power, dignity, majesty and authority of the imperial office; as well as that of the unified council 
and will of the Estates; and finally, in order to execute the Papal Bull. The Emperor called Luther 
a public heretic who instigated violence, disobeyed authority, and caused war, murder, plunder 
and arson in the Empire—though interestingly there was no explicit mention of a “Land-Peace 
violation” in the Edict.42 The Edict applied not only to Luther but also to anyone who “houses, 
feeds, gives drink, maintains, or in any way, with word or deed, secretly or openly aids or gives 
encouragement to Luther.” All who did so would be punished for a crime against the crown with 
outlawry (Acht), superior outlawry (Aberacht), and removal of all imperial privileges.43 Luther 
was to be imprisoned and delivered to the Emperor—though it was left open what would happen 
after imprisonment. His followers were to be imprisoned if they could not provide evidence of 
papal absolution, and their goods were to be confiscated, though no physical extermination of 
Luther or his followers was called for.44 
 The third major part of the Edict was the order of censorship. It called for the destruction 
of all heretical writings. No one would be allowed to buy, sell, read, own, or spread his writings. 
No agreement with Luther or public defense of him was allowed—even if it was to defend 
something that was true or good in his writings, because everything true in his writings could 
also be found in writings of the Holy Christian Church.45  
 In some ways, “the Edict of Worms was a dead letter.”46 The only places where any 
action was taken against Lutherans was in the Netherlands, where Charles V was direct overlord; 
and in Bavaria, Albertine Saxony, and Brunswick.47 Before the galvanizing events of the 1530s, 
most princes had a “neutral stance, who remained personally loyal to the old religion but who 
took no action against evangelical teaching in their territories as long as law and order were not 
threatened.”48 Indeed, in conformity with the broader political and legal culture of specific 
privileges, the Elector of Saxony was “granted exemption from having to execute the edict in his 
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own Ernestine Saxon lands.”49 Other territories ignored it.50 The Elector was able therefore to 
maintain Luther in the Wartburg Castle within Saxony; removed from public life, he continued 
writing extensively.51  
 Because of the top-down, unilateral form of the Edict, its effectiveness relied upon a 
relationship of order and obedience; that is, that the Emperor’s order would be met with 
obedience by the Estates. But in practice, it required the acceptance of the Estates, who actually 
had the ability to enact the terms of the Edict. What the Edict in fact unleashed were a series of 
constitutional questions about (1) the extent to which the Emperor could demand obedience of 
the Estates; (2) the status of the laws of a territorial ruler with regard to his own subjects, when 
those laws conflicted with the Emperor’s Edict;52 as well as (3) the status of the efforts of Estates 
to seek solutions to the problem in the context of deliberative assemblies and negotiations, which 
would take the form of imperial recesses, rather than imperial edicts. 
 
The Regiment Mandate 
  
In addition to the Papal Bull and the Worms Edict, another, lesser-known, legal basis for 
prosecuting Luther and his followers was the Regimentsmandat of 1521.53 According to section 3 
of the Regiment Ordinances of 1521, one of the competences of the Imperial Regiment 
(Reichsregiment) was to proceed against impugners of the Christian faith.54 This was not linked 
explicitly with the Worms Edict.55 This shifted in early 1522, when the Regiment came under 
new leadership—Duke Georg von Sachsen, a prominent opponent of Luther. On January 20, 
1522, the Regiment promulgated a mandate that provided an independent legal basis for the 
prosecution of heteropraxy.56 This mandate cited neither the papal excommunication (Bull) nor 
the imperial declaration of outlawry (Edict). It read: 
 
It has come to be known that some priests celebrate the mass in lay clothing, 
consecrate the sacrament in the German language, and give the sacrament into the 
hands of lay people, who may eat before confession and do not need to do 
confession. They hand wine to the lay people in other containers than a chalice. 
Children also receive the sacrament. It has come about that there are assaults on 
priests who want to read the mass, monks are leaving the monasteries and getting 
married. All of this leads to error and fickleness of faith, especially among the 
common people. These innovations against church custom may not become 
rooted before those acts are given sufficient hearing regarding whether they are 
proper, decent, good and according to faith or not. They are still not widespread 
and therefore easy to suppress. Therefore, they should be stopped until the 
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imperial estates arrange a Christian assembly or council concerning such matters 
and a thoughtful, well-considered, reasoned and certain declaration is made about 
it. The innovators are at first to be pointed to the right way amicably, but should 
that not help, then with seriousness, and if necessary with proper punishment. 
 
It is noteworthy that the preaching of Lutheran teachings was not explicitly forbidden; in other 
words, dogmatic questions were bracketed out. The focus was on outward acts and ceremonies.57 
Unlike the Bull or Edict, this Mandate in theory left the possibility open that these new practices 
could be approved in practice through an imperial assembly of the German nation, or a church 
council.58 
 The Mandate was sent only to those directly relevant, that is, the Elector of Saxony and 
other Saxon princes, as well as their neighbors. Some of these rulers ignored the mandate, others 
simply responded that they, too, were concerned about the innovations, but took no action.59 Yet 
others took concrete steps on the basis of the mandate.60  
 Thus, there were several legal bases upon which clergy who converted to the new 
teachings, rulers and city councils who sought to reform their domains in the evangelical manner, 
and regular subjects who adopted the new faith, might have been prosecuted. The Papal Bull, the 
Worms Edict, and the lesser-known Regiment Mandate all deemed Luther a “reviver of the old 
and condemned heresies and inventor of new ones” and all of his followers of the same. Luther 
was outlawed under imperial law and excommunicated under canon law and the same was 
promised for anyone spreading his writings or views. The Bull, Edict, and Mandate portended a 
large-scale inquisition. Yet nothing like that followed.   
 
The Non-Stakes: Heresy, Excommunication, and Outlawry 
 
As we will see, heresy and excommunication played little role in the Reformation cases. 
The threat of a declaration in the Acht (outlawry) was one possible consequence for a violation of 
the Land-Peace, but more frequently the stakes of a legal dispute were the restitution of property, 
the returning of conditions to their former state, or the payment of a penalty or damages.61 
Indeed, in the Reformation cases, one encounters evangelical litigants not only openly 
acknowledging Lutheran and Zwinglian reforms in their domains, but even underlining the 
Reformation context by arguing that it was a “matter of religion” outside of the Court’s 
jurisdiction.62 One might wonder: could not imperial and Church authorities have targeted 
evangelical estates under heresy law, if not under the terms of the Edict, Bull, and Mandate? 
Why was heresy law so peripheral in these early Reformation disputes? 
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In the German-speaking lands, only a few anti-Lutheran or anti-Zwinglian heresy trials 
took place, with a small number of those ending in execution.63 As Moeller writes: “there were 
hardly any inquisition cases in the early Reformation period in Germany. [...] They were on the 
fringes of German Reformation history […] which stood in glaring disproportion to the extent of 
the crisis that the Church found itself in.”64  
However, heresy prosecutions were happening. Where and to whom they were happening 
illuminates three important contexts of this period: first, the reliance of the Emperor upon the 
Estates to enforce a law in domains where he was not direct overlord; second, the reliance of 
spiritual authorities on worldly authorities to enforce excommunication; third, the differential 
status of rulers and subjects, and of different kinds of reformed Christianity, in successfully 
taking on new teachings without the threat of loss of life, property, and legal standing. 
One place in which inquisition processes were “unceasing” since the 1520s was the 
Netherlands, most parts of which were directly subject to Emperor Charles V.65 The inquisition 
there was led by an inquisitor appointed by the Emperor, with most processes taking place in 
municipal and land courts, with assistance from theological experts, and rulings based on a series 
of increasingly tough imperial edicts, rather than canon law.66 There, the prosecution program 
was in the hands of worldly authorities, and the Emperor had direct lordship there and was able 
to enforce the terms of the Worms Edict on his own authority. This was in contrast to the 
German lands, which required the enforcement authority of the Estates and cities. The fractured 
political landscape of the German lands prevented the emperor from carrying out a top-down 
inquisition as he could in his domains in the Netherlands. 
In theory, an order of excommunication automatically implied a duty on the part of 
secular rulers to outlaw that person; hence the ubiquitous pairing in legal discourse of Acht and 
Bann (outlawry and excommunication).67 Since at least the eighth century, excommunication had 
been accompanied by certain secular punishments, such as exclusion from kingly courts and 
assemblies, civil death (inability to undertake any legal action), and loss of feudal protection.68 
These were derived from an evolving set of doctrines and metaphors that envisioned spiritual and 
temporal authority in complementary relation with one another. In the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, this automatic linking became the norm with respect to an ever-wider set of crimes.69 
But beginning in the fourteenth century, as hierocratic theories waned in salience, and with the 
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gradual relocation of ecclesiastical and executive authority to the territorial level, as both Church 
and Emperor dispersed ever greater privileges to local rulers, the link was no longer automatic.70 
 Anabaptists were the most targeted in this period for heresy. Within the German-speaking 
lands, there were a high number of executions of Anabaptists, with the years 1527-1533 seeing 
the greatest number,71 including at the hands of rulers of newly reformed Lutheran and 
Zwinglian domains, and most occurred without a trial. In 1528, an imperial mandate cited not 
only canon law but also a code from Justinian’s compilations that declared rebaptism a heresy 
punishable by death.72 The 1529 Imperial Recess called for the execution of Anabaptists without 
a preceding trial (article 6) and that no ruler should tolerate the subjects of another ruler who had 
fled due to prosecution of Anabaptism (article 7). In their protestation of the 1529 Recess, the 
evangelical estates nonetheless declared their commitment to carrying out these anti-Anabaptist 
articles. When the Anabaptist Kingdom was briefly established in Münster in 1534-1535, old-
faith and evangelical estates combined forces to suppress it.73  
One case from the Imperial Chamber Court provides an illustrative example of the 
license to prosecute and execute Anabaptists that some rulers believed they had in this period. In 
1529, the Bishop of Würzburg sued Count Wilhelm von Hennenberg for violating its jurisdiction 
over the people and goods in the village of Sendelfeld, including in criminal matters and in the 
execution of punishments, when the Count imprisoned and then executed nine Anabaptists.74 
“Nine persons living in Sendelfeld,” the Bishop wrote, “who made themselves part of the 
unchristian Anabaptists were baptized again and also rebaptized several others. It is public law 
that Anabaptists are to be punished with death.” After the Count took the nine Anabaptists and 
held them in prison, the Bishop asked him to return the prisoners, but he did not. Instead, after 
interrogating them under torture, he had them executed.75 The Count responded in his 
Exceptiones document that, among other things, the 1528 imperial edict “extends to magistrates 
and rulers in general”; in other words, the Anabaptists can be prosecuted and punished not only 
before their ordinary judge in the first instance, but by other forums and rulers. Also, he wanted 
to act in such a way that the Anabaptists would not have forewarning to leave the land. The 
matter of the Anabaptists is so clear and notorious, he said, that it is not necessary to hold a trial 
such as the one the Bishop claims he had the right to hold.76 The Bishop argued in response that 
he had the authority and right to execute the Anabaptists as their original judges in the first 
instance. Moreover, though Anabaptism is a public crime, still an ordinary court process was 
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necessary to ensure that they had indeed rebaptized, for their actions were not notorium, having 
occurred not in public places but in secret, and usually at night; furthermore they made no 
confession.77 The back and forth of this case continues, and the case file contains witness 
testimony; the contents give us a glimpse of the distinctive legal precarity of Anabaptists in this 
moment.  
The question remains why Lutherans and Zwinglians were not prosecuted for heresy, or 
treated as heretics like the Anabaptists.78 There are a number of things that made the 
Anabaptists’ and Lutherans’ situations different. For one, there were many fewer Anabaptists, 
and among them, dozens of sub-groups.79 In addition, Anabaptists were not powerful; they were 
primarily subjects, unlike Lutherans who counted among their ranks some of the most powerful 
cities and princes in the Empire. Anabaptists were thus more vulnerable to heresy trials or to 
prosecutions. Unlike the Lutherans whose reforms were based on the idea of a universal Church, 
Anabaptists in general called for independent, local, voluntary congregations—a subversive, 
even seditious sectarian idea. Thus, Anabaptists and Lutherans each posed a different kind of 
problem for imperial and territorial sovereignty. Anabaptists “condemned government itself as 
being unchristian,” and “rejected the very concept of state church.”80 Also, the Anabaptists were 
mainly prosecuted in connection with the Peasants’ War of 1525 and its aftermath, and sustained 
suspicions that they would wage apocalyptic rebellion. To the extent that their beliefs and 
practices aligned, or were perceived to align, with the anti-feudal revolt, they were regarded as a 
threat to all authorities—both proto-Catholic and proto-Lutheran.81 
By contrast, rulers and cities were adopting Lutheran views as a matter of public, 
governmental concern.82 “Theological heresy [was] for all practical purposes extinct” or at least 
“had become a rarity” reserved for the most egregious cases of outright atheism.83 These rulers 
were pressing a set of questions that long preceded Luther, namely, the constellation of duties 
and rights of a ruler or patron to protect, manage and if necessary reform the church in his 
domain, and the liberties of the estates of the “German nation” vis-à-vis the emperor and the 
pope. The different fates of the Anabaptists and the Lutherans is another reminder of the extent 
to which the Reformation was less about individual freedom than it was about sovereignty. 
  Thus, Anabaptists “posed a direct and serious challenge to the social order; they 
undermined the body politic both by their intrinsic beliefs and by their outward separatism.”84  
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By contrast, “in those areas where the Reformation received political sanction and protection, its 
followers ceased to be sectaries and became members of officially recognized and institutionally 
established territorial churches. Not only were they no longer clandestine, their profession of 
faith ceased to be entirely a matter of individual conscience or witness, or at best of group 
solidarity, and became a matter of public and political concern.”85 Put another way, heresy was a 
legal tool suited to dealing with “subjective commitment” not with new forms of “objective 
regulation” of religion in Lutheran territories in the form of new church ordinances.86    
Luther’s heresy trial and excommunication, and subsequent hearing before the imperial 
Diet at Worms and outlawing, revealed that even some of the heaviest instruments available to 
papal and imperial authorities had limited effectiveness, and this variously tempered efforts at 
prosecution and emboldened reforms. Popular support and the aid and protection of the powerful 
Elector of Saxony, the Landgrave of Hessen, and economically important free imperial cities 
exposed the instruments not only as weak, but even perversely elevating Luther’s popularity. In 
the case of magisterial reforms, there was a mismatch of the instrument with its slow-moving 
pace, layered personnel, procedural stages, and costs to the scope, pace and volume of the 
Reformation movement.87 “In short, the very success of the Reformation in certain German and 
Swiss territories removed it from the realm of medieval heresy and sectarianism.”88 
In addition, there were structural, customary, and constitutional elements that made 
heresy prosecutions against certain individuals, rulers, and domains unthinkable, impossible, or 
ineffective. There were customary and constitutional limitations on prosecuting estates, or 
subjects of estates, under the legal regime of heresy that would not have been approved even by 
old-faith estates. There was a strongly developed sense among all estates of their liberties vis-a-
vis the Emperor and the Pope, and these took expression in the form not only of custom, but also 
in more concrete terms such as the prohibition of trying estates in a “foreign court,” including a 
papal one, in the Emperor’s 1519 Wahlkapitulation.89  
 Reforming rulers were breaking a range of laws, and the nature of these violations had a 
material and worldly dimension that may have felt more immediate to church authorities than 
concern about the salvation of souls, or their basis in heretical teachings. The heresy trial was at 
the scale of the individual, and the salvation of his or her soul, while the kinds of issues that were 
coming up in relation to the evangelical movement were about systemic change, about the way in 
which matters of faith redounded on jurisdiction, property, and peace. It may have made 
existential sense for church authorities to deal with unauthorized appointment of Lutheran 
preachers in terms of jurisdiction, or with iconoclasm in terms of property destruction, for 
instance. As we will see in the next chapter, monastic and church litigants were practiced in 
litigating such matters before secular authorities even before the Reformation. 
   
 
The Dualism of the Imperial Constitution and its Significance for Imperial Assemblies  
 
 The imperial constitutional regime brought together a wide variety of rulers; questions of 
the distribution of authority was a perennially open question. In this context, unilateral decisions, 
                                               
85 Scott, “Heresy,” 185. 
86 Scott, “Heresy,” 185. 
87 Moeller, 32. 
88 Scott, “Heresy,” 185-6. 
89 On the Wahlkapitulation of 1519, see footnote 29 above. 
  56 
such as those embodied in the Bull, Edict, and Mandate, were less valued. Indeed, that the 
Worms Edict was “confirmed” by the Estates at the Nuremberg Diet of 1524—and that in 
several Diets thereafter its content was either confirmed or conditioned—indicates that the Edict 
on its own was insufficient as a legal instrument.90 In order to understand the conditions in which 
this was the case, we must understand the dualistic quality of the imperial constitution, which 
refers to the shared authority between the Emperor and the Estates. 
 The Estates of the Empire became direct subjects to the Emperor in the twelfth century. 
The Concordat of Worms (1122 C.E.) gave the Emperor the right to grant Bishops secular 
authority; these ecclesiastical princes, or prince-bishops, now feudal subjects to the Emperor, 
technically received their land and office from the Emperor as a fief. In 1180, a new estate was 
formed—that of territorial princes—which likewise positioned certain lay princes as direct 
feudal subjects to the Emperor. This enfeoffment of both clerical and lay princes in the twelfth 
century was central to the imperial constitution, but had a paradoxical quality. On the one hand, 
it stabilized the uniform subject position of princes to the Emperor. On the other hand, it 
“strengthen[ed] the autonomy of the territorial rulers” because it “created a legal bond with the 
Emperor which no [other] imperial prince could ever shake off” through war, occupation, or 
otherwise.91 While these twelfth century moves stabilized the idea of the Emperor as the source 
of all political and legal authority, it reconciled this with “the political reality that most of 
Germany was not directly governed by the Emperor himself but by royal dynasties.”92 Although 
the Estates were directly subject to the Emperor, the vast majority of nobles became vassals of 
princes; they were “indirect or mediate subjects” of the Emperor.93 
 In this context, it made little sense to attempt to pursue political authority outside of the 
Emperor’s orbit; “authority [was] imparted by the Emperor’s legitimation.”94  Thus, the means 
by which individual rulers gained independence and autonomy were processes of “integration in 
a system of imperial law and orientation toward the Emperor and the circle of imperial 
princes.”95 At the same time, this arrangement could “only survive as long as [the princes] 
accepted the system,” and this made it somewhat fragile.96 “This form of feudal nexus remained 
the only outward juridical bond that held together the Emperor and the princes in subsequent 
centuries.”97 
 The nature of the authority of those individual rulers, however, was historically 
determined; “the local prince exercised a patrimonial or personal rule based on a bundle of 
separate rights rooted in either local custom or private law.”98 In this world, “law was 
particular”; one’s status was a “concretely defined, locally recognized condition to which rights, 
privileges and obligations adhered.”99 These fragile arrangements were in constant play, as forms 
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of symbolic claims-making and legal speech acts set off chain reactions in the dense 
constitutional machinery of the Empire.100 The mechanisms for stabilizing these often implicit or 
contested rights, privileges, customs, and freedoms proliferated between the thirteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, reflecting the increasing authority of text and writing, the growing focus on 
the discovery of facts as critical for the settlement of law, and the material authority of 
documents in legal and constitutional life, among other things.101 In the late medieval period, the 
Emperor secured his centrality through the distribution of privileges and grants; “while the grants 
gave the appearance of the exercise of a royal prerogative beyond the usual constitutional 
limitations, basically they represented a transfer of competence to the recipient of the privilege 
out of the king’s own reservoir of rights.”102 Beginning in the fifteenth century and into our 
period, “under the influence of the academic jurists,”103 these notions of rule began to shift 
towards one of territorial lordship—of “uniform public authority endowed with a set of 
inalienable rights and duties of government.”104 
 At the end of the fifteenth century the term Reichstag (Imperial Diet) was used to 
describe the regular assemblies of Emperor, Electors, and Estates, instead of the term Hoftag 
(Emperor's Court Diet).105 The Hoftag had been an assembly designed to establish publicly 
personal ties between the Emperor as overlord and his immediate subjects: the Electors, prince-
bishops, and other Estates. 1495 has been regarded as the first Reichstag because it was the first 
time that the Estates treated the assembly as an instance of their own collective action in the 
name of “the Empire.”106 For instance, for the first time, deliberations among Estates were held 
in a distinct location from where the Emperor held court.107  
 Diets took place in a variety of locations, so ceremonial demonstration was essential to 
“lift [the Diet] demonstratively out of the flow of daily activity, […] symbolically marked in 
space and time.”108 A Diet was much more than deliberations. It included all of the performative 
labor required to transform a gathering or social event, the meaning of which was “sometimes 
initially open,” into a rationalized context of decision-making.109 All of these rulers or their 
delegates were living for weeks or months at a time in the same location, participating in other 
kinds of events, performances and ceremonies: the Emperor “held court, celebrated masses, sat 
as a judge, acted as conciliator and mediator, granted privileges and other demonstrations of 
royal favor, performed enfeoffments and knightings, hosted banquets and tournaments,” and 
more.110  
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 All of these public actions contributed to the definition of the constitution; “the 
fundamental questions—who was really part of the Empire, how participants dealt with one 
another, what rank they held vis-a-vis one another, and above all how decisions binding on all 
could arise out of their joint actions—could not be answered in the abstract. The answers were 
sometimes put down authoritatively in writing, but primarily they emerged out of concrete 
praxis.”111 Imperial assemblies were densely inflected with legal purpose; its literal staging had 
constitutional significance. Like a tableau, the arrangement of bodies in space actually embodied, 
in a legally meaningful way, the constitution of the Empire.112 Every motion, object, or word had 
the ability to create legally meaningful presumptions. Thus, the imperial assembly was thick with 
legal and constitutional implications; almost nothing could be left without some registering of 
stances, some mapping of pathways for future action.   
 In addition to all of this performative constitutional production, Diets produced Recesses 
at the end.113 The “imperial recess” (Reichsabschied) was a form of legislation born of 
consensus. Unlike an Edict, the theoretical basis of its authority was not the Emperor’s 
sovereignty but the agreement of those who took part in the decision-making procedure. The 
validity and effectiveness of a Recess hinged not on a prior commitment to obedience, but on the 
perception by those involved that consensus or compromise had been achieved. A Recess thus 
had less the character of a law than that of a compromise.114 “The Emperor, however powerful he 
may have been portrayed in theory, never was able to make or change laws of the Empire on his 
own.”115 
 Another change in the 1495 reforms was a move toward majority decision-making.116 
However, this rule had a hard time asserting itself into the decision-making culture of the 
Empire. Until 1495, majority decisions did not have a generally recognized validity; those in the 
minority would not be bound to observe that Recess as a matter of course.117 There was high 
value placed on social harmony and unanimity. This meant that there were costs to dissent; 
public articulations of disagreement when a decision seemed to be going in a different direction 
could mean loss of honor, or escalation into violence. Nonetheless, there were no abstract 
principles that required the acceptance of a decision based on commitment to a process, in which 
one submitted to a decision in advance, regardless of the outcome. Therefore, it was almost 
impossible to force a minority to accept a decision. In these cases, mechanisms developed to 
endure open contradiction, contingency, and ambiguity.118  
 At the first imperial assembly after the promulgation of the Worms Edict, at Nuremberg 
in 1522, the Estates did not discuss the religion question. “At first, the majority seemed inclined 
to leave matters unresolved” as the common concerns of governance continued to serve as 
ground for solidarity.119 When the religion question was discussed two years later at the 
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Nuremberg Diet of 1524, the Estates requested in the Recess produced at the end that the 
Emperor advocate to the Pope for a Christian Council, or else that he convene a National 
Assembly for resolving the division in the religion. They also in 1524 renewed the Edict of 
Worms, its enforcement reliant on the Estates. Each elector, prince, prelate, count and estate, it 
said, should ensure for himself that the Worms Edict was obeyed with respect to his subjects “as 
far as possible” (so viel ihnen muglich).120 This caveat effectively removed the teeth of this 
recommitment to the Worms Edict, licensing princes and cities to do as much—or as little—as 
they wanted to enforce its terms. In practice, this “effectively allowed princes or magistrates to 
protect their Lutheran preachers against attempts by bishops to exercise discipline in their 
dioceses as well as their territories.”121  In July 1524, the Emperor promulgated the Edict of 
Burgos in which he not only rejected the Estates’ resolution for a national Church Council, but 
he also ordered all Estates to enforce the Edict of Worms unconditionally, even removing an 
earlier exemption he had made for the Elector of Saxony. Again, far from resulting in its stated 
aims, the Edict made it clear to the Empire that “a general settlement was now impossible”; it 
hardened boundaries as Estates continued to disagree not only about “the legality of Charles’s 
insistence on the Edict of Worms,” but also “the practicality of its execution.”122 
 
 
Courts and Constitutionalism  
 
 In the previous section, we learned about the relationship between the Emperor and the 
Estates. While the Estates were direct feudal subjects to the Emperor, so that all authority orbited 
around his office, governance of the Empire was mediated by the Estates, so that nothing could 
be accomplished without the willing participation of princes and cities. This structure of 
authority meant that imperial assemblies and the legislation produced from them—Recesses—
already registered a consensus position, unlike imperial edicts and other forms of unilateral 
legislation. Inasmuch as the 1521 edicts, bulls and mandate were unilateral forms of legislation, 
this may account for their ineffectiveness in stopping the spread of Lutheranism. 
 In this section, I propose that we begin to think of courts as a forum of constitution-
making alongside imperial assemblies—and to do so not just on the basis that court cases were 
politically important, and therefore the subject of negotiations at imperial assemblies.123 In the 
previous chapter, I showed the potential value of looking at case files as a matter of 
historiographical methodology. Here, I argue that courts are an important place to look for the 
legal history of the Reformation because of the importance of courts within the overall 
constitutional order of the Empire. There are at least three ways in which courts were important 
for the constitutional order. First, courts were an important forum of constitution-making in the 
Holy Roman Empire of the sixteenth century because the juridical pluralism and wide range of 
courts in the German lands meant that questions of jurisdiction were always on the table, and 
questions of jurisdiction inevitably touched on constitutional issues of the distribution of 
authority. That is: because there were so many courts, and because the proper forum for this or 
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that party, or this or that dispute, was not always self-explanatory, questions of who had the right 
to adjudicate were perennially on the table, and those questions inherently touched on the 
broader question of authority that was constitutional in nature.  
 The very same history that produced the fragmented political landscape of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and that shaped the consensus-based decision-making culture of assemblies and 
recesses discussed in the previous section, also produced this plural juridical landscape: 
beginning around the thirteenth century, “in order to purchase loyalty and support from German 
nobles and prelates, [kings] showered them with grants of immunity from royal control and 
distributed the power of government among many eager hands.”124 This included the judicial 
function. Courts unmoored from any kind of centralized imperial government were transformed 
as their horizon of accountability and salience became more localized. The drift was uneven and 
multifarious, as status group, subject matter, and space became the diverse determinants of 
jurisdiction, and legalities developed internal to these variously delimited arenas. Throughout the 
medieval period, judicial forums proliferated.125 Law everywhere reflected the unique set of 
privileges, obligations, freedoms, and loyalties that particular status groups had worked out over 
time through a dense set of historically settled relationships. These privileges and obligations had 
as their referents sometimes highly tangible and immediate aspects of local existence, such as 
access to hunt in this forest, or to fish in that stream, as well as less tangible but highly 
consequential arrangements on matters of exclusive jurisdiction and imperial office.126 As a 
result, “all law took on the character of private law.”127 The distinction between public and 
private law was not effectively delineated in the legal traditions of the German lands until the 
seventeenth century;128 until then, a certain class of ostensibly private law disputes, especially 
those involving estates and nobility, had public law implications. Put another way, because of the 
ways in which jurisdictional arrangements were tightly tied to personal status, the boundary 
between public and private law was not strongly delineated.   
 Local legalities cohered in different ways.129 Courts varied in terms of the expanse of 
their jurisdiction, their enforcement authority, the elaboration of procedure, and the 
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systematization of the law by which they judged. Some courts (Hofgerichte) became fused to the 
personal authority of higher nobles, princes, and feudal lords, and adjudicated various civil and 
non-capital criminal cases that originated in their locality. There were also independent peasant 
courts, often convened in taverns, over which local elders presided, that served as both 
arbitrative bodies as well as a space for managing various aspects of communal governance.130 
Commercial towns and cities developed their own municipal courts and were quicker than other 
places to employ and professionalize university-trained jurists, and to develop structures and 
powers of self-legislation.131 However, guilds and clergy maintained jurisdiction over their own 
members within a given city.132 Jews of the Empire were dealt with as a distinct status group in 
customary legal compilations and in courts, and they also had laws internal to their own 
community.133 Most courts of the Empire maintained the form inherited from an earlier period, in 
which a panel of lay judges (called Schöffen) adjudicated according to local custumals (written 
accounts of the customs of a community). Particularly functional and influential Schöffen courts 
became sources of law for courts in neighboring communities; though in no sense politically 
subordinate, and linked in no hierarchy of appeal, lesser courts sent requests of information to 
these superior courts (Oberhöfe).134 The Oberhof was tasked both with the work of hearing and 
deciding cases in its locality, and responding to requests made by court officials and litigants in 
neighboring communities.135 Though these written responses were case-specific, as early as the 
fourteenth-century some were compiled and systematized to serve as a non-binding way to keep 
track of past judgments.136 Also, courts and rulers began to issue declarations regarding “how 
these overlapping and competing laws should be reconciled in court practice.”137 It was not until 
after 1500 that higher nobility aspiring to territorial consolidation established appellate courts in 
order to capture the lower courts within the domains of their political authority, cutting through 
these loose networks of courts that had developed over the centuries.138 
 Yet well into the sixteenth century, the various judicial forums of the Empire’s “layered 
structure—village, city, province, region, and Empire” stood in no self-evident relation to one 
another, hanging together through the accrual of highly specific settlements that were always in 
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flux.139 Overlaid on top of this bustling jurisdictional geography was the Empire’s ecclesiastical 
organization, its division into archbishoprics, bishoprics, dioceses, and lesser units established 
around the year 1000.140 This system contained another layer of courts, a hierarchy grounded in 
local parish modes of pastoral care and discipline, answerable to the highest instance, the Pope. 
In the medieval period, ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses 
committed by or involving clerics (a doctrine referred to as privilegium fori). Vis-a-vis the laity, 
the canon law had authority on matters of heresy, blasphemy, sacrilege, marriage, legitimacy of 
children, poor relief, certain kinds of commercial and financial behavior such as usury, and 
immoral behavior, including sex offenses. “Canon law permeated the entire medieval social 
order"; it touched the lives of everyone.141 
 The diversity of relationships between and among these legalities engendered 
“jurisdictional politics” as a normalized feature of late medieval life.142 While litigants “court-
shopped” within the particular possibilities that their status, location, and subject matter afforded, 
competing authorities haggled—and fought—over both the authority to adjudicate a matter, and 
the particular structure of political and police authority that this authority to adjudicate implied. 
Since at least the fifth century, courts had been used as one forum in which to settle such 
jurisdictional conflicts143—this is the second way in which courts were significant sites of 
constitution-making. A key part of the early modern constitution of the Holy Roman Empire was 
“a continuation of that medieval policy which aimed at the pacification of large settlement areas 
beyond the limits of rulers and clans, by establishing judiciary procedures.”144 There were three 
principles on which the imperial constitution rested by the time of the Reformation: first, the 
"cooperative decision-making process" of the Imperial Diet; second, the defensive military 
alliance as against external aggressors; and third, the court system for the maintenance of public 
peace.145 As Wilson describes it, “the Empire’s legal history is essentially a story of delineating 
these responsibilities [whether a case should be heard before civil, ecclesiastical, feudal or some 
other kind of tribunal] and aligning them with the evolving status hierarchy, whilst sustaining 
consultative processes and collective enforcement decisions.”146 While in the rest of Europe at 
this time, courts were becoming a means for establishing the sovereignty of the emerging 
territorial nation-state, in Germany, courts were one of a few mechanisms that held together this 
loose consortium of polities; the constitutional system that this court system implied was one of 
arbitrating among sovereigns, rather than claiming sovereignty to itself. 
 Until it was outlawed in 1495, feuding was a normalized method of resolving disputes 
about the bundles of rights and privileges that belonged to competing rulers. “The medieval state 
lacked both the means and the ability to supply every man with justice against any real or 
imagined wrong he might have suffered. Therefore, the legitimate use of legal self-help, which 
                                               
139 Brady, Protestant Politics, 8; Whaley, Germany, 40-1. 
140 Brady, German Histories, 16. 
141 James A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London; New York: Longman, 1995), 96. See Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation for a brief discussion of the jurisdictional relationship between secular and spiritual authority. 
142 On “jurisdictional politics” see Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World 
History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4, 10. 
143 Willoweit, 124. 
144 Willoweit, 125-6. 
145 Whaley, Germany, 38. 
146 Peter H. Wilson, Heart of Europe: A History of the Holy Roman Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 611. 
  63 
was called Fehde, became an integral part of local law.”147 Beginning with Brunner, scholars 
have shown that feuding was not the absence of law, nor were courts simply an alternative to 
feuding; rather, feuding was its own kind of legal modality that operated within the broader legal 
culture, sometimes in competition with, but often in reliance on courts for its effectiveness.148 
Courts were often involved in legitimating a dispute as a feud, and sometimes became one forum 
in which a feud was pursued.149 “A Fehde was not simply any kind of feud. A legitimate Fehde 
was the prerogative of the noble class to realize a legal claim. It was a solely aristocratic means 
of self-help.”150 
 Beginning in the late eleventh century, emperors brokered “peaces” (Königsfriede), 
agreements to cease fighting for a limited time, in a certain area, among certain people.151 These 
agreements had “the character of a contract, which gave it the force of law.”152 Then, in the 
thirteenth century, we begin to see emperors issuing public peaces “in the active role of a 
legislator.”153 Central to these enactments was the assertion that the emperor had supreme 
judicial authority and would be able to provide for an “effective royal tribunal which would be 
reasonably accessible and reliable for those who sought justice.”154 In practice, in the medieval 
period, the emperor’s judicial authority and enforcement capacity was limited; “the preservation 
and execution of the Public Peace fell into the hands of autonomous and local associations.”155 
Feuding reached its climax in the fifteenth century.156 It was first in late fifteenth century reforms 
that we see the resurgence of the idea of the public peace as a matter of imperial concern in the 
form of the declaration of the Eternal Land-Peace and the establishment of the Imperial Chamber 
Court. These were attempts to contain feuding in the form of institutions and procedures 
governed now not by the Emperor alone but by “the totality of the estates.”157  
 Thus, it was this implicit acceptance of the Empire’s jurisdictional claims to resolve 
disputes and feuds among its members through litigation (judicial procedures) and legislation 
(land-peaces) that constituted two of the primary modes of imperial constitutionalism. Law, and 
the guarantee of the Emperor, the collectivity of the Estates, and imperial institutions to deliver 
justice and peace, were central to the Empire’s legitimacy. “The concept of the Empire as a legal 
order and the Emperor as the dispenser of justice […] lay at the root of so much German 
sentiment.”158 
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 Third, to the extent parties saw courts as a mode of settling matters of constitutional 
significance by way of proxy private law disputes, they were conditioned to approaching this 
forum with the same logics of performativity, the same expectations of maintaining peace 
through “workable compromises,”159 and even some of the same procedural instruments that 
characterized the broader legal culture of the Empire, including at imperial recesses. In other 
words, the legal culture and its implicit and ubiquitous constitutional stakes were brought into 
courtrooms through the legal consciousness of litigants, lawyers, and judges.160 This is not to 
deny the specificity of the courtroom context; indeed, this dissertation aims to highlight just that. 
Especially with the founding of the Imperial Chamber Court, the heavily conditioning forms of 
Roman-canonical civil procedure created certain demands and limits on narrative, performance, 
sources of authority, standards of evidence, among other things, to be discussed more in the 
coming chapters. In turn, these demands and limits produced certain possibilities that were not 
present outside of courts.161 Rather, the point is simply that the broader legal culture of the 
Empire was such that parties were conditioned to seeing the constitutional stakes of things 
extending into all domains of life, including and in some cases especially into courts and 
ostensibly private civil law disputes.162  
 
The Imperial Chamber Court 
 
 The Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht) was established in 1495 at the 
Imperial Diet of Worms. Serious efforts to establish a new kind of Court began at least as early 
as 1486, as part of a wave of late fifteenth century reforms.163 Scholars widely regard 1495 as “a 
milestone of German constitutional history, the turning point from the Middle Ages to the early 
modern era.”164 Some identify in this period an institutional corollary to a shift from the Empire 
in its “medieval configuration as a polity bound together by feudal and personal bonds, to an 
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association of principalities under territorialized lordship (Landesherrschaft).”165 The Emperor 
came increasingly to be seen less as a feudal lord than as the “elected head of a voluntary 
fellowship for peace and Right, based on the union of the estates.”166 Others note the ways in 
which these reforms coincided with a stronger distinction being made between the “Empire of 
the German Nation,” on the one hand, and the wider Holy Roman Empire, on the other, that 
included the totality of Habsburg holdings including Bohemia, the Netherlands, and parts of 
Italy.167 Stollberg-Rilinger shows that the Diet of 1495 which resulted in these reforms itself was 
significant; “a milestone not only because of the substantive results, but also because of its 
form,” which would shape future assemblies in a number of ways.168 
 The three core elements of reform were: a court, coinage, and the peace.169 At the 1495 
Imperial Diet, the Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1493-1519) and the Estates had come to an 
agreement on the need for a “perpetual Land-Peace” (ewige Landfriede), the achievement of 
which would be guaranteed through a Court: “We have established,” reads the preamble, “a 
general land-peace and since it can hardly last without the necessary law, we have ordained that 
our and the Reich’s Kammergericht [Empire’s Chamber Court] be established and maintained, as 
follows […].”170  
 In principle, the Court’s spatial jurisdiction covered the whole Empire—including lands 
that lie in modern-day Belgium, Latvia, Poland, and Austria, among others.171 In terms of 
subject, its primary task was to maintain the terms of the Land-Peace.  In terms of personal 
jurisdiction, in its posture as a court of first instance, the Court had competence to adjudicate in 
disputes involving subjects directly subordinate to the Emperor (reichsunmittelbar)—including 
free imperial cities and certain princes and prince-bishops.172 Non-imperial subjects were also 
permitted to sue their rulers in the Court under Land-Peace law, which the historiography calls 
Subject Litigation (Untertanenprozesse).173    
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Yet there was very little that was jurisdictionally self-evident or total in the legal 
landscape of the Holy Roman Empire in this period. Indeed, litigants might choose to pursue 
other means to resolve disputes besides the Imperial Chamber Court: through mediation by 
particular Estates, the Regent, or Emperor; in imperial assemblies; through procedures internal to 
leagues;174 the Imperial Aulic Council (Reichshofrat);175 the Imperial Regiment (while it existed 
until 1531), and more.176   
 In addition, specific privileges and exemptions shaped, in practice, the jurisdiction of the 
Court. In many of the cases discussed in this dissertation, a litigant declined the jurisdiction of 
the Imperial Chamber Court on the basis of an old imperial privilege that listed the specific 
courts in which that litigant could exclusively be sued—usually the courts of neighboring cities. 
Over the course of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries the Court’s appellate jurisdiction was 
selectively narrowed as territorial rulers obtained imperial privileges that prevented their own 
subjects from pursuing cases against the decisions of their courts—the privilege of non-appeal 
(privilegium de non appellando).177 It was even possible to secure total exemption from the 
Court’s jurisdiction (Exemtionsprivileg).178  
 While it is true that in order to understand the Imperial Chamber Court, we must 
understand the ways in which its context shaped, delimited, or undercut its jurisdiction, it is 
equally important to grasp what was new about it. In particular, the Court was endowed with 
certain characteristics that indicate the intentions of its creators to ensure its independence from 
the personal justice of the Emperor—a significant innovation and departure from previous 
instantiations of an imperial court.179 Nonetheless, as we will see, there were challenges to 
maintaining these characteristics, and to ensuring this independence 
 First, the Court was to have a stable location. In other words, it was not to travel with 
the Emperor. Second, the right to declare the Acht (outlawry) was extended to the Court. This 
highest form of punishment was a right formerly belonging to the Emperor alone.180 Finally, the 
Judges of the Court were to be appointed not only by the Emperor but also by a specific set of 
Estates and Electors, and were to be a mix of nobles, as well as doctors of Canon and Roman 
law.181 The Court President (Kammerrichter, praesidens) was to be an imperial prince, selected 
by the Emperor. He served a representative function—on behalf of the Emperor, and on behalf of 
the Court as a whole, vis-a-vis litigants, court personnel, and all in public session (Audienz). The 
Emperor also selected two direct-subject nobles as generosi who would stand in for the Court 
                                               
literature cited there; Helmut Gabel, “’Daß ihr künftig von aller Widersetzlichkeit, Aufruhr und 
Zusammenrottierung gänzlich abstehet.’ Deutsche Untertanen und das Reichskammergericht” in Frieden durch 
Recht: Das Reichskammergericht von 1495 bis 1806, ed. Ingrid Scheurmann (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 
1994), 274; Werner Troßbach, “Untertanenprozesse am Reichshofrat,” Zeitenblicke 3 (2004), no. 3, 
http://www.zeitenblicke.de/2004/03/trossbach/trossbach.pdf. Also, for the study of subject litigation in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, see Rita Sailer, Untertanenprozesse vor dem Reichskammergericht: Rechtsschutz 
gegen die Obrigkeit in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999).  
174 More on leagues in Chapter 5. 
175 See Chapter 1, footnote 15. 
176 Smend, 64.  
177 Whaley, Germany, 363. See also Lorenz, 189; and Gross 35-6. 
178 Lorenz, 193. 
179 Gross, 33; Wilson, 626. 
180 Smend, 46. 
181 After 1548, all judges had to be university-trained jurists, if not doctors. See Peter Stein, Roman Law in 
European History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 91. 
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President if necessary, as well as two doctors of law as judges (Beisitzer). The number of Judges 
to be appointed varied in different Court ordinances, but the number floated around twenty.182  
 These innovations came with challenges. Perhaps the most complicated was that the 
Estates were both the primary litigants over whom the Court had jurisdiction, and those 
responsible for appointing its judges, financing it, creating laws about it, and evaluating it 
through visitations.183  
 In its first twenty years, the Court was unstable, undergoing multiple location changes,184 
and periodic dissolution as attempts to fund the Court through general taxation failed, due to 
financial, structural, and enforcement limitations of the imperial order as a whole.185 The Court’s 
instability in the first decades of its existence makes its role in the Reformation all the more 
interesting. For it was roughly at the same time that Reformation cases begin appearing in the 
Court that the Court became more stable and prestigious. Thus, when telling the story of the 
Reformation cases, it is essential to understand not only the legal pluralism backdrop, and the 
new kinds of claims the Court was making about its jurisdiction and authority, but also the 
reliance of that Court for its stability on the very people and institutions that would be litigating 
there, and the coincidence in time of the Court’s rise with the influx of Reformation-related 
cases.  
 Between 1544 and 1548, the Court was suspended due to pressure from the Schmalkaldic 
League of Protestant princes.186 When the Schmalkaldic League was defeated militarily in 1547, 
the Emperor revived the Court on his own terms. Yet the Princes’ Rebellion and estates-led 
negotiations in the early 1550s generated a transformation that inaugurated a “new order” in 
legal imperial relations, and signified a departure from the Emperor’s heavy-handed “Interim 
Politics.”187 These reforms were made more concrete in the 1555 Imperial Chamber Court 
Ordinances, which are regarded as a major watershed in the Court’s history, putting it on an even 
firmer basis until the end of the Empire in 1806. 
 
                                               
182 Dick, 77-8. Smend argues that this last condition, unlike the first two, was not constitutional in nature—
not, that is, designed to ensure the independence of the Court from the personal justice of the Emperor. Rather, it 
was a purely bureaucratic and technical aspect of the establishment of the Court. He says that in the documentary 
remainders of the discussions surrounding the establishment of the Court, we do not see discussion about the 
meaning of dispersing the appointment authority of the Judges among the Estates. He suggests that this 
constitutional interpretation was offered first by the Protestants in the first half of the sixteenth century. When they 
found that the imperial court system might be the Empire’s biggest challenge to reform, they posited the 
interpretation that the purpose of delegating appointment was to increase the authority of the Estates, and to separate 
the Court from the authority of the Emperor. Catholics challenged this interpretation (Smend, 33-34, 41) Moreover, 
delegation of the presentation of judges was initially regarded as a duty not a right; it was highly practical and was 
not designed, as later interpretations had it, to redound heavily on the distribution of power (Smend, 35-36, 40, 48). 
183 On visitations, see Dick 80-81; and Anette Baumann, Visitationen am Reichskammergericht: Speyer als 
Politischer und Juristischer Aktionsraum des Reiches (1529-1588) (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018). 
184 In the first decades of its existence, however, the location of the Court moved almost a dozen times, 
until in 1527 it settled in Speyer, where it would remain, with brief interruptions, for the next 150 years. The last 
century of its existence (roughly 1690 to 1806) were spent in Wetzlar (Scheurmann, Frieden durch Recht, 96). Court 
personnel were guaranteed certain reduced prices on required living expenses such as food and housing, and were 
exempt from local taxation, which greatly impacted the localities in which the Court was based. While the Court’s 
presence in a town brought great prestige, it also generated stratification and resentment. See Ingrid Scheurmann, 
“Die Installation des Gerichts in Frankfurt und die Speyerer Zeit,” in Frieden durch Recht, 89-108. 
185 Whaley, Germany, 164.  
186 More on these developments in the 1540s and 1550s at the end of Chapter 5. 
187 Whaley, Germany, 330. 
  68 
 
The Reception of Roman Law 
  
 
The founding of the Court was the “decisive step”188 in a “centuries-long process of 
gradual adoption and adaptation of Roman law” in the German lands.189 The 1495 ordinance that 
established the Court stated that it was to judge “according to the common law of the Reich 
[Empire] and also according to the proper, worthy and accepted statutes, ordinances, and 
customs […] that are brought before them.”190 “Common law” (jus commune) referred to the 
collection of Roman law source texts compiled by Justinian in the sixth century C.E. Litigants 
also had the right to present to the Court local and customary laws for consideration in their 
case.191  
  Scholars have challenged the metaphor of “reception” on several grounds.192 Trusen 
argues that “reception” implies the substantive, wholesale adoption of a foreign law. This 
obscures both the gradual, piecemeal nature of the process, as well as the varieties of legal 
transformations that this period witnessed.193 For Trusen, reception must be looked at in the 
longue durée, beginning with early reception in the thirteenth century, primarily through 
ecclesiastical courts, and into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Furthermore, what 
happened in the period was actually the “scientification” or rationalization of the German 
judiciary and of German legal culture. The transformation that this period underwent was not 
primarily the substantive change of legal rules. Rather, it was a change in the legal imaginary 
itself, and in the positionality of legal teaching, jurisprudence, and law-making to a scholarly 
level.194  
  The adoption of the procedures of the learned Roman law shaped German legal thinking 
more deeply than the reception of its substantive law.195 It is important to note that there are 
many examples of ways in which Roman-canonist procedure had already taken root in the 
German lands.196 Though the Imperial Chamber Court was not the first secular court to adopt 
Roman-canonist procedure (preceded by the courts of some free imperial cities), when it did 
adopt the procedure, it had a multiplying impact. In part, this happened through a trickle-down 
                                               
188 Karl Kroeschell, “Die Rezeption der Gelehrten Rechte und ihre Bedeutung für die Bildung des 
Territorialstaates,” in Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte, ed. Kurt Jeserich, et al., vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1983), 279–80. 
189 Strauss, 65. 
190 Dawson, 188. 
191 See Peter Oestmann, Rechtsvielfalt vor Gericht: Rechtsanwendung und Partikularrecht im Alten Reich 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002); Kroeschell, “Die Rezeption,” 281; Gross, 32, 35. 
192 Kroeschell, “Die Rezeption,” 282. Hermann Conring coined the term the “reception” of Roman law in 
the German lands in his 1643 manuscript De origine iuris Germanici. Conring’s historical argument, that Roman 
law was taken up in Germany not primarily through legislation but through German students studying in Italian 
universities (Kroeschell, “Die Rezeption,” 280) was coextensive with a theoretical one; his writings advocated for 
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applying Roman law in a manner relevant to context, and harmonizing it with customary and statutory law of 
specific localities. 
193 Trusen, Anfänge, 2. 
194 Trusen, Anfänge, 3. 
195 Dick, 220-1; Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1967), 183; Gross, 32. “Procedural law” refers to rulers governing the manner and process by which a case is 
handled. “Substantive law” refers to rules governing how facts are to be adjudicated. 
196 See Dick, 11-18. 
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effect. But also, in the first half of the sixteenth century, there was hardly an imperial assembly at 
which the institutional and procedural law of the Imperial Chamber Court was not discussed.197 
These settings may have functioned as an education for estates and rulers. These discussions, 
moreover, led to the adjusting and tailoring of Roman-canonical procedure to align with the 
constitutional specificity of the Holy Roman Empire of the German lands. In between the 
promulgation of roughly fifteen Imperial Chamber Court Ordinances 
(Reichskammergerichtsordnungen) between 1495 and 1555, imperial assemblies had the 
capacity to legislate aspects of the Court within regular imperial recesses (Reichsabschiede), 
through the outcomes of visitation commissions (Visitationsabschiede), ordinances on notaries 
(Notarordnungen), as well as Land-Peaces. The Court itself could announce temporary 
procedural adjustments in the form of a Gemeine Bescheide (common notification), which they 
did 45 times between 1495 and 1555.198  
  The Court’s procedural and substantive legal requirements had a percolating impact on 
the Empire’s many legalities. This worked in tandem with the priorities of German princes 
interested in consolidating their territories, for whom Roman law offered a strong potential for 
systematizing and integrating the legal variability within their domains. Emperors, German 
princes, and city magistrates employed the learned jurists who were returning from study in Italy 
and France in city governments and chanceries, and increasingly, to replace the benches of lay 
judges (Schöffen). But these changes were not evenly distributed. They more easily took hold in 
the fractured political landscape of the south, while in the north, the old centers of legal 
expertise—Lübeck and Magdeburg—and the most authoritative legal text, the Sachsenspiegel 
(Mirror of Saxony), held their weight against Roman law.199 
  In addition to the systematizing and consolidating functions that Roman law offered, 
there was a sense in which this legal tradition was already part of the Empire’s “Roman” 
heritage. Thus, for emperors and princes across these centuries, establishing Roman law was in 
part about translatio imperii.200 This myth was introduced by Frederick I, Barbarossa, (r. 1155-
1190), who claimed himself in line with the emperors of antiquity, and established a basic 
recognition of the validity of Roman law in the Empire as a result of this claimed lineage. 
Barbarossa introduced the “late-classical assumption that the Emperor was the origin of all 
political power” and “more consistently than ever before, the attempt was made to base the 
power of all courts on the power bestowed by the Emperor.”201 This ideology eventually 
extended beyond Roman law and procedure to likewise elevate imperial legislation such as land-
peaces, reformations, and recesses.202 Moreover, in the early sixteenth century, this ideology 
extended beyond the Emperor to include all manner of ruler with respect to his domain.203 Thus, 
the adoption and adaptation of Roman law in the German lands operated in multiple ways—
                                               
197 See Dick for period between 1495-1555. 
198 Dick, 2, 9. See Peter Oestmann, Gemeine Bescheide: Teil 1: Reichskammergericht 1497-1805, ed. Peter 
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rationalizing the legal system, consolidating the dominion of rulers, upholding the myth of 
Roman continuity, and locating the source of justice variously in the Emperor and princely 
rulers. In the fifteenth century, “the imperial title […] took on a distinctly national coloring, 
forgoing any pretense to universal rule. […] In 1486, a law used for the first time the title ‘Holy 
Roman Empire of the German nation.’ The name was the only real vestige of the Roman 
imperium, although it was still loaded with emotional and political possibilities.”204  
 The establishment of the Imperial Chamber Court has been regarded as a decisive step in 
this story because it was first in the early modern period that secular courts began to adopt 
Roman law wholesale; until then, canon law was at the forefront of reception and most jurists 
were clergy.205 The rising prominence of Roman law as a secular discipline and source of law 
was a new and profound change. “The canon law pulled the Roman law behind it” and it was 
carried by the clergy into civil life and the civil courts.206  
 While territorializing princely rulers sought to integrate it, many others were opposed to 
the Roman law’s insinuation into the German lands. Lower nobility railed against the ways in 
which the emerging prestige of the lawyerly, bureaucratic class was causally linked to their 
displacement in the social hierarchy. Some members of the lower nobility were able to adjust to 
these social changes by sending their children to universities, but others were left without a clear 
social position.207  
  The sixteenth century teemed with popular imagery calling attention to the corruption, 
greed, and sophistry of all manner of legal actors—including judges, lawyers, and local notaries. 
Indeed, “the movement of opposition to law reached special intensity in the German-speaking 
regions of the Holy Roman Empire around the time of the Protestant Reformation.”208 Peasants 
were especially vocal critics of Roman law’s competition with “good old law” (guten alten 
Recht).  
 Some scholars have shown that it was precisely during the period of reception that the 
notion of an ancient Germanic law gained traction. Gerhard Köbler argues that this itself is 
evidence of Roman law’s influence—ancient Germanic law became a customary law 
(consuetudo), which was a Roman law category.209 Teuscher’s book on the Weistum, for 
example—an instrument that claimed to be a transcription of group testimony under oath as to 
the established custom of an area—tells a nuanced story about this. Interestingly, the period 
around 1600 saw the greatest number of Weistümer.210 Teuscher argues that though these 
documents claimed to record laws valid for a locality since time immemorial, in fact, “the 
regulations are scarcely any older than the documents that record them.”211 The documents were 
not simply transcriptions of orality (as they claimed to be) but instead “products of a written 
culture”212 that, though presented as if they had merely transcribed a ritual performance of legal 
agreement with the population of a village present, in fact were drafted in chanceries by learned 
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jurists of Roman law.213 Teuscher argues that “paradoxically, this vision of the law,” as 
“established, old oral tradition,” was “more closely connected to forerunners of modern 
developments, such as […] the formation of large, proto-state power structures.”214 “The 
perception of local laws as old legal customs was in many respects less the point of departure for 
the reception of learned law than the consequence of it.”215 
 Whitman’s study of the fortuitous timing of the rise of the Imperial Chamber Court and 
the “reception” of Roman law in the German lands with the Reformation finds echoes in this 
dissertation.216 In particular, I argue that certain legal transformations in this period—such as 
changes in the way co-litigation was conceived, the role of the state in recognizing new forms of 
combination, and the shifting valence of protestations, among others—might have their origins in 
proto-Protestant experimental usages of instruments of Romano-canonical procedure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the legal culture of the German lands of 
the Holy Roman Empire by exploring its constitutional structure, legislative typology, and two 
especially important legal forums—imperial assemblies and courts. While we set out to 
understand why the laws of 1520-22, promulgated by the most powerful offices of the Holy 
Roman Empire, failed to create a legal front against the Lutheran movement as a heresy, along 
the way we have gained a more complete picture of the way in which courts could function as 
important sites of constitution-making in this period.  
  In the next chapter, we begin a detailed exploration of the substantive law on which 
litigants and lawyers based their arguments in the Reformation cases. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
PEACE, PROPERTY, AND JURISDICTION:  
PATCHWORK JURISPRUDENCE IN REFORMATION LITIGATION 
 
In August 1521, the imperial Fiscal (prosecutor), Dr. Reynhart Thyel, sent out a Mandate 
against the city of Erfurt (“the Mayor, Council, and entire Commune”) on account of allegations 
made against the city by the clergy there.1 It was alleged that between May and July 1521, there 
had occurred various attacks on the two collegiate churches in Erfurt, the Church of Our Lady 
and St. Severus; the clergy’s living quarters were overrun and violently broken into, leaving 
windows smashed, and property including clothing, books, bed linens, pots, and kettles either 
destroyed or stolen.2 These attacks, alleged the Fiscal, were carried out by “a mob or a society” 
that gathered at night, and sometimes during the day.3 Some citizens as well as servants of the 
city council were part of that group.4 When the deans of these two collegiate churches went to 
notify the city council, and to request its protection, the city did nothing against it, and did 
nothing to prevent it from happening in the future.5 Not long after, more attacks occurred against 
not only the two churches, but 44 other clerical residences, including the residence of a Provost. 
The mob broke into cellars holding wine, letting the wine drain out.6 In the end, damages 
amounted to 4000 Gulden. It was the “common rumor and reputation” that these attacks 
happened with the knowledge and will of the council.7 Even more, the city ordered its citizens 
not to rescue the clergy, and indeed while it was happening and while they could have helped, 
they chose to “take it easy” instead.8  
 According to the Fiscal’s account, the deans of the two collegiate churches, out of 
necessity, went to the city council seeking protection and defense. The council responded with a 
set of significant cash demands, and compelled the deans to sign an agreement with very specific 
property-related terms concerning customs, inventorying, and buying and selling.9 For instance, 
                                               
1 On the Fiscal, see Chapter 1. Landeshauptarchiv Sachsenanhalt Standort Wernigerode Rep. A53 No. F37 
(“Wernigerode F37”), Q1, “Mandatum Penali Fiscalis,” 1522. I am reconstructing the alleged events on the basis of 
several documents submitted by the Fiscal. 
2 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524. 
3 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “ein Rotthe oder gesellschaft” 
4 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das in gemellter ratt und geselschafft der 
beschediger vil burger, burgers sone und gesindt auch des Raths diener mitgewest seindt.” 
5 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das wiewol der rath zu erffurth diser gewaltsamer 
handlung gut wissens gehept ist doch die warheit one das er icht dargegen furgenomen oder in zukunfft dergleichen 
zufurkomen understanden habe”; “das Bürgermeister, Rathmeister, Rathe und gemein zu Erffurt des gut wissen 
getragen und doch den geistlichen beschedigten, mit keiner hilff oder scheirm beystand thun wöllen.” 
6 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das sie in etlichen kellern der geistichen die Reiff 
an den fassen abgehawen und den wein in den keller lauffen lassen haben.” 
7 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das ein gemein gerucht und leumut darvon sey das 
sollichs mit des Raths wissen und willen geschehen sey.” 
8 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das den Burgern in einer gemein durch den Rath 
oder von eins Raths wegen gebotten worden in angezeigter vergwelltigung der geistlichen stillzusitzen und die 
geistlichen nit zuretten; das Rathmeister Rath und gemein zu Erfurth solhe handlung gewist und wol weren helfenn 
mogen habens aber nit gethan sonnder die genem gehept.” 
9 Wernigerode F37, Q1, “Mandatum Penali Fiscalis,” 1522: “wie ir on einich ursach aus eigenem 
gewaltigem furnemen und mut willen die geistlicheit so bey uch in erffurt wonet frevenlich uberlauffen ire heuser 
und wonungen gewaltiglich auffgestossen, und das ire zerschlagen zerprochen und in andere wege nach ewerm lußt 
und wolgefallen zu irem verderblichen schaden gefrevelt und gehandelt und darzu derselben geistlicheit ein 
merglich summa gelts die sie uch geben mussen abgedrungen habt.” For the agreement, see second to last document 
 73 
it required the churches to report to the city all property they possessed whether inside or outside 
of the city, including houses, land, vineyards, hops gardens, fields, pastures, and particular kinds 
of income-yielding financial arrangements, and to pay taxes on its incomes, like any other citizen 
of Erfurt.10 One of its terms touched on jurisdiction: “that the clergy shall not burden any citizen 
or subject of the city council with spiritual demands, rather, will let those persons be summoned 
before the council, the city magistrate, or territorial court; only then will the matter be remitted 
elsewhere, on a case by case basis.”11 Only after they had signed this agreement did the council 
promise defense against the mob.12 In other words, the Fiscal alleged, the city took advantage of 
the vulnerable state of the clergy, and the deans agreed to their demands out of “legitimate fear 
of great evil on the part of the city.”13  
 In the face of these fears, the Mandate continued, the clergy sought the Emperor’s help, 
who mobilized his imperial Fiscal to prosecute the city on the clergy’s behalf. Their actions, the 
Mandate said, violated “honor, law, propriety, the holy Empire’s laws,” as well as the city’s 
“own duty and oaths.”14 The Court ordered the city to “cease its violence and mischief from this 
hour on,”15 and by one month from then to have repaid the damages, at risk of imperial disfavor 
and punishment, including a penalty of 30 marks lötigen golds.16 By the following January, the 
imperial Fiscal reported back to the Court that the city had failed to obey the Mandate, and had 
even in the meantime sent creditors to the clergy to repay the city’s considerable debts,17 
warranting the carrying out of the financial penalty. A Citatio sent out to the city of Erfurt 
summoned them to Court.  
 What was not mentioned anywhere in the Court’s Mandate, or the Fiscal’s petitions, was 
that the uprisings that took place against the clergy that June began a few weeks after of the 
Worms Edict was promulgated, and the text of it printed and circulated among the “common 
man” in Erfurt.18 And a few weeks before the Worms Edict was promulgated, Luther himself had 
                                               
of the case file beginning with “Wir Paulus Shulmeister,” as well as Q7, titled “Artickel die priesterschafft zu Erffurt 
vom Rath furgeschlagen unnd ubergeben.” 
10 Wernigerode F37, Q7, “Artickel die priesterschafft, etc.,” 1524: “Item, das die geistlichen einem erbern 
Rath anzeigen wollen, was fur guter sie ine und auß erffurdt auch an frembden orten, die etwan die burger oder des 
Raths unnderthonen landsessen, als hewser, hof ecker, weingarten, hapfberg [Hopfenberg], wysen, weiden, gerten, 
widerkauff, erbzins etc. gewesen und an sich gepracht solh guter sollen sie verrechten gleich andre uns burger das 
hundert gellt und das geschoss gleichmessig den burgern davon geben.” 
11 Wernigerode F37, Q7, “Artickel die priesterschafft, etc.,” 1524: “das sie keinen burger der des raths 
unnderthan mit geistlicher forderung besweren sollen sonder dieselben vor dem Rath statt voydt oder landtgericht 
heishen lassen, das soll inen sleunig hilff geschehet Es were dann das die sach von einem Rath nach gelegenheit 
annderswohin geweyset wurde.” 
12 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das alsdan der Rathe inen sagen lassenn sie 
wollenn ir erpietens den vormunden und handtwercken anzeigen; […] das nach sollichem erpieten der geistlichen 
und nit ehe der Rathe in die sachen gesehen und verschaffet hatt, das die bose Ratt gestillet ist werden.” 
13 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das die geistlichen auß ehehaffter forcht grossers 
ubels durch den Rath zu letzst dahin bewegt und pracht seind worden das sie solhe artickel bewilligt und angenomen 
und furter sich vershriben haben…” 
14 Wernigerode F37, Q1, “Mandatum Penali Fiscalis,” 1522: “wider alle erberkheit recht pillichait und des 
heiligen reichs ordnung auch wider ewer eigen pflicht und eide.” 
15 Wernigerode F37, Q1, “Mandatum Penali Fiscalis,” 1522: “das ir solchen ewern unpillichen gewalt 
frevel und mutwillen von stund an abstellet.” 
16 See “Usages” in dissertation front matter for an explanation of this monetary denomination.  
17 Wernigerode F37, Q2, “Citatio,” 1522: “auch darneben demselben unserm key. gepot zuwyder ewer 
glaubiger an die gemelten geistlicheit zubezalung ewer selbst gemachten schulden zuweysen understehn und sie mit 
grossen und merglichenn Sumen bezalung zuthung genotigt.” 
18 Ulman Weiss, Die frommen Bürger von Erfurt: Die Stadt und ihre Kirche im Spätmittelalter und in der 
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returned to Erfurt to a triumphant welcome, and had preached in the city where he had become a 
monk in 1505.19 The so-called “parson storm” of 1521 in Erfurt was one of the first “Martinist” 
anticlerical, anti-Worms uprisings in the Empire, a “prelude” to the plunderings of monasteries 
and church institutions that would take place in the coming years, many of which would be 
litigated in the Imperial Chamber Court.20 That the Fiscal in this case failed to mention this 
context is remarkable; for if the city had given cover to the mob that attacked clergy residences, 
then it might easily have been shown that this mob had Lutheran leanings. The Worms Edict 
itself clearly prohibited providing any kind of cover for followers of Luther. Why was the Edict 
not invoked? Why did the Fiscal fail to make this link for the judges between the violence 
against clergy residences and the pro-Luther cause? 
 
*** 
 
 To the extent 1521 failed to bring about a legal front against the spread of Lutheranism, 
local church and monastic institutions sometimes sought the help of courts to resolve disputes 
arising from local reformations or Luther-inspired anticlerical acts. These litigants were doing 
nothing new; in the 1520s, Reformation probably seemed an extension of late medieval 
anticlerical, anti-Rome, and territorializing moves by princes and cities, and courts had, since 
that time, been one venue in which property, jurisdiction, and peace disputes had been brought. 
Indeed, Erfurt did not formally introduce Reformation until 1525, and like other places, it had 
had its fair share of conflict between clergy, city council, and commune before Luther’s ideas 
were in circulation at all.21 An analysis of the pre-Reformation context in the German-speaking 
lands of the Holy Roman Empire indicates that it was not so abnormal or unusual for spiritual 
authorities to make use of a variety of legal means to address encroachments on their property, 
authority, and powers, and that they were already in practice at using civil courts for addressing 
these conflicts.  
 Nonetheless, the kinds of elisions we see in the case against Erfurt are characteristic of 
many of the Reformation cases. The reasons for these elisions change. In the earliest cases, the 
Reformation context of a dispute were elided because of a continuity in the litigative strategy of 
church and monastic institutions before and after 1521, just discussed. Then, in the mid-1520s, 
there was a shift. For the first time, some cities and princes became open converts and began to 
reform their domains explicitly in the Lutheran and Zwinglian manner.22 In 1526, the Speyer 
Recess identified the “division of the Religion” (Zwyspalt der Religion) as one cause of the 
“uprising of the common man” of 1525. In this urgent context, the Recess called again on the 
Emperor to urge the convening of a Christian Council or a National Assembly for the purpose of 
resolving the division of the religion. It also forbade innovations in “the holy Christian faith and 
religion, also the ceremonies and well-inherited usages of the holy Christian churches.”23 Its 
most consequential article—section 4—stated that until the convening of a Council or Assembly, 
each of the Estates had authority to “live, govern, and behave with their subjects in matters of the 
                                               
Reformationszeit (Weimar: Böhlau, 1988), 126. 
19 Weiss, 123-124. 
20 Weiss, 126. For more on the Reformation in Erfurt, see Robert Scribner, “Civic Unity and the 
Reformation in Erfurt,” Past and Present 66 (Feb. 1975): 29-60. 
21 See Weiss, Chapters 1 and 2. 
22 Whaley, Germany, 181.  
23 For text of the 1526 Speyer Recess, see Senckenberg, NSRA II, 272-80. 
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Worms Edict, as each hopes and trusts himself to answer to God and the Emperor.” Finally, the 
Recess added plunder (Spoliation) and confiscation (Entsetzung) to the list of actions that would 
count as a violation of the Land-Peace.24  The Speyer Recess thus, on the one hand, gave 
plaintiffs an additional legal ground on which to sue cities and princes for reforms explicitly on 
the basis of innovations in the religion. On the other hand, the evangelical estates saw the 1526 
Recess, especially section 4, as license to ignore the Worms Edict and to continue reforms so 
long as they would be ready to answer to God and the Emperor about them.25 Thus, although by 
invoking the Speyer Recess of 1526, the Reformation context was increasingly brought to bear in 
cases, it appeared as one legal issue among many, and the consequences of invoking it were 
never predictable as the very same Recess was used equally by the evangelical litigants to 
suggest that their actions were actually protected and legal. 
 After 1529, when the protesting estates began to decline the forum of the Imperial 
Chamber Court on the argument that the dispute was a matter of religion and therefore not within 
the jurisdictional competence of the Court (as we will see in chapter 4), plaintiffs had yet another 
reason to omit the Reformation context in the case. In order to avoid the legal black hole of the 
evangelical estates’ “matter of religion” argument, plaintiffs found themselves in the position of 
having not only to elevate the civil and public law matters of peace, property, and jurisdiction, 
but also to positively deny that a dispute had any link to a dispute in religion. In one case, as we 
will see in the following chapter, one plaintiff even submitted a “Correction” to his suit, 
explicitly removing all language that touched on old-faith ceremonies and worship, and replacing 
it with language about property and jurisdiction.  
 Despite these elisions, litigants and lawyers found ways to thematize or bring to the 
surface the issue of Reformation in these disputes—through sometimes colorful, sometimes more 
subtle forms of rebuke and suspicion. And in other cases, references to a Lutheran litigant found 
its way into a proceeding apparently entirely unrelated to the Reformation context, without there 
being a clear legal purpose for doing so.  
 More than anything, this chapter pieces together the sources of law on the basis of which 
the Reformation suits were litigated—not only the issues plaintiffs and the Fiscal raised, but also 
the sources of law and legal issues that defendants raised. This chapter presents and delineates 
the patchwork jurisprudence that developed in the Imperial Chamber Court to handle 
Reformation-related disputes—before the protesting estates began to conceive of the disputes as 
a unit and experiment with the extraordinary jurisdictional claim that they constituted, 
collectively and individually, “a matter of religion” (Chapter 4), and before the Augsburg Peace 
of 1555 settled the meaning of a “violation of the Religion-Peace” (Chapter 6). Included in this 
patchwork were not only the learned Roman law, but also the terms of various imperial recesses; 
treaties and out-of-court settlements; an endless range of specific ancient privileges recorded in 
original documents (Urkunden); usages that extended “beyond human memory”; and the 
fundaments of the dualistic imperial constitutional order, such as it was, among others. 
 Overall, these cases potently raise the question: in whose interest was it to make legible 
the Reformation context of a dispute, at a time when the consequences of doing so were so 
multifarious? 
 
 
                                               
24 Branz, 74. 
25 See more on this in Chapter 5. 
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Peace 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, since the eleventh century in the German lands, kings had 
brokered “peaces” between feuding parties as an expression of their particular authority as 
mediators at the center of an endlessly complex feudal network. These peaces initially had the 
legal character of a contract. By the thirteenth century, kings were promulgating peaces as a form 
of legislation, but their enforcement capacity was limited. In the late fifteenth century, in an 
expression of the dualistic imperial constitution in which Emperor and Estates co-governed, the 
Imperial Diet promulgated the Eternal Land-Peace, and the Imperial Chamber Court was 
established to actualize its terms in the form of an institution rather than the person of the 
Emperor.26 
 Land-Peace violations had as an essential element actual physical violence, the threat of 
violence, or the facilitation of violence. Section 1 of the Eternal Land-Peace of 1495 prohibited 
“feuding, warring, hijacking, taking captive, attacking, laying siege, […] scaling the fortified 
walls of castles, cities, markets, fortifications, villages, farms, or hamlets, or conquering them 
violently, or damaging property with fire or other means.”27 The assisting, advising, 
encouraging, housing, feeding, or in any way aiding of someone doing such actions would also 
be considered a violation of the Land-Peace. Section 5 even deemed the subsequent privileging 
or favoring of someone who had committed such acts to be a violation of the Land-Peace.28 
Imperial Chamber Court case files of the sixteenth century include other related acts that were 
litigated under the Land-Peace rubric, including: raiding, killing, cruelty, and coercion. Other 
kinds of actions that on their own might not have counted as a violation of the Land-Peace could 
become one if they were carried out with a certain “quality,” actions such as encroachment and 
taking control over property and property rights; confiscating property; embargoing; detaining 
persons or things; and defamation.29 Litigants thus had the opportunity to argue that a wide range 
of cases had the quality of a Land-Peace violation;30 and judges had a great deal of discretion in 
determining what counted as a violation of the Land-Peace. Not all violations of the Land-Peace 
would result in outlawry; financial penalties were another frequent consequence.31 
                                               
26 See also Hendrik Baumbach and Horst Carl, eds., Landfrieden - epochenübergreifend neue Perspektiven 
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Schutz der Verfassung: Normen, Institutionen, Höchst- und Verfassungsgerichte: Tagung der Vereinigung für 
Verfassungsgeschichte in Hofgeismar vom 12. bis 14. März 2012, ed. Thomas Simon and Johannes Kalwoda 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014); also Anette Baumann, Visitationen am Reichskammergericht: Speyer als 
Politischer und Juristischer Aktionsraum des Reiches (1529-1588) (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 137-49. 
27 On plunder as a legally and morally legitimate form of violence in the context of feuding in the medieval 
period, see Stefan Xenakis, Gewalt und Gemeinschaft: Kriegsknechte um 1500 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 
2015), 265-6. For other meanings of plunder, see Daniel Lord Smail, Legal Plunder: Households and Debt 
Collection in Late Medieval Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017) and Michael Jucker 
“Plünderung, Beute, Raubgut: Überlegungen zur Ökonomischen und Symbolischen Ordnung des 
Spätmittelalterlichen Kriegs, 1300-1500,” in Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftskriege, ed. Valentin Groebner, 
Sebastien Guex, and Jakob Tanner (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2008), 51–69.  
28 Branz, 16. 
29 Branz, 19, 23-4. 
30 Malte Hohn, Die rechtlichen Folgen des Bauernkrieges von 1525: Sanktionen, Ersatzleistungen und 
Normsetzung nach dem Aufstand (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 298. 
31 Branz, 24. 
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 In the early 1520s, Land-Peace law was not initially seen as a way to deal with 
Lutheranism or to prosecute evangelical reforms. The Worms Edict of 1521—a sui generis 
attempt to deal with the Lutheran problem—itself serves as evidence that it was believed that a 
special legal basis was required for prosecuting the new heresy at the level of imperial law.32  
 In the Speyer Recess of 1526, new elements were added to the list of actions that 
constituted a Land-Peace violation.33 The Recess described “how in many places, the spiritual 
and worldly [estates] stand in danger in their life and limb, also that their annuities, fees, and 
tithes”—Zinß, Renth, Gült und Zehenden, terms that signified not only forms of wealth and 
financial arrangements, but the rights implicit in them34—“are being detained, and they are 
hindered from bringing them in or distributing them.” “Because no one should be plundered or 
confiscated [of anything] against law, therefore every ruler, whether spiritual or worldly, should, 
according to the content of the Land-Peace, loyally defend and protect against violence and 
injustice, so that until the future Council, peace, unity, and equality can be held between the 
spiritual and worldly estates, and so that neither worldly nor spiritual have cause to complain of 
any improper violation or confiscation.”35 This was the first time that the Imperial Diet made a 
direct connection between the Land-Peace and the Reformation, the first time that an imperial 
law besides the Worms Edict was promulgated to manage the Reformation’s conflicts.36  
  In the Speyer Recess of 1529, any violent act impinging the rights of another estate, if 
done for reasons of faith and religion, could be considered a violation of the Land-Peace. “No 
one, of the worldly or spiritual estate may violate, coerce, or conquer another on account of the 
faith (des Glaubens halben), nor deprive them of their annuities, tithes, and goods.” It also 
prohibited, as a violation of the Land-Peace, protective lordship over subjects who leave their 
rulers on account of faith matters. But because the acts listed could already be considered Land-
Peace violations, the mentioning of the faith conflict and reasons added nothing new; if anything, 
the Recess made it clear that faith reasons were no escape from the consequences of a Land-
Peace violation.37  
 The Augsburg Recess of 1530 was sweeping in its ambition to undo the reforms of the 
previous decade.38 Both in terms of the numerous measures promulgated,39 and the lengthy 
narrative portions in which they were couched, it was clear that the aim of the Recess was to 
stymie further efforts at reform in the evangelical manner.40 After efforts to dialogue on doctrinal 
issues went nowhere, the Emperor (present at the Diet for the first time since 1521) doubled 
down on his policy that the Worms Edict was still valid law.41 As in 1529, the protesting estates 
                                               
32 Branz, 74. 
33 See timeline in appendix to see overview of the Recesses in relation to one another. 
34 Branz, 83. 
35 See convenient appendix in Branz, 285-293 for excerpts of key imperial recesses as they pertain to 
religious peace. 
36 Branz, 75. 
37 Branz, 82-3. 
38 Kohnle, 381-94 
39 Not all of the measures were Land-Peace related, such as Section 60 which guaranteed imperial 
protection to old-faith Christians who lived under Protestant rulers (Branz, 86). See Senckenberg, NSRA II, 314-5 
for Section 60 text. 
40 For instance, Sections 10-37 (Senckenberg, NSRA II, 309-311) included a declaration of the Emperor’s 
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to date of the reforming changes being made in territories and cities. Sections 38-56 (Senckenberg, NSRA II, 312-
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41 Whaley, Germany, 299-300. 
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departed and the old-faith majority promulgated a lengthy series of specific measures, some of 
which were addressed directly to the Elector of Saxony and his associates (Mitverwandten). 
These prohibited all innovations in religion (section 57) and the printing or sale of anything that 
might lead to disunity in matters of faith (section 2); seeking to convert anyone to their sect or 
disturbing monastic persons in their faith and ceremonies (section 3); seizing any property or 
rights of any estate (section 62), especially on account of faith (section 65), especially that of the 
spiritual estate (section 59); required the promotion of Catholic worship and Christian good 
works everywhere (section 56), the reestablishment of those things where they had been taken 
away (section 59), and the restitution of all alienated property and rights for bishoprics, 
monasteries and collegiate churches (sections 6 and 59). To violate these explicitly anti-reform 
laws would thereafter be considered a violation of the Land-Peace, subject to prosecution by the 
imperial Fiscal in the Imperial Chamber Court (section 67).42 In other words, no longer was 
violence an essential element for a Land-Peace violation; effectively any actions done against the 
spiritual estate, and the old-faith worship and institutions, could be considered a violation of the 
Peace.43   
 The legal validity of the 1530 Recess was, however, a matter of debate in the decades 
following, not only because the protesting estates protested portions of it, bringing out the 
tension between the inherited principle of unanimity and the decision procedure of majority 
rule,44 but also because several of the most important sections of the Recess when it came to the 
anti-reform measures were promulgated unilaterally by the Emperor, with the willing approval of 
the majority of estates, again raising the challenges inherent to the Edict form, discussed in 
Chapter 2.45 
 Still, the 1530 Recess broadened the definition of a Land-Peace violation, and portended 
an increase in the Land-Peace litigation that would occur in the Imperial Chamber Court. With 
the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532, which promised an end to the Imperial Chamber Court’s 
jurisdiction over “matters of religion,” however, it seemed that the protesting estates had 
successfully negotiated an end to this threat.46  
 Between 1532 and 1541, no Imperial Diets met, and therefore no new Land-Peace 
legislation was promulgated, leaving the question of the extent of Land-Peace law deeply 
ambiguous.47 On the one hand, 1530 represented a doubling down on the Edict of Worms. On 
the other hand, 1532 was a clear move away from the Worms regime.48 Both of the legal regimes 
produced in these years had questionable legal validity—as majority recesses, unilateral 
mandates, and private contracts. The circumstances were ripe therefore for a period of 
tremendous litigative creativity, as parties sought to settle the meaning of these laws, contracts, 
                                               
42 Three of the sections explicitly mentioned the Land-Peace: Sections 59, 62, 65. See NSRA II, 314-316, 
and Branz, 287-288. 
43 Branz, 82. Gero Dolezalek, “Die juristische Argumentation der Assessoren am Reichskammergericht zu 
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and legal regimes. This period also saw the first declaration of the Acht by the Imperial Chamber 
Court, over the city of Minden, in 1538.49 
 Already in the early 1540s we begin to see the emergence of the Religion-Peace as a new 
kind of legislative form, on the template of the Land-Peace. Though Religion-Peace has typically 
been seen in the historiography as a shorthand for a kind of reconciliation or rapprochement 
between religious confessions, the opposite of religious war,50 in fact, Religion-Peace means 
something more like the legislation that delineated the terms of the relations between 
confessions, and which religion-related offenses counted as violations of the Land-Peace. It was 
the beginning of public law on churches in Germany, more than it was the beginning of religious 
toleration or religious freedom. 
 
Property 
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of property in the early Reformation. 
Whether to do with indulgences and other sacramental instruments for motivating the donations 
of believers, the accusation of clergy greed in receiving multiple and bloated incomes, the 
concerns about opulent display of Church wealth in the form of relics and various sacred items as 
part of ritual– property was a central issue for Reformation theologians and their followers. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, these concerns dovetailed with political-economic concerns around 
property including popular anti-feudal resistance to tithing, and opposition to the massive land-
holding and wealth of churches as a problem for territorializing rulers. Reform-minded princes 
and cities targeted church property. Old-faith clergy and institutions saw the potential of this 
proxy issue to discredit the new movement—to argue evangelicals were making a variety of 
category mistakes, or were revealing their suspect motives in seeking to gain property and 
wealth.  
 Körber writes that in the question of church property, all of the divisions and antagonisms 
of the Reformation converged to a combustion point.51 According to Ocker, “imperial acceptance 
of Lutheran churches had nothing to do with tolerance of Luther’s faith” but everything to do 
with acceptance of its radical property claims.52 As Brady writes, “the German Reformation was 
a struggle for faith; it was also a struggle for property.”53 The Reformation brought with it not 
only widespread secularizations, and a revision of law governing church property and its usages 
within territories, but also increasing reliance on secular rulers to codify biblical morality into 
civil and economic laws.54 Approximately two-thirds of cases brought to the Imperial Chamber 
Court by church institutions between 1520 and 1539 were brought by monasteries seeking 
restitution of property.55  
 
                                               
49 U. Hölscher, “Die Geschichte Der Mindener Reichsacht 1538-1541,” Zeitschrift Der Gesellschaft Für 
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Church property, from the Proprietary Church System to the Patronage System 
 
 “Even before the end of persecutions” in the first three centuries of the Common Era, 
“some Christian communities had what looks like corporate property in practice—a cemetery, a 
clergy-house, a building for worship.”56 Then, “under Christian emperors, church property 
received special treatment in the law, so that something like civil personality, or property-owning 
capacity, was attributed to the church of each city.”57 Bishops administered the property of their 
city’s church.  
 Church wealth increased quickly. “Emperors financed magnificent buildings; Christians 
in general gave not only bread and wine for the Eucharist, wax and oil for lights, and food or 
money for the clergy and the poor, but treasures of plate and precious stones; and not only things 
but land,” which “flowed in from gifts and legacies, including the clergy’s private property,” and 
“it came to be taken for granted that the livelihood of bishop and clergy, help for the poor, and 
upkeep of church buildings were paid for partly by income from land.”58  
 From the fourth century onwards, we begin to see multiple churches in one city, and 
churches established in rural areas. Still “any offerings in money, kind, or land were part of the 
diocesan property administered by the bishop.”59 In the fifth century, localized distinctions began 
being made within church property according to function, such as funds for the bishop’s use, the 
poor, the clergy, and the Church Fabric (Kirchenfabrik, fabrica ecclesiae);60 this practice became 
more widespread from the tenth and eleventh century onwards.61  
 Around the same time, “diocesan property” (centrally managed by bishops) “was 
becoming an ever smaller proportion of all existing church property, while the clergy supported 
by it became only some among the whole clergy.”62 Instead, “almost every church in town or 
country” came to have “its own land from which produce and rents were drawn, its own slaves 
and tenants, and its own income in offerings.”63 “By the eighth century virtually every old parish 
church both sides of the Alps and in the remnant of Christian Spain was a self-supporting 
property-owning church,” with significant independence from Bishops, on whose incomes and 
administration they no longer relied.64 This was the beginning of what Ulrich Stutz famously 
called Eigenkirchenwesen or the “proprietary church system,” by which is meant this situation in 
which an increasingly larger share of overall church wealth was made of property in private 
possession—a church building along with its contents, its land, stock, tithes, dues, offerings, and 
the rights to appoint its priest, were the possession of some person or family.65  
 It was in this context that forms of church property ownership came to vary 
tremendously, linked in equally multifarious ways to forms of lordship. Higher churches, which 
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included monasteries and abbey churches that had “massive splendours” and “lordships of 
several thousand mansi or peasant holdings,” might belong to a king or prince, a founder or his 
or her heirs, non-founder nobles such as lay abbots and advocates, a larger church or monastery, 
or a bishopric.66 Lower churches—those “wooden sheds with barely a pewter or horn chalice” 
with lordship of “a single peasant holding or less”67—constituted the vast majority of churches, 
and lordship over them sometimes belonged to lay proprietors including rulers, nobles, or 
knights; families and partnerships with common property; townsmen and merchants; communes; 
priests; nearby higher churches like monasteries, collegiate churches, or chapters; and bishops 
and bishoprics, who might be lords over churches both within and outside of their diocese.68 
 These proprietary churches were established by private individuals and families for a 
variety of reasons. There was some “combination of piety and prestige” in doing so. The church 
often served as “a memorial and burial-place,” as a “shrine for relics,” a gift to a saint, or as the 
basis of a charitable foundation.69 A proprietary church required the consecration of the bishop to 
count as a church—and this, along with the authority to ordain clergy, were “the two great levers 
for the diocesan bishop.”70 But ownership, possession, usage, management and control of the 
new church was not always clear, and varied greatly from case to case. In practice, churches 
were established to be self-sufficient, and were treated as the property of their founders. Some of 
this can be attributed to the decay of public law after the fall of Western Roman imperial 
government in the fifth and sixth centuries.71  
 But Wood suggests that there is a more positive story to tell here about “the everyday 
sense in which a church ‘belonged’ to someone who, in spite of having ‘given’ it an endowment, 
felt it was his own and treated it as his own,” and the ways in which this sense “could easily—in 
the ambience of customary law—become what rulers and local courts recognized as a property-
right.”72 The Church’s wealth was sustained into the late middle ages by widespread pious belief 
of everyday people who gave of their wealth to achieve salvation, who believed in the salvific 
potential of good works.73 “Gift of property to churches or monasteries were personal acts of 
devotion. They implied exchanges of service and protection between heaven and earth.”74 
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 Pious endowments and gifts grew continuously reaching their height in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.75 But these pious donations could be delayed, qualified, or made conditional 
on a variety of specific factors.76 Later, donors might renege on a donation by denying that it had 
happened, saying it was done under coercion or that their consent was invalid.77 In this way, 
donations were “an ongoing process, involving many people, and never absolutely completed.”78 
The countergift in some cases was non-material, the hopeful expectation that “parting with the 
property” would “lay up treasure in heaven”79; but in other cases, it was “prayers in their 
lifetime, a burial-place, perhaps deathbed admission to the community or a funeral as for a monk 
or canon, anniversary masses, inscription of their name in the Liber memorialis; burial for a dead 
son, or entry for a living one; perhaps some specified almsgiving or commemorative feast; in 
more general terms, the monks’ societas or confraternity, and a share in the rewards of their way 
of life” that they got in return.80 Sometimes the countergift was the right to appoint clergy of that 
church. Sometimes it took the form of material goods or money, which made it hard to 
distinguish from a sale transaction.81 In some cases, they were not averse to using precisely that 
language of a “sale,” though on its face this would violate the inalienability principle.82  
 The ideology of the strong separation of temporal and spiritual property came about in 
the context of the Investiture Controversy and Gregorian reforms of the eleventh century. In the 
tenth and eleventh centuries, there was a rise of the idea of “monastic liberty” which in part 
involved an attack on the proprietary church system.83 The root of the problem was seen as “the 
general ‘mingling of sacred and secular things.’”84 The consequence was a hardening of the 
boundary between spiritual and temporal on matters of property, and prohibition on alienation of 
church property from its divine purposes was made more strict, though how this was defined 
remained always an object of discussion and deliberation.85 Plöchl describes the “defensive 
character” of this conceptual distinction.86 But the problem was not about challenging views that 
regarded a church as property—that was never really the core of the dispute.87 Indeed, the 1122 
Concordat of Worms that marked the end of the Investiture Controversy recognized the lordship 
of lay rulers over churches “in terms that we may call broadly ‘feudal.’”88 This gave rise to the 
development of the canon law of patronage (ius patronatus) in the twelfth century. The canon 
law of patronage was more than anything a rationalization and codification of proprietary church 
practices, in light of Gregorian reforms, according to principles of the newly developing Roman 
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legal science.89 Rather than the world of the gift and countergift,90 this was a world of rights in 
exchange for patronage in the form of a financial gift and protection—rights similar to those of a 
property-owner, plus clergy appointment rights, and other kinds of rights, such as “a kind of 
insurance policy” for provision “if the patron fell into want.”91  
 In summary, after the Investiture Controversy, we see a double move. On the one hand, 
there was a move towards drawing a sharper conceptual distinction between church property and 
all other kinds of wealth, especially through the mechanism of the prohibition on alienation of 
church property,92 laws against simony,93 as well as a sharper conceptual distinction between 
temporal and spiritual church property.94 On the other hand, the canon law of patronage 
formalized and regularized the rights that would accrue to lay church donors, marking an 
apparent jurisdictional win for the Church as against the more unruly and lay-dominant propriety 
church system, but ultimately proving to pave the way for greater secular control over church 
governance.95 
 
Types of Church Wealth 
 
What were the kinds of properties under dispute in Reformation cases? Landed property 
formed a large proportion of Church wealth. These took the form of buildings for worship 
(cathedrals, churches, chapels), and residential buildings for monks, nuns, priests, the poor and 
infirm (monasteries, cloisters, parsonages, infirmaries, poor houses, hospitals).96 Also there were 
kinds of outposts owned by various institutions for hosting traveling clergy or administrators, for 
collecting tithes, and certain administrative functions (such as Zehnthöfe). As noted above, the 
Church Fabric was also a form of wealth, a fund with its own legal personality consisting of all 
incomes and wealth dedicated to the purpose of maintaining church buildings.97  
Church wealth also included income-yielding real properties, such as facilities for the 
production of goods that would be sold by the church institution (like wine).98 Land owned by 
the church—in the form of farms, homes, fields, grasslands, gardens, forests, pasturelands, also 
saltworks and mines—could also be held and managed by nobles, citizens and farmers who then 
paid various types of annuities, in the form of Zinsen (Lehenszinsen or Pachtzinsen)99 or Gefälle 
for the use of that land.100 Rente was another form of annuity that itself became the object of 
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speculation, and by the sixteenth century was “one of the most widely used legal devices for 
transfer of property rights.”101 It originated in the twelfth or thirteenth century, when landholders 
granted churches the right to annual deliveries of yields from their lands, in perpetuity. This 
“created in the grantee a property right in the land, and not just a personal obligation of the 
grantor.”102 If the grantor or future tenants of the land failed to deliver, the church had the right 
to take possession of the land. In the fifteenth century, increasingly these annual deliveries took 
the form of money rather than goods, and it became a widespread practice to buy and sell these 
rights to annual deliveries, often connected with the purchase or lease of land; a buyer would pay 
a certain price as a down payment for the land, with the remainder of the price to be paid in the 
form of annual deliveries of produce or money (Renten), on the understanding that failure to 
deliver would result in the possession of the land.103 Sometimes, a smaller church would be 
pledged as security for a loan, in most cases to a monastery or higher church.104 Usually there 
would be a fixed term for repayment, at which point the church would fall to the monastery.105 
The Church also gathered tithes (Zehnten) and other kinds of compulsory fees.106 By the 
ninth century, the paying of tithes had moved away from the previous model of being “a personal 
observance of the well-to-do,” with “its destination [...] largely a matter of choice” to becoming 
compulsory on all Christians, and a matter of “rights of particular churches over defined 
populations or territories.”107 “Tithes, firstfruits, baptism, and burial rights became pertinences of 
churches, part of their value as property.”108 Disputes about which church institution should 
receive the tithes of certain villages and communes were commonplace and persisted into our 
period. Tithes could be redirected, traded, exchanged, pawned, or sold.109 Tithe-districts more 
often aligned with their founders’ or owners’ lordship than with parish boundaries.110 Private 
church founders sometimes reserved the right to testate the tithe to another church, if they 
wished.111 The acquiring of new tithes “could give a new church and its lord a stake in the 
development of wider territory.”112 Over time, there was an increasing linking of tithe and 
territory, a shifting from being conceived as an obligation on a person “to pay tithe to a particular 
church depending [...] on where he lived” to being conceived as “a charge on specific lands 
regardless of who held them and where he received the sacraments.”113 This “made it easy to 
treat the tithe [...] as separate, negotiable bits of revenue like any rent.”114  
“Offerings,” fees and dues constituted another key source of revenue and therefore of 
church wealth. These depended to some extent on custom of a locality or region; “offerings 
could be elaborately distinguished according to who paid them and what was their occasion and 
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intention.”115 “Some were given by individuals for individual reasons, to fulfil a vow or as part 
of a penance; for a blessing on a pilgrim’s pack before leaving home, or on newly planted fruit 
trees or a new well; for an annual commemorative mass; or for more or less unavoidable 
occasions—marriage, baptism, burials.” Also, offerings were given at regular mass and at regular 
feasts. In some sense these offerings can be thought of as payment to a professional for his 
services to a client, though demanding payment of this kind was forbidden.116 Churches varied 
with the kinds of offerings, fees, and dues they were entitled to collect, based on what they were 
empowered and consecrated to carry out—if they had a burial ground, for example, or a 
baptismal font, or an altar for the church’s patron saint.117 Unlike tithes, these were less easily 
transferable and tradable, in part because they often were paid in church, in a liturgical 
context.118 So competition for offerings was often allocated at the time of consecration, or in the 
form of agreements between competing church-owners.119 And peasants for their part could 
exercise some choice on where their offerings went, more so than tithes.120 “By the eleventh 
century, with regional and local variations, [offerings] are regularly named in the charters as 
pertinences, along with tithes and lands.”121 
Church institutions owned a variety of precious objects (Kleinodien) for use in religious 
rites and devotions, such as reliquaries, liturgical gear, books, paintings, and statues.122  
Benefices (prebends, Pfründe) were ecclesiastical incomes. They were attached to certain 
offices (Amt) like rector of a parish, cathedral dignitaries, or canonries.123 These were also a form 
of wealth that could be traded, accumulated, redirected, confiscated, and claimed. It took the 
form of land, capital, or profit-bearing rights. In the late middle ages, the benefice varied in form 
and extent—some benefices did not include use of a parish house, while others had a residence, 
the right to collect tithes of a certain place, and incomes from various enterprises. Each parish 
received one parish benefice, but as the numbers of a congregation grew, the status of the church 
institution might change and draw increasingly more benefices. It was not uncommon for a priest 
to have multiple benefices; a priest with only one would probably have to supplement his income 
elsewhere.124 The right to a benefice was granted by a bishop.125 But a donor who endowed a 
benefice could make stipulations, such as that the benefice be restricted to the donor’s kin.126 
Also a donor might stipulate the “right of presentation—the right to present candidates to a post,” 
though in theory only the papal court could trump the power of the bishop to formally appoint.127 
Hence, when Protestants confiscated, they hoped to achieve total control of management of 
church personnel; by staking a claim on church incomes, they were also assuming control of the 
bishop’s and papacy’s functions.128  
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Church foundations and endowments (Stiftungen) were a major source of wealth for the 
Church, and the main source of the capital used for loans. These were endowments established 
by lay donors for particular purposes, such as for charitable institutions, for maintaining 
monasteries, or for the holding of a mass.129 The medieval church was in those times the only 
safe economic institution, so a donation was also a kind of retirement plan; donations to 
monasteries and houses of worship in exchange for room and board in a monastery until death, 
plus a burial, were not uncommon especially for the patriciate class.130 Donated endowments 
were also a way for noble classes to ensure financial wellbeing of their descendants: unmarried 
daughters of the noble and landed elite would have a secure place in a woman’s monastery.131  
 
Pre-Reformation Secularization Methods 
 
 Secularization and conversion of church property did not begin with the Reformation. For 
centuries, a variety of means—legal fictions, technical loopholes, as well as force and 
impunity—were used to displace church wealth from the hands of the church alone, or from the 
intended purposes of a certain fund of wealth, despite the prohibition on the alienation of church 
property. Kratsch calls this the “normalized violation of inalienability of church property” in the 
late medieval period: “the church property-grabbing Protestants could therefore call upon the 
‘models’ of Catholic territorial rulers in defending themselves against Emperor and Empire.”132 
The late middle ages produced the legal pathways, structures, instruments, and argumentation 
that made a reformation of the relation between church property and state authority possible.133 
Mikat argues that the practical and political development of these relations was prior to the 
theoretical or theological grounding or justification of them.134 Much of this secularization 
happened through secular rulers with territorial ambitions through indirect taxation, patronage 
rights, protector rights, among other methods. But some of this happened in collusion with 
church authorities.135  
 One key point to make here is that although we use “secularization” to refer to the 
varieties of ways in which church wealth was re-formed or re-purposed, secularization was just 
one form of doing so, or often the final step in a sequence of mechanisms. Lehnert identifies a 
processual sequence of first sequestration (including inventorying, a ban on selling), possession 
(confiscation of property without changing the dedicated purpose of that wealth), reformation 
(reformulating purpose of wealth for another pious objective), innovation (use of wealth for use 
in a broader definition of pious objective), cumulation (centralization and fusion of wealth with 
the common treasury), and secularization (worldly use of church property).136 
 The patronage system, for one, opened up pathways for a wide range of secularization 
techniques, especially starting in the fifteenth century, and ultimately to the development of 
Staatskirchenrecht (territorial governance of church institutions).137 Lay donors including princes 
increasingly became patrons specifically to be able to influence church governance of the 
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institutions in their domains.138 Princes would deliberately unite as many continuous patronages 
as they could in order to make a claim to the right to presentation of as many clerical posts in 
their region as they could.139 
 Also beginning in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some princes and territorial 
rulers began simply to claim prerogatives to be informed about or to have some kind of say in 
internal church matters especially concerning property, as part of a generalized lord-subject 
relationship,140 or in exchange for a generalized duty to protect (Schirmvogteirecht).141 Key was 
the work of inventorying church property and managing that information. Secular rulers would 
appoint an official whose task it was to manage this information.142 In many cases, these 
oversight privileges led incrementally to direct management of certain parts of church wealth, so 
that we have evidence already in the fifteenth century of territorial rulers taking in all incomes 
directed to a church, and apportioning out benefices, upkeep expenses, and keeping some for 
themselves, on their terms.143 Cities likewise sought to increase their oversight over church 
wealth by gaining control over a patronage.144 A lay representative would be selected by the 
commune or city council to administer the wealth that was specifically dedicated to upkeep and 
maintenance of the physical church.145  
 In some cases, agreements would be made between church institutions and secular rulers 
of localities that required ever more access to church wealth and to use of the monastery or 
building itself (as a fortress) in cases where churches were under direct threat and required 
military defense. Rulers in some cases regularized the steady flow of church monies into 
territorial coffers by charging fees, under the auspices of preparing defensive funds, despite 
canon law rules exempting spiritual goods from taxation.146 Cities were likewise successful at 
getting around the prohibition on taxation.147 Some rulers and cities would negotiate privileges to 
access monies of endowments for “other pious purposes” that had nothing to do with military 
defense and protection.148  
 In addition to using patronage rights, protective rights, and sovereign prerogative to 
inventory, control, and tax ever greater portions of church wealth, rulers and cities attempted “to 
restrict (or regulate) the flow of real property into Church hands.”149 Mortmain laws 
(Amortisationsgesetze), for instance, came into widespread use in the twelfth to fourteenth 
centuries. These were laws that forbade or required a ruler’s approval before property could be 
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sold with the condition of perpetual, inalienable ownership, something that at the time could only 
be done by a perpetual institution like the church.150 In addition to such territorial and municipal 
laws, we see increasingly from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that contracts of sale to a 
church provided evidence as a condition of sale that the seller had the right to buy back the 
property; in some cases, rulers would claim this so-called right of repurchase (Rückkaufsrecht) 
regarding real estate that had never belonged to them.151 
 Finally, there were practices among late medieval clergy and certain financial instruments 
and practices of church institutions themselves that provided pathways to secularization and 
conversion of church property. To the extent there was a redirecting of benefices and 
endowments from founding purposes, this contributed to a general slackening of standards 
around alienation of property.152 The practice by clergy of taking in multiple benefices, and 
appointing vicars to carry out daily activities of a parish, was a kind of conversion.153 Even more 
explicit was the institution of the commendam (Kommende), a canon law method for redirecting 
a benefice to a third party without transferring the duties of office originally attached to the 
benefice.154 Another form of conversion of church property purposes was incorporation 
(Inkorporation), the legal process of subsuming wealth and funds of smaller churches into higher 
churches and monasteries, usually due to financial need of the higher church, a university, or a 
monastery.155 
 On the eve of the Reformation, the contradictions of the overall church property system 
contributed to the Church’s “vulnerability.”156 “This monetary tangle harmed the Church’s image 
with laypeople: an impoverished local priesthood seemed to offer a poor service for the money 
that it demanded; much of what was levied effectively ‘disappeared’ into enclosed monasteries 
or the arcane areas of higher education or administration. In spite of gifts prodigally given to 
some sectors of the Church, the institution as a whole managed to appear simultaneously 
impoverished, grasping, and extravagant.”157 At the same time, the rise of lay charitable 
institutions in the late middle ages set up a contrast with the economic basis and “moral 
sensibility” of church institutions; “this new world valued service over mediation, instruction 
over ritual, and thrift over display.”158 
 Ocker argues that the Peasants’ War indirectly “accelerated lay designs on church 
dominion, under the cover of traditional religious obligations” by provoking evangelically-
inclined church patrons and territorial rulers to take defensive action against the plundering and 
iconoclasm of rebel armies.159 Protestant princes and cities opportunistically confiscated church 
property in the name of protection. Ironically, “it was the protectors who posed the enduring 
threat to the material basis of the church.”160 This is important: to the extent princes and cities 
were confiscating church property in the Reformation period, their actions were often continuous 
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with the methods and techniques of the late medieval period; these intrusions were “variants on a 
recognized theme, and the mere fact of encroachment did not really distinguish the new 
church.”161 What had changed was not the forms—legal and otherwise—but the substance of 
their designs on the uses of church wealth: especially the aim to install and support evangelical 
preachers, to empty monasteries of their clergy, and to use wealth for a variety of pious and 
sometimes not-so-pious purposes.162  
 Thus, in terms of law, it is no surprise that churches would have responded to these 
claims and confiscations as they had throughout the previous century or two, bringing disputes 
concerning church property to a wide variety of forums and tribunals. “In most of the West, from 
the eighth century onwards, we find rulers’ or public courts—or increasingly, ad hoc assemblies 
of laymen and ecclesiastics—dealing with claims to churches as they would with claims to land, 
by the same processes and on the same grounds.”163  
 
Jurisdiction 
 
 In many Reformation cases, plaintiffs sued for violations of their jurisdictional rights. 
Jurisdiction refers broadly not just to the right to adjudicate disputes or pass legislation 
concerning certain places, people, or subjects. Rather, it includes the whole range of rights and 
privileges that accrue to people, offices, institutions, or polities. The sources of these rights and 
privileges were multifarious and varied.  
 In some of the Reformation cases, one party or another would argue that the dispute 
belonged before an ecclesiastical court or a temporal court. But this is only one kind of 
jurisdictional dispute to be found in the Reformation cases.  
 More frequently, jurisdictional disputes in the Reformation cases concerned issues of 
control over property, the authority to tax, to wage wars, to appoint preachers, to discipline 
personnel in spiritual or worldly institutions, to punish citizens, to provide protection (Schutz und 
Schirm), to change laws, or broadly to do things differently than they had been done before.164 
More than the binary of spiritual and temporal, the important categories in these disputes had to 
do with lordship rights (both “high” and “low”), patronage rights, and the relative supremacy of 
different kinds of rulers including prince, prince-bishop, bishop, abbott or abbess, provost, dean, 
capital, mayor and city council, among others. 
 While in many ways the spiritual/temporal binary was insufficient for describing the 
German lands’ “settings of extreme physical, social, economic, and cultural diversity,”165 
nonetheless, the binary mattered as a discursive framework.166 Even though the binary on its own 
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settled very little when it came to resolving hard jurisdictional disputes, to the extent “spiritual” 
and “temporal” were terms in which disputes about jurisdiction were conceptualized, it is 
important to understand something about them, which will be summarized in the first part of this 
section. 
 Understanding the spiritual/temporal framework is also necessary in order to understand 
the significance of the protesting estates’ claims that the Imperial Chamber Court had no 
jurisdiction over disputes involving them because those disputes were “matters of religion.” As 
we will see in Chapter 4, this jurisdictional argument called for a deliberative, conciliar forum 
outside of the papal ecclesiastical court hierarchy. 
 Beginning in the eleventh century, and continuing into the late medieval period on the 
eve of the Reformation, the Church had both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Its civil jurisdiction 
was defined in terms of personal status and the substantive issue. The Church had competence in 
all legal matters concerning clergy, over all disputes concerning crusaders, the poor, orphans, 
and widows, as well as travelers, merchants, and mariners, as well as Jews.167 The privilegium 
fori for clergy would only be stripped if there was first a degradation of the clergy (a formal 
removal of his rights by the Church, or if the cleric himself laid off his clerical garments); in 
other words, even a heavy crime itself did not justify the prosecution of a cleric by a worldly 
court.168 Lay persons could sue other lay persons in ecclesiastical court, provided both parties 
agreed to submit to its decision; this latter condition was often a legal fiction in places where no 
worldly forum could provide real recourse.169  
 In terms of substance, the Church had jurisdiction over all causae spirituales which 
included disputes concerning marriage, church offices and church incomes, as well as causae 
spiritualibus annexae, which included such issues as patronage, disputes about marital property, 
legitimacy disputes, tithe and inheritance matters, accusations of usury, as well as any contracts 
or claims that were empowered or based on oaths or vows.170 Any dispute in which one party 
accused another of a sinful deed could be brought before an ecclesiastical court “ratione peccati” 
(because of sins),171 in other words, “if the salvation of souls were at stake.”172 Also, in cases of a 
worldly court denying justice (Rechtsverweigerung, iustitia denegata) church courts had 
competence.173 These broad, open-ended pathways to church jurisdiction meant that in the 
medieval period practically any worldly dispute could find its way into a church court.174 
 When it came to criminal jurisdiction, church courts had competence over such matters as 
apostasy, heresy, simony, sacrilege, false oath, perjury, divorce, incest, bigamy, and rape.  There 
were also “mixed delicts” that could be handled by both worldly and church courts, which 
included blasphemy, counterfeiting, and violation of godly peace (treuga Dei).175 The categorical 
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separation of criminal and civil procedure in church courts happened first in the thirteenth 
century.176 
 Beginning in the eleventh century certain instruments and institutions emerged that 
would extend church jurisdiction. The treuga Dei or pax Dei was an obligation established by the 
Church in the era of heightened feuding that required a ceasefire from Wednesday evening to 
Monday morning, as well as during certain holy periods, and the protection of clerics, monks, 
nuns, women, crusaders, farmers, and merchants.177 The sanction for violation was 
excommunication and interdict (banning from participating in certain rites). Another instrument 
was that of sanctuary, according to which all churches and certain privileged places would be 
places of perpetual peace, and therefore completely off limits to violent invasion, even by 
worldly authorities who would seek a person who had committed worldly crimes.178 Beginning 
in the thirteenth century, and increasingly in centuries following, decretals were promulgated 
providing for exceptions to the application of sanctuary law, as worldly rulers’ claims to pursue 
criminals in their jurisdiction led to more and more exceptions, and the weakening of the overall 
institution of sanctuary.179  
 Beginning in the fourteenth century, secular rulers created competing legal instruments 
designed to undermine or limit ecclesiastical jurisdiction. For instance, the institution of recursus 
ab abusu empowered a territorial authority to force a church judge to reverse a judgment 
considered unjust, to pay satisfaction (Genugtuung) to the party wrongly judged, and in some 
cases, the territorial authority could detain that judge.180 Also, some localities promulgated laws 
forbidding the delivery of letters and court documents from spiritual judges to their subjects.181 
The goal of some of these measures was to prevent the possibility of spiritual courts claiming 
“custom” in the future.182 Part of the territorializing work of secular rulers was to try to put into 
writing their rights against the backdrop of this fluid political landscape, especially through 
claims of custom, and to enforce their position as a ruler concerned with the wellbeing of the 
church, the logic being that the reason for limiting spiritual jurisdiction was because if the clergy 
were too involved in material matters, it would sink their spiritual status.183 This kind of 
competition of spiritual and worldly did not happen to the same extent in spiritual territories, 
where bishops were also the territorial rulers and therefore civil matters were often in spiritual 
courts.184 
 Even at the time when the principle of privilegium fori was most clearly defined and 
legislated in the thirteenth century, we see that clergy themselves would flout the rule, by suing 
both other clergy and lay people in royal courts, or not challenging the jurisdiction of a worldly 
court if they were sued. In the late medieval period, privilegium fori also began to be undermined 
in a variety of ways. These were incremental changes. For example, according to the important 
legal compilation The Mirror of Saxony, in certain financial and debt cases involving clergy, a 
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worldly judge could adjudicate.185 This was in contrast to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
when financial and debt cases would be adjudicated in church court; even if a city or territory 
started a proceeding against a cleric, the spiritual court could claim jurisdiction and declare all of 
the proceedings null.186 Cities sometimes tried to pass statutes against the privilegium fori, but 
would then be placed in excommunication and interdict.187 In some cases, the privilegium fori 
was negotiated away as a concession to territorial princes made for certain kinds of other 
privileges and protections.188 
 Location also played a role in the competence of a church court. In general, the place of 
residence of the plaintiff determined which church court had original jurisdiction. But other 
markers could play a role, such as the location of a dispute, the location in which a contract was 
made, or the location in which a crime occurred.189 Territorial rulers sometimes claimed 
jurisdiction over a matter that would substantively otherwise belong in a church court based on 
the principle forum rei sitae (the forum where the thing is situated).190  
 Though there was a hierarchical court system—from lower church courts subject to a 
Bishop, to Bishop courts, to Metropolitan courts, to Super-Metropolitian courts, all the way up to 
the Papal Court— the latter had universal jurisdiction, which meant that at any time in a 
proceeding, a party could bring a dispute there in the first instance, or the Papal Court could pull 
a case to it at any stage of a proceeding.191 Reform efforts in the fifteenth century sought to limit 
the instances in which ordinary hierarchy could be bypassed in this way.192 Importantly, 
interspersed within and around this hierarchy were jurisdictional privileges given by the Pope for 
other kinds of courts specific to certain localities and institutions, such as universities, cathedral 
capitals, and monastic orders.193 The Pope also appointed delegated judges called Conservators 
whose jurisdiction sometimes cut into and limited the legal competences of existing church 
courts.194 Some scholars argue that this increasing use of particularizing forms of jurisdiction 
contributed to the undermining of the overall unity and coherence of the church court system.195 
 
Patterned Particularism in Jurisdiction and Property Arrangements 
 
 Statutes on jurisdiction frequently did not align with actual legal relations; law in the 
books is more helpful for determining how church and worldly authorities wanted things to be, 
or what they each regarded as encroachments, rather than describing how things were actually 
done.196 The statutes themselves were also in flux across period and locality as the relative might 
and legitimacy of spiritual and secular authority waxed and waned.197    
 But there is more to this story than the gap between law in the books and law in action. 
Rather, the particularism of jurisdictional and property arrangements was built into the legal 
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norms and legal culture ordering it. Matters of jurisdiction were variously settled through war 
and feud, imperial mandate or privilege, arbitration and treaties,198 custom and historical 
usage,199 or contracts. In this way, questions of jurisdiction straddled the anachronistic categories 
of public and private law.200  
 Questions of property and jurisdiction were often tightly linked. The basis of the property 
and jurisdictional configurations at play in the Reformation cases is best understood through the 
entanglements of ecclesiastical geography, political geography, and personal histories. There 
were patterned but idiosyncratic ways in which individuals pieced together livelihoods, how 
institutions pieced together incomes, and how customary, local, political configurations 
conditioned what was and what was not possible. The configurations of property and jurisdiction 
were intricate and irregular, homologous to the political configurations of the Empire as a whole 
in this moment. 
 This also meant that the impact on church property in the Reformation was not total and 
sweeping but piecemeal.201 As Ocker writes: “Without a true monarchy, the links between 
aristocracies, princes, cities, and other regional authorities varied all the more. These links were 
the very substance of German political life. The connections of aristocratic networks to 
monasteries, cathedral chapters, and collegiate churches conditioned both resistance to 
confiscation and success. […] Ultimately, one must try to determine not just how the church lost 
property but how the redistribution of property affected these lateral relationships.”202  
 
 
Patchwork Jurisprudence 
 
 With rare exception, the Reformation cases in the Imperial Chamber Court made hardly 
any reference to the three sources of law of the early 1520s—the Bulls, the Worms Edict, and the 
Regiment Mandate. Litigants in the Reformation cases also rarely cited the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
the authoritative Roman law compilation, as a source of substantive law, though the Court was 
operating according to the norms of Romano-canonical procedure.203 
 Rather, the sources of law cited in the Reformation cases ranged from references as broad 
as “the Holy Empire’s laws,” to the details of specific ancient privileges; from the customary 
standards on the duties and rights of lordship, to the details of a certain endowment; from norms 
around the inviolability of imperial protection, to the terms of a treaty. After 1526, litigants on 
both sides of an issue increasingly cited the legislation promulgated at imperial assemblies, 
Recesses. We can broadly categorize these sources of law under the headings of peace, property, 
and jurisdiction. 
 Litigants always invoked multiple sources of law, and as the case progressed, layers of 
law were often added. Sometimes, this came in the form of allegations that a defendant party had 
failed to adhere to the terms of a Court mandate, or had continued its illegal behavior despite the 
pending proceeding, resulting in fresh accusations or to proceeding in contumacy. In other cases, 
improper technical form or invalid uses of legal instruments would become central to a case, 
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sometimes relegating the substantive issues with which the case was launched to secondary 
importance. 
 What will become clear as we proceed through the Reformation cases discussed here is 
that the validity of all of these sources of law, and the relative priority of them, was not settled in 
advance; as in litigation in other times and places, precisely the argumentative labor in most of 
these cases was to stake a meta-legal claim about which facts of a story were pertinent, which 
interpretations of a given law were valid, and which laws mattered more than others. Some of the 
character of these claims was shaped by the particular context of litigation, in which parties were 
geared to achieve a certain outcome—to win a case, to claim certain rights, to settle certain facts, 
to secure one’s interpretation of events. Some of the character of these claims was shaped by the 
legal pluralism and legal culture of the Empire, in which particular, ostensibly private law cases 
had the capacity to take on broader importance, whether as a matter of public or constitutional 
law (such as it was) or as a site for staking claims that would matter in other cases. 
 In this context, the narratio—the description of the events in question—was of the 
utmost importance. The narratio itself played a large role in the judicature of the Court, because 
whether or not a particular concrete situation was an instance of a violation of the various laws in 
question was the core of the litigants’ argumentative labor.204 As a result of this central role of 
the narratio, there was plenty of opportunity for litigants to insert language into a proceeding 
that had no explicit legal relevance to their case, perhaps in the expectation that doing so would 
have an impact on the outcome nonetheless, for example as a form of aggravating factor. While 
the narration was thus a normalized mode of affective speech in litigation, in the Reformation 
cases, this form of speech took on a particular character. The Reformation cases are thus dotted 
with the language of pious rebuke, as, for instance, a plaintiff highlighting the violent irreverence 
and invented teachings of the defendant, while the defendant underlines the financial 
mismanagement and absenteeism of the plaintiff. In the process, the Court became a site in 
which pious forms of mutual rebuke and accusation were declared and registered. 
 In the remainder of the chapter, I offer a detailed account of the sources of law cited in 
Reformation-related litigation. This analysis reveals an enormous range and heterogeneity of 
claims. Given how much ground is covered in the litigation, the absence of reference to the 
recent legislation responding to the Lutheran challenges is all the more striking.  
Writing about case files poses certain challenges of presentation. On the one hand, the 
ordered, articulated structure of the case files on its face demands a methodical presentation that 
stays close to the procedural back-and-forth of this type of litigation. Otherwise, details of 
argumentation, response, and counter-response get lost, simply too difficult to keep track of. On 
the other hand, the analytical interest in identifying patterns across cases seems to require a 
willingness to depart from the order of the case file itself, and to move from one case file to 
another under different thematic headings. I have chosen a middle path to reconcile these two 
competing demands. For each point of analysis, I present one core exemplary case. This allows 
me to keep the coherence of the case file’s procedural and narrative flow, while highlighting 
points of analysis. Each case is evidence of many things, and so as we proceed through a given 
case, threads will appear that were discussed in more length in another case, but that apply 
equally to the case at hand. 
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Suing on the Basis of the Worms Edict 
 
 Although the Worms Edict, and the other high-profile legislation of the early 1520s 
discussed in Chapter 2, found little usage in the Reformation cases, there is at least one 
exception. 
 In 1529, Johann Fabri, the parish priest at Lindau’s St. Stephan church, sued the mayor 
and city council of the imperial city of Lindau. 205 Fabri held a number of other important titles. 
He was vicar for the Bishop of Constance since 1517, chaplain to the brother of the Emperor, 
Ferdinand, beginning in 1522, and himself the Bishop of Vienna in 1530.  
 Luther’s teachings had begun to be taught and preached about in Lindau around 1522. In 
1524, the city demanded that Fabri give the full parish priestship to Siegmund Rötlin, who Fabri 
had appointed as his vicar, but who turned out to be a follower of the “new teachings.” Not only 
was the commune inclined to these teachings, but they felt it was wrong that Fabri continued to 
receive income as the parish priest, while he was never in the city, busy with the work of serving 
both the Bishop and the Archduke Ferdinand.206 
 Beginning in 1525, Fabri launched a series of actions against the city of Lindau. First, 
Fabri tried to bring heretical preachers in front of the spiritual court of the Bishop of Constance 
in 1525. Despite multiple summons sent to Lindau, and even a warning from the Archduke 
Ferdinand, Lindau did not send their preachers to appear in the court.207 Second, Fabri appealed 
to the Reichsregiment to order that Lindau provide him a letter guaranteeing safe passage 
(Geleitsbrief) so that he could enter Lindau without fear.208  
 Third, Fabri launched two suits against Lindau for the evasion of tithes. In the first one, 
pending in the Imperial Chamber Court from 1525-1526, Johann Fabri sued not only the mayor 
and council of Lindau, but also four communes that were branch locations of the parish of 
Lindau (Aeschach, Schachen, Schönau, and Rickenbach).209 In the second one, which will be 
discussed here, Fabri sued Lindau, and the case ended up litigating the question of whether the 
dispute was a matter of religion. 
 According to Fabri’s Petitio Summaria, submitted in the Summer of 1529, Fabri had had 
legal title in the parish at Lindau for many years, and had, during that time, rightfully used all 
priestly rights, incomes, and usages due to him as legal priest there.210 These were “belonging to 
him, and not belonging to anyone else” and “had always been used without any hindrance.” 
Despite this, Lindau had, since 1524, begun to disturb, confiscate, and plunder the parish church, 
St. Stephan, doing so on its own authority, without legal recognition.211 The city appointed 
misguided preachers, one Thomas from Bludenz, Austria, and Joachim Gagell, who had been 
chased away and cast out of localities elsewhere, on account of their unchristian actions which 
they committed in the 1525 Peasant Uprising. The city, by appointing them, gave them 
permission to all of the incomes, usages, and rights that were in fact Fabri’s. Furthermore, when 
Fabri sent several Christian priests and lawyers to Lindau, assigning to them the administration 
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of his parish, and warned the Lindauers “in a princely and fatherly way” to cease their actions—
Lindau disobeyed, refused to allow into the city those people that Fabri had sent. The city 
effectively stripped Fabri of all of his rights as a parish priest, blocking even his attempts to send 
in new administrators, and illegally gave themselves the authority to appoint not only an 
administrator, but also preachers, according to their preferences; and to take in the parish’s 
incomes and distribute them according to their own wishes. All of these actions, Fabri’s lawyer 
alleged, violated (1) the common law, (2) the imperial order and constitution, (3) the Land-
Peace, (4) the Imperial Edict of Worms, and (5) the 1526 imperial Recess of Speyer.212 The city 
was ordered to cease those actions, or else face a penalty of 40 marks lötigen golds.  
 This is the only case I have seen in which the Worms Edict was explicitly cited by the 
plaintiff as one of the laws of which the defendant was allegedly in violation. But to which action 
did it specifically apply? Most likely, it was meant to apply specifically to the appointment of the 
“misguided preachers.” But even that claim was connected with the larger frame of the suit as a 
dispute about the administration rights of a parish church, including the right to appoint priests 
and direct its incomes and usages. Fabri gave no other language to his reference to the Worms 
Edict. It is noteworthy that the Edict, on its own, was not regarded even by this plaintiff and his 
lawyers as sufficient basis for bringing a suit to the Imperial Chamber Court. In addition, as we 
will see, after the protesting estates entered the suit and declared it a matter of religion, Fabri was 
put in the position of having to downplay precisely those elements that would have made the 
Worms Edict relevant to the case. 
 
Lindau’s Response Declining the Forum  
 
  In November 1529, Lindau submitted its Exceptiones Fori Deklinatori, objections 
declining the jurisdiction of the Court.213 Their submission cited an imperial privilege which said 
that the city could only be sued in front of certain judges.214 The case, they said, should therefore 
be nullified and remanded to their “privileged judge” (gefreite Richter), in this case, the city 
council of the imperial city of Constance,215 to whom they said Fabri had already consented as 
the proper forum for this case. They included four documents as evidence of this.216 Fabri failed 
                                               
212 Munich 5083, Q3, “Petitio Summaria,” 1529: “alles gemeinem rechten und der Reichs reformation 
ordnung Landfrieden und dem key. Edict zu Wormbs ußgangen darzu auch dem key. und des heiligen Reichs 
speierischen Abscheidt so im 26 Jar uffgericht zuwider und vielangezognem d. johan fabri zu merglichem schaden 
und Nachteill.” 
213 Munich 5083, Q5, “Exceptiones Fori Declinatori,” 1529. 
214 Munich 5083, Q13 and Q15 were submitted as evidence of Lindau’s privileges from 1452, renewed in 
1521. 
215 Constance was Zwinglian. 
216 Munich 5083, documents marked c, d, e, and f (Q8, Q9, Q10, and Q11). Q8 is the document that Lindau 
submitted as evidence to show that Fabri had agreed to discuss whether to bring their dispute before the privileged 
judge (gefreite Richter). In this letter, Fabri let Lindau know that he was escalating the dispute by proceeding against 
them legally since they had not responded to his good-faith efforts. However, “so that you do not claim later as if I 
wanted to cheat you out of your freedoms, therefore it is my desire to come to an understanding with you” to litigate 
the matter either before one of the gefreite Richter, or in front of the Imperial Chamber Court, and to ensure that if 
the messenger from the Imperial Chamber Court came with a summons, that he would have safe passage or not. In 
Q9 (dated Monday after Bartholomew 1525) we see Lindau’s response to Fabri accepting the proposition to pursue 
the dispute in front of the mayor and city council of Constance, according to their privilege. In Q10 we see a letter 
from Lindau to Constance requesting them to accept the dispute in their court, saying that Fabri had invited them to 
resolve the dispute in court, and they had suggested Constance as judges. Q11 (dated August 30, 1525) is 
Constance’s acceptance of this. Constance wrote: “We received your letter concerning the future legal proceedings 
 97 
to disclose his having earlier agreed to have the case pursued in one of the courts named in 
Lindau’s imperial privilege. 
  After declining the forum, the city went on to address the “ungrounded” and “false 
narration” which was the basis of Fabri’s petition and the Court’s mandate. In pursuing this 
mandate, Dr. Fabri committed subreption (stated untruths) and obreption (covered over or was 
silent on certain truths). First, the city denied that they acted with self-authority, or that they 
confiscated the benefices and incomes of the parish, or that they drove Fabri away. Rather, the 
mayor and council of Lindau had been loyal to Dr. Fabri, in the hope that he, as a loyal pastor, 
would stay and support the commune in emergencies and at times of death (referring most likely 
to the plague). This, however, did not happen. Over their many well-intentioned requests and 
demands that Fabri come to Lindau and to not abandon them in their death emergencies, “as he 
was obligated to do by God and righteousness,” nonetheless, Fabri did not come to them.217 Fabri 
violated “both godly and spiritual laws” according to which a cleric is given shelter and 
compensation in exchange for doing his duty and carrying out the services linked to his office. 
Fabri thus covered over the fact of his own absenteeism, especially at times of desperate need. 
The city also denied that they had not given safe passage to the administrators that Fabri had 
sent, and they included two documents indicating not only that they had given them safe passage, 
but that Fabri knew about it.218  
  One of those documents is a copy of the letter of safe passage that Lindau had sent to 
Fabri in 1526.219 At the beginning of the letter, Lindau said that it was giving this letter in 
response to the order of the Reichsregiment and on the request of Fabri, to allow Dr. Fabri—who 
was in Lindau “to preach the holy Gospels”—safe passage.220 But in the document, Lindau went 
on to express their serious concerns about doing so. “We have no lack of disputes and conflicts 
around the true word of God and the Gospels,” they said, and having Fabri or his appointees in 
the city, no matter how worthy of persons they were, would ultimately be more dangerous than 
useful to the city.221 Still, Lindau said, the city gave safe passage letters to Fabri and his servants 
out of obedience to Roman imperial majesty. 
  In his response to the Exceptiones, which is extensively damaged, we see indications that 
Fabri challenged all of the points raised by the city. For instance, Fabri denied the claim that he 
was an absentee priest, noting that he had personally delivered sermons in Lindau on the Gospels 
thousands of times.222 
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  In 1531, Lindau submitted the Mandatum Constitutionis Generalis of the Protesting 
Estates, appointing Dr. Hirter and Licentiate Helfmann as their attornies, in which it was 
indicated that they now considered the dispute a “matter of religion.”223 We will return to Fabri’s 
response to this claim in Chapter 4.  
  In 1540, the Court renewed the Mandate against Lindau.224 While the case file is murky 
as to the circumstances of this renewal, in early 1541, Lindau responded to the Mandate with a 
letter explaining to the Court why they were not obligated to proceed.225 “This obviously and 
undeniably is a religion matter” they wrote. The Court, by issuing this Mandate, was going 
against and not conforming to the various imperial and kingly treaties, decrees, and 
compromises, and the various notifications of the same, both in and out of law that required a 
pause to all such cases. Furthermore, Lindau said that the Court knew that they, along with 
“other estates of the Christian understanding,” had recused the judges in all and every religion 
matter, for good reasons.226 The suit never reached the litis contestatio stage. 
 
The Holy Empire’s Laws, the City’s Duty and Oaths 
 
 When, as we saw in the introduction to this chapter, the Fiscal sued the city of Erfurt for 
allegedly failing to stop and in some cases facilitating the attacks on the clergy, for failing to 
prosecute or punish culprits, and for forcing the two collegiate churches to agree to sacrifice 
financial autonomy and large sums of wealth in exchange for nominal protection, he did so on 
the basis of several legal standards.227 In doing these things, he argued, the city violated “honor, 
law, propriety, the holy Empire’s laws,” as well as the city’s “own duty and oaths.”228  
When the Fiscal cited “the Holy Empire’s laws” as one of the sources of law of which the 
city of Erfurt was in violation, he was gesturing to a set of customary standards and legal 
documents that made up the constitution of the Empire. One component of this constitutional 
order was the Golden Bull of 1356, cited in several Reformation cases, which outlined the 
procedure for the election of the Emperor, and fixed the exact number and identity of the seven 
Electors. It also regulated the succession to the Electorates based on primogeniture, and “forbade 
the territory of the Electorate to be reduced or subdivided in any way,” thus laying “down the 
principle that the Electoral dignity went together with possession of the Electoral territory, 
thereby reversing the earlier view that the Imperial arch-offices of state were the main 
determinants of Electoral dignity.”229 Though the terms of the Golden Bull did not directly play a 
role in the Erfurt case, it was “the first of the fundamental laws of the Empire,” a precondition 
for the ones that followed.230 To say that Erfurt was in violation of it in this case was to gesture 
to the very foundation of the constitutional order. Another component of the constitutional order, 
also cited in several cases, were the reforms of 1495, in particular the Eternal Land-Peace which, 
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among other things, forbade all feuding between Estates and set up the Imperial Chamber Court 
to judge in disputes that violated the terms of that Peace. But the Fiscal did not lean heavily on a 
Land-Peace argument in this case; he did not insist that these actions were a violation of the 
Land-Peace specifically.  
Rather, the city of Erfurt behaved in a way that violated its “own duty and oaths,” as well 
as “honor, law, propriety,” and “the holy Empire’s laws.” Duty and Oath (Pflicht und Eid) 
always referred to the lordship relationship. Arguably, the Fiscal’s claim was that the city of 
Erfurt, in violating its “duty and promise” to protect the clergy of the city, violated something at 
once more fundamental and more particularistic than the Land-Peace legislation. Its “duty and 
promise” was more fundamental because it gestured to an implicit set of norms around the 
seriousness and gravity of oaths, the responsibilities of lordship vis-a-vis vulnerable subjects, as 
well as the special protection warranted to those of the spiritual estate—an aggravating factor in 
the city’s negligence. It was more particularistic because it implicated a long-running 
jurisdictional competition with the Archbishop of Mainz about who had lordship over the clergy 
there.231  
 
Rebukes Against Clergy  
  
The Fiscal’s case against Erfurt rested primarily on stabilizing the facts which, if true, 
would speak for themselves as the sorts of behaviors warranting censure in the generalized laws 
and lordship customs of the imperial order. The responses by the city contained not only formal 
challenges on matters of legal procedure, but also attempts to deny the factual claims made by 
the Fiscal, attempts, that is, to tell an alternative story of the events.  
 The city stressed that it had had a friendly relationship with the clergy, while at the same 
time referencing the clergy’s own role in the animosity and attacks. Specifically, the city’s 
account contained rebukes of the clergy’s privileges against taxation, gestured obliquely to 
liberties they had taken with regards to Erfurt subjects in their spiritual jurisdiction, and 
highlighted discord amongst the clergy themselves (likely referring to the reforming elements of 
the city’s clergy), such that some of the mob in question in fact were clerical students.232 
 In February 1522, the city submitted a Protestatio und Exceptiones document. In it, they 
asked the Court to nullify the Citatio and summons sent out to them, on the grounds that the 
imperial Fiscal’s accusations against them were unfounded. Interestingly, they said it was 
unlikely that the clergy intended by requesting the Emperor’s help to thereby accuse Erfurt of the 
attacks; instead, they suggested that the Fiscal was aggressively exercising his prerogative to 
prosecute even where no request had been made to sue anyone in particular. Responding to the 
first of the substantive allegations, the city denied that it had had any involvement in the attacks 
on the clergy.233 Indeed, the city itself had received reports of “rebellious defiant acts by several 
                                               
231 For more on this background, see Weiss and Scribner, “Civic Unity.” Though not a litigant in this case, 
the Archbishop was mentioned throughout as having played a direct role in the provenance of this proceeding, and 
was party to the Treaty of Hammelburg (see below). 
232 For a discussion of the complicated alliances in the city of Erfurt at this moment, see Bob Scribner, 
“Anticlericalism and the Cities,” in Peter A. Dykema and Heiko A. Oberman, eds., Anticlericalism in Late Medieval 
and Early Modern Europe (Leiden, New York, Cologne: Brill, 1993), 151. See also Branz, 126ff; and Scribner, 
“Civic Unity,” 40. 
233 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “es sey gantz on, und mag sich in der 
warheit nymer erfinden, das Burgermeister rats und gemeinde der stat erffurt die geistlicheyt ye uberfallen, ihr 
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priests, knights, students and other frivolous, unknown persons” who had “amassed together at 
night in Erfurt, captured and damaged clergy houses, and carried out their wantonness and 
outrages in them.”234 By the time the city council had become aware of these attacks, the group 
had already left, and the city appointed guards to protect against further damage. But by the time 
the guards had reached that place, it said, attacks had begun in other places. Eventually, the 
group fled so the city was unable to punish them immediately. “Indeed, that is how the uproar 
dissolved away and was thereby stilled, and nothing further came of it.”235 The city swore that it 
had had no prior knowledge of the attacks, that as soon as they had been made aware of it, they 
“did not neglect to mobilize our citizens to defense,” and “to this day, we strive to punish those 
suspected of participating in it who are under our jurisdiction.”236  
 Responding to the second of the substantive allegations, concerning the taking of clergy 
money and pressing them to sign the agreement, the city alleged subreption and obreption on the 
part of the imperial Fiscal, and offered an alternative account that showed that the clergy 
institutions there in Erfurt, far from being forced, willingly agreed to pay off a portion of the 
city’s debts. According to the city, some time before, they had approached the churches seeking 
“advice and aid” (Rat und Hilff), as the city found itself with a burden of extreme cash debt,237 in 
part due to a new taxation scheme promulgated at the 1521 Imperial Diet.238 According to the 
city, not long after the attacks described above, the deans said that they had come to the 
realization that “if the city of Erfurt deteriorates, that likely the same would happen to the two 
collegiate churches.”239 And so these foremost representatives of the clergy in Erfurt authorized 
the rescue of the city of Erfurt, as well as their own and church property—not only to ensure the 
city’s ability to defend and protect them, but “also in consideration of the fact that for years, they 
had kept to themselves the property of many citizens, and had neglected paying taxes toward the 
                                               
hewser aufgestossen sie an irn guetern oder personen beschedigt verwaltigt oder in einichen andern weg gem inen 
gefrevelt, …sonderlich auch ganz on, das sie inen einich gelt verschreibung oder anders abgetrungen uberfallen 
vergeweltigen beschedigen oder betrungen lassen haben.” 
234 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “ein widerlichs geposell von etlichen 
pfaffen knechten studenten und andern leichtfertigen unbekannten menschen, bey nechtlicher weyl in erffurt 
zusamen geheufft haben, in etliche der geistlichen heuser gefangen sein darinnen mutwillen und frevell geübt und 
beschedigt haben.”  
235 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “doch so zerging die auffrur und wurd 
damit gestillt und weyters nichts darauß.” 
236 Wernigerode F37, Q5, “Littere Excusatorie,” 1523: “Wir mugen aber ewer key. mayt …mit warheit 
berichtenn das wir vor der that und geschicht vonn solcher furgenommenen conspiration und auffrur kein wissens 
gehabt als wir aber hernach derselbigen inne wordenn, und vorstendigt, habenn wir nicht unterlassenn, unsere 
burgere inn harnisch zuerfordern und denn thethernn mit allem vleyß nach zutrachten also das wir unns hierinen nit 
anders dan geburlich und unvorwislich wie auch unsers verhoffens die geistligkeit selbst nit anders sagen, wurde 
oder konte, wo die jenigen so unverdechtig darumb gefragt wurden ertzaigt und gehalten trachtenn auch nach heuth 
zu tage so viel zu nen(?) mugelich denn jenigen so bey diesser auffrur sollen gewest und unserm gerichts zwang 
unterworffenn sein, nach uns jegenn dieselbigen wo wir sie erfaren konthenn mit ernster und geburlicher straff 
zuerzeigenn.” 
237 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “Vor etlichen zeiten mag ein ersamer rat 
bey denn stiefften zuerkennen gegeben haben irn und gemeiner stat grossen last der ubermessigen gelt schulden, 
damit sie jedoch an ir verschulden beschwert weren und sie umb rat und hilff in solch angelangt haben.” 
238 Wernigerode F37, Q5, “Littere Excusatorie,” 1523: “wie e. key mayt auß dem mannigfeltigem ansuchen 
ßo jungst zu wormbs widder unns geschiehenn sunder zweyfel vormargkt habenn, und unnser Burgerlichenn und 
weltlichenn guther halbenn ßo sie ein zceit her in grosser zcal zu sich bracht und der stat zenßbar gewest do durch 
der stat einkommenn merglich geringert.” 
239 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “so hetten sie inen bedacht, wo gemeine 
stat erffurt zuverderben mocht komen, das es als dan mit den beyden stiefften versehenlich auch bescheen macht.” 
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common treasury and other civil duties”—by paying up to 10,000 gulden worth of the city’s 
debts.240 This the city accepted with great gratitude, and guaranteed again to those 
representatives their safety and security.241 The clergy agreed to this “willingly, not with any 
distress or powerful fear.”242 It was on the basis of this friendly agreement that the city denied 
that this suit launched by the imperial Fiscal could have been brought at the request of the clergy 
of Erfurt. 
 Notwithstanding these pre-trial attempts by the city to have the Court nullify the case, the 
Court ordered the litis contestatio in August 1522, and the Fiscal’s accusations made in the 
Positiones et Articuli were just as damning as the original Mandate had been, now with the 
added claim that the city of Erfurt had disobeyed the Court’s order in the Mandate to cease its 
actions and was required to pay back damages and all that had been taken.243 
 In their Exceptiones, the city once again painted a picture of having been struck by the 
ravages of a plundering mob, which they sought to defend against; but they added in this account 
that the 1521 attacks were the result of a conflict among the clergy themselves. They began their 
account several years prior. “Your honors have no doubt received reports of the merciless and 
ruinous damages that the city underwent, and how several years ago the city council was faced 
with significant rebellion, uproar, and disobedience, all of which occurred against the will of the 
city council and which the city was unable to stop.”244 These uprisings, the city explained, were 
part of a pattern of attacks happening against many clerical institutions in a number of cities, and 
“in which many people were killed, though, praise God, none of the clergy.”245 These attacks 
somehow led to discord between the two collegiate churches, such that in the summer of 1521, 
“the clergy’s own servants and companions, including students, with their followers, assembled 
and made an unexpected uprising and uproar, without the will or knowledge of the council.”246 
The clergy refrained from bringing lawsuits against each other, and the city suggested that in the 
                                               
240 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “Und haben darauf zuerrettung gemde stat 
auch irer und der kirchen gueter bewilligt auch in mit betrachtung das sie etlich jar, vil burger gueter bey sich 
gehabt, davon dem gemeinen beutell geschaß und ander burgerliche pflicht nachplieben wern, das sie zuergetzung 
desselben etlich der stat glaubiger auf sich nemen und dieselben mit der zeit bis auf ein summa zehen tausent guldin 
ablegen wollten.” See also Wernigerode F37, Q5, “Littere Excusatorie,” 1523. 
241 Wernigerode F37, Q4, “Protestatio unnd Exceptiones,” 1522: “welchs dann ein erber rat zu grossen 
danck angenomen und inen widerumb in der stat erffurt auch des rats gepieten gleyd und sicherheit und sovil 
verschrieben, das sie irer oder irs gesyndts zu recht und pillichkeyt mechtig sie zu schutzen und handthaben und 
nicht zuverlassen.” 
242 Wernigerode F37, Q5, “Littere Excusatorie,” 1523: “williglich und ausserhalb drangsals oder 
beweglicher forchte.” 
243 Wernigerode F37, Q6, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1524: “das war ist one das sie solhem mandat in 
einichem stuck oder artickel parirt oder gehorsampt haben.” 
244 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “und anfengklich zweifelt einem 
Rat nicht es sey khund und offenbar und e.g. haben bericht empfangen wie es mit der stat erffurt gelegen in was 
ungedey und verderblichen schaden, dieselb steet, und wie sich merckliche emporung aufrur und ungehorsam etlich 
jar here, durch zuschub, erhaben und gehalten alles wider willen eins rats und auch on das das ein rat stillen hett 
konnen.” Perhaps this is referring to uprisings in the city in 1509? See Scribner, “Civic Unity,” 33. 
245 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “darinnen auch also zuvilmaln 
leuth erschlagen werden, der darnoch got lob in solcher handlung gegen der clerisey, keins beschehen.” 
246 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “und nach dem meniglich 
khundt, dies schwinde leiff und zeit, die zwitracht, auch zwischen der geistlicheit erhaben, darunter zanck und irrung 
ichzinter erwachsen, und dweil also im zwey und zwenzigsten jar im sommer verschienen, gnanter zweyer stifft 
personen unter einander irrig und zweyspeltig wie des jezundter allenhalben leyder alzuvil ist das der geistlichen 
aigene diener und gesynd sambt studenten, mit iren anhengern so sich dorein gemenget, ein aufstehen und aufrur 
unversehener sach gemacht, on willen wissen eins rats.” 
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vacuum, the Fiscal prosecuted the city without any factual basis. Indeed, continued the city, the 
clergy expressed distress that the city, despite all it did to stop the mob—including quickly 
mobilizing defense and patrols, day and night, during the attacks; and afterwards, promulgating 
an edict ordering the return of all goods taken, no matter how little, and to turn in all culprits to 
be punished247—now found itself in this legal trouble.248 On account of these facts, the city said, 
they wished to have the suit nullified.  
 
Spiritual or Temporal Jurisdiction 
  
In the Exceptiones the city also argued that the Fiscal was not entitled to sue the city of 
Erfurt in this case, because, among other reasons, the case concerned spiritual persons and 
property. “The imperial fiscal may not sue what concerns spiritual persons and spiritual goods 
before the imperial worldly chamber court.”249 In the Protestatio et in Eventum Responsiones ad 
Articulos document, the city restated this argument, saying that this matter belonged before the 
ordinary spiritual judge.250 The city suggested that the antagonistic Archbishop of Mainz directed 
the dean of one of the collegiate churches, who had approached the Archbishop as the ordinary 
judge in this case, to bring the suit before the Imperial Chamber Court instead, and to claim that 
it was a profane matter.251 The suit, they alleged as the proceeding was winding down in 1537, 
had become a “matter of blame-shifting, in order to disparage, annihilate, and oppress the city of 
Erfurt.”252  
                                               
247 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “das sie sich mit wachen im 
harnasch, nacht und tag, auch ein schliessig der ketten in gassen zustillen solchen unfug erberlich und einverwißlich, 
auch mit irer cost und darlegung erzeigt und gehalten, und das nach begagner that, von dem rat offenlich getruckt, 
edict on allen offenlich steten angeschlagen, und von den canzely verkundiget, gebotten das ein jedermann die 
entwandte hab und guter, wie wol die gering gewest sovil der zu ime khomen widergeben, auch die theter und wer 
die inn hett, ansagen sollt, bey eins rats ernster straff.” 
248 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “auch die geistlichen welcher 
diese sach furnemlich ist, sich zuclagenenthalten und offenlich von sich sagen es sey inen leyd, das ein rat, nach 
dem sie wissen das er aller muglich vleis gethan, solcher gesambleter ratt und bosen buben zu steurn angeclagt und 
in weythern schaden, und verderb irent halben gefurt sollen werden, welchs auch ir woll bevelch und meynung nit 
ist.” 
249 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “geburt dem fiscal kein clag 
noch clag artickell, aus dem grundt key fiscal mag darumb nicht clagen was geistliche person und geistlicher gueter 
betrifft vor key. werntlichem camer gericht.” Werntlich was one variation of weltlich, meaning worldly. See 
Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. “weltlich,” accessed July 3, 2019, 
http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=weltlich. 
 250 Wernigerode F37, Q10, Protestatio et in eventum responsiones ad articulos, 1524: “Item zum vierdten, do 
des key. fiscals und auch des Erzbischofs zu Mentz furnemen gegen den von Erffurt geschopfft belangen die 
geistlicheyt der selben personen und irer gueter, So gehoren die selben sachen fur die geistlichen ordinarien, als die 
bequemen Richter ainig, der aber der fiscal von ampts wegen weder vor werntlichen noch geistlichen Richtern und 
dann privati agentes ander ende dann vor den geistlichen gerichten auch nit zuthun haben.” 
251 Wernigerode F37, Q8, “Exceptiones contra pretensos articulos,” 1524: “furnemlich dweil die selben 
geistlichen personen gegen welchen Rom Rat zu erffurt mishandellt sein soll, des sindicus nit gesteet sich gar nichts 
beschweren noch beclagen, die doch also mundig und geschickt wie gemeinlich die geistlichen das sie inen kein 
beschwerungen wider pillikeit lassen auflegen, die auch onzweifell ein erbern rat zu erffurt, wol entschuldig# 
hallten, denen auch leyd ist, das sie der gestallt, vom key. fiscal und hernach von erzbischofe also sollen molestirt 
werden zu irer der geistlichen selbern und auch der stat ungedey verderb und untertruckung.” Also see Wernigerode 
F37, Q10, “Protestatio et in eventum responsiones ad articulos,” 1524 and Wernigerode F37, Q11, “Supplicatio,” no 
date.  
252 Wernigerode F37, no quadrangle, fourth to last document in case file, “Exceptiones et protestationes 
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 At the same time, the city challenged a concurrent suit, regarding the same set of facts, 
then pending in a Papal Court, because it was not the spiritual court of first instance. In an 
undated and unquadrangled document, the city of Erfurt notified the Court that Johann 
Weidemann, Dean of the Church of Our Lady had launched a proceeding at the Papal Court in 
Rome against the city of Erfurt for the very same actions that had been at issue in this case 
before the Imperial Chamber Court; that the Papal Court had appointed a commissioner to gather 
witness testimony, and that he sought for the alleged culprits not only the Bann 
(excommunication) but also a penalty of 20,000 ducats.253 The city said that this violated not 
only the 1495 law, reiterated in 1521 at Worms, that no estate may be proceeded against in a 
foreign court, but also “imperial and Church laws” according to which disputes concerning the 
clergy and their property, properly belonged before the spiritual court of first instance.254  
 In this, one of the earliest Reformation cases, a number of circumstances were in 
circulation that we will not see in cases to come. First, the city of Erfurt, in the midst of 
undertaking reforms, was taking the position that the dispute belonged before an ecclesiastical 
court because it involved spiritual persons and property; in other words, it did not belong in an 
ecclesiastical court because of the Reformation context, but because the allegations concerned 
clergy and spiritual matters. It was the Fiscal, ostensibly representing the city’s clergy, who 
wanted the case to remain in the Imperial Chamber Court; Erfurt intimated that the Archbishop 
of Mainz had suggested to the clergy to bring the case as a “profane matter” to the Imperial 
Chamber Court, perhaps because it provided a more authoritative forum for settling questions of 
lordship, rather than those only of property. Second, at the same time that the case was 
proceeding before the Imperial Chamber Court, a case was pending before the Papal Court on the 
very same set of facts, meaning that the magistrates of the city of Erfurt were at risk of 
excommunication—a factor rarely seen in other Reformation cases. 
 
City as Culpable House-Father  
  
One of the accusations and rebukes the Fiscal made against Erfurt was that the city was 
failing to uphold the standard of a “loyal, caring, diligent ruler and house-father.”255 Even if the 
city did not actively take the lead in the parson storm of 1521, he said, still, it had let it happen 
without consequences, and it had capitalized on the danger for the clergy to extort money from 
them in exchange for protection. In a document of “additional articles,” the Fiscal said that not 
only was it the common rumor and reputation that the city knew all about the mob and attacks, 
but that it would have been impossible for them not to know about their meetings, or to have 
failed to have seen their attacks on the open streets, since the clergy of Erfurt lived in residences 
next to lay residences. It would not have taken long for the city to guard not only one place, but 
all clergy places at once, and it would have taken no time for reports of attacks to get to the 
                                               
cum anweis articulis peremptorialibus,” 1537: “Also ist es ein zu geschobenn sache, das die stadt erffurdt zu 
schmelerunge des heiligenn reichs, gethilget, und underruckt werde.” 
253 On Weidemann, see Weiss, 132, 134-5. 
254 Wernigerode F37, no quadrangle, fourth to last document in case file, “Exceptiones et protestationes 
cum anweis articulis peremptorialibus,” 1537: “Item zum viertenn, do des kay. fiscall, unnd auch des Erzbischoffs 
fur nemen gegen denn vonn Erffurdt geschopfft belanngen die geistlichkeit derselbenn personenn unnd irer gutter, 
so gehorenn die selbenn sachenn fur die geistlichenn ordinarien als die bequeme Richter einig…” 
255 Wernigerode F37, Q14, “Articuli Additionales pro parte Fiscalis contra Erfurdern,” 1526: “trewer, 
fürstiglich, fleissig Regenten und Hausvater” 
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council, because everything was relatively close together and would have been immediately 
witnessed by many. The Fiscal repeatedly used the standard of a “loyal, caring, diligent ruler and 
house-father” to cast an incredulous light on the claims of the city that they did not know about 
any of the plans, and that they were too slow to catch or punish any of the culprits. Indeed, 
during one of the attacks that occurred during the day, citizens watched from the early summer 
morning hours until late at night as the attacks took place as if it were a spectacle.256 The city did 
not seriously enforce the edict they passed, and they did not do what would be minimally 
expected in order to capture and punish the culprits and restore the lost property. A case in point 
was that of one leader in this society or mob, a student that was called “the Swiss” (der 
Schweizer),257 who was taken into Erfurt’s custody, but was released without any punishment 
and without having restored any of the property taken or damaged. All of this showed that the 
city of Erfurt did not exercise proper diligence in quelling and dealing with the uprisings and 
attacks, and therefore was grossly negligent (lata culpa).  
 The Fiscal also cast doubt on the claim of Erfurt that the two collegiate churches 
volunteered to pay 10,000 gulden towards the city’s debts. He said that the city had long been 
making exorbitant cash demands on the clergy. Each time it did so, when the clergy would 
respond that they could not pay, those refusals would be followed by attacks on clergy 
residences. Regarding the agreement, the Fiscal reiterated that the clergy were forced to sign the 
document in exchange for the protection of the city, though protection was their right anyway, 
and when they asked for changes to certain terms, they were denied this. Only after signing did 
the attacks stop. 
 The city of Erfurt, for its part, argued that the Court should not recognize these 
“additional articles” because “no plaintiff may amend a claim or make a change to” their original 
suit after the litis contestatio.258 These articles, it argued, were therefore inadmissible. They 
attempted to get the case nullified, this time on the grounds of improper form.  
 But responding to some of the articles in substance, the city denied or challenged the 
Fiscal’s account. For instance, they argued that that there was a way to gain access to clergy 
residences without using public streets.259 They also argued that it was not so unheard of for the 
governments of cities to be unable to stop these kinds of attacks, citing examples of other cities 
in which the attacks on clergy were even more “coarse,” in which clergy were forcefully ejected 
from their residences and chased out of town.260 They reiterated that among those who 
participated in the uproar were choir pupils, students, and priests.261 They also stressed that they 
                                               
256 Wernigerode F37, Q14, “Articuli Additionales pro parte Fiscalis contra Erfurdern,” 1526: “Allso das 
solliche beschedigung ganz offenbar und Notorium gewest, auch die Burger und Bergerin zu Ertfurt morgens fruhe, 
dweill es mitten im summer gescheen, biß zu endt desselben. darzu als einem Spectackell zuzusehen zugelauffenn.” 
257 A reference perhaps to “going Swiss,” a euphemism for Zwinglianism? See Thomas A. Brady, Turning 
Swiss: Cities and Empire 1450-1550 (Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
258 Wernigerode F37, Q15, “Exceptiones,” 1527. See also Wernigerode F37, Q22, “Exceptiones unnd 
ursachen warumb sindicus zu antworten nit schuldig,” 1536. 
259 Wernigerode F37, no quadrangle, fourth to last document in case file, “Exceptiones et protestationes 
cum anweis articulis peremptorialibus,” 1537: “nemlich, das man zu den geistlichen heusernn woll komen kann, one 
berurunge offenlicher strassen.” 
260 Wernigerode F37, no quadrangle, fourth to last document in case file, “Exceptiones et protestationes 
cum anweis articulis peremptorialibus,” 1537: “So ist es auch nicht setlzam, das solich geringe geschicht, fenster 
außwerffenn, gegitter zubrechenn, und thör uffstossenn, inn erffurdt geschehenn, dann es ist landtkundig, das man 
vill grober, inn viell stettenn und furstenthumben mit denn geistlichenn gehandelt, do man denn geistlichen ire 
heuser und guttere genomenn, darzu sy noch verjagt und die heuser ingeprochen und anndern gegebenn…” 
261 Wernigerode F37, no quadrangle, fourth to last document in case file, “Exceptiones et protestationes 
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did imprison and punish culprits. As for “the Swiss” student, who was allegedly a ringleader of 
the mob, he was released into the jurisdiction of the university rector. 
 
Out-of-Court Treaty 
 
 Between 1528 and 1534, no new actions were taken in the proceeding. Then, in 1535, the 
city of Erfurt challenged an attempt by the Fiscal to relaunch the proceedings, by presenting an 
agreement—the Treaty of Hammelburg of 1530—that the city said extinguished any pending 
litigation that existed between the city and the clergy.262 The Fiscal attempted to reject this claim 
on a number of grounds, but ultimately, this out of court agreement was accepted by the Court.263  
 This was another major source of law in the Court: treaties and settlements achieved 
outside of the Court that then were invoked either to show the failure of one party to live up to it, 
or to put an amicable end to the proceedings as a whole. In this case, the Treaty of Hammelburg 
was an agreement made in February 1530 between the Archbishop of Mainz and the city of 
Erfurt, in which, among other things, the parties agreed to restore an indulgent lord and loyal 
subject relationship, and that would require the city to pay for damages to certain church 
properties.264 The agreement also had terms that the mass “according to old usages” would only 
take place in the two collegiate churches and in St. Peter church, but “concerning all other houses 
of worship and in matters concerning the faith and ceremonies” neither party would have 
“anything given, taken, permitted or forbidden”—de facto license for “new faith” worship.265 
 Particular agreements, contracts, and settlements made outside of court had a status in the 
Court’s considerations. As we will see in the next chapter, the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532 
loomed large in the cases in which it was a question whether the dispute was a “matter of 
religion.” Also, in a dispute between the Archbishop of Riga and the city of Riga from 1529, for 
instance, the Archbishop sued the city for denying his lordship rights in violation of the 
Kirchholm Treaty of 1452. That treaty stated that the Archbishop of Riga and the Teutonic Order 
would share worldly lordship over the city of Riga. By swearing obedience exclusively to the 
Order, the city violated that Treaty.266 In the case of the Treaty of Hammelburg, the clergy (led 
by the Archbishop of Mainz) and the city came to an agreement that explicitly had within its 
scope the issue covered by the pending litigation, which the Court ultimately accepted.  
 
 
Worldly Enforcement of Spiritual Judgments 
 
 Apparent in the Erfurt case was the dubious position of the city. Specifically, the Fiscal 
alleged that the city had let the attacks happen, and had capitalized on the danger to the clergy in 
order to extort property from them, while the city was at pains to show that it had done its best to 
quell the uprising and to protect the clergy. Indeed, even in the historiography, it is not quite 
clear where Erfurt stood; there was division within the city council that extended past the city’s 
                                               
cum anweis articulis peremptorialibus,” 1537: “…auch communis, vox et fama in erffurdt das Chor schuler, 
Studenten, pfaffenn selbst soliche Rottierung gemacht.” 
262 Wernigerode F37, Q18, “Anzeug die sactz vertragenn,” 1535. 
263 Wernigerode F37, Q19, “Exceptiones auff den vermaynten Anzeyg des Vertrags,” 1535. See protocol. 
264 Weiss, 241-4.  
265 Weiss, 242. 
266 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde AR1-A Nr. 271 (“Berlin 271”); discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 106 
official introduction of the Reformation in 1525.267 In the case of Erfurt, the question was 
whether the city had done enough to protect the clergy as it was obliged to do. 
 There were other cases in which the position of a city or ruler were thematized.268 Take, 
for instance, a property dispute pending in the Court from 1526-1527 involving a family in the 
village of Habenhausen, that ended up becoming a proxy dispute between the city of Bremen, 
which had begun reforms in 1522, and the Dean and Capital of the two collegiate churches in 
Bremen, St. Wilhadi and St. Stephan. The case began as an apparently straightforward request by 
the plaintiffs that the Imperial Chamber Court mandate the defendants to carry out the terms of a 
prior Papal Court judgment. It ended with the plaintiffs explaining that they had turned to the 
Papal Court and the Imperial Chamber Court in order to avoid relying on the jurisdiction of 
Bremen, which had been influenced by the “Lutheran sect” and therefore could not be relied on 
to carry out the terms of an ecclesiastical court judgment.  
 A Mandate and Petitio Summaria describe the plaintiff’s position.269 A dispute about 
property in the village of Habenhausen had first been adjudicated before the Cathedral Provost at 
Bremen (an ecclesiastical court) as the forum of first instance, and then moved to a Papal Court 
in Rome. The Roman Court had produced an Executorial Letter calling on the worldly power to 
enforce the judgment “because according to legal order and custom of both spiritual and worldly 
authorities, in order for law to achieve its purposes, both authorities (spiritual and worldly) must 
be helpful to each other.”270 This Mandate was thus produced by the Imperial Chamber Court so 
that the legal decision of the Papal Court would be carried out. The purpose of the Mandate was 
to actualize the Executorial Letter, to require the defendants to immediately—within 3 days of 
receiving the Mandate—carry out the terms of the Papal Court’s prior judgment with regard to 
the disputed property at Habenhausen, which involved delivering ownership of that property as 
well as its usages, plus court expenses, to the plaintiffs.  
 The defendants submitted an Exceptiones containing a number of objections.271 First, 
they argued that imperial ordinances provided that no one should be brought before a foreign 
court (in this case, the Papal Court) in the first instance, rather, they should be tried before a 
judge with original jurisdiction.272 Second, if a final judgment were to be spoken by a foreign 
judge, the execution of that judgment should be sought at the place where the losing party 
resided or where the disputed goods lay—not at the Imperial Chamber Court.273 The plaintiffs 
                                               
267 Scribner, “Civic Unity,” 207. 
268 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv Stade 27 RKG Nr. 97 (“Stade 97”).  
269 Stade 97, Q1, “Mandatum cum clausula justificatoria,” 1527; and Stade 97, Q2, “Peticio Summaria,” 
1527. 
270 Stade 97, Q1, “Mandatum cum clausula justificatoria,” 1527: “Und daruf ursachn halber das sie diser 
zeit execution und volnstregkung solhs irs behaptn Rechtn anderst nit dan durch weltliche oberkeyt konden oder 
mogn erlangn an gedachtem unserm Camergericht in crafft obberurter clausel umb nachvolgend mandat und ander 
notdurfftig hilff des rechtn gegn euch diemutigclich anrueffn und bitten lassen. Dieweil dan nach rechtlicher 
ordnung und herkomen bed geystliche und weltliche obrigkeytn darmit das recht seinen furgang erryche eyn andern 
behilfflich sein sollen, Auch billich und recht, und uns vestigclich gemeynt, das gesprochn urtheyln volnstreckt 
werdn, und inen daruf solich mandat erkent worden ist…”  
271 Stade 97, Q4, “Exceptiones,” 1527. 
272 Stade 97, Q4, “Exceptiones,” 1527: “Erstlich so ist offenbars rechten auch in des reichs ordnung 
versehen das keiner an außlendische gericht soll gezogen sunder in erster instantz vor seiner ordenlichen oberkeit 
und gerichts zwang furgenumen warden.”? 
273 Stade 97, Q4, “Exceptiones,” 1527: “deßgleichen so ist im rechten versehenn wen ein end urtel von 
einem frembd richter gesprochen das die execution und volziehung derselben urtel allein an ortten do der verlustig 
teill gesessen oder die strittigen gutter gelegen geschehen und begert soll werden.” 
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ignored these two jurisdictional rules, so the defendants were not required to respond to this 
Court’s Mandate. 
 Third, the defendants alleged subreption and obreption in the Mandate. They offered 
instead a “true” version of events. There was property, they said, in the village of Habenhausen 
that had been owned by the defendants’ forefathers peacefully with authentic title and without 
objection “for 20, 30, 40 years ago and longer than men can remember.” Around 30 years before, 
the two collegiate churches, St. Wilhadi and St. Stephan had claimed that land was theirs. The 
parties had agreed to have the dispute handled by the Dean and Capital at St. Eucharien of 
Bremen, as well as by the city council of Bremen. There it was judged that Sivert (the 
defendant’s father-in-law) and his descendants would keep the goods, and they should pay an 
annuity of four wheelbarrows of grain to St. Stephan. But when Sivert died, the plaintiffs without 
any legal reason sued Sivert’s daughter (Alecke/Adelheiden) and her husband (Johann von 
Essen) in front of the Cathedral Provost at Bremen. The case was pending there for a while. “But 
because the plaintiffs did not like that judge (perhaps because they knew that the judge would not 
decide in accordance with their wish) therefore they petitioned to the papal curia that the matter 
be transferred to the Pope.”274 This parenthetic note gestures to a court-shopping motive on the 
part of the plaintiffs in moving the dispute to the Papal Court, though the dispute was pending in 
the local ecclesiastical court, ostensibly without issue. 
 Soon after this case began, before the litis contestatio, Johann died. According to the 
defendants, after he died, the Dean and Capital said several times that they would come to a 
settlement out of court with the surviving children and that they would not continue the case at 
Rome. Despite these promises, the Dean and Capital nonetheless continued the case, which 
ultimately produced multiple rulings against Johann von Essen as applied to his successors. The 
Papal Court had continued the case in contumatiam, that is, in the absence of the defendant 
parties who willfully remained out of the case, but in fact, said the defendants, the Papal Court 
had not summoned any of Johann’s descendants after his death. The decision was therefore 
invalid. And because the Papal Court’s judgment itself was invalid, the defendants had no duty 
to respond to this Court’s mandate ordering compliance.275 The defendants asked the Court to 
remit the case to the mayor and city council of Bremen as the proper judges, in whose domain lie 
the disputed property and where the defendants lived. For the defendants, it was not just that the 
city of Bremen was the proper worldly authority to carry out the judgement of the Papal Court; 
rather, the Papal Court’s judgment itself was invalid, therefore the order from the Papal Court 
that it should be carried out by a worldly authority should be nullified, and the case should be 
relitigated in Bremen. 
 The plaintiff’s Replik began by insisting that the matter before the Imperial Chamber 
Court was not to discuss the main substantive issue of the dispute. In response to the defendants’ 
objection that the judgment, on which the Executorial Letter was based, should have been 
decided by the city of Bremen and should be remitted there, the plaintiff churches argued that 
“this case, by virtue of the kind and nature of the goods, as they belong to the Church, more 
                                               
274 Stade 97, Q4, “Exceptiones,” 1527: “do aber gemelltem capitel solcher richter nit gevallen (der villeicht 
nach irem willen nit urtailen wollen) haben sy in curia bei pebstlicher heiligkeit angehallten das die sach ex absoluta 
ptate pendente adhuc lite coram primo judice sollt advocirt werden.” 
275 The defendants’ final objection in the Q4 Exceptiones document had to do with who was summoned. 
The mandate was sent out to several people who were not mentioned at all in the case at Rome, and “according to 
law,” one cannot belatedly apply a decision to a third party not originally included in the scope of the decision. 
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properly belongs before the spiritual scepter.”276 Second, the plaintiffs responded that at the time 
that the spiritual court had summoned them, the defendants had submitted a claim of 
jurisdictional incompetence, but this was rejected, and the decision was declared “res 
judicata”—that is, the question of jurisdiction was unavailable for re-litigation. By continuing 
the proceeding after this point, the defendants consented tacitly and expressly to the forum.277  
 
  “Spiritual Sword will not cut with the Lutheran Sect” 
 
 In the Replik, the plaintiffs also responded to the allegation that they had moved their suit 
to the Papal Court because they doubted that the Cathedral Provost in Bremen would judge in 
their favor. The plaintiff said that even though the ordinary judge in this case was properly the 
Cathedral Provost in Bremen, nevertheless, he “however cannot or may not execute the judgment 
at this time because his sword will not cut with the opposing party, who follows the Lutheran 
sect.”278 And in response to the defendants’ argument that the Executorial Letter was improperly 
sought at the Imperial Chamber Court, that it should have been sent to the city of Bremen to 
carry out its decision as the worldly authority with original jurisdiction, the plaintiff said that “no 
execution is to be provided by Bremen, which the opposing party alleges is their ordinary judge 
in worldly authority, because of hostile sentiments.”279 The plaintiffs continued, “and also they 
[Bremen] have until now stood by the defendants throughout, and are still in part mitfecher (co-
fighters, co-instigators) of the matter.”280 Specifically, the city of Bremen was “somewhat 
related” (etwas verwant) in this dispute, because Bremen imprisoned for several days a group of 
tenant farmers, who had been permitted by the plaintiffs to build their homes upon the disputed 
property.281 The plaintiffs then asked rhetorically: “what kind of justice and carrying out of the 
law should the plaintiff expect from Bremen when they have been participants in the dispute, 
using their power to stand by the defendants in their willful actions?”282 In other words, 
                                               
276 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “das wird ime nit gestannden dan so hat dise rechtvertigung noch art 
und natur der gutter dweil die der khirchen zugestanden unnd noch zusten nindert annders gerechtvertiget mogen 
werden dann vor dem geistlichen stab.” See Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, s.v. 
“Stab,” definition 8, accessed July 3, 2019, http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=stab. 
277 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “die gegenteil haben als sie vor den geistlichen richter gefordert worden 
irs vortheils auch nit vergessen und angemast incompetencia furbracht sey inen aber mit urtheil und recht ab 
erkhannt worden und die urtheil in rem judicatam gangen ob sie gleich aber nit declinirt so hatten sie durch ire 
erschinen unnd handlung forum tacite et expresse prorogirt darumb mogen sie sich diser vermeinten exception nit 
weitter behelffen.” 
278 Indeed, Bremen had begun to reform the city’s churches and monasteries in the Lutheran manner in 
1522. 
279 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “Dann als weitter gegentheil auch vermeint e.g. seien diser Execution 
halber unnbillich ersucht worden als solt die deren Ordinario geburen, darzu sagt anwald Ordinarius sey wie 
obengemelt der geistlich richter der khun oder mag aber diser zeit berurte urtheil nit exequiren, dan so will sein 
schwert bey dem widderteil, welche der Luttherischen Sect anhangen, nit schneiden so ist bey den von Breme 
welche die gegenteil vermeinen ir ordinarias zusein in der weltlichen obrickeit, sich kheiner execution zuversehen 
Propter sententia adversaria.” 
280 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “und auch das sie den widderteilen bisher fur und fur beygestannden 
und nach der sachen zum teil mitfecher sein” 
281 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “das die widderteil die bawleut der spennigen gutter welche daruf als 
coloni dieselbigen zu Bawn durch die cleger hievor gesetzt worden gefangen, die gefencklich in die statt Breme 
gefurt und die von Breme die selbigen auch ettlich tag darin gefengklichenthalten.” 
282 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “was recht und auch execution solten sich dan die cleger bey den von 
Bremen als diser sachen teilhafftig und die den widderteilen in irem geweltigenm furnemen beigestannden unnd 
inen behilflich gewest versehen haben.” 
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according to the plaintiffs, Bremen had exposed itself as partial towards the defendants by 
imprisoning these tenant farmers. 
  In a later Supplicatio, the plaintiffs stated explicitly that the defendants were resisting 
carrying out the decision of the Papal Court because the defendants “received help from those in 
their locale, namely at Bremen, who are also of this abominable trend of the faith.”283 The 
plaintiff also alleged that Bremen had overrun the Capital’s members and administrators and, 
heavily armed, had forced them to make oaths.284 On the plaintiffs’ account, this resulted in an 
impossible situation: the spiritual authority had no power of execution of its own judgment, and 
because of the city’s Lutheranism, there would be no hope of expecting the ordinary worldly 
authority to ensure enforcement of the decision. That was why they turned to the Imperial 
Chamber Court. 
  
  Rebukes against clergy 
 
In response to these accusations, the defendant’s Duplik reads, in part: 
Also, the other party says that it is not proper for Bremen to carry out the execution 
with respect to this case because they are in part followers of the Lutheran sect, and 
with them no execution may be acquired. To that this lawyer says that the other party 
would be excessive in citing this as evidence285 because until now the city council of 
Bremen has always conducted itself with respect to the clergy in a way that they 
cannot with equity make any such claims.286 Also no clergy has ever been denied his 
rights or denied any execution [of his judgments], and in Bremen no one has been 
authorized to hold the goods, incomes, rents or wealth of the clergy, and to this day in 
the city of Bremen all worship services, ceremonies and the whole clergy hold all 
masses as they always have, and it is abusive/insulting to hear that the city of Bremen 
for that reason that this matter involves its citizens and subjects should be considered 
on those grounds co-instigators, because the other party may never be able to prove 
with truth that Bremen is biased or has ever acted in a way that is not proper for a 
worldly ruler.287 
                                               
283 Stade 97, no quadrangle, first document in case file after protocol, “Sup[plicatio] mit erzelung der 
geschichte des zeugen process,” no date: “als sy aber durch hilf deren der ort als zu Bremen und auch in disen 
widderwertigen leuffen des glaubens khein execution bekhommen” 
284 Stade 97, Q5, “Replicae,” 1527: “das sie auch etwan die capitls herren und verordneten mit gewapner 
hanndt uberloffen glub [Gelübde] von inen gedrungen.” 
285 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “das dem gegenteil solich sein anziehen wol 
wer uberblibt.” 
286 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “dan sich ein erbarer rat zu bremen bisher je 
unnd alwegen gegen den geistlichen dermassen gehalten darab sy sich mit keinem fug oder bilich keit zubeclagen.” 
287 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “Zum andern do gegenteil furgibt als solt der 
stat Bremen diser sachen halber kain execution gepurn dan sy zum teil mitfechen der lauterischen sect anhangem 
und bey inen kain execution mocht erlangt werden, darzu sagt anwald das dem gegen teil solich sein anziehen wol 
wer uberbliben dan sich ein erbarer rat zu bremen bisher je unnd alwegen gegen den geistlichen dermassen gehalten 
darab sy sich mit keinem fug oder bilich keit zubeclagen es ist auch keinem geistlichen je rechts versagt oder einig 
execution abgeschlagen und wurd zu bremen niemand gestatet den geistlichen ire guter einkomen renten oder gulten 
furzuhalten und werden uff heutigen tag in der stat Bremen alle gots dinst ceremonien und die ganz clerisey 
allermassen, wie vor alter her gehalten und ist schimpfflich zuhoren das die stat bremen darumb das dise handlung 
ire burger und underthan belanngt mit fecher sein sollen, dan die widerteil nit der warheit nymmer darbringen 
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 In the Duplik the defendant city also denied that the alleged causes why the plaintiffs felt 
they could not litigate in Bremen was because Bremen had improperly imprisoned some tenant 
farmers who had built on the disputed property; rather, the tenant farmers were arrested because 
they refused to hand property back to the defendants that belonged to them by law. To underline 
the city’s lack of bias against the clergy, the defendants said, referring perhaps to the Peasants’ 
War or another uproar, that “if the clergy of Bremen had not been protected by the city council 
and Bremen had not stood by the clergy with such a big and valiant seriousness, then the clergy 
would have been attacked both in and outside of the city.”288  
 The defendants also denied the claim that the city council of Bremen had exhibited its 
bias towards the defendants by using force to get oaths from the plaintiffs.  
 
Here is the actual shape of things: when, several years ago, the dispute between the 
parties regarding the disputed goods befell, and the parties appeared before the 
Cathedral Provost, there a member of the Cathedral Chapter, named Liederns 
Kistemacher, freely, willfully, without any cause hit Frau Alecke, the wife of Johan 
von Essen, on her chest to the earth, so that she soon after that had a stillbirth. The 
father of Johann, Herman von Essen, saw this, and asked [Kistemacher] why he hit 
the woman, and [Kistemacher] lost his mind and ran upon Herman von Essen and hit 
out two of his teeth, also directed big hits to his face that are still visible. And because 
of that, many people know about it. That was the only reason why the city of Bremen 
demanded the oath stating that he would not act further with violence against the 
defendants.289  
 
The picture here is one of clerical plaintiffs who “treated the defendants violently, sought to 
confiscate their goods and possessions without justification of law, and in other ways damaged 
them.”290 
 It is not clear what the plaintiffs thought they would get by bringing up that the city of 
Bremen was leaning towards Lutheranism. They raised the issue in the context of explaining 
why they had brought the dispute to the Papal Court, rather than litigating in the Cathedral in 
                                               
mogen das sich die von bremen in diser sachen de/je parteyisch gehalten oder ychzig gehanndelt das einem E. Rat 
als weltlicher oberkait nit zustende.” 
288 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “das aber die angezogen Bauleut gefanngen 
worden ist darumb geschehen das die bawleut sich mit gwalt widersezt den beclagten ire gulten so inen von rechts 
wegen zugehorig von iren eigen gutern zuraichen und seind die bawleut der vermeinten widerteil halben gar nit 
gefangen worden wolichs e.g. sunderlich us dem abzunemen dan wissentlich und offenbar mag auch durch die 
widerteil nit widersprochen werden wa(?) die clerisey zu Bremen durch ein E. rat nit geschuzt und mit so grossem 
dapfferm Ernst ob inen gehalten wern sy bisher in vil weg inwendig unnd usserhalb bremen angriffen worden.” 
289 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “so hats dise gestalt als vor etlichen jaren 
sich irrung zwischen gemelten partheyen der spenigen guter halber zugetragen und sy die partheyen vor gemelten 
thumprobst erschinen do hat ein chorherr liederns kistemacher freilich ganz mutwiligclich on einige ursach Frau 
Alecke johan von essen eliche hausfraw fur ir brust zu der erden geschlagen, also das sy bald dar nach abortini 
geborn da herman von essen jez gemelts hansen vatter das gesehen und den corhern gefragt warumb er die frawen 
geschlagen ist der corher von sunden uff herman essen geloffen ime zwen zene eingeschlagen auch sein angesucht 
mit grossen schlegen dermassen zugericht das noch sichtigclich und menigclich der art des gut wissen hat darum 
auch der gemelt und keinen anndern ursach nachmals durch einen E. rat in glubt genummen der gestalt das er gegen 
denen beclagten mit gewalt ferers nichts furnemen sole.” 
290 Stade 97, Q6, “Duplice et in eventum conclusiones,” 1528: “Daruß dan e.g. offenlich vernemen das die 
vermeinten cleger alwegen geweltigclich mit der beclagten gehanndelt sy irer guter unnd possession on erlangts oder 
erwunnen(?) rechtens zuentsezt understanden und in ander weg vilveltigclich beschedigt haben.” 
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Bremen; if the Cathedral of Bremen had made a ruling, they could not expect to rely on the 
corresponding worldly authority, the city of Bremen, to execute its judgment. They also raised 
the issue of the city’s Lutheranism in the context of dispelling the defendant’s argument that the 
Court should remit the case entirely, even in the main substantive issue, to the city council of 
Bremen. The city of Bremen, the plaintiffs argued, was not a neutral arbiter, but was allied with 
the interests of the family against the two collegiate churches on account of its Lutheranism.  
  The Court promulgated an administrative ruling in July 1528 that asked the defendant 
family to restate all of their allegations in article form. The family did so, producing a Positions 
and Articles document soon after.291 The plaintiff churches responded with an Exceptiones 
document in September 1528, in which they repeated their jurisdictional arguments.292 The 
protocol ends in January 1529 with no conclusion. 
 
 
“High Contempt for Divine Worship and of the Spiritual Estate,” A Land-Peace Violation 
  
In 1529, Christoph the Archbishop of Bremen and Administrator of the Stift Verden sued 
the mayor and city council of Bremen for violently attacking the church of St. Paul situated 
outside of the city; plundering the monastery including all of its house goods, belongings, and 
that of the persons inside of it, taking them away or else breaking or destroying them.293 They 
even partially deconstructed the building itself, taking away stone and other building materials. 
Furthermore, it accused the city of Bremen of holding the persons of the monastery in stables, in 
order to “hunt them into misery.”294 “All of this not having satisfied you,” they are accused of 
having removed the old pious preacher in the city of Bremen itself, chasing out him and other 
pious clergy, while at the same time accepting back “runaway monks and apostates,” some of 
whom were of the Lutheran sect, who “had forgotten their own oaths and promises,” and who 
preached and acted in an “unchristian manner.” Then, after that, through the incitement of these 
runaway preachers and apostates, it was achieved that all sacraments, rites, and ceremonies of 
the holy Christian churches—with high contempt for divine worship and service, and of the 
spiritual estate, and in general the common Christian unity, peace, and love— were destroyed 
and completely annihilated.295 Until today, alleged the Archbishop, the Christian sacraments, the 
mass, and other godly offices and services were not taking place. Rather, churches, altars, and 
monasteries had fallen apart, having been taken with violence from the spiritual persons and 
prelates. Thus, no one was safe in his property or person.  
 In this case, the plaintiff Archbishop was explicit that not only did the city violently 
attack clergy and plunder church and monastic properties, but it also removed clergy of the old 
faith, appointed preachers of the “Lutheran sect,” welcomed back apostate monks, and abolished 
the traditional sacraments and worship. 
                                               
291 Stade 97, Q7, “(A) Vertrag belangend,” 1528. 
292 Stade 97, Q8, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1528. 
293 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde AR1-A Nr. 475 (“Berlin 475”). See Wilhelm von Bippen, Geschichte 
der Stadt Bremen, Vol. 2. Bremen im Zeitalter der religiösen Kämpfe (Bremen: C.E. Müller, 1898), 47, 49. 
294 Berlin 475, Q1, “Copia mandatum Archieps zu Ciuitatem Bremen,” 1529: “mit ferrern furnehmen, 
desselben closters viehheuser so noch steen, darinn die personen des closters sich bis heer mit irer armuth enthalten, 
auch zw zerreisen, hinwegk zwprechen und die personen genzlich in das elendt zu weisen und zuveriagen.” 
295 Berlin 475, Q1, “Copia mandatum Archieps zu Ciuitatem Bremen,” 1529: “das alle sacrament, ordenung 
und ceremonien, der heiligen christlichen kirchen, auch mit vill und hoher versmahung und verachtung gotlicher 
ehre und dinstes und des geistlichenn stands, und sunst die gemeyn cristenliche einigkeit fried und lieb.” 
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 All of these acts violated “common written law, the Golden Bull, imperial Reformation, 
and the Land-Peace, all of which forbid, at risk of heavy penalty, for anyone to confiscate, war, 
rob, feud, or in any other way damage another on their own authority without legal sanction.” 
Here, the Archbishop invoked the most foundational components of the imperial constitution, 
and explicitly sued the city for violating the Land-Peace. In addition, he said that their acts went 
against “the order of the Holy Christian Church,” which perhaps referred obliquely to the Papal 
Bull, but more likely referred to the generalized and ubiquitous constitutional norm that the 
Empire, being Holy, holds the spiritual estate, the church and monastic institutions, and their 
sacraments, rites, and ceremonies, in the high regard that are their due. To show contempt for 
them was not just a violation of a particular Papal Bull or imperial ordinance, but more broadly, 
a more fundamental smear upon “common Christian unity, peace, and love.”  
 At one point in a later Petitio, Christoph mentioned that the recesses violated were 
specifically the Speyer Recesses of 1526 and 1529,296 but did not elaborate on what precisely the 
city violated in those Recesses. Most likely, the relevant article in the Speyer Recess of 1526 to 
which he referred was the one that forbade innovations in “the holy Christian faith and religion, 
also the ceremonies and well-inherited usages of the holy Christian churches.”297 The Speyer 
Recess of 1529, among other things,298 said that any violent attacks, property confiscations, or 
jurisdictional or lordship seizures that were done by anyone “whether of the spiritual or worldly 
estate, on account of the faith” would now count as a violation of the Land-Peace, punishable by 
the Acht.299 What was new here was that even if a property confiscation or jurisdictional or 
lordship seizure did not involve violence, if done “on account of the faith” it would be 
considered a violation of the Land-Peace.300 
  The Mandate ordered that the city rebuild the St. Paul monastery with its own money; 
that it return all of the spiritual persons to their positions; that it return or replace all of their 
plundered and confiscated goods; that it restore the mass; also that it make reparation (Abtrag) to 
the Archbishop for this violence and damage, and show him obedience as its lord;301 that it 
remove the inciteful preachers and apostates; that it re-erect the broken churches and altars; that 
it not hinder the spiritual persons and prelates in carrying out the mass and other Christian 
ceremonies; that it not commit any violence against them, but rather leave them in their persons, 
body, property, and freedoms of goodly custom; also that it let the churches and monasteries 
remain in their ways and that in all of this it not be disobedient or recalcitrant. If it failed to do 
these things, the city faced the punishment of the Land-Peace, namely, the Acht.  
 
Counter-Suit against the Archbishop, Breaking Promises of Lordship 
 
 In September 1529, Bremen brought a long and detailed counter-suit (Reconventiones) 
against the Archbishop. It began by stating that the law permits a defendant to bring a counter-
suit against a plaintiff before the same judge (coram eodem iudice). They presented the counter-
                                               
296 Berlin 475, Q3, “Petitio,” 1529: “des zum rechten unnd des reichs ordnung und abscheiden sonderlich 
den auf negst hie zu speyer im 26 und dis lauffenden 29 jars gehaltnen rechtstäge gegeben.” 
297 See Senckenberg, NSRA II, 272-80. 
298 See discussion of 1529 Recess in Chapter 5. 
299 See Senckenberg, NSRA II, 292-301. 
300 Branz, 83. See discussion of this in “Peace” section above. 
301 Bremen was not a free imperial city; it was subject to the Archbishop of Bremen. 
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suit in the same form that any suit would be brought; 38 articles outlined their complaints against 
the Archbishop.302 
 When Christoph became Archbishop, the city said, he promised to the city council, the 
entire city of Bremen, and the collegiate church of Bremen, that he would work to support the 
city, avoid its division, and protect it.303 The Archbishop, the city alleged, violated these 
promises. He introduced multiple burdens and hardships on the poor subjects of the city, by 
incurring large debts and creating new tariffs. It provided several cases of these new debts and 
tariffs. First, the city of Bremen loaned the Archbishop 1000 gulden that still remained unpaid. 
Second, even though the council and city of Bremen had always been freed from having to pay a 
tariff on any goods at Langwedel, the Archbishop and his personnel ordered Bremeners not only 
to pay tariffs on their goods at Langwedel, but at times, they violently took their goods and 
detained Bremeners in prison when they resisted. Third, even though the citizens and subjects of 
Bremen had never before had to pay tariffs to drive their oxen through Verden or Stattel, the 
Archbishop and his officials forced the citizens and inhabitants of Bremen to pay tariffs, and 
when some of the citizens did not pay, their oxen were taken away. Fourth, even though the 
citizens and subjects of Bremen had never in past times had to pay anything for gathering carts 
of wood, the Archbishop forced those from Bremen to pay 1 gulden to the Capital at Verden for 
each cart of wood they gathered.304  
 In addition, the Archbishop broke his lordship promises by getting involved in wars and 
feuds that placed Bremen and its inhabitants in danger and hardship. The city recalled the actions 
of the brother of the Archbishop, Herzog Heinrich von Braunschweig the younger, at a time 
when he and the other princes of Braunschweig violently took the duchy of Hoya. Apparently 
aided through a servant of the Archbishop, Herzog Heinrich violently took 110 sturdy pigs from 
the rural citizens of the city of Bremen, without any cause. Another relative of the Archbishop—
this time Herzog Eric of Braunschweig, the cousin of the Archbishop—detained 19 Bremen 
citizens at Erenburg without any cause or legal permission, and held them there in heavy 
imprisonment for several weeks, and taxed them several hundred gulden. Yet another relative—
this time the Bishop of Minden, the Archbishop’s brother—robbed the parts of Vieland that 
belong to Bremen and quarried and distributed his booty in the Archbishop’s own castle at 
Peterschlagen. 
 On yet another occasion, the Archbishop’s brother, the Bishop of Minden, allegedly gave 
support to one of the public enemies of Bremen. Specifically, the Bishop of Minden housed and 
boarded and took as his servant the rejected enemy of the city of Bremen, Roplene/Rolf von 
Deischold, who had several times damaged Bremen with robbery and fire. When Bremen 
encountered this public enemy, imprisoned him, and sought to put him on trial, the Bishop of 
Minden threatened Bremen, so that Bremen had to fear further violence. On another occasion, 
the Bishop of Minden—during a time when the Archbishop had conveyed several knights to 
conquer the people of Vieland (thus leaving the city undefended)—robbed, burned and destroyed 
crops and oppressed the people of Bremen in many ways. In summary, “these violent actions of 
                                               
302 Berlin 475, Q4, “Reconventiones,” 1529. Q6 of the case file is a copy of the Q4 Reconventiones, with 
some additions and changes throughout the document. 
303 Berlin 475, Q4, “Reconventiones,” 1529: “nutz und aufnhemen alzeit furdern irenn schaidenn 
abwenndenn sy darvor schuzenn und schirmen sollenn und wollenn.” 
304 The Q6 version of the Reconventiones notes that the Archbishop had collected 80 marks as a result of 
these various tariffs placed on the people of the city of Bremen. 
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the Braunschweigian princes happened through the instigation of the Archbishop himself, was 
tolerated by him, and he gave no aid or assistance to those from Bremen.” 
 More than tolerating or encouraging such acts, the Archbishop himself had given shelter 
at Schloss Rottenburg to a public robber and thief who had done especially large damage to 
Bremen, named Schullerman, in order to keep him from having to go to prison. When Bremen 
requested that the Archbishop hand over to them the offender, named Schullerman, to put him on 
trial, he instead let Schullerman go. This was not the only alleged criminal that the Archbishop 
sheltered; he “housed, boarded, and hid” several “public rejected enemies of Bremen” at the two 
collegiate churches of Bremen and Verden, including one man who had on multiple occasions 
set fire to several parts of Bremen’s town hall and to several private homes; nonetheless, the 
Archbishop let him live at Verden and took him as a servant. 
 In addition to all of these ventures involving the Archbishop and his relatives, the 
counter-suit described the impacts of the Archbishop’s feuding on the inhabitants of Bremen, 
feuding that took place “even though the Archbishop promised he would not pursue feud in this 
domain.” For one, he had recently sent several knights against the Duke of Geldern in Holland. 
On account of that, the Duke of Geldern detained several ships belonging to Bremeners, and took 
more than 14,000 gulden worth of goods. On a separate occasion, the Archbishop took 400 
gulden from a citizen of Gronnigen, named Hernick, who had been traveling through the Stift 
Bremen. As a result, that same Hernick took from a citizen of Bremen, Heinrichen Bliffernicht, 
his ship and over 1300 gulden worth of goods, alone on account of the actions of the Archbishop. 
A third episode provided further evidence of the direct negative impact of the Archbishop’s 
actions on the citizens of Bremen. The Archbishop, without the knowledge or consent of the 
common estates of the collegiate church of Bremen, overran the Wursten people in Friesland in 
1517, and the people of Hadeln, neighbors of Bremen, burning and completely spoiling them, at 
a cost of 20,000 gulden to the city of Bremen. This overrunning of its neighbors caused great 
damage and made it difficult for Bremeners to purchase their daily wares and victuals; what 
before one bought for one grosschen, now one had to pay three grosschen for it. 
 On occasion, when the Archbishop had no current war or feud, he would quarter a great 
crowd of knights in Bremen, who would rob and plunder the city, as well as the surrounding 
countryside. They would stay for weeks at a time, eating up all that the poor people had, taking it 
with violence and bringing it to spoil. Overall, since the Archbishop assumed office, the 
Bremeners were “daily in a state of worry, and must stand guard to ensure that they are not 
damaged or run out of the city by the knights.” 
 The narration ended with specific requests for the Court, namely, that the Court should 
demand that the Archbishop (1) repay his debt of 1000 gulden to the city; (2) abolish the tariffs 
and other burdens he introduced, including at Langwedel, Verden, and Stattel, and that the 
residents and subjects of Bremen no longer be arrested or detained on account of these and be 
left by their old customs; (3) pay back what they were forced to pay for tariffs and wood; (4) pay 
restitution for damages caused by the actions of his relatives who were given license by the 
Archbishop, by the actions of the city’s enemies who were maintained by the Archbishop, and by 
the impacts of the Archbishop’s feuds and wars, and to refrain himself from such future acts and 
damages;305 and (5) “the Archbishop should be removed of all authority and jurisdiction 
concerning Bremen; that the city of Bremen should have charge of its courts and territories; and 
                                               
305 Berlin 475, Q6, “Reconventiones,” 1530: “und dergleichen eingrif und beschedigung sich kunftiger zeit 
zuenthalten.” 
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the city should be put in the Emperor’s protection (Schutz und Schirm) and be considered a city 
of the empire.”306 
 
Bremen’s Attentata Suit 
 
 This counter-suit is followed in the case file by yet another kind of suit, called a Libellus 
Attentatorum (or Attentata Clag), submitted by Bremen against Christoph the Archbishop of 
Bremen.307 This was a legal instrument that allowed a party to bring in new information with 
bearing on the suit. It was a suit within the suit that required resolution before returning to the 
main issue.308 This suit introduced some new facts and allegations that described the 
Archbishop’s alleged illegal actions following Bremen’s submission of the counter-suit, 
described above. When litigants in a pending dispute took aggressive action against each other 
outside of Court, that was grounds for submitting an Attentata suit, and could greatly impact the 
proceedings. 
 The Attentata suit begins by summarizing the legal proceedings so far: after the 
Archbishop brought a penal mandate against the city of Bremen in August 1529, and after 
Bremen entered the case by submitting a counter-suit (Reconventiones) in November 1529, the 
Archbishop undertook a variety of retributive actions to pressure the city to obey the terms of the 
Mandate.  
 Their first accusation was that the Archbishop, “without any legal cause” imprisoned 
Johan Roden/Rode and Herman Farberger/Vorberger, two citizens of Bremen. The Attentata’s 
Mandate suggested that this was done with the intention of hindering them from delivering a 
message from the city council of Bremen to other persons that the Archbishop was at the time 
holding in prison, Dr. Johan Wick and his secretary.309 And this is the second accusation, that the 
Archbishop arrested the city of Bremen’s delegate in these pending legal matters, Dr. Johan von 
der Wick, and his secretary; that he took them to Verden, and had them inspect the city’s seals 
and letters, rewrite certain documents, and notarize others. In short, the Archbishop had arrested 
this doctor of law and his secretary for the purpose of having them manipulate some 
documentation relevant to the pending legal proceeding.  The doctor was then forced to take an 
oath that he would return when summoned. 
 In another episode, a Bremen citizen, Dietrich Refschleger, though traveling under 
guarantee of safe passage near the castle Verden, was attacked by street thieves who violently 
took 80 Gulden and 2 horses. The Archbishop’s riding messenger partook in this attack, and then 
rode to the castle Verden, taking one of the citizen’s satchel as booty. The Mandate added that a 
gag was put in Refschleger’s mouth, and he was pushed into a bush. 
 In addition, the Archbishop attempted to bring villages and territories belonging to 
Bremen under his authority, namely Schloß Bederxa and the village of Liehe, by taxing its 
subjects 200 gulden, going against this pending legal proceeding.  
 The suit contained other accusations of retributive action on the part of the Archbishop. 
The Attentata suit ended by requesting the Court to order the Archbishop to cease and undo all 
                                               
306 That is, become reichsunmittelbar, directly subject to the Emperor, a free imperial city. 
307 Berlin 475, Q7, “Libellus Attentatorum,” 1530. 
308 Samuel Oberländer, ed., Lexicon Juridicum Romano-Teutonicum (Nürnberg: Johann Christoph 
Lochners, 1723), s.v. “Attentata,” 67. 
309 On von der Wick/Wieck/Wyck, see Wilhelm von Bippen, "Wyck, Johann von der," in Allgemeine 
Deutsche Biographie 44 (1898), 381-383, accessed July 3, 2019, https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/gnd143557653.html#adbcontent; and Bippen, 45ff. For this episode, Bippen, 50-1. 
 116 
such new actions that were aimed at burdening the city of Bremen in light of the pending legal 
proceedings, and that he should return the city of Bremen to the state it was in when the litigation 
began. This would mean: releasing Johan Roden and Herman Farberger from prison; releasing 
Dr. Johan Wick from his oath, and returning to him the documents in question; repaying 
Refschleger 90 gulden and 2 horses; undoing taxation burdens on Liehe and Schloß Bederxa; 
among other things. 
 As a result, the Court sent out a Mandate against the Archbishop in February 1530, for 
violating the common law and the Land-Peace, with a penalty of 40 marks lötigen golds for 
failing to cease the actions described.310  
 
The Archbishop’s Responses 
 
 Against both the Counter-Suit and the Attentata Suit, the Archbishop responded in June 
1530 with a variety of technical challenges. For instance, he argued that a counter-suit required a 
simulem casum, an analogous cause of action or issue. The suit brought by the Archbishop was a 
Land-Peace issue, whereas the counter-suit brought by the city of Bremen was a matter of civil 
law, he argued. The only forum in which a violation of the Land-Peace can be adjudicated is the 
Imperial Chamber Court, but the counter-suit, being a civil matter, must be tried before the 
judges of first instance in Bremen, as described in the imperial ordinance titled “How counts, 
barons and others, electors, princes and prince-like rulers may be proceeded against at law.”311 
 Furthermore, the legal actions Bremen had so far undertaken in the context of the pre-
trial stage were improper because Bremen was not directly subject to the Emperor but rather was 
directly subject to the Archbishop. Therefore, the city was obliged to obey the original Mandate 
and obey the demands made therein “especially insofar as they concern the Christian faith.”312 
 Despite these objections, the Court required the Archbishop to settle the litis in the 
Attentata suit, hindering the original suit until that matter was resolved. 
 
Attempt to Reframe: Bremen’s Attempt to Become a Free Imperial City? 
 
 In a Supplicatio, the Archbishop asked that the Court strike down this administrative 
decision concerning the litis contestatio in the Attentata suit, because all of the acts which were 
outlined in the original Mandate against Bremen, and its orders “that the city rebuild the St. Paul 
monastery, that they restitute the driven-out fathers and other clergy persons that they plundered 
and confiscated from; that they fire the rebellious preachers and apostates; that they reestablish 
the broken churches and altars; that they not hinder the clergy persons and prelates in holding the 
mass and other ceremonies; that they not commit any violence but leave them in their freedoms 
of old, praiseworthy custom in their person, body, possessions and goods, and also that they 
leave the churches and monasteries in their old, praiseworthy ways”—all of these demands 
                                               
310 Berlin 475, Q5, “Copey mandat,” 1530. 
311 It is not clear to me the grounds on which Christoph argued that the counter-suit was not a Land-Peace 
issue. See Berlin 475, Q9, “Exceptiones con Reconventiones,” 1530, in which the Archbishop’s lawyer cited a 
precedent from 1528, in which a court recognized a case in which a count sued the city council based on the land-
peace, and the city counter-sued for homicide, based on civil law. The Imperial Chamber Court ruled that the count 
was not required to respond and the case was remitted to the court of first instance. 
312 Berlin 475, Q3, “Petitio,” 1529: “dweyl dieselbigen [Bremen] seiner fürstlichen gnaden on mittel 
underworffen derselbigen underthon und von rechts wegen zu gehorsamen schuldig sein, sonderlich sovil das 
ausganngen mandat der cristenlichen glauben belangen ist.” 
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conformed to what was contained in imperial ordinances, the Land-Peace, edicts, and imperial 
recesses.313 In other words, the Archbishop was asking the Court to return to the framing he had 
proffered: that this was a dispute about a city violently changing the religion without authority to 
do so, and upsetting long-inherited customs and worship. 
 By allowing the Attentata and counter-suit by Bremen, the Archbishop also alleged, the 
Court emboldened the city in its long-standing efforts to become a free imperial city and to flout 
the Archbishop’s lordship.314 Indeed, the final request of the Court that the city made in its 
Counter-suit was that the city become reichsunmittelbar, directly subject to the Emperor rather 
than the Archbishop. According to the Archbishop the Imperial Chamber Court was not the 
proper forum in which to seek the privation of lordship prerogatives and freedoms of a prince of 
the Empire, which was the city’s clear intent. Much less was it the correct forum to do so since 
the plaintiff was an Archbishop, a spiritual prelate.315 
 
A Matter of Religion? 
 
 In 1532, the Schmalkaldic League listed the case as a matter of religion.316 Yet the city of 
Bremen did not undertake the Protestant strategy of co-litigating with other protesting estates and 
declining the forum on the argument that the dispute was a “matter of religion.” This was 
probably because ongoing negotiations with the Archbishop seemed promising,317 and since the 
city was launching the counter-suit against the Archbishop in a bid to gain reichsunmittelbar 
status, they were not interested in a complete rejection of court judicature.318  
                                               
313 Berlin 475, Q10, “Sup[plicatio],” 1531: “In dem mandat hoghgedachter meiner g. h. gegen gemeltem 
sein underthon der von Bremen zu uberfluß uspracht wird uff furbracht narration under andern inen gebotten Sant 
Paulsen closter so sie abgebrochen widerumb uff zubawen, auch daselbs und der usgetrieben vättern das jhenig sy 
die von Bremen ine und andern geistlichen personen des stiffts bremen genomen spoliirt und entsezt widerumb 
zugeben, den uffrurischen prediger, apostate wie der dan genant wird zuurlauben, die zerbrochen kirchen und altar 
widerumb uff zurichten, die geistlichen person und prelaten an meßhalten und andern ceremonien nit zuverhindern 
noch ime darin einichen gewalt zuzufiegen sonder sie ire person leyb hab und guter bey irn freyheiten alten 
loblichen herkumen auch die kirch und kloster in iren wird und wesen bleyben zulassen und wird uff solch mandate 
nichts anders gebetten dan den zugehorsamen wie dan dasselbig und die peticion daruff gefolgt und den 13. 7bris 
1529 inbracht (doruff sich anwalt zeucht) inhelt Also das in berurten puncten nichts anders begert und geben wird 
dan was e.g. vermag deß reichs ordnung ußgekhunten landfriden kh. reformacion key. Edicta und gegebnen deß 
reichs abscheide on das zuhandhab# schuldig.” 
314 Berlin 475, Q10, “Sup[plicatio],” 1531: “und die von bremen in solchen irem furnemen gehalts starkt 
werden allein darumb abgeschlagen darumb hohermelter Erzbischof seiner regalien privirt.” 
315 Berlin 475, Q10, “Sup[plicatio],” 1531: “als ein Erzbischof und ordenlich prelat zu Bremen hat diß orts 
meins erachtens unangesehen der privation von wegen der seiner zuclagen mag darumb nit repellirt werden dan je so 
ist ## allein der Regalien und freyheiten so die vonn Re## hat privirt, aber deß Bistumbs und der administration der 
geistligkeit und versehung seiner f.g. underthon, sovil die geistligkeit belangen ist gar nit wie da e.g. diß orts auch 
kein gewald uber sein g. ime dasselbig auch nit zunemen haben.” Indeed, Johann von der Wick did see this case, and 
the religious division more generally, as an opportunity to advocate for Bremen’s becoming reichsunmittelbar; see 
Bippen, 49-50, 54. Berlin 475, Q11, “Supplicatio,” 1531 is an interesting document describing an incident in which 
the city of Bremen punished a convent-brother of the Teutonic order who led an uproar against the city. The city 
claimed that the Archbishop’s prerogatives to appoint a judge to the criminal court (Halsgericht) had been deprived, 
and therefore the city, in order to not let those actions go unpunished, executed the convent-brother on their own. 
The protocol may provide more context for this document, which, however, is not in my possession. 
316 Schlütter-Schindler, 26, 28-9. 
317 Schlütter-Schindler, 45. 
318 Schlütter-Schindler, 120n435, 121. 
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 In 1533, Bremen came to a compromise out of court with the Archbishop.319 They agreed 
to stop all pending legal disputes before the Imperial Chamber Court, excepting those that had to 
do with questions regarding the old-faith worship and ceremonies, insofar as those would be 
resolved in a future Christian Council.320  
 
 
Injuring the Honor and Status of Clergy 
 
 In 1534, the Archbishop of Bremen brought another suit against the city of Bremen, this 
time for injury to the “honor, lineage, and status” of the Archbishop.321 The case file has no 
protocol and the documents have no quadrangle numbers, indicating that the judges likely never 
discussed the case, and the proceeding fizzled out after the production of the Citatio. Yet the case 
reveals another cause of action available to old-faith litigants: that of injury and insult to 
clergy.322  
 The Citatio began with a statement of law, that in common written law it is clearly 
provided for that no one should, through words or deeds, smear or injure the honor or good 
reputation of another, and that in particular, subjects are obliged to uphold the honor of their 
rulers.323 Yet, alleged the Archbishop, the city of Bremen violated these in three ways. First, the 
city submitted a supplication to the imperial government in which it, among other things, 
accused the Archbishop of “tyrannical and unchristian violence.”324 This although the 
Archbishop had always “acted and governed as nothing other than a Christian, mild Archbishop 
and prince.”325 Second, in September 1531, some citizens of Bremen went into the residence of 
the late counselor and servant of the plaintiff, a commandry of the Teutonic Order, who was 
under the protection (Schutz und Schirm) of the Archbishop, and killed him without any legal 
grounds. This deed was done either on the city’s behalf, or the city allowed it to happen, or the 
city silently ratified the murder by leaving it unpunished.326 Third, the city of Bremen had 
                                               
319 Schlütter-Schindler, 120-1. 
320 Bippen, 95. 
321 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde AR1-A Nr. 477 (“Berlin 477”). 
322 For other examples of Reformation cases in which the legal issue was insulting clergy, see Buck, 251-5; 
however, these were cases before spiritual courts. 
323 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Clagen,” 1534: “Darumb und dweil dem also, 
und aber im rechten loblich versehen, das niemant den anderm hohen oder niddern standts noch mit wortten oder 
wercken iniuriert noch an sein erhen schmehen soll, furnemblich aber die obrigkeit von iren underthanen von denen 
sie ebe(?) schutzt beschirmt und von allem schaden laut ires ayds behutet werden sollen.” 
324 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, first document in case file, “Copia Citationis cum Executione,” 1534: “So 
sollet ir doch des unbetrachtet, auch uber das in ime (ime alls ewern landtsfursten und herrn vor allem schaden zu 
warnen seyner nutz zufurdern wie dan getrewen underthanen wol anstee) gelobt und geschworn, verschiener zeit ine 
in einer supplication, so ir damals unser keyserlichen damals im reich gehaltten regierung ubergeben lassen, under 
anderm alls solt er sich tyrannischen und unkristlichen gwalts gepraucht beschuldigt und in also an seiner andacht 
furstlichen erhen und wirden am hochsten angetast geschmecht und iniuriert.” 
325 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Clagen,” 1534: “anders nit, dan eine 
Christlichen miltten Erzbischof und fursten gezimet und wolanstat gehandeltt und regiert.” 
326 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Clagen,” 1534: “einer seiner rethe und diener 
weyland Conventhur des teutschen ordens im hauß zu Bremen in seiner eigener behausung selb drit ine jar der 
mindern zal ein und dreissig im monat septembris durch ire burger, on alle redlich und in recht gegrundte ursach, on 
das sie das auch zuthun macht gehapt unerwundes(?) rechten eigens furnemens und mit gewalttiger thath, unerlichen 
umbringen, solliche ubelthat, gestattet und ungestrafft haben hingaen lassen.” Also: Berlin 477, no quadrangle, first 
document in case file, “Copia Citationis cum Executione,” 1534: “weiland N. Conventhur teutsch ordens zu Brem, 
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recently captured several of its citizens. Some died of torture in the tower, some of them were 
executed, others were exiled. These poor captured citizens were interrogated by the Bremeners 
about the Archbishop. “All of which in no way is proper for them to do, and highly forbidden in 
law,”327 and “deeply offended the Archbishop.”328 For these acts, the Archbishop asked for the 
Court to place a penalty upon the city of Bremen of 50,000 gulden. 
 
Incitement 
 
 Moving from injury to incitement against clergy, this case has to do with events that took 
place in Hildesheim several weeks after the city council of Hildesheim decided, with popular 
support, to accept the Augsburg Confession in August 1542.329 The defendant in the case was 
Cornelius Völkers, from nearby Sarstedt, who was appointed the first evangelical preacher of the 
former St. Paulus monastery in Hildesheim. The plaintiff was the Bishop of Hildesheim, 
Valentin von Tetleben, who was a plaintiff in several Reformation cases; on the same day that he 
sued Völkers—December 19th, 1542—he launched at least one other sweeping case at the Court, 
in which he named specific Protestant leaders, and sued for the restitution of all worship 
services, clerical appointments, and church property that had been lost or changed with the city’s 
introduction of the Augsburg Confession.330   
 In the Citatio, we read the Bishop’s version of events and his grounds for suing. On 
October 3, 1542, Völkers allegedly wrote in a letter to one Hans Heydtmuller, a citizen of 
Hildesheim, that a noble told him that the Bishop’s arrival in town meant danger for the 
Protestant citizens. (The Bishop resided in Mainz, and came to Hildesheim in October to 
challenge the city council for the reforms, and to remind them of his lordship there.) The clergy, 
he was alleged to have said, have a treasonous plan “to deliver the citizens there to the butcher’s 
stalls”—a euphemism for betrayal.331 And that therefore, Heydtmuller should warn “the citizens 
who have love for the word of God”332 that they should take care, diligently watch the gates and 
protective walls of the city, and keep an eye on what the clergy and monks are up to “because the 
treason would be great.”333 And that they must do as the citizens of Minden did, who drove the 
                                               
so seiner andacht rath und diener auch in seynem fundern schutz und schirm gewesen, in seyner aignen behausung 
zu Brem so eins yeden sich erste wonung sein soltt, unersuchts viel weniger einiches rechten erlanngt, durch ewere 
burger eygens furnhemens und gwaltts selbs dritt jemerlich umbringen lassen oder zum wenigsten dem selben also 
zugesehen sollichs gestattet geduldet ungestrafft hingeen lassen also stilschweigend ratificiert und angenem 
gehaltten.” 
327 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Clagen,” 1534: “Zum dritten beclagt sich 
anwalt von wegen und in namen…erzbischof…gegen Bremen… als sie verschiner zeit ettliche ire Burger gefangen, 
deren eins theils in der matter und thurn gestorben, eins theils vom lebenn zum tod gerichtet, eins theils aber 
relegiert worden, das man dieselbigen armen gefangenen leut uff hochgedachten erzbischove anwalts principal 
fursten in seiner stand wirden und wesen peinlich gefragt, damit auch sein f.g. welchs ine kein weg zuthun gepurt 
hat und in recht sonderlich hoch verpotten Alles hochgedachten fursten zuverlezung, seiner f. wirden standts wesens 
namen und stamms.” 
328 Berlin 477, no quadrangle, first document in case file, “Copia Citationis cum Executione,” 1534: 
“welchs alles sein andacht zu jederzeit sich solliche schmehe und iniurien begeben zu herzen gefast.” 
329 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv Hannover, Hann. 27 Hildesheim 715 (“Hannover 715”). See Karl 
Kayser, Die Einführung der Reformation in der Stadt Hildesheim und die Feier derselben am Lutherfeste, 10. 
November 1883. Nebst Angehängten Actenstücken Aus Der Reformationszeit (Hildesheim: Julius Gude, 1883). 
330 See Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv Hannover, Hann. 27 Hildesheim 694. 
331 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “uff die Flaischbanck liefern.” 
332 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “die burger so gottes wort lieb hetten” 
333 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “Unnd das sie auff iren thoren unnd zingeln auch weß 
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clergy and monks out of the city, “so that thereupon they might have the same peace, and the 
Gospels further develop”334; that they must destroy certain monastic buildings, “the earlier, the 
better,”335 and to tell the evangelical brothers that if they are to have peace, they must also chase 
the Bishop out of the city.336 
 According to the Bishop, Völkers’ alleged letter had some effect: on October 6, and on 
several nights thereafter, citizens of Hildesheim gathered in the night with their armor—no one, 
“neither spiritual nor worldly residents, knowing what to expect from the other.”337 These unruly 
gangs openly threatened to carry out the “unchristian, bloodthirsty advice” contained in the 
letter, “to kill the Bishop or at least to capture him and to do with him what they will, and with 
the singular aim to spill blood, cause tumult, belligerency, and uproar against the Bishop and 
clergy, to violate them in their bodies, their possessions, and their well-being.”338  
 These acts of intimidation, the Bishop argued, violated prudence, natural, godly, and 
written laws, the Golden Bull, the Holy Roman Empire’s ordinances and decrees, and the Land-
Peace. The proper punishment for such acts was, he said, outlawry (Acht).  
 The case file contains no record that Völkers responded to the suit. A new summons from 
June 1543 added that the defendant’s failure to respond put him in further danger of punishment. 
It does not seem that this repeated threat made any impression on Völkers, or that the suit had 
any conclusion. 
In this case, the theological divide appeared in the language of the incendiary letter 
(“those who love the word of God”; “to ensure the Gospels’ further spread”). It also appeared in 
the coded rebuke by the Bishop that Völkers’ deeds expose him as a false cleric, contrasting his 
actions to those of the clergy at Hildesheim who “strive diligently at all times for honesty, peace, 
and justice while fulfilling their offices and worship services, and never did anything to bring 
about uproar, rage, spilling of blood or burden to neighbors.” Implicit in this comparison was a 
rebuke, demonstrating the quality of cleric the “new sect” produces. The legal cause of action in 
this case, however, was that of incitement to violence, a violation of the Land-Peace. 
 
 
                                               
die pfaffen und Munch anrichten vleissig ausssehen hetten dann die verreterei groß were.” 
334 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “da alsdan dieselben frieden gehabt hetten unnd das 
Evangelium furtgangen.” 
335 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “dar zu die zwey Plockheuser die Carthaues unnd die 
Clöster zur sulthen zerstöret je ehe je lieber.” 
336 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “Unnd demnach obgedachten heydmuller weitter 
gebetten solchs den evangelischen Brudern samptlich antzusagen, das sie den Blawen bischof sein andacht meynend 
mit sampt allen pfaffen unnd monichen zu hildesheim austreiben wöltten so wurden sie frieden haben.” 
337 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “niemandt von baiden gaistlichen und weltlichen 
inwonern gewust wes er sich zu dem andern zugetrösten oder zuversehen.” 
338 Hannover 715, Q1, “Citatio uff die Acht,” 1543: “Darauff dan ferrer ervolgt das uff den Freitag darnach 
den sechsten obgemelts monats octobris die ganz stat hildeßheym unnd derselben Burgerschaft bei nechtlicher weyl 
in harnisch gebracht, das niemandt von baiden gaistlichen und weltlichen inwonern gewust wes er sich zu dem 
andern zugetrösten oder zuversehen. Dergleichen etliche mher nacht darnach zu etlichen malen sich auch rottirt und 
zusamen gelauffen in gemut unnd maynung solchem obgemeltem deinem schreiben unnd unchristlichem 
blutgirigem rathe nachzusezen sein andacht, mit sampt derselben zugewandten todt zuschlagen oder sonst zum 
wenigsten zufahen und ihres mutwillens mit inen zu pflegen. Alleyn der ursachen blut vergiessen, Tumult, rumor 
unnd uffrur gegen seiner andacht unnd derselben gaistlicgkeyt zuzurichten, sie an iren leyben, haben, guetern, unnd 
aller wolfart zuvergwaltigen.” See Valentin von Tetleben, Protokoll des Augsburger Reichstages 1530, ed. Herbert 
Grundmann (Gütersloh: Carl Bertelsmann, 1958), 36, for a description of these events; see introduction of this 
edited protocol by Tetleben for a biography of him. 
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Public Execution as a Violation of Imperial Protection 
 
 In late 1532 and early 1533, two combined suits were launched in the Imperial Chamber 
Court against the city of Memmingen for violating an imperial safe passage letter when it 
executed Ludwig Vogelmann in January 1531.339 One suit was brought by the surviving children 
of Vogelmann, led by Ludwig Vogelmann’s son, Joachim, who appointed Dr. Valentin Gottfried 
as their lawyer. Another suit was brought by the imperial prosecutor, Dr. Wolfgang Weidner. It 
was at times a subject of discussion, recorded in the protocol, the extent to which these suits (the 
family’s and the Fiscal’s) should be handled separately or together.340  
 “In the matter of the gruesome, unlawful violation committed upon the late honorable and 
pious Ludwig Vogelman,” began the Positions and Articles document from 1535.341 Vogelmann 
had been the former respected city clerk (Stadtschreiber) for Memmingen (from 1508-1523). At 
the time of his death he was serving as Burggrave, councilor and advisor to Christoph, the 
Bishop of Augsburg, and as lay administrator of the Antoniter monastery in Memmingen. He 
was regarded during his lifetime as an “honest, pious, and good man.” However, “on account of 
several important reasons,” a conflict emerged between Vogelmann and the city council, and the 
dispute was brought before the city council of Ulm to adjudicate. An agreement was brokered 
that put the parties back “in the good” with one another. Nonetheless, “good benefactors, friends, 
and loyal people” warned Vogelmann to beware of the city of Memmingen and to take 
precautions against its mayor and city council. As a result of these prudent warnings, Vogelmann 
went to the Imperial Diet at Augsburg and sought and received an imperial letter of protection 
(Schutz- und Schirmbrief) so that “the body, possessions, and goods of Vogelmann were taken 
into especial imperial advocacy, protection, and safe passage for three years.” The Emperor gave 
notice in particular to the mayor and city council of Memmingen to “hold fast to the terms of that 
imperial protection,” and “not to force, distress, insult, or violate Vogelmann, neither through 
themselves nor through someone else on their behalf.” Another imperial protection letter was 
granted to the Antoniter Order in Memmingen. “To violate, insult, damage in body or limb, 
much less to bring someone from life to death, who is under imperial protection is illegal and 
unauthorized,” the document continued; it violated common law, statutes and the order of the 
Holy Empire.  
 “Despite all of this, and despite Vogelmann’s service and usefulness to the city, ignoring 
the above-mentioned Ulm agreement; against all law and fairness, and the Holy Empire’s Land-
Peace and special imperial protection letters; also against the privileges of the Preceptory at 
Memmingen—the city of Memmingen mercilessly brought Vogelmann from life to death.” 
Armed servants of the city captured Vogelmann while he was on his way to the Antoniter 
monastery, and broke through several gates and doors with logs, axes, and other instruments in 
the process. They took Vogelmann as a prisoner “as if he were a public evildoer and their worst 
enemy” and had him tortured in a “gruesome and horrific” manner. Then, “unsatiated by such 
                                               
339 BayStA (RKG) 5657 (“Munich 5657”). See brief discussion of this case already in Chapter 1. 
340 The case file is incomplete; certain documents are missing, including notably all of those from the 
period between the months December 1533 to May 1534, when Landgrave Philip of Hessen and the Elector of 
Saxony wrote saying it was a matter of religion, to the time they were added to the case, to the time they were 
removed from the case. 
341 Because the case file is incomplete, I am relying on the Positions and Articles document, which was the 
first submitted document after the litis contestatio, i.e. after the pre-trial stage and settling of the issue, which 
occurred around 3 years after the suits were first launched. For more on litis contestatio, see summary of court 
procedure in Chapter 1. 
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undeserved torture,” the next morning, “on their own authority, without any orderly court 
process, they led Ludwig Vogelmann to the public marketplace in order to kill him.” All of this 
was against “law, the Golden Bull, the Land-Peace, the Holy Empire’s constitutional order and 
statutes, as well as the imperial protection and safe passage letters,” but it also violated “all 
honorable fairness, natural human rationality, custom, and good virtues.” For these violations, 
the city was ordered to pay 50 marks lötigen golds, half to the descendants of Vogelmann, and 
half to the Court.342 
 
Duty and Right to Punish Treasonous Former City Servant: A Direct Appeal to the 
Emperor 
 
 Memmingen’s first move, as a free imperial city directly subject to the Emperor, was to 
make an appeal directly to the Emperor, probably in January 1533.343 The language of the appeal 
suggests that they believed that by presenting the Emperor with the other side of the story, he 
would see that, due to Vogelmann’s treasonous activities, through which he violated not only the 
Ulm contract but also his citizenship oath and several city statutes forbidding sedition, they were 
correct to violate the imperial protection letter by exercising their capital and criminal 
jurisdiction in Vogelmann’s case. Not least because Vogelmann had himself, just before his 
execution, allegedly confessed to these acts and intentions, Memmingen was in fact not only in 
the right to do so, but had a duty to do so. The Memmingen appeal also indicated that 
Vogelmann was misusing the imperial safe passage letter as a protection as he emboldened his 
seditious activities against the city; that he was using the imperial letter as a cover as he 
proceeded to act with impunity against the city. And that by law, the imperial safe passage letter 
could not be understood to extend to protect its holder from the legal consequence of his own 
crimes. For these reasons, Memmingen appealed to the Emperor directly to order the Imperial 
Chamber Court to stop the proceeding.344 
  The position of City Clerk was quite influential; during his tenure, Vogelmann would 
have processed all of the city’s correspondences, have known all of the official documents 
(Urkunden) and legal titles of the city, and therefore would have developed a deep and current 
knowledge of the political, economic and legal matters of the city. One of his duties was to take 
minutes of the meetings of the city council, and there he would have been exposed to countless 
personal requests and concerns from individual citizens and constituencies.345 Though born 
elsewhere (in Schwäbisch Hall), Vogelmann and his wife were conferred citizenship of 
Memmingen in 1513, and he was given a series of honors and privileges over the years of his 
tenure, indicating how highly regarded he was in Memmingen.346 
                                               
342 Because a violation of imperial safe passage implicated imperial sovereignty, it was within the 
Emperor’s prerogative to regard Memmingen’s violation of the Land-Peace as warranting decalaration of the Acht 
(outlawry) (Rautenberg, 57). It is notable that the Acht is not mentioned here as a possible consequence. 
343 Peer Frieß, “Die Causa Vogelmann: vom lokalen Konflikt zum reichspolitischen Problemfall in der 
Reformationszeit,” Memminger Geschichtsblätter / Historischer Verein Memmingen e.V. (2016), 104-5. 
344 Frieß, 105. 
345 Frieß, 75-6. 
346 Friedrich Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter nach handschriftlichen und gleichzeitigen 
Quellen, Fünfter Theil: Das Reformationswerk zu Memmingen von dessen Eintritt in den Schmalkaldischen Bund bis 
zum Nürnberger Religionsfrieden, 1531-1532 (Augsburg: Lampart, 1878), 7; Frieß, 76. 
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 Though anti-clericalism and calls for reform as to clergy privileges and morals had been 
brewing in Memmingen since the 1470s,347 it was not until Christoph Schappeler, the priest at St. 
Martin parish church, began openly preaching pro-Luther sermons in the early 1520s that city 
officials began to take notice of a new kind of escalation.348 Some city council members opposed 
the new teachings and others supported them, and overall the council’s approach was to avoid 
conflict.349 In 1522 the city passed a preaching ordinance demanding “exclusive reliance on the 
scriptures.” This was a common move in imperial free cities with a strong Reformation 
movement; “the city fathers refused to believe that the ‘Gospel’ might prove controversial”; 
historians have traced the impact of this notion of a communal consensus based on the Gospel.350 
In 1523, Schappeler’s provocative preaching on the abolition of tithes in the New Testament led 
to a “constitutional crisis” in the city, as more and more people refused to pay tithes. Key 
charitable institutions were threatened with insolvency; the city’s standing with noble endowers 
was compromised; and the Emperor might choose to send in troops if the current city council 
could not maintain order.351 
 Ludwig Vogelmann was one of Christoph Schappeler’s greatest critics.352 He was deeply 
frustrated with the lack of decisive action on the part of the city council to deal with Schappeler 
and his followers, and was even more disturbed by the apparent support that some members of 
city council showed Schappeler.353 Vogelmann’s opinionated statements led to his gradual 
alienation from the city’s elite.354  
                                               
347 Blickle, Communal, 26ff, 37. 
348 Frieß, 76; Friedrich Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter nach handschriftlichen und 
gleichzeitigen Quellen, Erster Theil: Christoph Schappeler, der erste Reformator von Memmingen, 1513-1525 
(Memmingen: Verlag der Besemfelder’schen Buchhandlung, 1877), 11. For more on the 1479 Endowment 
(Stiftung) from the noble Vöhlin family that established this preachership office at St. Martin, as well as the 
requirements, duties, and rights of its office holder, see Dobel, I, 9f. Blickle notes that these positions were 
“somewhat outside the conventional clerical hierarchy” and many similar positions were established in the second 
half of the fifteenth century. They were like lectureships, “founded to provide intellectual guidance in matters of 
faith” and “largely free from any sacramental or pastoral duties.” In this case, the occupant received 100 Gulden; 
preachers in these positions had a disproportionate impact on the Reformation (Blickle, Communal Reformation, 
21). Blickle dates the first council remark on Schappeler’s incendiary sermons to August 1521 (Blickle, Communal 
Reformation, 19). See also Dobel, I, 28-29. City chronicler Galle Greiter wrote on Nov 15, 1523 that Dr. Schappeler 
had made his “first Lutheran sermon” (Dobel, I, 36).  
349 Dobel, I, 36; Frieß, 77; Blickle, Communal Reformation, 28. 
350 Blickle, Communal Reformation, 20n14. A “fiction” because it covered over the fact that what it meant 
to follow the gospel was precisely what was under dispute; citing a contemporary report: “For a while there has been 
great confusion between clergy and laity in our town, with all inhabitants interpreting the holy gospel to their liking 
and despising anybody else’s opinion. Thus, they call each other heretics and exchange many other insults, whereby 
the common people are confused, all to the detriment of souls and the honor of God” (Blickle, Communal 
Reformation, 43). 
351 Blickle, Communal Reformation, 38ff; Dobel, I, 43ff. 
352 Dobel, V, 8; Dobel, I, 28-9. 
353 Frieß, 77. Vogelmann wrote in the city council protocol on Nov 27, 1523: “Yet again we face upheavals 
because of the Lutherans. The preacher has arrived from Switzerland, where he visited Zwingli in Zurich, preached 
against masses, intercession by the saints, and other matters; the result has been much debate and resentment and 
much talking in the council; in summa: the preacher enjoys support, Luther threatens to take over, I fear the worst; it 
is decided to meet the clergy and talk to them, to stop them from calling the preacher a heretic” (Blickle, Communal 
Reformation, 30). Original here: Dobel, I, 37. 
354 Frieß, 78; Dobel, I, 41. 
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 Vogelmann left his position and the city in 1524355 and became a secretary for Christoph 
the Bishop of Augsburg.356 Throughout the 1520s, Vogelmann remained engaged in city politics 
from afar, and mutual distrust brewed. Around 1530, Vogelmann took two steps that challenged 
the city. First, he was given administration of the Antoniter monastery, from which position he 
could launch continuous and concrete opposition against the Reformation policies of the city, 
including ordering the performance of mass in the chapel despite the council’s having forbidden 
it, and transferring benefices so that they could not be accessed by the city.357 Second, at the 
Imperial Assembly at Augsburg, he agitated against Memmingen’s city government and 
requested and ultimately received imperial guarantees of safe passage and protection due to fear 
for his personal safety from Memmingen’s city council, which he said also made it impossible 
for him to carry out duties of his office as administrator of the Antoniter monastery.358  
 The city council of Memmingen consulted with the city of Nuremberg on how best to 
proceed against him. 
Vogelmann is now a great enemy of the word of God and despite all of the good that 
Memmingen has done for him when he came as a poor young man, he still does so 
much secretively against the city […] and is so totally a follower of the priests that 
where he has an opportunity to provoke unrest among those who are followers of the 
word of God, he does not hold back, and lets Memmingen have no peace, as though 
he has nothing else to do but day and night complain against us and make us 
unfavored by the Emperor, and hated by [the other estates].359  
In January 1531, they decided to arrest him, torture him, and execute him.360 Before his 
execution, he signed a statement in which he allegedly confessed to acting against his civil oath, 
violating a contract made between them,361 disparaging the city before the Emperor, and stirring 
up conflict in the city to provoke uproar, among other things.362 
 
  Declining the Forum Based on an Imperial Privilege Concerning Jurisdiction 
 
 The attempts by Memmingen to convince the Emperor that the execution of Vogelmann 
was justified had no effect. Hirter, the lawyer for Memmingen, sought to decline the forum of the 
Court based on an imperial privilege given to Memmingen in 1471 by Emperor Friedrich III, and 
                                               
355 Frieß, 79; Dobel, V, 9-10. 
356 Frieß, 80. 
357 Dobel, V, 16-17; Frieß, 87.  
358 For text of the supplications see Dobel V, 19-25. Schlütter-Schindler, 134; Frieß, 91-92.  
359 Text of their letter to Nuremberg in Dobel, V, 27ff: “Dieweil nun diser Vogelman ain grosser feynd des 
wort gotes vnnd vngeacht das jm vil guts zu Memmingen beschehen vnnd alls ain armer gesell dahin komen, so 
waist er aber vil gehaims der Statt und sonnst annderer Stett hanndlung auch, vnnd ist so gar den pfaffen anhengig, 
das er, wa er denjhenen, so dem wort gotes anhengig, vnruo antragen mag, das nit spart vnd sonnderlichen vns zu M 
kain ruo last, sonnst nichts zu schaffen hat dann das er thag und nacht trachtet, wie er vnns durchaechten, mit der 
vnwarhait verclagen vnnd in gross vngnad gegen kayser, konig, fürsten, herren, gegen den Bundtsstenden vnnd 
menigclichem verhast machen mecht,...” On inter-city communication and advice-seeking, see Christopher W. 
Close, The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525–1550 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
360 Frieß, 95-6. 
361 Referring to the contract mediated by Ulm. 
362 Karrer, 195-7; Schlütter-Schindler, 134n561. 
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confirmed by then current Emperor Charles V in 1521. According to Memmingen, this privilege 
said that “thenceforth and into the future eternally no one, of whatever estate (wirden, stats, oder 
wesens), may launch a legal suit against Memmingen or its citizens, residents, or subjects, 
seeking their goods and properties, whether it concerns honor, body/life, or property, at the 
Hofgericht at Rottweil or any other court. And the only places where one could take legal action 
against them was before the following cities: Augsburg, Ulm, Ravensburg, Biberach or 
Kempten.”363 Thus, “anyone who proceeds against Memmingen and its people in any other 
court, the whole proceeding is invalid, powerless, and nonbinding with respect to the 
Memmingers, and is completely undamaging to them.” The children of Vogelmann, argued 
Memmingen, by suing the city in the Imperial Chamber Court, violated an oath that they took as 
citizens of Memmingen, which all citizens pledge to every year, to do nothing to undermine the 
city’s privileges, freedoms, and immunities.364  
  These arguments also came to no effect. Though we do not have documents in the case 
file from the period immediately following (December 1533 to May 1534), the Protocol gives 
some indication of the kind of arguments that Memmingen was met with. For the Fiscal and the 
plaintiffs, the key was to bring Memmingen to a point where they were forced to settle the litis. 
Gottfried argued that because the case involved a violation of an imperial protection and safe 
passage letter, it could not be heard anywhere but at the Imperial Chamber Court, and that 
despite the defendants’ objections, the litis contestatio should happen. 
 Hirter made a third attempt to remove the case from the Court’s jurisdiction by claiming 
that the case was a “matter of religion.” This will be discussed in Chapter 4. These attempts by 
the defendant city in the pre-trial stage to decline the forum of the Imperial Chamber Court were 
unsuccessful; in September 1534, the Court ordered the defendant to settle the litis. Then in 
September 1535, about a year after the city’s failed attempt to recuse the judges as part of the 
protesting estates’ Recusation strategy, the court ruled that the litis contesatio take place with the 
defendants in contumatiam.365 
 
  Negotiated Out-of-Court Settlement 
 
 Beginning with Memmingen’s direct appeal to the Emperor, the city undertook an 
unusually active extra-judicial agenda to have the case nullified.366 Part of this effort was focused 
on gaining the advocacy support of the Schmalkaldic League, in particular by having the case 
listed as one of the cases “concerning the religion” that would then be included in the co-
litigation strategy of the protesting estates. Another part of this agenda was centered on imperial 
delegates and King Ferdinand, the brother of Charles V, and in part, these negotiations also 
thematized the question of whether the suit could be considered a “matter of religion.” We will 
return to these issues in Chapter 4. 
                                               
363 Munich 5657, Q13, “Articuli additionales fori declinatory,” 1533. For text of that privilege see Philipp 
Jakob Karrer, Memminger Chronik, oder Topographie und Geschichte der kurpfalzbayerschen Stadt Memmingen 
(Memmingen: Rehm, 1805), 423-7. This privilege is not contained in the case file; usually a party would submit this 
kind of evidence, but I do not see any indications that this Urkunde was submitted by Memmingen here. 
364 Munich 5657, Q13, “Articuli additionales fori declinatory,” 1533. 
365 Sprenger, 209.  
366 Another case with a lot of out-of-court advocacy and negotiations were the cases involving the city of 
Frankfurt. See Jahns, 256-7. 
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 Witness testimony proceedings took place in 1538 and 1539 in Dillingen and 
Weisenhorn.367 In the end, the dispute was settled out of court in the Tettnang treaty in May 
1542, according to which it was forbidden for anyone to launch a suit against Memmingen 
regarding this matter, and Memmingen would pay the family of Vogelmann 3000 gulden.368 
Final payment amounting to 10,000 gulden occurred in 1548, with the help of other Protestant 
cities.369 
 
Patronage Rights (Jus Patronatus) 
 
In 1537, Philipp von Rechberg, who was both the Cathedral Provost at Worms, and the 
Cathedral Dean at Augsburg, sued a noble citizen of Ulm named Ludwig von Freyberg for 
willfully taking over the administration of the parish of Öpfingen bei Ehingen, on the Danube, in 
the Bishopric of Constance, and confiscating property and incomes.370 In his Petitio Summaria, 
he wrote that in April 1536, Ludwig had ordered Hans Moßberg, the vicar, to clear out of the 
parish, and in the process confiscated large quantities of chaff, barley, wheat, rye, hay, wood, 
straw, and grain.371 He did this although Hans, like Ludwig, was an “honest and pious 
prelate.”372 Since then, he had taken all tithes, annuities, rental fees, and incomes of the parish to 
himself or redirected them. These actions, claimed Philipp, violated several layers of rights and 
laws. First, it violated the rights of the liege lords (Lehensherren) and legal patrons of the parish, 
the noble family von Berg. It also violated the rights of Philip von Rechberg himself, in his 
capacities as the Cathedral Provost at Worms, and the Cathedral Dean at Augsburg, to whom the 
parish had been invested by both the von Berg family and the Bishop of Constance in 1518, and 
who therefore had administration and presentation rights there. Finally, it violated the rights of 
the vicar Hans Moßberg who had been, until then, receiving incomes through the parish.  
Collectively, these violations defied (1) a specific protection relationship (Schutz und 
Schirm) between the Emperor and the plaintiff; (2) common written laws; (3) the Golden Bull; 
(4) the Land-Peace in which it is provided for that no one, whatever estate they may be, may in 
any way damage another estate; (5) the Speyer Recess of 1526; and (6) the Augsburg Recess of 
1530, which especially forbade that any one, on their own authority, bring to themselves the 
incomes, tithes, or rents of a spiritual estate; and warned that each should remain peacefully with 
what he has in goods and administration of them, as inherited from earlier times.373  
In light of all of these violations, the plaintiff requested that the Court order Ludwig von 
Freyberg to return the confiscated wealth, to pay in addition the total worth of his takings, to 
                                               
367 More on the witness testimony proceedings in Chapter 4. 
368 After the Schmalkaldic War, the city would pay out 10,000 gulden. Frieß, 116-119; Karrer, 197-204; 
Dobel, V, 35. 
369 Frieß, 119; Dobel, V, 35. 
370 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 2019 (“Munich 2019”). Including tithes (Zehnten), annuities on 
the loaning of capital (Renten), and rental fees on the lending of land (Zinsen). 
371 Munich 2019, Q21, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1541 for list of all items taken and their values. For 
example: “Item er lutz von Freyberg hatt ime Mosperger all sein hew, im stadel geweltigclich genomen, dasselb 
verkaufft, und das gelt zu seinen handen genomen.” 
372 Munich 2019, Q21, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1541: “Item das der von Rechperg als ain eerlicher und 
fromer prelat, sich der massen gehalten, das er pillich, weder von lutzen von freyberg, noch yemandts andern vil 
angezaigter pfarr geweltigclich solte entsetzt oder spoliertt warden. Item das herr Hans Mosperger, des von 
Rechpergs arendierter, sich gleicher massen und gestalt gehalten habe.” 
373 Munich 2019, no quadrangle, third document in case file after protocol, “Ladung cum Executione,” no 
date. Also: Munich 2019, Q4, “Petitio Summaria,” 1537. 
 127 
redirect the incomes to Hans Moßberg, to release administrative control of the parish, and to “let 
the plaintiff and his administrator remain with the parish and the old Christian usages and 
ceremonies, safely and uninjured.”374  
This last sentence of the plaintiff’s suit was the only indication in the plaintiff’s 
allegations that what was at stake in the dispute was “the old Christian usages and ceremonies” 
as such. It is on one level self-explanatory that by taking over administration of the parish and 
redirecting the incomes away from then-vicar Hans, Ludwig obstructed the exercise and carrying 
out of “old Christian usages and ceremonies.” Yet the plaintiff party was making a choice here to 
sue in a manner that turned on the property violations in question; and, specifically, to do so 
under the terms of patronage rights and under imperial law, especially the Land-Peace and a 
variety of recesses and statutes. 
 
Since Longer than Humans Can Remember 
 
The defendant, Ludwig von Freyberg, entered the case through a power of attorney 
appointing Ludwig Hirter.375 He also submitted the combined power of attorney for the 
protesting estates, including himself who, though not an estate, was “a citizen of Ulm,” one of 
the protesting cities.376 
First, they responded to the suit with a number of normal procedural arguments. They 
capitalized on an apparent notarial error, for instance, arguing that it had improperly taken four 
years for the summons to be sent out after production of it.377 The plaintiff responded that these 
were merely notarial errors in the writing of the date as 1533 rather than 1537, and questions of 
form, which should not nullify the case.378 
Substantively, Ludwig von Freyberg claimed that he was the Lord of Öpfingen, including 
its castle and village, and as such possessed high and low dominion (Oberkeit) there; that his 
forefathers had been, as its liege lords, in peaceful administration and quasi possession379 of the 
parish “since longer than humans can remember.”380 As such, Ludwig von Freyberg, like his 
                                               
374 Munich 2019, no quadrangle, third document in case file after protocol, “Ladung cum Executione,” no 
date; and Munich 2019, Q21, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1541: “Item das auch lutzen von Freyberg bey hocher straff 
und pennen und bey vermaidung ro.key und kon. mt. schwerer ungnad von rom.kay.mt. gepotten, dem hern kleger 
und sein verweßern bei vilgemelter pfarr und altem christenlichen gebrauch und cerimonien sicher und unbelaidigt 
beleiben zuelassen.” 
375 On Ludwig von Freyberg, see Caroline Gritschke, Via Media: Spiritualistische Lebenswelten und 
Konfessionalisierung: Das süddeutsche Schwenckfeldertum im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2011), 49-50; and Rainer Sailer, “Öpfingen im Mittelalter: Eine Spurensuche nach Geschichte und Geschichten” 
(2016), accessed May 30, 2019, 
https://www.oepfingen.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Bilder/Geschichte_OEpfingen/OEpfingen_im_Mittelalter_Teil_2.pdf 
376 Munich 2019, Q5, “Mandatum Constitutionis,” 1537; and Q6, “Copia Mandati Constitutionis Generalis 
der protestierenden Chur und Fursten Graven frey und Reichstette darinn benennt unnd Lutz von Freiburg als 
Burgern der Stadt Ulm,” 1538. 
377 Munich 2019, Q7, “Ursachenn cum Annexa petitione et protestatione,” 1538. 
378 Munich 2019, Q8, “Petitio,” 1538; Q9, “Supplicatio pro Rescripto,” 1538. The plaintiff then submitted 
corrected versions of the Citatio and Petitio Summaria in Q10, “Copia Citationis,” 1538; and Q11, “Petitio,” 1538. 
379 Possessio vel quasi refers to incorporeal property. See Marta Madero, “The Servitude of the Flesh from 
the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century,” Critical Analysis of Law 3, no. 1 (2016), 151; and Karl Stehlin, “Die 
Exemtionsformel zu Gunsten der Schweiz im Westfälischen Frieden,” Anzeiger für schweizerische Geschichte 15, 
no. 1 (1917). 
380 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das der 
gemelt Ludwig von Freyberg und seine voreltern vonn zehen, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 und mer jar dann kain mensch 
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forefathers, had the right to appoint and remove the priest of the parish and its vicar. This 
appointment, however, was conditional on the approval of Philip von Rechberg (the plaintiff) as 
the representative of the Bishop of Constance. In the past, these appointments had been approved 
without incident—until the most recently appointed vicar.381  
 
A Matter of Religion 
 
The conflict began, said the defendant, when Hans Moßberg was appointed vicar, and 
neither preached nor in other ways behaved as a vicar.382 Eventually he departed from the 
parish.383 So Ludwig von Freyberg appointed another vicar “who would deliver the pure, clear, 
plain Gospels and word of Christ”384 without “any human ornament or addition.”385  Indeed, 
Ludwig “considered the teaching and preaching of this vicar as Christian and in line with the 
holy Gospels.”386 It was after this appointment that Philip von Rechberg brought this suit against 
Ludwig von Freyberg, saying that he illegally took to himself the administration of the parish 
and improperly redirected its incomes away from Hans Moßberg. In doing so, Philip von 
Rechberg ignored the fact of the former vicar’s own departure, and that it had been the custom 
since time immemorial that the present vicar be paid through parish incomes. Ludwig denied that 
his actions constituted a Land-Peace violation, or a confiscation of the incomes of clergy.387 
The entire dispute, said the defendant, came down to Philip von Rechberg’s objecting to 
the new vicar they appointed. He “has no other objection to this vicar, except that he does not 
                                               
gedenckenn mag in ruwigen inhabenn gewer, und quasi possession gewessen und noch seyn der lehenschafft der 
pfarr zu Opffingen unnd das sie derselbenn alwegenn und ye recht patroni gewesenn unnd noch seien also das jus 
patronatus dem gemelten vom freyberg und seinem voreltern alwegenn und je zugehort unnd noch zugehoren.” 
381 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das alle 
und yede so seine vicarien gewesenn, durch den gedachtenn Ludwigen vonn Freyberg angenomen und alwegen 
besetzt und entsetzt wordenn seienn, welche er auch die pfarr also verwaltenn lassen one alle irrung und 
widersprechen biß uff jungsten ernembten und gesetztenn vicarien.” 
382 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das der 
gemelt Hanns Moßberg nit predigen und sich sonst dermassen gehalten auch sunst anders geubt.” 
383 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das 
gedachter hanns moßberg also vonn der pfar abgewichenn.” 
384 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das vil 
gemelter vonn Freyberg seinem lang hergeprachten und ersessnem gebrauch nach ainem andern Vicarien gesetzt der 
ime und seinen underthanen das Rain, clar, lautter, evangelium und wortt Christi verkunthen soll.” (This clause is 
underlined in the case file, most likely by a judge.) 
385 Munich 2019, Q7, “Ursachenn cum Annexa petitione et protestatione,” 1538: “gedachts Lutzenn vonn 
Freybergs beger und gemuth allein sey zu seiner hohen und nider oberkhaitt ein Cristenlichen verkhunder des 
hailigen wortt gotts, dasselbig auch on allen menschlichenn thant [Tand] oder zusatz, rhein, lautter zu predigenn und 
zuverkhunden, zu habenn.” Though not named in the case file, this is most likely referring to Georg Keller. See 
Sailer, “Öpfingen im Mittelalter.” 
386 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das 
vielgemelts vonn Freyberg seines gesetzten vicarien leer predigenn fur christenlich und dem heilligen evangelio 
gemes halt.” 
387 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “damit 
dann e.g. aigentlich und gruntlich vernemen, das gegenwurttiger spann kain landtfridbruch noch entsetzung noch das 
Ludwig von Freyberg willenns gewesenn oder noch nit seie, ime her Philipsen... als ainem gaistlichen die rent und 
gult zunemen, oder ine derselbenn zuentsetzenn, so erpuett er sich frei willig und will sich des hiermit vor e.g. 
offenlich bewilligt und protestirt habenn, das er ime von Rechberg alle usstende nutzung auch was kunfftiglich 
verfallenn wurdt und uber die gewonlich und lang herpracht underhaltung aines vicarienn unnd vogt recht bevor stet 
verfolgenn zulassen wie vonn alter her einzubringen.” 
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like his faith and teachings, which, however, Ludwig von Freyberg considers truly Christian and 
the word of God.”388 Thus, “all of the conflict has to do with the faith and religion.”389  
The defendant party thus argued that he in fact inherited the right and authority to 
administer the parish, and to appoint and de-seat a vicar, conditional on the approval of the 
Bishop of Constance or his representative; and that customarily, certain parish incomes went 
directly to the vicar. He thus challenged the claims the plaintiff made in terms of patronage 
rights, and then, by presenting the chronology—beginning with the departure of Hans Moßberg, 
and leading up to the launching of the suit—suggested that Phillip sued Ludwig only because 
Philip objected to the new vicar because he did not agree with his faith and teachings.  
As we will see in Chapter 4, Philip von Rechberg found himself in the position of having 
to insist that the dispute was not primarily about letting the parish remain with “the old Christian 
usages and ceremonies,” as he had initially said, but rather, was primarily a matter of jus 
patronatus, property, the right of appointment, and spoliation, and a violation of several layers of 
imperial law including recent Recesses. He had to elide the Reformation context in order to 
strengthen his case. 
 
Highest Advocate of the Christian Church 
  
In April 1532, the Imperial Chamber Court summoned the mayor, council and commune 
of Bremen, plus “the 104 men of that city,” regarding a suit brought by the entire clergy in and 
around Bremen.390 The case file—though containing no special protocol (indicating that the 
judges never called for its compilation), and no documentation that indicates a response by the 
defendant parties—provides a snapshot of the ways in which issues of property and faith were 
translated into familiar legal idiom.  
 The “104-Man Revolt” of 1530 began as a “citizen protest over access to the city’s 
pasturelands.”391 It was led by a committee of 104 elected representatives—four for each of the 
area’s twenty-six parishes. “By 1532 growing violence prompted the council to exile several 
antireform magistrates and to permanently remove the cathedral chapter from the city,” and to 
introduce evangelical preaching into the Bremen Cathedral that year.  
 In the Mandate, the Court wrote: 
                                               
388 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das der 
gedacht herr philips von rechberg kain ander einred noch widersprechen hatt, dann allein das ime der vielgemelt 
jungstgesetzt vicarii seins glaubens und leer halb nit gefellig welche doch Ludwig von Freyberg fur ain gerechte 
waren Cristenliche wer und wortt gottes helt.” 
389 Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn Cum annexa petitione,” 1540: “das also 
allain aller spann glaubenns und der relligion halb ist.” 
390 Staatsarchiv Bremen 6,1 (RKG) Nr. B24 (“Bremen B24”), no quadrangle, second document in case file, 
“Mandatum penale cum executione,” 1532: “Wir [...] embieten den ersamen unnsern und des reichs liebe getrewen 
Burgermaister Rat gemainde und sonnderlich den hundert vier mannen der stat Bremen so von ainer gemain daselbst 
zu oberkait vermaint erwelt sein sollen unnser gnad und alles guts Ersamen lieben getrewen unns haben die Ersamen 
unnser lieb andechtig Brobst dechant und Capitl des Erzstifft Bremen desgleichen prelaten Brobst dechant Capitl 
annderer stifftkirchen Closter und Gotzheuser, auch pharrer vicari und gemain phaffhait und clerisey in der stat auch 
ausser halb so in dem erzstifft Bremen wonen mit clag furbrinngen unnd zuerkennen geben.” 
391 Jason L. Strandquist, “Bremen,” in Dictionary of Luther and the Lutheran Traditions, ed. Timothy 
Wengert (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), no page numbers online, accessed August 7, 2018, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=i9HlDQAAQBAJ&lpg=PT194&ots=GitXHATaIl&dq=revolt%20of%20104%2
0men%20Bremen&pg=PT194#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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According to written law, the Golden Bull, the kingly Reformation, the established 
Land-Peace and our and the Empire’s ordinances—no one may plunder or deprive 
someone of what he holds in peaceful possession.392 Yet, in recent days, the clergy of 
Bremen have been degraded and plundered in their freedom, jurisdiction, grounds, 
gardens, and pastures of the village Utbremen, including their agricultural land and 
rights.393 
The Mandate was general about the facts, and there was no mention of the ways in which this 
property dispute was tied up with evangelical teachings. By the time this suit was brought, the 
clergy of Bremen could have invoked the Recess of 1530, for instance, against the introduction 
of evangelical preaching in the Cathedral. But they did not; they only invoked long-established 
norms and laws regarding property, and only by inference did they make reference to any more 
recently established recesses. 
The Mandate continues: 
And they humbly call upon us, that we, as the highest advocate (Vogt) of the 
Christian Church, make right against your violent, self-authorized actions with 
imperial relief.394 Whereas no one should be dispossessed outside of law with 
violence of what he holds in peaceful possession, and since we are disposed to law 
and equity, therefore, we command you to pay the heavy penalty stated in the above-
mentioned imperial recesses and ordinances of 50 marks lötigen golds—half to us in 
the Court and half to the plaintiffs. And that within fourteen days of receiving this 
mandate, you return to the clergy all of their freedoms, jurisdictions, and lands 
unconditionally, that you completely restitute them and that you leave them 
undisturbed. However, if you would like to submit an alternative narrata, or to offer 
objections and legal causes for the above actions, then we summon you to the Court. 
This invocation of the Court, that “we”—recall that all Court mandates and summons were 
written in the name of the Emperor, so it is to him the clause refers—as the “highest advocate 
(Vogt) of the Christian Church,” is not customarily used in such a document, and seems to be a 
subtle effort to index the faithful context of the dispute. In the 1530 Augsburg Recess, the 
Emperor used the very same expression, referring specifically to the Emperor in his capacity as 
the worldly representative of the Church, who held a duty of protection towards it.395 But this 
                                               
392 Bremen B24, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Mandatum penale cum executione,” 1532: 
“Wiewol nach vermog geschribner Recht gulden Bullen kunigklicher Reformation aufgerichteen Lanndtfriden und 
unnser und des Reichs ordnung niemanndt den anndern seiner hab gueter und ruebiger possession spoliern und 
ensezen.” 
393 Bremen B24, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Mandatum penale cum executione,” 1532: 
“so sollet jedoch in kurzverruckhten tagen dieselben clerisey irer freyhait jurisdiction grundt Sarten(?) heve und 
waidlanndt, des dorffs utbremen sambt seiner veldmarckh und gerechtigkait entwert und spoliert haben, des sy sich 
merckhlich und zum hochseten beschweren.” 
394 Bremen B24, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Mandatum penale cum executione,” 1532: 
“und unns darauf diemutiglichen anruffen und bitten lassen, das wir als oberister vogt der cirsteliche kirchen, gegen 
solchen eurn gewaltigen thatliche hanndlungen unnser kayserlich notdurfft umsehen zuthuen gnedigklichen 
geruchten.” 
395 See section 10 of 1530 Augsburg Recess, for example, in Senckenberg, NSRA II, 309. See also 
Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 5, s.v. “Vogt, Vogtei,” by D. Willoweit, 932-46. 
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was the only subtle, though out of the ordinary, indication we have that this property dispute 
concerned church property and church litigants, against a backdrop of reform in the city.  
 
The Priest’s Lutheran Lawyer 
 
 Some cases during this period in the Imperial Chamber Court, though not Reformation 
cases, make legible the Lutheran leanings of a litigant in order to achieve a particular end in the 
litigation—though sometimes that end is not so clear. 
Take for instance the case of Christoph Hoss, doctor of laws and procurator at the 
Imperial Chamber Court since 1522, who in 1530 sued a priest, Johann Purpner, then vicar at the 
Speyer Cathedral, for unpaid wages. Hoss had served “in a most loyal way”396 as Purpner’s 
lawyer in a case against the commune at Kappelrodeck (Cappel unter Rodeck) where Purpner 
was formerly curate/rector. Between 1526 and 1531, Hoss had carried out a variety of judicial 
and extra-judicial tasks, including the production of some extensive documents at his own 
expense, without remuneration for his labor, other than four gulden given at the time the contract 
was made.397  
 In his Replik, Purpner claimed first of all that he paid more than the four gulden Hoss 
claimed.398 More importantly, it was Hoss who at a certain point in the proceedings abandoned 
his appointment, leaving Purpner alone in the case,399 doing so both against imperial law, as well 
as his promise that he would serve as advocate, procurator, solicitor and councilor in his matter. 
He did so suddenly after a September 1 administrative decision in the case, in which the Court 
ordered Hoss to settle the litis. Hoss even kept with him many of the documents that Purpner 
needed in order to continue to pursue the matter.400  
 Then Purpner said that he did not know what the cause was for Doctor Hoss’s leaving 
him in the middle of the proceeding, but that he speculated that it was because Hoss had 
overheard him saying to his father that Doctor Hoss was Lutheran and therefore wondered 
whether he could trust him to carry out his affairs. He could think of no other reason, he said, 
why Hoss would no longer want to serve as his advocate and procurator, for he had otherwise 
treated Hoss with nothing but friendship.401 He described the complications that Hoss’s 
unexplained abandonment of the case posed for the legal proceedings, and sought restitution for 
the costs and disadvantages that this caused him.  
 Hoss for his part responded that this Replik was unfounded; he denied that he received 
any of the additional payments that Purpner outlined.402 But he did not address the statement that 
he abandoned the case, or about his being Lutheran. And in a final document submitted by 
Purpner the issue of his being Lutheran was not brought up at all; instead, he used language that 
                                               
396 Landesarchiv Speyer E6 (RKG) 812 (“Speyer 812”), Q2, “Copia supplicationis pro citation ad 
videndum taxari labores,” 1535: “zum getrewlichsten gedeint.” 
397 Speyer 812, Q2, “Copia supplicationis pro citation ad videndum taxari labores,” 1535. 
398 Speyer 812, Q6, “Replice et Conclusiones in eventum,” 1535. 
399 Speyer 812, Q6, “Replice et Conclusiones in eventum,” 1535: “mich an meinem rechten verlassen.” 
400 Speyer 812, Q6, “Replice et Conclusiones in eventum,” 1535. 
401 Speyer 812, Q6, “Replice et Conclusiones in eventum,” 1535: “Gnediger her, waß doctor Hossen darzu 
verursacht mitten in meinem rechten zu verlassen hab ich nit wissen. Es were dan die ursach, umb das ich zu 
meinem Vatter hab gesagt, ich habe vernommen, daß doctor Hoss Lutterrisch sey, ob ich imme durffe vertrauen, 
mein handel zu fueren, daß mir doctor Hoss hatt uff gehaben, ob er mir deß halben nit mer wollen Advociern Statt in 
seinem wissen, dan ich ime sonst nichts gethon sonnder alle fraindtschafft, wie ich hab kondth bewisen.” 
402 Speyer 812, Q7, “Conclusiones,” 1535. 
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had to do with the duty of office of an Imperial Chamber Court procurator, that his actions were 
not motivated by noble purposes, but rather “sub rusticulum animum.”403 In the end, the plaintiff, 
Hoss, won the case, with Purpner obligated to pay a certain amount.404 
 In 1531, Christoph Hoss was “reminded” after a 1531 visitation of the Court to abide by 
the terms of the 1530 Augsburg Recess in points of the religion; by this point, it was known that 
Hoss was Lutheran.405 It was first in 1548, however—after the four-year hiatus of the Court, and 
the Schmalkaldic War—that Hoss and several other Lutheran procurators were fired from the 
Court.406 He was reinstated either in 1553 after the Passau Treaty, or in 1555. He died in 1558 or 
1559. 
 
Recently Ordered Peace in the Religion 
 
 In April 1540, Count Martin of Wallerstein, represented by Dr. Lukas Landstraß, sued 
Count Ludwig the Elder of Öttingen due to events concerning the St. Jacobs parish church at 
Öttingen.407 Sometime between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning the day after Laetare Sunday 
(March 18th), Count Ludwig allegedly sent a servant, Wolffen Riethmuller, to the sexton of the 
parish church at Öttingen to take the key of the church away from him, and locked up the church. 
Around this time, a citizen of Öttingen gave birth, and desired a baptism for her baby “according 
to old praiseworthy custom”; but she was prevented from the baptism, and forbidden to even 
seek out the sexton for that purpose. Instead, she was forced to have the baptism done in another 
place outside of the city. Then, “unsated with this,” on the following day, around 9 o’clock in the 
morning, Riethmuller, along with a secretary named Bietsch Serretan, went to the chaplain of St. 
Sebastian church, who was serving also at St. Jacob “because no orderly pastor or priest who was 
according to the old praiseworthy usages had been presented or invested or ordinated there in the 
parish,” and ordered him to “completely stop all of his religion, ceremonies, as well as all access 
and usage of the parish church, because Count Ludwig would no longer tolerate it as the religion 
in that parish church.”408  
                                               
403 Speyer 812, Q8, “Conclusiones in eventum contra pretensas conclusiones,” 1536: “und wo purpner 
gepuret so mochte er mitt gutter wissen sprechen das doctor hos nit generosum, sonder sub rusticulum animum et ab 
on(?) officiis pietate humanaquae alienum gehapt hete, das er purpner kein trüw und wolthonen von doctor hosen 
beremen kan, wie wol ers genaigt were.” 
404 Ironically, Johann Purpner seems to have pursued his own case for withholding of income, in 
completely different circumstances. In 1530 he was asked to leave his position because he had lost his voice, but 
proved to be a bit of a troublemaker in putting up a fight against this; see Gustav Bossert, “Beiträge zur badisch-
pfälzischen Reformationsgeschichte, III. 1529-1546,” Zeitschrift für die Geschichte Oberrheins 18 (Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter’s Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1903), 227ff, accessed July 4, 2019, 
https://archive.org/stream/zeitschriftfrdi20langoog. 
405 Baumann, Visitationen, 125. 
406 Malte Hohn, Die rechtlichen Folgen des Bauernkrieges von 1525. Sanktionen, Ersatzleistungen und 
Normsetzung nach dem Aufstand. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), 281-2 and the literature cited there. 
Zeitschrift für Bücherzeichen, Bibliothekenkunde und Gelehrtengeschichte 6 (1896) 107, accessed July 4, 2019, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=mFIxAQAAMAAJ&pg=PP11#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
407 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 1476 (“Munich 1476”). Count Ludwig the Elder began 
introducing Reformation in 1539. See Reinhold Herold, Geschichte der Reformation in der Grafschaft Oettingen, 
1522-1569 (Halle: Verein für Reformationsgeschichte, 1902). 
408 Munich 1476, Q2, “Copia mandate penalis,” 1540: “…(dieweyll kein ordenlicher pfarer oder priester, 
der nach altemloblichen gebrauch presentiert und investyert auch nit ordiniert unnd geweyset alda uff der pfar 
gewesen) bevolhen, in der pfar zuversehen verordnet haben, ime dem Caplan zu sagen unnd zugebietten, das ehr 
sich gemelter pfar kirchen mit seinen Religion Ceremonien Zuganng unnd gebrauch genzlich enthalten solte, dan dir 
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 These acts, the Mandate continued, went against the “praiseworthy, Christian usages” 
such as “holding mass and other holy and Christian sacraments, offices, and ceremonies” which 
have remained undisturbed and without any kind of hindrance at St. Jacobs church for “longer 
than human memory stretches.”409 Not only did Count Ludwig lack any authority to hinder 
access or usage of the church,410 but in so doing he also violated imperial law: “our imperial 
edict and mandate and our and the Empire’s Land-Peace, as well as numerous promulgated 
recesses and in particular, the recently ordered peace in religion, in which it is ordered and 
demanded, that no one, on account of faith, religion, or any matter may burden, insult, afflict, 
disturb or hinder another.”411  
 In order to avoid the penalty provided for “in the Empire’s Land-Peace and Peace in the 
religion”—namely the Acht—Count Ludwig was ordered to “leave undisturbed all and every 
holy Godly office, ceremony and usage of the holy Christian Church, as from ages inherited and 
praiseworthily maintained, without any hindrance, burden or antagonism” and to leave all 
images, and church items unchanged, unshaken, and undisturbed and to show himself to be 
obedient and acting in accordance with imperial ordinances and recesses. 
In June, the Court sent a Citatio Executionis to the Count for having failed to obey the 
terms of the Mandate; specifically, although the court messenger reported having successfully 
delivered the Mandate to his usual residence, and recorded his receipt of it, nonetheless, when 
someone was sent to collect the key from his servant Riethmuller, he responded that he knew of 
no mandate, and had no order to do anything.412 And when that person was sent to the Count 
himself, the Count “hotly” responded that he had nothing to carry out with respect to the 
Mandate. In so doing, the Citatio said, the Count was in danger of bringing upon himself the 
Acht, and so should respond to this summons. 
 In October, the defendant Count Ludwig appointed Dr. Christoph Hoss and responded 
with an Exceptiones cum annexa peticione in which he declined the jurisdiction of the Court, 
first on the basis that as a direct imperial subject there were certain rules contained in the Court’s 
ordinances regarding when one may be sued in the first instance there, and that this case did not 
count among them; nor may the party sue on account of Rechtsverweigerung (the denial of 
justice at a lower instance).413  
 And second, he declined the forum on the basis “that you, judges, in matters concerning 
Christian faith and religion, and all that flows from it, according to written law, have no 
jurisdiction. Now it is however the undeniable truth that the present matter is nothing other than 
one concerning the religion, as the plaintiff’s own narration indicates. Therefore, the present 
matter, according to its place and nature, is to be adjudicated before an ecclesiastical forum 
                                               
die alt Religion in gemelter pfarkirchen lennger zugedulden nit gelegen sein wolte.” 
409 Munich 1476, Q2, “Copia mandate penalis,” 1540: “vil lenger here dan sich menschen gedechtnuß er- 
strecktt nach loblichen Cristlichen gebrauch mit meshalten unnd allen anndern heyligen unnd Cristenlichen 
Sacramenten Ampten unnd Ceremonien […] auch bey der heyligen Cristenlichen kirchen, satzungen, ordnungen 
wolher gebrachten gebreuchen unnd gewonheytten unbetruebt und on menigklichs verhinderung plieben.” 
410 Munich 1476, Q2, “Copia mandate penalis,” 1540: “weder fueg noch recht gehabt oder noch habest.” 
411 Munich 1476, Q2, “Copia mandate penalis,” 1540: “auch zuo solchen in unnsern kayserlichen Edict 
unnd mandat unnd unnsern unnd des reichs lanndfrieden unnd vielen auffgerichten abschieden unnd sonnderlich 
jungsten unnserm kay. in den Religion bevolhnem frieden geordnet unnd gebetten seye, das niemandts den anndern 
des glaubens Religion oder annderer Sachenhalb beschwerrn, belaidigen, betrueben, irren oder verhindern sole.” 
Referring to the Peace Mandate of 1532, promulgated as part of the Regensburg Recess. 
412 Munich 1476, Q3, “Copia Execute Citationis,” 1540. 
413 Munich 1476, Q7, “Mandatum constituciones,” 1540. 
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(coram judice ecclesiastico).”414 Unlike other cases we have seen in which ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction referred to the spiritual courts, here, in the context of the Nuremberg Settlement, he 
is referring to a Christian Council. He defended this on the basis of the 1532 Nuremberg 
Settlement, which required a pause to all processes in matters concerning Christian faith and 
religion, until a free common Christian council or national assembly; followed by multiple 
imperial and kingly missives and directives to the Court saying as much.415  
 These arguments did not convince the Court, which required the litigants to settle the litis 
in October of 1540. The plaintiff’s Positions and Articles restated his account in article form, 
with some added detail including the claim that by Count Ludwig’s locking of the Church, the 
subjects at Öttingen were “plundered and confiscated of their old praiseworthy, inherited church 
usages, sacraments, baptism and ceremonies.”416 This striking use of “plunder” and 
“confiscation” normally reserved for property disputes, was used here to describe the forbidding 
and removing of access to use of the church, with all that entails in terms of sacraments and 
ceremonies. More than simply ignoring the Court’s Mandate, when representatives of Count 
Martin went to Count Ludwig’s servants to retrieve the key, open the church, and reestablish the 
holy Christian ceremonies, they responded derisively that Count Ludwig had the Church locked 
up, and would unlock it in his own time. When Count Martin, “as a lover of the true religion” 
sent servants to open the Church themselves “without violence,” the servants of Count Ludwig 
locked it up again and threatened them with words of violence, including that they would 
“clobber them over the head.” And so, to avoid violence, the servants of Count Martin left with it 
still locked up.417 All of these behaviors were evidence of Count Ludwig’s and his consorts’ 
“arrogance,” “animosity, and hatred.”418 
 
Or a Matter of Religion? 
 
 In May 1541, Count Ludwig responded to the Positions and Articles with a document, 
titled “A reminder of the imperial majesty’s suspension and pausing in the matter of the religion, 
with annexed petition” in which he argued that he had no obligation to take part in this 
proceeding because the judges of the Imperial Chamber Court cannot be the “competens judex” 
in this case because “all processes concerning the religion, and under the appearance of the 
                                               
414 Munich 1476, Q6, “Exceptiones cum annexa peticione,” 1540: “aus dissem grundt, das e.g. in sachen 
Christlichen glauben und religion betreffend und allen daraus fliessende noch besagt geschribner recht kein 
jurisdiction gepueren. Nhun ist aber die unwidersprechlich warheidt das presens causa nichts anders dan tueram(?) 
religione belangen thut, uf die narrate ausgangner proceß dasselbig augensheinlich mit bringen sich gezogen. Also 
das gegenwerts sach irer ort unnd natur nach coram judice ecclesiastico zu rechtvertigen ist.” 
415 More on this in Chapter 4.  
416 Munich 1476, Q8, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1540: “das also seiner gnaden underthannen zu Otting ir 
altenn loblichen herbrachten kirchen preuche Sacrament Tauffs und Ceremonien durch versperrung der kirchen biß 
uff den heutigen tag gewaltigklich spoliert unnd noch entsetzt seyenn.” 
417 Munich 1476, Q11, “Testamenten davon das penal mandat meldung thut,” 1540: “Dardurch unser 
gnediger her als ain lieb haber der warhafften religion geursacht das seiner gnaden geordenten solchen der 
pfarkirchen zugang on alle gewaltsame durch ain ainige person haben geoffnet zu dem ampt benten(?) und das 
selbig halten wollen aber Grave Ludwigs diener die selben Kirchen widerumb worspert und Grave Martins Capelan 
und gesanten auch den schlosser der hievor auffgethon mit beschwerlichen tronworten(?) und emporung ime 
schlosser werd so er ferner auffthue der Kopff erschlagen und so sich d geordenten ains solchen anmassen werden 
man mit inen zum haitzen(?) treten und sollen also on schanz und gefar besten neben andern unzeitigenn hitzigen 
tronworten violenter hinwegck und abgetaben(?). 
418 Munich 1476, Q11, “Testamenten davon das penal mandat meldung thut,” 1540: “hochmut, neid, haß.” 
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religion, as flowing from or out of it”419 were to be suspended. This was according not only to 
earlier recesses and settlements, but was most recently repeated in an order from the Emperor 
that came out of the Regensburg Diet of 1541.  
 It is evident, he argued, from the language of the plaintiff’s own narration that this is 
“purely and entirely a matter of religion.”420 And as Count Ludwig was one of the protesting 
estates, that suspension applied to him as well.421  
 In August 1541 the defendant submitted another document titled “Causes and reminder of 
the imperial recess and the Emperor’s declaration that followed at Regensburg in religion 
matters, along with attached request,” which reproduced a letter sent to the lawyer Christoph 
Hoss by his principal, defendant Count Ludwig, basically restating his understanding that the 
Regensburg Recess, and an imperial declaration that followed it, made it clear that the Imperial 
Chamber Court must pause religion matter cases; and asked that the case be suspended, and the 
plaintiff no longer heard, and that no further decisions come down in the case.422 
In 1542, both Counts came to a compromise, that reformed worship would happen in St. 
Jacob and old-faith worship in St. Sebastian, and that parish incomes would be evenly divided 
for priests of both churches.423  
In this case, we see that beginning in the early 1540s, there began to develop a language 
of a “religion-peace” as a new kind of legislative form, on the template of the Land-Peace. In this 
case, the plaintiff described the relevant portions of the Regensburg Recess of 1541 that forbade 
violent confiscations and the like as “the recently ordered peace in religion.”424 
                                               
419 Munich 1476, Q14, Erinnerung Ro. Key. Mt. Suspension und anstellung in sachen der Religion cum 
annexa petitione,” 1541: “das alle proceß die religion sachen belangen und under dem shein der religion als darvon 
herr oder daraus fliessendt.” 
420 Munich 1476, Q14, Erinnerung Ro. Key. Mt. Suspension und anstellung in sachen der Religion cum 
annexa petitione,” 1541: “Item ist die unwidersprechlich warheidt das gegenwurtig sach aus der religion herrurdt 
unnd ein tanter pur religion sach ist sich dessen uf die narrata f.G. vender(?) außgangen penal Mandaten referiert 
und gezogenn.” 
421 Munich 1476, Q14, Erinnerung Ro. Key. Mt. Suspension und anstellung in sachen der Religion cum 
annexa petitione,” 1541: “darzu wolgedachten graf einer aus gemeines(?) protestierenden stenden und der religion 
zu gewandten derhalben vormag key. Suspension deren der beclagt grafen alieege(?) anhangen will Bit demnach 
anwalt den beclagten seinen g. hern bey Ro. Key. Mt. suspension und anstellung in massen hieoben deduciert ist in 
religion sachen wie andere protestierende stende und zugewandten pleiben zulassen.” More on this identification 
with the protesting estates in Chapter 5. 
422 Munich 1476, Q15, “Ursachenn und erinnerung des Reychs abschiedt und kay. mt. daruff gevolgter 
declaration zu Regenspurg in Religionn sachen sampt angehanckten bitt,” 1541: “Diewyl in der Raychs abscheidt 
und key. Mt. declaration daruf gevolgt lauter und mit claren worten begriffen und verabscheydet ist, das das key. 
Camergericht in Religion Sachen gegen meniglich still steen und nit weyther procidiren, sollt ich uff des widertheyls 
anhalten umb handlung sollichen des Reychs abscheidt und stillstandt ains key. Mt. declaration exception weyß, 
warumb E.G. gegenwurtiger sachen nit Richten werenn zurwenden und mich keins wegs vor E.G. einlassen in 
ansehung das alle Religion sachen wie die genannt vermög angezogen Regenspurgischen abschidts suspendiret und 
in eynen stillstandt khom weren. Will also auß sondern schrifftlichen bevelch E.G. des Reychs abschied und key. 
mt. declaration daruf gevilgt also erinnert haben. underthenniglich bitten die wolgedachtigen Grave Ludwigen bey 
dem thanige so durch der stend des Raychs und key. mt. zu Regenspurg verabschiedet worden pleyben und 
gemessen zulassen und den widerthayl mit seiner vermeinten rechtvertigung und anruffen nit zuhorenn als sich 
anwaldts g. herr endtlich zu E.G. auß oberzelten furprachten ursachen versehen und verfernern urtheylen und 
erkhammussen nit unschweren(?) oder dem widertheyl waythero Proceß erkhennen.” 
423 Herold, 20. 
424 Also in Landeshauptarchiv Sachsenanhalt Standort Wernigerode Rep. A53 No. H156 (“Wernigerode 
H156”), Q5, “Peticio summaria articulirta uff die pen den land friden,” 1550: “das uff dem gehaltnen reichstag zu 
Regenspurg anno 41 von der Kay Mt und den stenden des heilligen reichs sonderlich gesetzt und geordnet das in der 
religion und glaubens sachen auch sunst khainer ander ursach willen, wie die namen haben möchte, niemants hoch 
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Yet, the defendant insisted for his part that the key element of the Regensburg Recess 
was its confirming the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532 which ordered a suspension of all “matter 
of religion” disputes before the Imperial Chamber Court.  
What is so striking about this case is that we see that the “matter of religion” and the 
“peaces in religion” were operating as parallel imperial sources of law. The next chapter 
examines the “matter of religion.” In chapter 6, we will see that the “peace in religion” 
swallowed up the “matter of religion.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
Collectively, these cases illustrate the variety and range of the sources of law cited by 
parties in the cases, and the ways in which the cases were litigated under issues of property, 
peace, and jurisdiction laws. We have also seen a range of ways in which parties elevated or 
downplayed the Reformation context of a dispute.  
In the dispute between Johann Fabri and the city of Lindau, Fabri sued the city for 
illegally seizing his rights, authorities, and incomes as parish priest there, and redirecting them to 
two “misguided” preachers; and for denying appointed administrators access to the city. In that 
case, Fabri cited a variety of legal authorities, including the common law, the imperial 
constitution, the Land-Peace, the 1521 Edict of Worms, and the 1526 Imperial Recess of Speyer. 
In response, the city cited an imperial privilege limiting the forums in which they could be sued, 
“both godly and spiritual laws,” and the nexus of authorities that made the dispute a “matter of 
religion” (to be discussed in Chapter 4). This is the only case I have seen in which the Worms 
Edict was cited by the plaintiff as one of the laws of which the defendant was in violation.  
 We have also discussed a case in which the imperial Fiscal sued the city of Erfurt for 
facilitating attacks on the clergy by a mob, for failing to punish the culprits of those attacks, and 
for forcing the two collegiate churches in Erfurt to agree to sacrifice financial autonomy and 
large sums of wealth in exchange for nominal protection. He said that the city had violated 
“honor, law, propriety, the holy Empire’s laws,” and the city’s own “duty and oaths,” which 
referred to the proper lordship relationship. Interestingly, despite the Reformation context of the 
so-called “parson storms,” the Fiscal did not sue on the basis of the Worms Edict. Both parties 
used the narratio portion of their legal filings to provide the “true” version of events. The 
defendants, for instance, argued that the Fiscal was suing the city on its own prerogative, rather 
than on behalf of the clergy, with whom the city had a good relationship. The defendants also 
cited “imperial and Church laws” according to which the Fiscal may not sue in disputes 
concerning spiritual persons and goods before the worldly court; as well as the imperial law that 
provided that no estate may be proceeded against in a foreign court (referring to a concurrent 
dispute in the Papal Court concerning the same facts). The case ended up being settled outside of 
Court in the Treaty of Hammelburg. 
 The third case we discussed had to do with property in the village of Habenhausen. The 
plaintiffs sought the Court’s help in executing the terms of a Papal judgment because the worldly 
authority that would normally be expected to do so—the city of Bremen—was inclined towards 
                                               
oder nider standts bis zu endung gemainer oder nacional concili den andern vertriben, bevedhen, bekriegen, 
berauben, fachen, etc. noch darzuhelffen oder furstub thuon, sonder ein jeder den andern mit rechter freuntschafft 
und cristlichen lieb mayen und die khirchen unzerbrechen und umbgethan und einen ieden bey dem so er noch in 
possess bleiben lassen etc. alles bey vermeidung der kay. mt. schwerer ungnadt und straff darzue der pen in 
ußgebhunten khayserlichen landfriden begriffen.” 
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the Lutheran teachings, and so, they claimed, could not be trusted to carry out the ruling of the 
Papal court.  
 In the dispute between the Archbishop of Bremen and the city of Bremen, the 
Archbishop’s original allegations concerning the plunder of a monastery and appointment of 
Lutheran preachers were set aside in light of counter-allegations brought by the city that the 
Archbishop had seriously burdened the city and its citizens through costly and dangerous 
ventures. The Archbishop argued that in bringing these counter-accusations, the city was 
attempting to gain direct imperial status, thus litigating the question of lordship which was 
properly reserved to other forums. 
 A few years later, the Archbishop again sued the city of Bremen, this time for injuring the 
“honor, lineague, and status” of the Archbishop by supplicating to the Emperor for protection 
from the Archbishop’s alleged “tyrannical and unchristian violence.” In another case in 
Hildesheim, the Bishop of Hildesheim sued a Lutheran preacher there for inciting his followers 
to threaten and violently attack clergy and church property. In yet another case, a former city 
official’s complaints to the Emperor regarding the reforms of the city of Memmingen led to his 
execution, despite an imperial letter of protection.  
 Several of the cases discussed in this chapter also made arguments that the dispute was a 
“matter of religion” and therefore did not belong before the Imperial Chamber Court. It is to 
those arguments we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SHIFTS IN DISPUTATIONS TOWARDS “MATTERS OF RELIGION” 
 
 This chapter is about the protesting estates’ experimental and extraordinary, multi-
layered claim, beginning around 1529, that a number of disputes that were then pending in the 
Imperial Chamber Court, though formally about matters of property, peace, or jurisdiction, in 
fact flowed from disputes concerning “matters of religion.” Therefore, they argued, the Court 
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate in these cases, and the background disagreements that gave rise 
to these disputes should be treated collectively by a free Christian Council.1  
 On its face, this may seem like a straightforward objection to the forum, a claim about 
temporal versus spiritual jurisdiction. But in fact, as we will see, this claim was extraordinary, 
for several reasons. First, in this period, “religion” had no specifically legal meaning.2 It was 
unconventional to use that term to denote a certain legal forum or object of dispute. Second, to 
say that something was a matter of religion was to put it in a jurisdictional no-man’s-land. A 
dispute concerning a “matter of religion,” they said, did not belong in the Imperial Chamber 
Court as a temporal court. Nor did it belong in an ecclesiastical or spiritual court; it did not, in 
other words, assimilate or overlap with “spiritual matters” as they were understood legally at the 
time. Rather, according to the protesting estates, the nature of the disputes had no proper existing 
forum, other than the extraordinary forum of a Christian Council. Third, the protesting estates 
were trying to make legible a certain factor that brought a wide range of pending cases in the 
Court together. In the last chapter, we saw how the Reformation backdrop of a dispute was 
sometimes elevated and sometimes downplayed in a dispute, for a variety of reasons; now, we 
see an attempt to make the Reformation backdrop legally meaningful in the context of litigation, 
                                               
1 On the conciliar option, see Stollberg-Rilinger, Old Clothes, 97; Brady, German Histories, 81-2. This 
position of the protesting estates was summarized in an instruction they sent in the summer of 1533 to their 
delegates, concerning how they should apply themselves to the Court’s judges: “Each and every matter that concerns 
the religion, that has been bound to both God and law, cannot be fairly judged or proceeded by any judge, whether 
he is spiritual or worldly, high or low; rather those same matters should be heard and discussed nowhere other than 
through a free, Christian council” (“Dadurch alle und yde sachen, die religion belangend, von gots und rechts wegen 
dermassen anhengig worden, das von keinem richter, er sei geistlich oder weltlich, hoch oder nidder, pillich in den 
fellen dawider gehandelt oder procedirt warden soll, sonder sollen dieselben sachen nirgent anders, dan durch ein 
frei, christlich, concilium und das wort unsers herrn geortert und entscheiden werden, wie wolichs dasselb wort, alle 
recht und vernunft wollen und vermugen”) (Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 57, 164). 
2 See Ernst Feil, Religio. Vol. 1: Die Geschichte eines Neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffs vom Frühchristentum 
bis zur Reformation, 4 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986). Feil shows that in the late medieval 
period, the term “religio” meant variously worship, as well as the situation in which one devoted oneself to worship. 
The “religious” were those who took oaths to devote themselves to worship. To be “religious” could also be used 
more broadly to refer to the virtue of being devoted to worship. The term was “self-explanatory”; it had neither a 
philosophical nor theological importance. Indeed, “there were no problems for which the solution required a more 
specific definition” of “religion” (Feil, 231). For more on the use of “religio” and related terms by the early 
reformers, see Feil, 235-81. See earlier chapters in Feil on the uses of “religio” in antiquity, early Christianity, and 
the high Middle Ages. See also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the 
Religious Traditions of Mankind (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 19-44. See also Clifford Ando, “Religion, Law, and 
Knowledge in Classical Rome,” in Roman Religion, ed. Clifford Ando (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2003), 1-15. Ando shows that for the Romans, “religio” is best translated as “the sum total of current cult practice”; 
central to this was the idea of an “asymmetrical reciprocity between humans and gods,” such that “relations between 
gods and men [were] characterized by ‘justice,’ and hence to be governed by ius, a system of justice or body of law” 
(Ando, 5). See also Matthew C. Mirow and Kathleen A. Kelley, “Laws on Religion from the Theodosian and 
Justinianic Codes,” in Religions of Late Antiquity in Practice, ed. Richard Valantasis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 263-274. 
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and to argue that rather than continue to adjudicate the details of a specific case in terms of a 
dispute between two parties, that the cases should be handled collectively at a deliberative 
Council. 
 In this chapter, I explore the reception and impact of this proto-Protestant argument about 
“matters of religion.” Through a close look at case files, correspondences, and judges’ notes, I 
consider the details of the protesting estates’ “legal descriptive strategy,”3 and track the unsettled 
quality of this term as it was invoked in dozens of Reformation-related cases. I show that, in the 
course of litigation, these arguments were met variously with rejection, confusion, or a wait-and-
see attitude.  
 This chapter reveals that, out of the tussle of these inconclusive disputes, “religion” rose 
to the surface as a significant legal term. It became a bricolage legal category, that indexed a set 
of constitutional conundra born out of the Reformation, without resolving them.  
 The bricolage character of the legal category will be discussed in the conclusion. For 
now, I want to underscore three central tensions that constitute that bricolage. First, there was a 
tension in the category “matter of religion” between being foundationally a matter of 
“conscience,” on the one hand, and being inextricably entangled with material matters, on the 
other. As we will see, for protesting estates, pious motivation, beliefs about correct teaching and 
correct worship were always the “origins” of a matter of religion dispute. Yet this position 
exposed them to the retort that even if these “origins” of a dispute were removed, the justiciable 
issues of peace, property, and jurisdiction remained, which belonged before the Court. The 
protesting estates then responded that matters of religion were precisely those matters that were 
entangled with material issues but that had their origins in or flowed from differences in the 
religion, and that the material dispute could not be resolved without attending to the religious 
divide that had given rise to it. Thus, in contrast to scholars who argue that the Reformation 
produced a definition of “religion” tied to interior conviction and conscience, my research shows 
that the protesting estates were insisting precisely that all “matters of religion” were entailed with 
worldly consequences. 
 Second, there was a tension between “matter of religion” being spoken of as a 
commonsense moral category, on the one hand, or as a narrow legal category, on the other. 
Particularly in cases involving violence, or long-standing dynastic disputes, plaintiffs expressed 
incredulity and rebuke when the protesting estates claimed that the matter concerned the religion. 
But in other cases, “matter of religion” gestured narrowly to those agreements and recesses that 
explicitly governed such matters. Thus, plaintiffs who otherwise freely elaborated the 
Reformation context of a dispute—in the hopes of mobilizing prosecution under the terms of the 
explicitly anti-reform Augsburg Recess of 1530, for instance—could claim, without 
contradiction, that the dispute was not a “matter of religion.”  
 Third, there was a tension in the category between its classificatory and homogenizing 
effect, on the one hand, and its reliance on the details of particular disputes for its definition, on 
the other. The “matter of religion” category was defined not through abstract principles but in the 
form of lists and examples that were always embedded in particular cases and disputes. Yet the 
matter of religion category had the effect in this litigation of lifting a dispute out of its 
particularity, and declaring that nothing else in a case mattered but its being a matter of religion, 
and it was on these grounds alone that the proceeding should be nullified.  
                                               
3 Simon Teuscher, Lords’ Rights and Peasant Stories: Writing and the Formation of Tradition in the Later 
Middle Ages, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 77. 
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As we proceed through the cases below, these three central tensions will appear again and 
again.  
 
The New Argumentation that 1532 Unleashed: The Nuremberg Settlement of 1532 
 
 On November 6, 1532, Emperor Charles V sent an instruction, while on a visit in the 
Duchy of Mantua, to the Judges of the Imperial Chamber Court: 
“[I]t is our desire and order that you exercise loyal zeal and goodly attention in the 
handling of the common Land-Peace, and of the [Regensburg] Peace Mandate that we 
established between all estates in matters concerning the disputatious religion, [...] so 
that peace and unity may persist in the German nation and so that law and justice may 
be achieved. Where, however, legal disputation, conflict, and matters that concern the 
religion come before the Court, it is our serious order, based on relevant, important 
causes and motivations, that you suspend such matters that concern the religion, until 
further order from us.”4 
 The Emperor’s order that the Court suspend all “matters that concern the religion” 
(sachen, die religion belangendt) was one outcome of months-long negotiations between the 
Emperor, the Elector of Saxony on behalf of the protesting estates, and the Electors from Mainz 
and the Palatinate on behalf of old-faith estates.5 By the time the Emperor agreed to suspend 
these cases, in July 1532, it was on the condition that the directive remain a secret, known only 
to the negotiating estates and the Court. In particular, the old-faith estates, gathered at that very 
time for a Diet in Regensburg, were not to be told of this promise. In his final instructions to the 
Electors of Mainz and the Palatinate before the sealing of this agreement, which would be kept in 
writing exclusively with them, he ordered “that this assurance by all means be well-guarded and 
kept by your hands and not publicized, nor that anyone else be given a copy of it, for many 
critical reasons and especially to prevent that the other estates of the Empire be made all the less 
unhappy.”6  
                                               
4 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 31, 105-6: “[S]o ist an euch unser gnedigs begeren und bevelh, das ir ewer getrewe 
vleiß und gut aufmerken haben zu handthabung des gemeinen lands- und auch des fridens, so wir zwischen allen 
stenden in sachen, die stritige religion belangende, aufgericht [...], damit in teutscher nation wie oblaut guter frid und 
ainigkeit besteen und das recht und gerechtigkeit iren furgang wie pillich dester mehr erraichen mugen. Wo aber 
rechtliche spenn, irrung und sachen, die religion belangendt, vor euch im rechten schweben weren oder kunftigklich 
furkomen wurden, ist auß treffenlichen grossen ursachen und bewegnissen unser ernstlicher bevelh, das ir soliche 
sachen, die religion belangendt, biß uff unsern witern bevelh abstellet und suspendiret.” 
5 Schlütter-Schindler, 31; Kohnle, 401-6. For more on the negotiations, see Rosemarie Aulinger, “Die 
Verhandlungen der Kurfürsten Albrecht von Mainz und Ludwig von der Pfalz mit Karl V. 1532 in Mainz: ‘Missing-
Link’ Zwischen dem Reichstag 1530 und dem Nürnberger Anstand 1532,” in Im Schatten der Confessio Augustana: 
Die Religionsverhandlungen des Augsburger 1530 im historischen Kontext, ed. Herbert Immenkötter and Gunther 
Wenz (Münster: Aschendorff, 1997), 185-199.  
6 On the instruction of secrecy, see Otto Winckelmann, Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im 
Zeitalter der Reformation. Vol. 2: 1531-1539, [PC II] (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl Trübner, 1887), 169n1: “das 
diese versicherunge in alwege bei euern [der Kurfürsten] handen wolverwart und behalten und nit publiciert noch 
jemands copei davon gegeben werde, aus viel beweglichen ursachen und sonderlich zu verhuiten, das die andern 
stende des reichs desto weniger unlustig gemacht warden.”  
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 In the Peace Mandate made public from these negotiations (promulgated on August 3, 
1532) as an addendum to the Recess of the Regensburg Diet, the promise to cease cases 
concerning matters of religion was absent.7 Instead, it reiterated the language of earlier Land-
Peace legislation found in recesses of the previous decade, in which it was agreed that until the 
convening of a Christian Council, the participating estates would not feud, war, rob, capture, 
conquer, or siege another estate on account of the faith, nor for any other reason, […] rather each 
should treat the other with proper friendship and Christian love.”8 
 Thus, the Emperor’s directive to the Court had an apparently contradictory character. On 
the one hand, he was ordering the Court to carry out the terms of the public agreement (the Peace 
Mandate) that had been appended to the Regensburg Recess, and in general to uphold the Land-
Peace laws. On the other hand, he was ordering the Court to implement the terms of a secret 
agreement made among a small subset of estates and himself, to suspend cases concerning the 
religion. Which kinds of cases should be governed by the terms of the Land-Peace laws and the 
Regensburg Peace-Mandate, and which should be governed by the secret Nuremberg Settlement? 
Which should be adjudicated according to normal law, and which should be suspended? The 
Emperor seemed to produce here a distinction between cases “concerning the disputatious 
religion” in which adjudication would produce “peace and unity” and others “concerning the 
religion” which adjudication would lead to “disputation and conflict.” If adjudicating a case 
according to normal laws and procedures would lead to peace and unity, he seemed to be saying, 
then let the legal and judicial norms prevail. If, however, adjudicating a case according to those 
norms would lead to discord, then suspend those cases. What were the judges to make of this? 
As we will see, the directive generated a variety of perspectives among the Judges. 
 The Emperor’s ambiguous directive left some of the protesting estates’ unsatisfied. 
Landgrave Philip of Hessen, for instance, called it “an insulting, laughable peace, and an 
uncertain assurance.”9 Most of the protesting estates disagreed with the condition of secrecy, and 
that it would not be shared in writing. They also had intended for the negotiations to lead to an 
imperial order to pause collectively a specific list of cases that they identified as “matters of 
religion.” In the end, the Nuremberg Settlement only allowed that each of the respective litigants 
would be given the opportunity to seek a pause in their own case.10  In the end, though the 
Nuremberg Settlement would prove to be “worthless”11 in achieving the suspension of any cases, 
it marked the first time in which anyone other than the protesting estates gave credence, in the 
context of these disputes, to this invented category “the matter of religion.” As I will show, this 
bare acknowledgment turned out to be consequential in ways that none of the parties could have 
anticipated.  
 The Emperor took his time to send his directive to the Court regarding this secret term of 
the Nuremberg Settlement. The delay did not go unnoticed by the protesting estates; on October 
21, 1532, over three months after their initial agreement, the Elector of Saxony sent a letter to the 
                                               
7 Schlütter-Schindler, 36 and the literature cited there; Otto Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund 
1530-1532 und der Nürnberger Religionsfriede (Strassburg: J.H.E. Heitz, 1892), 252-3; Brady, Protestant Politics, 
80-2; Bernd Christian Schneider, Ius reformandi: die Entwicklung eines Staatskirchenrechts von seinen Anfängen 
bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 108-14. 
8 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 15, 61: “keiner den andern des glaubens noch sonst keiner andern ursach halben 
beveheden, bekrigen, berauben, fahen, uberzihen, belegern […] sonder ein jeder den andern mit rechter freuntschaft 
und christlicher liebe meynen.” See Peace section in chapter 3. 
9 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 257. 
10 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 250-2; Schlütter-Schindler, 33-5. 
11 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 264. 
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Emperor letting him know that new cases concerning the religion had been launched, and 
requesting that the Emperor notify the Court about their agreement.12 On the same day, he also 
sent a letter to the judges of the Court:13 
 
We do not doubt that it is to you unconcealed, in what manner [the Electors of 
Mainz and the Palatinate], by the permission of the Emperor, this past summer at 
Schweinfurt and then Nuremberg, undertook to establish through negotiations a 
common peace concerning the religion and other matters in the Holy Empire, and 
that, from God’s bestowal, such a peace was established and settled at Nuremberg 
with the Emperor’s permission, and which has since been promulgated in the 
Empire and publicly announced.14 And that the Emperor also obliged you to 
observe the terms of that peace, where we or our associates (mitgewanten), 
collectively or individually, were to be put upon with law (mit recht angelegt 
wurden) by someone, whoever they may be (were der were), on account of 
matters of religion (der religion sachen halben), […] that you terminate it […]. 
 
 The letter then pointed out several newly launched cases that they, the protesting estates, 
considered matters of religion; they said that though these matters concerned the religion, they 
were being sued “under the appearance of law.”15 Should the Court continue with these cases and 
arrive at legal judgments in them, such behavior would be deemed a “void, willful, unjust act to 
destroy the imperial majesty’s written peace and standstill” as well as “natural and written 
laws.”16  
 These two letters to the Court—the one from the Elector of Saxony on behalf of the 
protesting estates, and the one from the Emperor—set off a flurry of discussions and debates 
among the judges in their plenum session on November 29, 1532. Judges’ notes reveal that there 
was disagreement among the judges about how to proceed.17  
 The first question the judges discussed was: what can possibly be meant under the term 
“matter of religion”? Several distinct views were represented. Two judges, Matthias Alber and 
Johannes König made an argument to absurdity.18 The Court had no jurisdiction over “pure 
religious disputes.” Unless the directive had no object, or was redundant, it must be ordering 
them to suspend cases over which they currently had jurisdiction. Thus, they argued, the Court 
had to go beyond the apparently narrow meaning of “concerning the religion” to include the 
secularization and dispossession cases that those known as the protesting estates had been 
                                               
12 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 29, 100-2. 
13 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 30, 103-5. Not sure of the chronology here; though dated two weeks earlier than the 
Emperor’s directive to the Court, the Judges say that the Protestants’ letter came to them “soon after” (baldt nach) 
they received the Emperor’s letter (Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 35, 111). 
14 I.e. the Regensburg Peace Mandate (Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 263). 
15 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 30, 104: “solicher sachen halben, die religion antreffen, in schein vermeints rechtens 
zu clagen.” I think the cases referred to here are Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 4523 and Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 4524 (Ambrosius Kaut v. Ulm), and the case concerning St. Arbogast (Bishop Wilhelm of 
Strassburg v. City of Strassburg case. 
16 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 30, 104. 
17 See: Gero R. Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren des Reichskammergerichts und der Nuremberger 
Religionsfriede vom 23. Juli 1532,” in Recht, Gericht, Genossenschaft und Policey, ed. Gerhard Dilcher and 
Bernhard Diestelkamp (Berlin: Schmidt, 1986), 84–96. Dolezalek uses the journal of judge Mathias Alber for the 
period October 1532 to April 1533. 
18 For details on all of the judges, see Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 86-89. 
143 
arguing were “matters of religion.” Alber and König also made a purposive argument, linking the 
decisive aim of the directive with the Court’s overall purpose: to preserve the peace, even if it 
was at the cost of postponing justice. And there will only be peace, they said, if these 
dispossession cases were put to rest for now.19 
 Assessors Hartmann Mor and Justinianus Moser argued that even if the words of the 
directive were to be understood in that way, the agreement was not binding on the Court. The 
Imperial Chamber Court was not beholden to the instructions of the Emperor, only to the 
common law and the imperial Diet decrees. A contract that the emperor made with the protesting 
estates behind the backs of the old-faith estates only binded the contracting parties, not the 
Court.20 
 The Court’s President, Adam von Beichlingen, argued that the Emperor was entitled to 
give such a directive if such an agreement was the only way to protect the peace. In support of 
this view, Alber cited Corpus iuris C.1.19.4 which showed that an Emperor permitted deferment 
of payment for debtors even at the expense of the rights of creditors, indicating that the rights of 
some can be delayed for the good of the whole.21 In other words, there were circumstances in 
which the rule of law was not the only pathway to achieving the ultimate purpose of the Court: 
maintenance of the Land-Peace.  
 Assessor Arnold Glauburger doubted whether the imperial order was binding, but said 
that it was important, in the interest of the Empire, to pause the cases. He suggested therefore 
looking at each of the cases for existing procedural means to bring about a suspension, without 
having to rely on the legally questionable imperial directive. Here, the Judge was calling for the 
use of procedural techniques to achieve the valuable purpose of pausing cases, without using the 
questionable means of the imperial order. 
 In the end, thirteen of the seventeen judges present agreed that they wanted in some way 
or another to uphold the emperor’s directive, but that they would ask the Emperor what he meant 
by “matters of religion,” and in the meantime would not proceed in any of the questionable 
cases. Philip Drachstedt agreed that writing to the Emperor was a good idea, but with the 
condition that the cases continue. The four who disagreed with the idea of writing to the Emperor 
(Haller, Burchard, Alber, and Glauburger) each had different reasons. Konrad Haller said that 
they should simply tell the protesting estates that they had not had sufficient time to discuss the 
matter and they would respond later.22 Philipp Burchard said that they should tell the protesting 
estates that they should present their objections in a procedurally correct form internal to the 
proceedings, rather than pursue extra-judicial negotiations with the Emperor to stop those 
proceedings.23 Alber advised against writing to the Emperor, preferring to deal with the question 
with regard to individual cases. Glauburger agreed with Alber, that the Judges needed no 
interpretative help from the Emperor; that they should read the imperial missive openly in Court, 
and debate with the procurators over it. This they agreed to do. In the context of two cases, 
                                               
19 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 91. 
20 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 91. 
21 See Fred Blume, trans., The Codex of Justinian, Vol. 1, ed. Bruce W. Frier (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 299: “Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius Augusti to Florus, Praetorian Prefect. 
All rescripts issued to grant delays in the cases of debtors shall not be valid unless adequate surety for the payment 
of the debt is provided.” 
22 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 91. 
23 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 92. 
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against Ulm and against Strassburg, on December 4, 1532, the Court read out the Emperor’s 
letter.24  
 In addition to reading the Emperor’s directive in public audience on December 4, the 
judges wrote to the Emperor to seek his clarification.25 In it, they indicated having received the 
directive to uphold both the general Land-Peace as well as “the other peace,” referring to the 
Regensburg Peace Mandate.26 As the Emperor sent only the bare directive, however, without 
mentioning the negotiations from which they emerged, or the precise contents of the deal, the 
Court did not know which matters and parties were envisaged in its terms.27 
 
For these reasons, we are not a little concerned, especially since in many of the 
cases that come before us, one party says it concerns the religion, that the issues 
cannot be disaggregated (unzerteillich), while the other sues for plunder, or 
violent dispossession in violation of the Land-Peace and of the 1526 Speyer 
Imperial Recess, and therefore that the matter originally or certainly did not touch 
the religion. When the parties regard the very nature of the dispute differently—
whether religion is directly involved in the dispute or not, whether the word 
‘religion’ extends to goods, or to the robbery of the goods, or to the specific cases 
described in the peaceful resolution [the Nuremberg Peace]—such questions we 
are not confident to handle on our own without your clarification. We have not 
given a clear answer to the protesting estates, because we wanted to write you 
first to ask for the document itself [the Nuremberg Peace], and also to ask what 
you meant, which parties and which issues are conceived to be included in the 
peace, and to what extent. Without your answer, we cannot act confidently, 
however it is of the highest importance that we act with care and certainty in these 
matters.28 
 
 On the very same day that the judges responded to the Emperor’s directive, the Emperor 
himself wrote a letter to them, again from Mantua, spurred by a flurry of frustrated letters from 
the protesting estates. In this letter, received by the Court on December 23, 1532, the Emperor 
finally explained that the directive he sent before was borne of an agreement made at Nuremberg 
in July with the protesting estates.29  
                                               
24 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 92; Robert Schelp, Die Reformationsprozesse der Stadt Strassburg am 
Reichskammergericht zur Zeit des Schmalkaldischen Bundes (1524) 1531-1541 (1555) (Kaiserslautern: 
Buchhandlung Schmidt in Kommission, 1965), 82. 
25 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 35, 110-13. 
26 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 30, 103-5: “des gemeinen landfridden und sonst des andern friddens.” 
27 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 35, 112. They say they requested the treaty from the Archbishop of Mainz, but that 
he said to request it directly from the Emperor. 
28 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 35, 112: “So werden wir aus erzelten ursachen in nit geringe sorgfeltigkeit gefurt, 
sonderlich auch, dieweil sich allerhand fell deshalben vor uns zugetragen, die ein partei als die religion belangend 
und derselbigen als unzerteillich anhengig achten, aber der gegentail halten und clagen wolte, das es ein spolium 
oder gewaltig entsetzung widder den landfridden, auch ufgerichten des reichs abschieds, sonder den hie zu Speyer 
anno etc. xxvi ufgericht, und also ursprunglich ader gewißlich dieselbige religion nit beruren solt, alsdan die sachen 
eine der andern ungleich und was art und wesens die seien, die religion one mittel oder nit antreffen und ob das wort 
religion sich uff die gutter und entwerung derselben erstrecken ader verstanden werden sollen ader die berurte 
frydlych bewilligung, solchs vermoge wir also one erkundung und erclerung nit wol merken und sicher handlen 
mogen.” 
29 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 92. 
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In recent days, we wrote to you and ordered, among other things, that you pause 
and suspend all pending or future cases concerning the religion until our further 
order, as we have recently at Nuremberg, through [the Electors of Mainz und the 
Palatinate] in the matter of the disputatious religion30 established a common peace 
with the Elector of Saxony and his associates, in which we let it be said, among 
other things, that we will pause all proceedings against them in matters 
concerning the faith and the religion,31 whether through our Fiscal or others, those 
that have already begun or have yet to begin, until the next Council, or, if a 
Council not be held, through the Estates of the Empire in another way addressing 
it.32 Because it is our will and intention that this recess [the Nuremberg 
Settlement] will maintain peace, therefore we order that you, in all matters and 
proceedings concerning the faith and the religion, as against the above-mentioned 
Elector of Saxony and his allies, that are pending before you in law now or in the 
future,33 not proceed or act further, rather that you fully pause those proceedings 
until a Council or until the estates of the Empire address the matter in another 
way. But in other disputation and proceedings that do not concern the faith and 
the religion, you should and may, as is proper, act and enact what is law. 
 
 This letter, having been written before the Emperor received the Judges’ letter, left much 
unanswered. The Judges waited for another letter from the Emperor, one that would respond 
directly to their request for greater clarification, until, having received no response, they 
discussed the situation again on January 30, 1533.34 Finally, on February 14, 1533, the Court 
received the long-awaited response from the Emperor, dated at Bologna January 26, 1533.35 The 
impatient tone of the letter was pronounced. He wrote that he would not send the specific 
contents of the Nuremberg Settlement to the Court because they had everything they needed in 
front of them:  
We hear from the parties’ pleadings, arguments, and counter-arguments, what 
religion and faith matters may or may not be, therefore we consider your request 
for a declaration from us unnecessary, on the view that no better explanation may 
be given in the text of the Settlement, than that which the cases bring 
themselves.36 Also, the agreement does not extend further than alone upon the 
matters of religion and faith37 and nothing further is contemplated in that 
agreement that affect judicial proceedings or that would be of service [in 
                                               
30 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 36, 114: “…in der strittigen religion sachen…” 
31 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 36, 114: “…das wir alle rechtfertigung in sachen, den glauben und die religion 
belangende…” 
32 Such as through a National Assembly. Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 36, 114: “…durch die stende des reichs in 
ander weg darinnen fursehung getan wurde…” 
33 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 36, 114: “…das ir in allen sachen und rechtvertigungen, den glauben und die 
religion belangende, so wider jetztgenanten churfursten von Sachssen und seiner lieb zugewandten vor euch in recht 
schwebend weren oder kunftiglich furkomen wurden…” 
34 Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren,” 92-3. 
35 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 46, 133-4. 
36 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 46, 134: “…so achten wir ewer begerte declaration fur unnoturftig, auch in 
ansehunge, das kein besser erleuterung darinne gegeben weren magk, dan wie es die sachen selbs mitpringen…” 
37 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 46, 134: “…es erstrecken sich auch die wort solcher abredde weiter nit, dan allein 
uff der religion und des glaubens sachen…” 
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clarifying]; therefore sending you the requested copy of the agreement is 
unnecessary.38  
 
 The Emperor thus denied their request to view the contents of the Settlement, because it 
contained no further definition of what the parties meant by “matters of religion.” Furthermore, 
he noted that the cases themselves yielded argumentation, and it was within competence of the 
Judges to decide whether those were convincing or not based on their expertise. His statement 
that “the agreement does not extend further than alone upon the matters of religion and faith” 
must have struck the Judges as profoundly unhelpful. The Judges found themselves in the 
difficult situation of being told both that they had the expertise, authority, and resources they 
needed to determine which cases should be suspended, and that the Emperor had a very specific 
expectation that some cases should be suspended based on the terms of the agreement.39 
*** 
 This remarkable set of correspondences in 1532 captures a new way in which 
Reformation issues were finding a foothold in life of the Court. While in the previous chapter, I 
showed that the issue of Reformation was litigated through a patchwork of laws and norms, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of when and how to make the Reformation context legible in a 
given dispute were not always clear, this chapter captures the moment when, beginning in the 
early 1530s, Reformation issues came to be debated in terms of whether this or that imperial law, 
treaty, or agreement applied. And whether this or that law applied increasingly hinged on 
whether the issue could correctly be called a “matter of religion.”   
As the judges said, the parties vehemently disagreed about the issue at the core of a given 
dispute; one sued for plunder, a violation of the Land-Peace, and the other said the dispute 
concerned the religion. Defendants said the issues could not be disaggregated; property 
confiscation could not be disambiguated from the question of proper stewardship of church 
property, and the pious motivation to reform clergy abuses of church wealth. Plaintiffs responded 
with a general objection against the claim of religion, stating simply that it was strange and 
alarming that the defendants would claim that violent plunder and spoliation could be attached to 
the term “religion.” The parties, the Judges said, “regard the very nature of the dispute 
differently.” Far from hair-splitting, the spectrum of interpretations that litigants brought 
indicated a core instability of the category itself.   
 Even as the term became increasingly salient as a subject of imperial political 
negotiations, its instability remained, even for those who had the authority to define its meaning 
once and for all. As far as the Judges were concerned, the matter of religion had no settled legal 
meaning. They handled its use variously with silence, rejection, or a wait-and-see attitude. Here, 
in the context of the Nuremberg Settlement, for the first time, the Emperor himself was using the 
term; for the first time, the term had gained salience in the political context of a Settlement, and 
the Court hoped that that agreement had contained some kind of satisfactory juridical definition. 
But what source of authority was ruling? Neither in the context of litigation, nor in Judge’s 
plenary sessions, nor in their correspondence with the Emperor was there any reference to the 
                                               
38 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 46, 134: “…und ist sonst ferner in derselben abredde nichts verleibt, das gerichtliche 
handlung berurend oder zu dießem articule dinstlich seien; deshalb der begerten abschrift von unnoten…” 
39 For a study on the role of judges in determining the meaning of “matters of religion” as recorded in 
Visitation protocols, see Baumann, Visitationen, 137-45. 
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possibility that Roman law, common law, or imperial law would hold the answer—no 
authoritative texts were cited. Even as some judges argued that any secret treaty the Emperor 
brokered with a small group of estates carried no authority over the Court, they still hoped at 
least that a better definition would be found in the text of the Nuremberg Settlement itself. When 
this hope was disappointed, they turned to the Emperor—not as a source of definitional 
authority, but simply as a party to that agreement, the terms of which required clarification in 
order for the Court to be able to act on it.  
 Many treaties and recesses throughout the 1530s and 1540s confirmed the Nuremberg 
Settlement suspension of “matter of religion” cases before the Imperial Chamber Court. These 
included: the Treaty of Kaaden (1534),40 the Treaty of Vienna (1535),41 the Frankfurt Settlement 
(1539),42 the 1541 imperial suspension mandate,43 the 1541 Regensburg Recess,44 and the 1542 
Speyer Recess.45 Yet none of them discouraged plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits, nor the Court 
from changing its judicature. 
 
Contextualizing the Political; Focus on Process Rather than Outcome 
 
 This episode involving the Judges, the Emperor, and the protesting estates indicates the 
political context in which the Reformation cases were embedded. In a number of ways, the 
Reformation cases were politically charged, and had political significance. First, the litigation, 
conceieved as a block, was the object of imperial-level negotiations, like those that took place in 
Schweinfurt and Nuremberg in 1532. Second, the political backdrop influenced the way in which 
these negotiations unfolded. It mattered, for instance, that it was the Elector of Saxony who was 
negotiating for the protesting estates; his leverage in the context of the Emperor’s fragile 
attempts to ensure his brother’s election as King has been well documented.46 Similarly, the 
protesting estates’ threat to refuse to pay into war coffers against the Turks unless the cases were 
suspended has been seen as a powerful explanation for the Emperor’s motivations in making 
(however toothlessly) such a drastic concession.47 Third, Reformation litigation was the subject 
of political advice that cities sought from each other,48 and the suits were one of the main reasons 
for the establishment of the Schmalkaldic League.49 Fourth, it is a constant of litigation in almost 
all historical periods that its purpose was not only to pursue a legal answer to a question or a 
resolution to a dispute, but to pressure another party to come to extra-judicial negotiations—what 
some would call a politicization of litigation. In these and other ways, to neglect the political 
would be to miss an important part of the story. 
 Yet when it comes to understanding the “matter of religion” category and its significance, 
this exclusively political perspective disables us. In particular, by viewing the litigation as an 
undifferentiated block, the collective existence of which mattered as the subject of political 
negotiations, and as political leverage, scholars have tended to reduce all discussions about the 
                                               
40 Schlütter-Schindler, 147-8; Whaley, 308-9. 
41 Schlütter-Schindler, 148-54. 
42 Schlütter-Schindler, 165; Friedrich, Territorialfürst, 201-9; Whaley, Germany, 314. 
43 Schlütter-Schindler, 205. 
44 Schlütter-Schindler, 210-1. 
45 Schlütter-Schindler, 217. 
46 Aulinger, 187.  
47 Schlütter-Schindler, 31. 
48 See Close, Negotiated Reformation. 
49 See Dommasch, Die Religionsprozesse. 
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meaning of the matter of religion as politically inflected, motivated, and interested. This has 
disabled them from seeing the techniques and legal culture that the production of the term 
reveals, and the unintended consequences that exceed and belie the interests and motivations of 
those involved. A review of what historians of the Reformation cases have said about the 
category can help us see the dimensions that have so far been unexplored. 
 Throughout this chapter, as in other sections of the dissertation that discuss the cases in 
detail, outcomes are of secondary importance. As we have seen, rulings are postponed, 
settlements are reached out of court, litigants slow down the proceedings, and many cases are left 
unresolved. Thus, outcomes have little analytical value for understanding the meaning of the 
“matter of religion” at any particular moment.  
 
Religion Literature  
 
 In recent decades, a critical historiography of the category “religion” has emerged. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s 1962 book The Meaning and End of Religion inaugurated an anti-
essentialist critique of the category, challenging its use as an analytic in comparative and 
historical work. These early critiques were primarily philosophical and methodological: the term 
“religion,” Smith argued, had been reified, so that it seemed to refer to a real “theoretical entity 
of speculative interest.”50 This was an error in naming that drove schoalrs to distort the proper 
object of study—persons, things, and ideas—studying instead an imagined impersonal, 
transcendent phenomenon.51 Beginning in the 1980s, Talal Asad added a geneaological and 
ethical critique, identifying the Christian (especially Protestant and liberal) premises and 
predicates that underlie “religion” as a modern academic and governmental category, and its 
extension as a universal as part of the colonial project. Moreover, Asad challenged the self-
evidence of the idea that “religion” and “secular” are opposites of each other, showing instead 
that these concepts are mutually constitutive, and historically coemergent.52 Since then, authors 
have extended and deepened these insights, showing the ways in which construction of 
“religion” is not just a definitional act, but a normative, discursive one; the work of identifying 
what does and does not count as religion is always normatively loaded, tied to certain 
hierarchies, privileges, freedoms, and stakes.53  
                                               
50 Smith, The Meaning, 22. 
51 For an anthropological approach to the study of religion, see Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural 
System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, ed. Clifford Geertz (London: Fontana Press, 1993). 
52 See e.g. Talal Asad, “Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’” 
History of Religions 40, no. 3 (2001): 205-222; and Talal Asad on Geertz, “The Construction of Religion as an 
Anthropological Category,” in Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 27-54.  
53 See e.g. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al., Politics of Religious Freedom (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015); Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017); Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of 
Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016). 
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 Together, these critiques have inaugurated an interdisciplinary literature that studies the 
specificity of the religion category’s usage in particular times and places, and its production as a 
domain of human life distinct from other domains such as science or superstition. Scholars have 
also generated a rich array of conceptual histories of the term religion, that have traced the twists 
and turns of the term’s usage.54  
 In many of these accounts, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries figure as a decisive 
moment in the formulation of religion as a modern category. In particular, the rediscovery of 
antiquity in the Renaissance, the Encounter with the so-called “new world,” and the Reformation 
produced the intellectual and social context in which for the first time it was possible to speak of 
religion as an exteriorized system of ideas and beliefs to which an individual may internally 
adhere;55 as a genus of which there were various species,56 and to speak of religion in the plural. 
 According to this literature, the Reformation contributed to this development in a number 
of ways. First, it generated difference, which created conditions in which it became desirable to 
find a language to describe “the clash of conflicting religious parties,” not only in terms of 
comparability but in terms of hierarchy.57 Second, the Reformation encouraged the rise of creeds 
and confessional statements in the sixteenth century.58 This created the conditions in which 
groups were defined and compared to one another based on what they believed to be true. 
 While these accounts are especially useful to account for the rise of the “world religions” 
analytic in academia and theology, it cannot tell us much about the use of religion as a 
specifically legal category. To the extent scholars of this period address religion as a legal 
category, it is through reference to the period’s touchstone settlement, the Augsburg Peace of 
1555, in which “for the first time, ‘religion’ could be understood as a political and legal 
construct.”59 The formulation commonly attributed to the 1555 Peace—cuius regio, eius religio, 
whose land, his religion—indicated, on this view, a move towards “objective formulation” of 
confessional difference.60 In historiographies of secularism, this signified a departure from the 
old ways of describing confessional difference in terms of truth and falsity, orthodoxy and 
heresy, instead clearing a space for nascent state neutrality and religious freedom.61 In 
                                               
54 See Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
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55 Smith, Meaning, 43, 44. 
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57 Smith, Meaning, 44. 
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Christian Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2003), 460-66. Blum argues that Lutherans invented “Bekenntnis” 
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59 Peter Harrison, The Territories of Science and Religion (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
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was first used in 1599 by Johann Joachim Stephani (1544-1623). See Axel Gotthard, Der Augsburger 
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in their domain. See Martin Heckel, Staat und Kirche nach den Lehren der evangelischen Juristen Deutschlands in 
der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Claudius, 1968), 237.  
61 Some authors make a link between this new legibility of confessional pluralism in Western Christendom 
and religious liberty. See e.g. Pelikan, Credo, 243: “As has frequently been observed, therefore, religious liberty was 
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historiographies of sovereignty, the 1555 formulation of “religion” marked its beginning as a 
principle of territorial division and a sphere of governance.62 But in these accounts, the period 
before 1555 is entirely dismissed. 
 The historiography of the Reformation cases, though it has remained untouched by this 
newer scholarship on the religion category, circulates a certain refrain about the protesting 
estates’ argument concerning “matters of religion.” Specifically, authors decry the term’s lack of 
definition as an indication of an underdeveloped legal science, or of the politicization of law. In 
an 1890 essay, for instance, Winckelmann argued that the Nuremberg Settlement was a weak 
foundation for a resolution between the Catholics and Protestants in part because “its content was 
much too ambiguous, vague, and indefinite.”63 Specifically, the clause in which the Emperor 
promised that in matters concerning the faith, he would tolerate no legal proceeding against the 
protesting estates at the Imperial Chamber Court, the vague language permitted each party to 
interpret the clause to their own advantage. When the Emperor, in response to the Court’s 
request for greater clarity on the meaning of “matters concerning the faith,” stated that it was the 
Court’s job to decide, any promise the treaty held for protecting the Protestants from litigation 
fell away. Naturally, he said, the Court, being populated primarily by those of the “old faith,” 
would adopt an interpretation advantageous to the status quo.64  With that, he wrote, “the 
floodgates of arbitrariness of the overwhelmingly Roman-leaning [i.e. Church of Rome] Court 
was opened,” in part because the judges did not know, or did not want to know, the pre-history to 
the agreement, from which the expression “Religionssache” derived its meaning. They 
interpreted the term as narrowly as possible, let cases involving secularizations or other church 
innovations simply continue, saying that the term Religionssache did not apply to it.65 The failure 
here was what Winckelmann called “typical sixteenth-century-style statecraft,” according to 
which finding a way out of and around difficult questions through provisional language was 
favored.66 
 In his 1892 book on the Nuremberg Settlement and the Schmalkaldic League, 
Winckelmann devoted a few pages to the term “religion.” He noted that as negotiations were 
winding down, the Protestant delegates raised objections about an apparently innocuous change 
in the language of the final peace treaty: where the Protestants had written that there should be a 
suspension of all cases “concerning the religion” (der Religion halber) the Emperor’s revised 
formulation was “regarding the faith” (den Glauben belangend). The revision, Winckelmann 
                                               
the product of the Reformation, but not of the Reformers. It was not the teaching of any one confession, but the 
result of the presence of so many competing confessions.” Others suggest religious liberty had more to do with 
concepts specific to the Protestant confessions; see e.g. John Witte and Frank S. Alexander, eds., Christianity and 
Human Rights: An Introduction (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 27-8. 
62 See Talal Asad, “Trying to Understand French Secularism,” in Political Theologies: Public Religions in 
a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 
497-8. More frequently, these are identified with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648; see e.g. Saba Mahmood, 
“Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and the Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 54, no. 2 (2012): 418–446. See also a reference to the cuius principle in Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego; New York; London: Harcourt, Inc., 1951), 274n16: “The first minorities 
arose when the Protestant principle of freedom of conscience accomplished the suppression of the principle cuius 
regio eius religio.”  
63 Otto Winckelmann, “Über die Bedeutung der Verträge von Kadan und Wien (1534-1535) für die 
deutschen Protestanten,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 11 (1890): 213. 
64 Winckelmann, “Kadan und Wien,” 214. 
65 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 261-2. 
66 Winckelmann, “Kadan und Wien,” 213. More on vagueness as a juridical technique in Chapter 6. 
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speculated, was calculated to undermine the intended meaning of the clause. In a letter to the 
imperial delegates, the Protestants requested that the language be put back because “presumably 
no one would be proceeded against on account of his faith, while they probably would be on 
account of matters that had their origin in matters of faith.”67 Having received the Protestants’ 
request, the Emperor expressed some frustration about their presumptuous quibbling given his 
tremendous leniency in negotiating with them in the first place, and did not make the requested 
change in the final August 2nd official text of the Settlement, though he did change his language 
in correspondences with his delegates, the Court, and the imperial estates.68 Winckelmann 
expressed doubt about whether such a switch—from faith to religion, or from matters of faith to 
matters that had their origin in faith—would have made the clause clearer. He concluded with a 
whif of frustration: “it would have been more correct and more secure in any case to define 
precisely the concept of Glaubens- or Religionssachen.”69 
 Like Winckelmann, Smend discussed the “religion” category in the context of these 
negotiations surrounding the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532. He indicated that the Emperor’s 
intention in changing the language of the Settlement—from “matters of religion” to “matters of 
faith”—had been to isolate the set of cases covered by the suspension to only those in which a 
Protestant was sued for believing what he believed—where faith (Glauben) has an interior 
quality, having no impact on matters of material or tangible concern. Smend noted that this 
approach was strategic and dishonest because the Protestants were not being proceeded against 
for what they believed—in an internal, propositional way—but rather because of worldly 
disputes following from the changes in faith.70 The Protestants were seeking to make legible that 
this change in faith had an impact on worldly matters—such as property, jurisdiction, and 
authority—and that the involvement of worldly matters should not exclude recognition that the 
origin of the dispute was a disagreement in faith. For Smend, the fact that the Settlement brought 
no change to the Court’s performance, and that the “legal war” against them continued, 
confirmed that the suspicions of some Protestants were correct: that the Emperor had managed 
through these negotiations to secure the Protestants’ financial support for looming war against 
the Turks while giving them empty promises in return.71 The experience taught the Protestants, 
Smend said, that they would not achieve their goals through negotiations with the Emperor.72 
 While Winckelmann and Smend focused on the ways in which the analytic obscurity of 
the religion category was linked to bad faith negotiations laced with mutual distrust, that often 
played a useful political role, Dommasch’s treatment of the subject focused on the way in which 
even the Protestants—whose request to suspend only those cases “concerning the religion” 
generated the question of its definition in the first place—themselves did not agree on how to 
define it.73 Dommasch pointed out disagreement within the Schmalkaldic League, and that some 
members’ cases were denied this title.74 At one point, the Landgrave of Hessen argued that some 
                                               
67 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 251, citing a July 25 correspondence: “daß versehnlich 
niemand seines Glaubens halben mit Recht vorgenommen (werden würde), aber wohl um Sachen, die aus des 
Glaubens Sachen ihren Ursprung hatten.” 
68 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 252. 
69 Winckelmann, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 251. 
70 Smend, 147-8: “da ja nur des Glaubens wegen niemand einem Prozeß ausgesetzt sein würde, sondern nur 
wegen weltlicher, aus der Religionsveränderung folgender Streitsachen.” 
71 Smend, 148-9. 
72 Smend, 149. 
73 Dommasch, 16. 
74 Dommasch, 17n33 cites references to published source materials in which the League debates the merits 
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of the cases the League had dubbed “matters of religion” rhymed with “Religion” like “Hase” 
(rabbit) rhymes with “Pauker” (timpanist)—in other words, not at all.75 
 The core failure of the protesting estates, according to Dommasch, was their inability to 
define the difference between religion matters and worldly matters—in other words, to articulate 
why a matter of property confiscation was in fact not a matter of property confiscation. 
Dommasch’s discussion about the category “religion” then evolved into an attempt to give more 
clarity to the term than he believed it had at the time of its use. His primary concern was 
methodological, to settle an analytic that the subjects of his study failed (on his view) to 
adequately define, and to explain what made a religion case different from a regular worldly 
dispute. At one point, for instance, he studied a document—a list written by the Landgrave of 
Hessen in December 1535 in an instruction to his delegates at the Schmalkaldic League, of the 
kinds of cases the Landgrave considered matters of religion—in the spirit of evaluation, 
correcting it for errors, rather than analyzing what it revealed.76 In the book’s final paragraphs, 
Dommasch wrote that the inconclusiveness of the efforts of the Protestant princes and cities to 
stop the proceedings against them could be traced back to the fact that the difficult problem of an 
exact differentiation of matters of religion from cases with a purely worldly object had not been 
satisfactorily resolved. Ultimately, he said, the ambiguity at the heart of these cases “eroded the 
idea of the Empire and damaged the function of the Empire’s organs.”77 
 Jahns’ rendering of the Reformation cases in which Frankfurt was embroiled made a 
similar move. She brought her own analytical binary of “religious” and “worldly” to the debates 
about the meaning of “matters concerning religion” and seems to evaluate the coherence or 
usefulness of the argumentation of the parties based on this external standard.78 For example, she 
said that the focus of the Protestants’ argumentation was to highlight the pious motivations for 
their actions, and to “minimize the worldly aspect of the dispute,” but, as we will see, this 
characterization simplifies the nuanced argument that Protestants were making that piety and 
worldly matters were inextricably linked.  
 Schlütter-Schindler’s book was the first to move the scholarship away from the earlier 
historiography’s mode, which had always focused on the ambiguity of the term “religion” and 
criticized its vagueness. Instead, one main purpose of her book was to track how the 
Schmalkaldic League made decisions about what counted as a matter of religion, and how the 
selection of those cases changed over time.79 It is moot, she says, to try to distinguish 
analytically worldly from churchly, or financial and political from theological perspectives, since 
it was characteristic of this period that “both domains” were tightly interwoven. Thus, her 
question was simply: which cases did the Schmalkaldeners define as matters of religion in the 
period after the Nuremberg Peace of 1532? And did the character of the cases that were counted 
as matters of religion change over time?80 While previous scholars had focused on disagreement 
between the Emperor and the Protestants, or the Protestants and the Court, Schlütter-Schindler 
                                               
of members’ requests to consider its case a matter of religion. For full study of this subject see Schlütter-Schindler. 
75 Dommasch, 17. “Der Hase” means rabbit, and “der Pauker” means either timpanist or a pejorative term 
for a teacher – I am not sure why the Landgrave chose these as his two non-rhyming words, but the point that there 
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76 Dommasch, 17-23, 61. 
77 Dommasch, 96. 
78 Sigrid Jahns, Frankfurt, Reformation und Schmalkaldischer Bund: d. Reformations-, Reichs- u. 
Bündnispolitik d. Reichsstadt Frankfurt am Main 1525-1536 (Frankfurt am Main: Kramer, 1976), 250. 
79 Schlütter-Schindler, 15. 
80 Schlütter-Schindler, 30. 
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showed that determinations about how to label a case were linked to a number of considerations 
internal to the Protestant league such as the aspirations and costs of the League’s promise of 
mutual military support; political predictions about how certain cases and disputes would unfold; 
and suspicions and dysfunctions internal to the League.81 She showed that overall there was a 
lack of intensive discussion about the nature and character of the cases; the focus was more on 
how to deal individually with cases involving any reform-minded ally, and on trying to avoid 
legal proceedings. Hence, instead of abstract definition, members produced lists.82 Schlütter-
Schindler’s rendering of these debates showed that the term’s ambiguity allowed it to become an 
index for tensions internal to the League. In their debates about what counted as a matter of 
religion and what did not, members indicated to each other what kinds of acts and changes they 
were willing to endorse—to give “Luft und Platz” (air and space) to—in the ongoing effort to 
define the boundaries of this union (simultaneously confessional and political in nature) they had 
collectively undertaken.83 The designation of a dispute as a matter of religion signaled what the 
League was willing to fight with the Emperor and old-faith Estates over, rather than a 
designation with a carefully worked out referent.84  
 This chapter contends that these varied motives, interests, and considerations contributed 
to, but did not fully comprehend, the bricolage character of the matter of religion term. To 
understand better the matter of religion, we have to move away from the familiar register in 
which Reformation historians have discussed it as a limitation on the legal science of the day, or 
a failure of the parties involved to posit a clearer definition. Instead, I suggest we bring the 
insights of the critical study of religion as a category to bear on this early sixteenth century 
usage. 
 
The 1532 Nuremberg Settlement in Litigation Context 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the events of the late 1520s and early 1530s had produced a 
number of laws, the legal status of each of which was deeply controversial, and therefore 
produced circumstances in which litigants in the Reformation cases were required, in a new way, 
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of making the Reformation context of a given dispute 
legible in their case. In particular, two legal agreements produced in this time contributed to the 
legal polysemy. First, the 1530 Augsburg Recess—promulgated by a majority of estates, but 
protested by the evangelicals—was clear that it was a continuation of the Worms Edict regime. It 
explicitly forbade many of the actions and changes that reforming rulers were making in their 
domains, violations of which were to be prosecuted at the Imperial Chamber Court under penalty 
of the Land-Peace. But its legal status was controversial, not only because of the protestation by 
the evangelical estates, but also because key parts of it were framed as imperial mandates, with 
the “willing approval” of the estates. The suspect quality of unilateral mandates and edicts has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2. Second, the 1532 Nuremberg Settlement promised a pause 
to cases “concerning the religion” in front of the Imperial Chamber Court. The Settlement 
seemed to contradict and undermine precisely what was promulgated in 1530. Yet this 
                                               
81 See especially Schlütter-Schindler, 133-45. 
82 Schlütter-Schindler, 26, 30n70. 
83 Schlütter-Schindler, 213. 
84 For another important in-depth analysis of the Schmalkaldic League’s definitions of “die Causae 
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Settlement also had a questionable legal status, as it constituted essentially a private—initially 
secret—treaty between the Emperor and the protesting estates to limit the judicature of the 
Imperial Chamber Court, an authority the Emperor did not really have.85 Moreover, as noted at 
the beginning of the last section, the Nuremberg Settlement itself underwrote a public Peace 
Mandate ordering that until the convening of a Christian Council, all Land-Peace laws should be 
upheld.86 
  For the plaintiffs of many Reformation cases, the 1530 Augsburg Recess, and to a lesser 
extent the Peace Mandate of 1532, promised a legal basis for suing princes and cities not just for 
violent actions, for property confiscations, or for jurisdictional seizures, but also for doing those 
things “on account of the faith and religion.” Yet, to bring a suit under these terms risked inviting 
a retort by the defendants that the dispute was a “matter of religion” and therefore, under the 
terms of the 1532 Settlement, did not belong before the Court. For the defendants, to invoke the 
1532 Settlement risked a doubling-down on prosecution under the 1530 Recess or the 1532 
Peace Mandate, as doing so essentially constituted an admission that their actions were in 
violation of the prohibition of unauthorized actions on account of faith or religion. 
 One case provides a particularly vivid example of this. In this case, both parties read the 
terms of the Nuremberg Settlement in favor of their own argument. This was a case brought by 
the Imperial Fiscal, Wolfgang Weidner, against the mayor and council of the imperial city of 
Lindau in 1536.87 On the order of King Ferdinand, the Fiscal prosecuted Lindau for having in 
1534 “forbade and abolished all well-inherited Christian ceremonies, usages, and customs” in 
“all of their churches, parishes, and places of worship, including in the cloister there,” and, 
furthermore, for establishing “new, uncustomary, and forbidden usages and ceremonies” 
instead.88 These actions violated several layers of law. First, it violated the common written law, 
the Golden Bull, the Land-Peace, as well as “multiple Recesses” in which it was ordered and 
provided for that “no one, of whatever estate, may feud, war, or rob nor in any way against law, 
violently violate, damage, or injure another; nor, if the clergy are involved, to hinder or disturb 
them in the carrying out and practice of their spiritual offices and worship, let alone to forbid, 
punish or through violent aggression to scare them away from their worship, or to coerce or force 
them to suspend or refrain from doing the same.”89 Second, the recently promulgated peaceful 
settlement made at Nuremberg in 1532 (to which Lindau was a party) “in the matter of the 
disputatious religion” provided that “no one should trouble, injure, or violate another, whether of 
the spiritual or the worldly estate.”90 Third, the city was being prosecuted for violating the 
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88 Munich 5654, Q7, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1538. The letter from the King to the Fiscal ordering him to 
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Geistlichs oder weltlichs stands betruben, beleyden noch vergeweltigen soll.” 
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special protective (Schutz und Schirm) rights of the House of Austria vis-a-vis the female cloister 
in Lindau.91 Fourth, the city ignored a Mandate promulgated by King Ferdinand at Vienna that 
“ordered the city to abolish the aforementioned unseemly innovations, and to place everything in 
its previous state.”92 Thus, continued the Citatio, “on account of these actions, you should fall 
into the penalty of the Land-Peace, especially the recently established Nuremberg peaceful 
Settlement.93 Over and over again, the Fiscal as well as King Ferdinand cited the Nuremberg 
Settlement as one of the central legal bases for their case against Lindau. 
 The city responded to the Court’s Citatio with a letter, written by Hirter and Helfmann, in 
which they requested that the Court recognize the case as a “matter of religion,” and therefore 
that any adjudication of it should cease, under the terms of the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532. 
“Our especially good friends of the same Christian understanding—the mayor and council of the 
city of Lindau—,” the letter began, “in the matter of the women’s cloister there, regarding the 
suppressed papist mass and ceremonies, were summoned to the Imperial Chamber Court.”94 This 
matter was, they said, “directly a religion matter.”95 Therefore, “in the name of and on behalf of 
the estates we are representing of this Christian union,” they asked, without argument, that the 
Court recognize it as such.  
 King Ferdinand likewise wrote to the Court, describing his order that Lindau cease its 
actions and return everything to its previous state, and mentioned also a correspondence between 
the Elector of Saxony and Landgrave of Hessen with him on this matter.96 The first document in 
that exchange was a Supplicatio from the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hessen to the 
King, dated December 1535 in which they said that Lindau had asked them “as our union 
relations” to “set them in your gracious and friendly counsel.”97 The letter described the actions 
of “those from Lindau” as having been done “alone to praise and honor God the Almighty, and 
so that his salvific words be clearly taught”; that they were motivated by a desire “out of the 
affliction of their conscience alone”98 to create a “Christian ordinance true to the holy Gospels 
and Godly word,” not at all to act against the King or the Emperor in doing so.99 Since the city’s 
                                               
91 Munich 5654, Q1, “Copia Citationis,” 1536: “das ir doch sollichs alles unangesehen indem frauen 
Closter bey Euch So unseren hauses osterreich mit sonderlichem Schutz und Schirm verwannt ist, die 
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94 Munich 5654, Q4, “Presentate 10. May Anno 36 belangend die Stat Lindaw g. den key. Fiscal, Den 
Achtparen und hochgelerten Ludwig Herter Doctor und Johan Helffman Licentiat der rechten beide des keyserlichen 
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daselbst unsern guten Protestierende Stend und Lindaw g. den key. Fiscal,” 1536. 
95 Munich 5654, Q4, “Presentate, etc.,” 1536: “one mittell ein Religion sachen ist.” 
96 Munich 5654, Q3, “Copia eyns konigklichen schreyben an fiscalen ausganngen,” 1536. 
97 Munich 5654, Q5, “Copia ainer Supplication von Churfursten von Sachsen Landtgraf Philipsen von 
Hessen und der selben mitverwanten an Ko. Mt. ausgangen Belangen Lyndau,” 1536: “So haben sy uns 
underthenigklich dienstlich und vleyssig gebeten Innen als unsern Eynungs verwants in deine gnediglichen und 
freundtlichen beraten zusetzen usw.”      
98 Munich 5654, Q5, “Copia ainer Supplication, etc.,” 1536: “auss bedrengnuß irer gewissen allein.” 
99 Munich 5654, Q5, “Copia ainer Supplication, etc.,” 1536: “So ist dennoch unser underthenigs und 
hochvlaissigs bitten E. konigklich mt. wolle gestalt und gelegenheit der sachen bedanckhen und erwegen und 
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actions were motivated in this way, the Nuremberg Settlement, insofar as it forbade any form of 
disturbing another in his religion, should apply both ways.100 
 In his response dated February 1536, King Ferdinand reiterated his claims and demands, 
urging the Elector and Landgrave to encourage Lindau to cease.101 However, unlike the Citatio 
which launched the case, this letter stressed that Lindau’s actions violated King Ferdinand’s 
Vogteirechte, his special protective lordship relationship to the cloister, which, in turn, he said, 
violated the peaceful settlement made at Nuremberg.102  For the King in this letter, the violation 
of the Nuremberg Settlement was precisely in the city’s “minimization and narrowing” of his 
“princely authority and supremacy.”103 Put another way, it was not the innovations in the religion 
alone that violated the peaceful settlement at Nuremberg, but that the innovations in the religion 
violated his lordship rights; and it was the violation of his lordship rights that stepped upon the 
Nuremberg Peace. This framing decentered the language of conscience and pious motivation 
that, for the Elector and Landgrave, made the case a matter of religion. 
  
 
Material Context Determines Matter of Religion 
 
 This move by the protesting estates to defend their argument that the Lindau case was a 
matter of religion because Lindau’s motivations in promulgating the ordinance were based on the 
force of their conscience and their desire to see God’s word spread was actually quite rare in the 
cases. More commonly, the protesting estates argued that it was precisely in cases where matters 
of conscience and piety were entangled with apparently straightforward disputes about peace, 
property, and jurisdiction, that the name “matter of religion” should be assigned. Indeed, they 
argued, no one would defend the view that the Imperial Chamber Court could adjudicate disputes 
that had no material element. We saw this represented in the judges’ considerations above; Alber 
argued that since the Court did not have jurisdiction of “pure matters of religion,” the Emperor 
must have meant something by his directive, so the judges had to determine to what he was 
referring. The protesting estates made this argument, too.  
 In a case in which the Bishop of Strassburg sued the city of Strassburg for damaging and 
taking the incomes of the St. Arbogast monastery, the evangelical estates made this argument 
very clearly. When they entered the case as co-litigants, the correspondence between the 
Emperor and the Court regarding the Nuremberg Settlement was ongoing. In response to the 
Emperor’s December 3 letter, the Bishop’s lawyer argued that it applied only to matters 
concerning religion and faith;104 this issue, by contrast “touches secular goods alone.”105 
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gnedigklich pleyben und sy daruber nit beschweren.” 
100 Munich 5654, Q5, “Copia ainer Supplication, etc.,” 1536: “sondern e. konigklich mt. deshalben gegen 
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102 Dommasch, 18-9. Smend, 153.  
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105 Dated January 4, 1531, in Winckelmann, PC II, 671: “und dann seins gn. herrn sachen allain zeitliche 
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 In response, the protesting estates wrote that:106  
 
any unbiased observer would recognize that the Nuremberg Settlement, and the 
Emperor’s directive that came out of it, contemplates all matters, whether to do 
with persons, goods, annuities, or tithes that touch on faith and religion, or belong 
to it.107 This was the very reason for the negotiations in the first place. For this 
Court would under no circumstance have jurisdiction over matters of faith and 
religion alone;108 and unless the suspension refers to the persons, goods and 
associated pending and mutually relevant matters that flow from matters 
concerning the faith and religion, it would have been unnecessary to negotiate a 
peace to suspend to such cases at all, or for the Emperor to trouble himself at 
all.109 
 
The protesting estates argued that disputes about property, peace, and jurisdiction could have 
their origin and beginning in disagreements about articles of faith, the correct forms of worship 
and ritual, or in pious struggles against old-faith Church abuses.  
 Another example of this form of argumentation comes in a case at the end of our period, 
one that is particularly instructive because it illustrates that the “matter of religion” 
argumentation had outlived the Schmalkaldic League and the co-litigation strategy of the 
protesting estates. 
In 1554, the Abbess of the female collegiate Church Of Our Dear Lady (Stift Zu Unserer 
Lieben Frau) in Lindau, Katharine von Bodman, sued the mayor and city council of the imperial 
city of Lindau, saying Lindau had seized the Gefälle (payments for real estate), Zehnten (tithes), 
and Zinsen (annuities) of the parish church St. Stephan, over which the abbess possessed 
patronage rights.110 In doing so, the Mandate said, the city not only disadvantaged and damaged 
her rights and those of the parish church, but it also violated common written laws, the Emperor 
and Empire’s established ordinances, statutes, and recesses.111 She sued for a restoration of rights 
and property taken, and for the city to cease all of their illegal actions immediately112, under 
penalty of 20 marks lötigen golds. A Petitio submitted soon after asked that the Court declare the 
city contumacious for failing to cease its actions and for failing to respond to the Mandate.113  
                                               
güter berüerete.” 
106 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 50, 140-2.  
107 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 50, 141: “…alle sachen, als personen, güter, rendten und zins, so des glaubens und 
religion articul berueren, auch darzu gehören, mit in dieselben sachen gezogen und begriffen sind…” 
108 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 50, 141: “…dann sonst, so der glaub und [die] religion allain, daruber ir on das nit 
richter sein köndet…” 
109 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 50, 141: “…und die personen, güter und zugehörige anhängige sachen und 
condependtien, so des glaubens und religion sachen halben harfliessen, nicht auch in berurtem stillstand, ruw und 
friden gebracht und damit gemeynt sein sollen, were von unnöten geweßt, von demselben friden und stillstand zu 
handlen und ire kay. Mat. vergeblich darumb zu bemühen…” 
110 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 8281 (“Munich 8281”). The protocol is empty, and the 
documents have no quandrangles, indicating that the judges never called for the case file to be collated. 
111 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Copia Mandati,” 1554: “wider gemeine 
geschribne recht unnser unnd des Reichs auffgerichte ordnungen satzungen und Abschid Auch ir Clegerin unnd irem 
Gotshauß zu Abbruch nachteil unnd schaden irer habenden gerichtigkeit.” 
112 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Copia Mandati,” 1554. 
113 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, third document in case file, “Petitio Summaria,” 1554. 
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In August 1555, the city of Lindau entered the case and submitted Exceptiones fori 
declinatorie, objections declining the forum. Presented in articulated form, the city began by 
arguing that as a free imperial city, Lindau had been given the privilege from late emperors and 
kings to only be tried before certain cities, namely: Constance, Überlingen, Ravensburg, and St. 
Gallen (in modern-day Switzerland). Next, the city of Lindau denied having confiscated any 
rights, goods, or incomes from the Abbess.114 On the contrary, it argued that the city had always 
acknowledged the Abbess and her ancestors as alone the patrons and liege lords of the St. 
Stephan parish. What they challenged was the claim that the tithes of Lindau belonged to the 
Abbess; the tithes, they said, belonged directly to the parish priest there, and had always been 
given to him without any complaint or hindrance by the Abbess.  
Indeed, continued the Lindauers, before the “maliciously brought out Mandate,” the 
Abbess had always publicly acknowledged this configuration. The desire and plans of the city of 
Lindau was, they said, nothing other than that the appropriate incomes of the parish go to “the 
Christian servants of the Church, and that they deliver the Godly word and pastoral care, as has 
always been the duty of a parish priest.”115 For the Abbess’ part, they argued, the only reason 
that the Abbess did not want to give those incomes to “the church servants and deliverers of 
God’s word” was that “in certain points and articles of our holy Christian religion, ceremonies 
and usages” she and Lindau “are not the same.”116 By not stating as much in the Mandate, the 
Abbess’ narration committed subreption and obreption (obscuring truth and covering over it). 
This dispute, they said, was a matter of religion, and had to do with the “present tension in faith 
and religion.”117 As such, and in accordance with various promulgated recesses and agreements, 
as well as the Passau Treaty of 1552, such disputatious matters of religion belonged before a 
common Christian council or national assembly and should be postponed until such a meeting.  
 Thus, Lindau in this case declined the forum of the Imperial Chamber Court on two 
distinct grounds: first, on the basis that this was a matter of religion; second, on the basis that the 
city received from late emperors a jurisdictional privilege to only be tried in the first instance in 
the courts of Constance, Überlingen, Ravensburg, or St. Gallen. So that “insofar as the matter is 
a religion matter, then it belongs directly before a Christian council; and if it is a worldly matter, 
then it belongs before the privileged judges (gefreite Richter).”118  
                                               
114 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554. 
115 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554: “Item 
dass Burgermeister und Rhat der statt Lindaw beger und vorhaben nie anderst gestanden begeren auch noch nit 
anderst, denn dass solliche der pfarr lindaw gefelh iren christenlichen dinern der kirchen und verkundern des 
gotlichen worts und sehlsorgern zugestelt werden Wie die vor jhenen alwegen und jeden pfarhern zugehort.” 
116 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554: “Item, 
dass die hochgedachte fraw Eptissin zu Lindaw den kirchen dienern der pfarr zu Lindaw und verkundern gottlichs 
worts allain die zehenden und gefell der pfarr darumben nit verfolgen lassen wolle, dieweil die in einichen puncten 
und artickeln unser heiligen christlichen religion mit irer f.g. ceremonien und geprauch halb nit ainhellig.” See 
similar kind of argumentation in case involving Ludwig von Freyberg, Chapter 3, Munich 2019. 
117 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554: “Item, 
dass also unwidersprechlich volge, dass dise sach ein Religion sach und handlung seye und gegenwertigen span ein 
glaubens und Religion span seie.” 
118 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554: “item 
gesezt, doch nit gestanden, dass diese ein weltlich sache und die Religion nit belangte noch glaubens sach were, so 
solte demnechst die hoch gemelte fraw epitissin gerurte Burgermeister und Rhat zu Lindaw nit vor E.G. sonder vor 
iren gefreyten richtern beclagen. Item, dass also ein unfelig argument und dileumma volge, So verr dise sach ein 
religion sach, so gehore die ohne mittell fur ein christenlich consili, ist ess dann oder were ess ein weltliche sache, 
So gehort die vor der statt lindaw gefreyte Richter unnd dass ist offenpar wahr.” 
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They then went further to explain what the nature of the dispute was and why it belonged 
to a free Christian council to resolve. “Most of the electors, princes, counts, free lords, and cities 
that have accepted the Augsburg [Lutheran] Confession hold it to be the case that the incomes of 
a parish, and the tithes that belong to a parish, be given to servants of the Church and the 
deliverers of the word of God. But, according to existing Godly and Spiritual Law, all tithes 
should be given to the servants of the Church, by virtue of those same servants giving the holy 
Sacraments.”119 The parish priest office at Lindau, continued the city, was vacant.120 During this 
vacancy of several years, the Abbess had illegally taken the tithes to herself. When the city 
attempted to correct this, by redirecting the incomes to its proper destination—for the use of 
paying the incomes of church servants and preachers of the word of God in Lindau, regardless of 
whether they carried out old-faith sacraments—they were acting on a core matter of disputation 
in the religion; and the Abbess was likewise responding to it on those grounds. But she chose, 
instead of seeking the proper forum to resolve it—a Christian council—rather to sue for 
confiscation of rights and property, which was simply not what this case was about, said Lindau. 
The core question that was the source of disagreement, Lindau said, was: how should tithes be 
directed when a parish seat is occupied by servants of the Church and deliverers of God’s word 
who will not carry out the old-faith holy sacraments? This, they said, could not be resolved 
through reference to existing law, and it definitely should not be handled in a temporal court that 
would obfuscate this religion and faith aspect. 
The dispute was settled out of court in February 1556, according to which Abbess 
Katharina would give up her patronage rights, as well as the tithes, rents, interests and incomes 
of the collegiate church, and in return the city would give to them the patronage rights of the 
parish Lindenberg, which had belonged to the Hospital of Lindau.121  
 
The Range of Actions that Could Make a Dispute a “Matter of Religion” 
 
 In Chapter 3, we learned about the arrest, torture, and public execution of a former city 
official of Memmingen, Ludwig Vogelmann.122 The suits brought by the imperial Fiscal and 
Vogelmann’s family against the mayor and city council of Memmingen said that the city had 
violated the laws of the Empire, the Land-Peace, as well as special imperial protection letters 
which had been given in 1530 to Vogelmann as well as the Antoniter monastery, of which 
Vogelmann was the lay administrator. After a failed attempt to decline the forum on the basis of 
a fifteenth century imperial privilege regarding where the city of Memmingen could be sued, and 
ongoing efforts to appeal directly to the Emperor to order the Court to bring a stop to the case 
based on their argument that they had the right to punish Vogelmann for violating his oaths to 
                                               
119 Munich 8281, no quadrangle, fifth document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatoriae,” 1554: “item, 
setzt und sagt wahr sein, dass mehrerteil bey allen churfursten fursten graven freynnhern und stett so die 
augspurgisch confession angenohmen, es also gehalten werde, dass die einkommen der pfarhen und zehenden, so 
den pfarren zuhoren, nichts desto weniger den dienern der kirchen und verkundern des gotlichs worts geraicht 
werdenn. Item, dass alle zehenden vermog d. gottlichen und geistlichen recht den dienern der kirchen gegeben 
werden sollen, und darumben dass inen die heiligen sacrament durch dieselben diener der kirchen mitgetheilt 
zugeben gepotten angenomen und bewilligt.” 
120 What is not mentioned here is that Lindau had formally introduced the Reformation already in 1528, so 
no parish priest appointed by the old-faith Church would have been accepted by the local population. 
121 Wolfart, 392. 
122 Munich 5657. 
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the city, stirring up conflict, and other seditious activities, Memmingen’s magistrates then sought 
to decline the forum because the dispute was a “matter of religion.”  
 In November 1533, Hirter submitted a document to the Court in which he provided eight 
reasons why the Vogelmann case should be considered a matter of religion.123 The “matter of 
religion” cases were never defined through abstract principles. Rather, a given case was always 
described as a matter of religion on the particular grounds of the dispute. A litigant would 
describe a particular fact, and then say “and therefore it is undoubtedly clear that the matter 
directly flows from the religion.” Likewise, the Schmalkaldic League in its internal deliberations, 
the Judges in theirs, and the correspondences between the Emperor, the Judges, and the 
League—none of these yielded an abstract definition. The Schmalkaldic League produced 
various lists to submit to the Emperor and the Judges to “describe” what counted as a matter of 
religion.124 As we will see below, plaintiffs likewise argued that a dispute was not a matter of 
religion simply by presenting a particular fact, and then saying “and therefore it is undoubtedly 
clear that this dispute does not concern the religion.” 
 According to Hirter, the first indication that “this matter took its beginning, middle, and 
end from and on account of the religion” was that Ludwig Vogelmann had been an honest, well-
regarded City Clerk of sixteen years in the service of the city, up until “the holy Gospel and pure, 
clear word of God was delivered” in Memmingen “as in other places in the holy Empire.” After 
that, “he completely gave himself over to the papacy, and all of the priests who were offensive to 
the city, and was so attached to their fabricated worship,” to such an extent that he gave up his 
office as City Clerk.125 The “first cause for this separation was the religion,” because “had the 
Gospel of Christ not come into Memmingen, and had the city not given up the papacy, Ludwig 
Vogelmann would have remained our City Clerk.”  
 Second, when he began to work as secretary for the Bishop of Augsburg, and then 
became Burggrave of Augsburg, he thereby took oaths with two other lords antagonistic to the 
city. When the city of Memmingen warned him that they could not abide this, he sued with the 
city council of Ulm, which resulted in a compromise, according to which Vogelmann would 
never again advise or serve the city in any way, neither in spiritual nor in worldly matters,126 and 
the city agreed to pay him 400 gulden for the strain during his service.127 “This dispute, legal 
proceeding, and compromise had absolutely no other cause than the religion.” Vogelmann had 
taken an oath with the Bishop, in violation of his oath with the city. And Memmingen had “many 
significant issues” with the Bishop and his clergy, so Vogelmann could neither advise nor serve 
                                               
123 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1.  
124 The evangelical estates created lists on at least four separate occasions in the 1530s and 40s. See 
Gabriele Haug-Moritz, “Religionsprozesse am Reichskammergericht: Zum Wandel des reichspolitischen 
Konfliktpotentials der Kammergerichtsjudikatur im Reich der Reformationszeit (1530-1541), in Anette Baumann 
and Joachim Kemper, Speyer als Hauptstadt des Reiches: Politik und Justiz zwischen Reich und Territorium im 16. 
und 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin; Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016), accessed May 20, 2019, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=Vw6yDQAAQBAJ&lpg=PT6&dq=haug-
moritz%20religionsprozesse&pg=PT29#v=onepage&q&f=false [no page numbers in online version] 
125 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “Als bey inen das haylig Evangelium und rhain lauter wort gottes wie 
an andern orten im heiligen Reych verkundt worden, ist er doch dem Babstumb gar ergeben und allen der Statt 
widerwertigen pfaffen und irem erdichten gotzdienst so anhengig gewest das er auch damit er demselben gnug thun 
mug das statschreyber ampt aufgeben.”  
126 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “Auch des weyter begeben und zugsagt das er wider ain ersamen rath 
zu Memmingen sein lebenlang weder in geistlichen oder weltlichen gemeiner statt sachen nit raten sein steen oder 
dienen soll in keinerley weys noch weg.” 
127 On the Ulm agreement, see Frieß, 83-4. 
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the city council who, in conflict with the Bishop, would simultaneously go against his religion.128 
If the religion dispute were not there, such a dispute between both parties would have been 
avoided. 
 Third, despite the Ulm compromise, Vogelmann accepted a position as administrator of 
the Antoniter monastery. He then went to the Diet at Augsburg and supplicated to the Emperor 
and fictitiously claimed that he was in fear and insecurity as a result of the inflammatory, 
misguided preachers in Memmingen, and that he was not bold enough (nit keck sey) to 
administer without protection. He asked for a letter of imperial protection and safe passage. In 
his supplication to the Emperor, not only did he disparage without cause the city of Memmingen 
and its preachers, against his civil oath, but he himself also indicated and testified that he sought 
the protection only on account of the religion.129 If there were no division of the religion, and 
were he not one of the old faith and a follower of the preachers, he would not have had a need for 
any imperial protection, said the city of Memmingen. 
 Fourth, Vogelmann went beyond simply seeking protection, thus placing Memmingen in 
highest disgrace with the Emperor. Rather, against the Ulm compromise, “with all possible 
diligence, speed, cunning, and evil methods, he sought to convince the Emperor to overrun the 
lovers of the Christian name and of the holy word of God, to kill them, to chase them out and to 
subvert them, and thereby to completely obliterate the holy Gospel which was being loyally and 
peacefully preached in their city; and to plant and establish the papacy there again.” The way he 
did this was by telling the Emperor that “the new teachings (meaning the holy word of God)” 
would cause uproar and rebellion, and would “bring the Christian people from Christian devotion 
to frivolity (Leüchtfertigkeit), disobedience, envy, hate, and antagonism,” so that the Emperor 
was made to worry greatly. And furthermore, he told the Emperor that the aim of this evil, 
uproarious, self-serving faith was to bring the property of the churches and their servants into lay 
hands. He also told the Emperor that the majority of the patrician families had remained firm on 
the “old Christian faith” and that most of the others had left the old faith based on 
misunderstanding.130 All of these statements by Vogelmann “indicate that it happened only 
because of the religion.”  
 Fifth, Vogelmann also in his supplication to the Emperor requested that he step in to 
change the city’s constitution to ensure an old-faith majority on the city council “in order to 
protect the city from further descent, and to bring it to the right way.”131 This was another 
indication, said Memmingen, that the dispute was a matter of religion. 
                                               
128 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “Er inen auch wider sein Religion mit warhait nit rathen noch dienen 
künden.” 
129 Frieß, 88; Schlütter-Schindler, 134; Frieß, 91-2; Winckelmann, PC III, Nr. 25, 30 footnote 2; Dobel, V, 
19-22 is a report from the Memmingen delegate to the 1530 Augsburg Reichstag on the supplication the preceptor of 
the Antonier monastery had made to the Emperor. It describes the preachers abolishing all old ceremonies, and that 
violation of this would lead to imprisonment and torture until death, as had happened tyranically in other places 
against the pious Christians (“wie an andern orten gegen fromen Christen jrer sect Thirannisch geschehen” (Dobel, 
V, 20). Dobel, V, 22ff contains the document in which preceptor asks for safe passage “so that we can carry out our 
offices, as God and Christian order demands us to do, unhindered by the Zwinglian preachers and their followers.” 
(“damit wir vnsere Ampt, wie vns von got vnd christenlicher ordnung aufgelegt vnnd bevolchen ist und würt, 
vnverhindert vor den zwinglischen predigern vnd jren anhengern volbringen” (Dobel, V, 25). See in general Dobel, 
V, 5-33, esp. 15f. 
130 Dobel, V, 20: “vnnder dem valschen schein seins glaubens der gaistlichen vnnd jren anhennger gueter in 
der weltlichen brauch zu bringen.” 
131 Dobel, V, 21; Frieß, 89. 
162 
 Sixth, Vogelmann wrote letters to two respectable citizens of Memmingen, in which he 
provoked in them “great fear and terror” that the city’s actions were putting them in direct peril 
of the Emperor’s military action. In particular, he indicated that Memmingen’s adopting the 
Zwinglian Tetropolitan confession put it at particular risk, while at least with the Lutherans, the 
Emperor was willing to negotiate—all of which happened, again, on account of the religion. 
 Seventh, Vogelmann seized two benefices that had already been sold to two farmers.132 
When the farmers complained, Vogelmann asked the parish priests of their towns to 
excommunicate them.133 A letter that found its way to the hands of the city council indicated that 
Vogelmann did this in order to “bring the city into an onerous and unbearable game”134 — by 
which was meant that Vogelmann intended through these actions to provoke the city to arrest 
him and thus to violate the letter of imperial protection. 
 Eighth, Vogelmann wrote many threatening letters regarding the faith and religion to 
Memmingen and many citizens, such that many fled from the city, setting up residence 
elsewhere and giving up their citizenship, indicating the extent of the fear and terror that 
Vogelmann made there. Many thought that they were daily under threat of being besieged and 
overrun on account of the faith and religion; the city was disunified. Vogelmann did all of this in 
order to abolish the holy Gospel and to reestablish the papacy. It was only on account of the faith 
and religion that Vogelmann stirred up this unrest and discord.135 These acts constituted sedition. 
Vogelmann confessed to undertaking all of these actions when the city arrested him, “without 
especially severe questioning,” as recorded in the confession statement (Urgicht),136 and right up 
until the moment of his death, he said he did all of it “only on account of the faith.”  
 From this document, we come to understand that the protesting estates were arguing that 
all kinds of actions—quitting a job, seeking imperial protection, sedition—though these may 
have a civil or public law cause of action, can additionally have their origins in matters of 
religion. It was precisely this entanglement that they were trying to make legible. 
 
Homogenizing Cases, Lifting them Out of Particularity 
 
 At the same time, it was constitutive of the protesting estates’ strategy to lift a dispute out 
of its particularity and to claim that the only important feature of a dispute was what made it like 
dozens of other suits—that it was a matter of religion.  
  Just two weeks after the execution of Vogelmann, Memmingen requested to join the 
Schmalkaldic League.137 By March 1531, it was accepted.138 When the suit was launched at the 
Imperial Chamber Court in late 1532 and early 1533, the city appointed Dr. Ludwig Hirter as 
their procurator, who was already representing them in another case,139 and was one of the two 
lawyers representing the protesting estates collectively. But it was not until about one year later 
in late 1533 that the protesting estates’ power of attorney document was submitted, declaring 
                                               
132 Schlütter-Schindler, 134. 
133 Dobel, V, 32. 
134 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “ain beschwerlicher und untreglicher spil fieren und pringen.” 
135 The language here is very strong. Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “hocherschrockenliche Sedition, 
aufrur und empörung […] lesterlichen vorhabens […] frefenclich […].” 
136 Karrer, 195-7. 
137 Frieß, 102. 
138 Dobel, V, 35. 
139 See Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 1176, case involving Matthias Mairbeck, 1532-1534. 
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them co-litigants in the dispute as it was a “matter of religion.”140 And, it was not until 1535 that 
the League finally agreed to include the Vogelmann case in its list of religion cases.141 
Nonetheless, from late 1533, throughout 1534 and 1535, Memmingen, Hirter, and the protesting 
estates were making arguments as though it were a “matter of religion” case.142 In Chapter 5, we 
will discuss the responses by Weidner and Gottfried to the attempt by the protesting estates to 
enter the case as co-litigants. 
 Because it involved the execution of a well-connected official, the Memmingen case 
turned out to be one of the most divisive and controversial among the protesting estates, and it 
came to be regarded as a sort of liability for the Schmalkaldic League.143 In her analysis of 
debates internal to the Schmalkaldic League concerning “matters of religion,” Schlütter-
Schindler argues that unlike other deliberations in which considerations of a more political and 
pragmatic nature were at the center, the Vogelmann case deliberations came down to a 
disagreement about the substance of the dispute, rather than the politics of it.144 Over time, 
Memmingen’s protection and the priorities of the League became increasingly at odds, and in the 
end, the city was pressured to resolve the dispute out of court.145 Why was a case that was so 
controversial and divisive among the League members, such that it was not included on the list 
of religion cases until late 1535, still being litigated as though it were a matter of religion case 
well before that? 
 On July 2, 1533, delegates from Memmingen were among several cities that presented 
their troubles and concerns over pending or rumored legal action in the Imperial Chamber 
Court.146 The Schmalkaldic League recess noted that, 
  
this matter is quite important but there is some doubt about whether it may 
actually be pulled into the Religionssachen or not. So, the messengers and 
delegates see it would be good that this matter be taken into consideration, and 
that the delegates to Speyer speak about it to both Dr. Ludwig Hirter and Lic. 
Helffman, whether one may find some way through which those from 
Memmingen can be unburdened of these difficulties; and that in the mean time 
they protect those from Memmingen to the best of their ability. 
 
This last phrase provides a clue as to why the protesting estates aided Memmingen in the case 
before it was counted as a matter of religion. It was a protective stance by the other protesting 
estates to join Memmingen in this case, rather than a principled one. Note that they did not say 
                                               
140 Munich 5657, see Protokoll, reference to Q14, which is not present in the case file. Dommasch, 90. 
Frieß, 103. For more on the power of attorney and specifically its use in this case, see Chapter 5. 
141 Schlütter-Schindler, 90n142, 135. 
142 This is similar to other disputes, such as the Frankfurt cases; in November 1532, the city of Frankfurt 
invoked the 1532 Nuremberg Settlement in their case which they argued was a “matter of religion” although they 
had not been part of those negotiations, had not yet adopted the Augsburg Confession, nor had they joined the 
Schmalkaldic League, which they did in 1533 (Jahns, 127). 
143 Schlütter-Schindler, 47: “in particular, the Memmingen Vogelmann case would continue to preoccupy 
the League and would be of considerable interest for its judgment criteria.” ⁠Also, Schlütter-Schindler, 75n2: “The 
Memmingen Vogelmann case seems especially to have busied the minds.” Frieß, 110-1. 
144 See Schlütter-Schindler 135-45 for a discussion of how the Schmalkaldic League made decisions when 
the case was not so clear. 
145 Frieß, 110-1, 114-6. Schlütter-Schindler, 201. 
146 Ekkehart Fabian, Die schmalkaldischen Bundesabschiede: 1530-32, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Osiander, 1958) 
[SBA 1530-32 II], 26. See Schlütter-Schindler, 133-4. Dommasch 90n10. 
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“whether it is or is not a matter of religion” but rather “whether it may actually be pulled into the 
matters of religion or not.”147 This suggests an awareness of categorization as a positivist act, a 
choice about how to draw the boundaries around what it meant to be a “matter of religion,” not a 
philosophical question about what is or is not a matter of religion based on a preexisting 
analytic.148 The definition of “matter of religion” was in the process of formation, defined, in 
part, through choices the League was making. In this case, they decided that before they would 
settle on the question of whether they would fully advocate on Memmingen’s behalf like they 
were for other religion cases—a calculation that was multi-pronged—that “in the meantime” 
they would act as if it were in order to protect Memmingen as a co-believer.149 
 The Vogelmann case was controversial because of its subject matter. In one telling 
exchange, for instance, Philip of Hessen wrote to the Elector of Saxony in November 1533 
saying that the Recusation of the judges accusing them of being biased in their adjudication in 
matters of religion, then being drafted, should include also the Memmingen/Vogelmann case 
because “Vogelmann had caused mutiny and upheaval in the city on account of faith matters.”150  
The Elector of Saxony wrote back to Philip of Hessen that December, disagreeing with him 
about including Memmingen’s Vogelmann case (or as he called it the case of the “beheaded city 
clerk of Memmingen”) as a matter of religion, because he felt that it weakened their overall 
argument, or perhaps even the legitimacy of their cause: “All that we enjoin should, if God wills, 
be found to have no deficiency.”151   
 The circumstances surrounding its being included in the list of religion cases was 
somewhat murky. By the time the Recusation was produced in 1534, the Vogelmann case was 
still not considered a “matter of religion.”152 Yet Memmingen submitted the Recusation in their 
case.153 Already in November 1533, in the document summarized above in which Hirter 
described eight reasons why the Vogelmann case should be considered a matter of religion, 
Hirter wrote that it was proper for a judge to remove himself from a case if he was aligned with 
one or the other party, and that “all of the judges are given over to and are followers of the 
                                               
147 Fabian, SBA 1530-32 II, 26: “ober der eigendtlich in di religionssachen geczogen werden moge oder 
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148 There are many examples of this reflexive awareness around naming and categorization in Reformation 
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and parenthetically the author noted “this is the title that he gave to the preaching of the Gospel” (Fabian, UARP I, 
Nr. 51, 148). In the same document, the evangelical estates referred to the proto-Catholic majority as “the obedient 
princes (as they say)”; “den gehorsamen fursten (wie sy sagen)” (Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 51, 148). See also the 
language in Munich 264 discussed at length in Chapter 6, about the way in which “hundreds of faiths […] all want 
to have a name”; “die doch alle ein Namen haben wollen” (Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 264, Q6, “Replick 
und Exception schrifft,” 1556). 
149 See Schlütter-Schindler for in-depth study of internal decision procedures of the Schmalkaldic League. 
150 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 71, 202: “Und weil der von Memmingen sach pillich in die religion sachen gezogen 
wirdet, dan der Vogelman, durch deß glaubens sachen meuterey und aufrur zu erregen und zu erwecken, 
understanden, so sehen wir fur gut an, das dieselb sach in die recusacion außtruglich gesetzt und so eher so besser 
gerichtlich damit procedirt werde.”. 
151 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 72, 206: “Dan an uns sol ob got wil in allem dem, das wir vorschreiben, auch kain 
mangel befunden werden” Elector of Saxony also was concerned about including Zwinglians into the League. 
152 Schlütter-Schindler, 80. 
153 Schlütter-Schindler, 63n17. 
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papacy,” so in any matter of faith or religion or that has its origins in it, are bound to be 
suspicious if ruled by these judges. “For if a judge who follows the papacy is competent to judge 
such a dispute, he would judge that everything that Vogelmann did was to root out the 
misguiding, new, heretical and uproarious teachings, because that it how they consider them, and 
so everything Vogelmann did was done well and honestly as a pious old Christian.” And on this 
view the punishment carried out by the city made Vogelmann a saint and a martyr.154 
 Like all of the other cases being litigated with the protesting estates involvement, the 
Recusation failed to achieve its aim; the Court continued the proceeding without interruption. At 
the next League assembly, the Memmingen case was not discussed.155 Then, after the next 
League assembly in December 1535 in Schmalkalden, Memmingen was included in the list of 
religion cases, without any mention of the reasons for this addition in the Recess itself.156 It was 
made on the basis of the Landgrave of Hessen’s opinion that the case was a matter of religion 
because of Vogelmann’s specific antipathy to the Reformation, that that was the motivation for 
his actions.157 But the violent act at the center of the suit made it an uneasy addition that pushed 
the limits of the coherence of the “matter of religion” category. 
 
Violence, and “Religion” as Honorific, Commonsense Moral Category 
 
 In some cases, especially those involving acts of violence or aggression, or in long-
standing dynastic disputes that suddenly took on the “religion” mantel,158 the claim that a dispute 
was a “matter of religion” was met with incredulity. Cases involving alleged acts of violence on 
the part of the proto-Protestant litigants gave plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge their claim 
that the dispute was a matter of religion. In these cases, we see “matter of religion” operating as a 
commensense moral category, where “religion” is an honorific, a designation for something good 
and pious.  
 This was apparent in the witness testimony of the Vogelmann case. There was inaction in 
the case after the litis contestatio took place and the plaintiffs and Fiscal submitted the Positions 
and Articles, in September 1535.159 On August 16, 1536, the Court announced that it would 
continue the proceedings by selecting within the next three months the commissioner to carry out 
the witness testimony proceeding.160 In 1538 and 1539, the witness testimony proceedings took 
place at Dillingen and Weisenhorn. Because the defendants were contumacious in this case (or, 
from their perspective, were not obligated to proceed), they suggested no witnesses, and their 
articles were not presented for testimony. 
 The “Rotulus” was the document produced by the commissioner at the end of the 
testimony proceedings.161 In this case, the last 200 pages or so are the actual witness testimony, 
                                               
154 Stadtarchiv Memmingen A330/1: “Und man inen deßhalben wider gott und unnbillich beschehner 
massen gestrafft wol aber ainen hailigenn und marterer aus ime gemacht hab.” 
155 Schlütter-Schindler, 75. Ekkehart Fabian, Die Schmalkaldischen Bundesabschiede: 1533-36, vol. 2 
(Tübingen: Osiander, 1958) [SBA 1533-36 II], 37-8. 
156 SBA 1533-36 II, 66ff. See Dommasch, 73n246; and Schlütter-Schindler, 90n142. 
157 Schlütter-Schindler, 144. 
158 Though I do not discuss them in this dissertation, the cases involving Herzog Ulrich of the Duchy of 
Württemberg evoked precisely this kind of skepticism. See e.g. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 2808, 2809, 
5560, 1175, 4182, and 5162. 
159 On July 5, 1536, the judges had a deliberating session (Sprenger, 209). 
160 Sprenger, 209. 
161 See more in Chapter 1 on court procedure. 
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which follows a very strict formula for each witness: first the oath, then asking basic personal 
details, then asking whether each article was true or not true, and how they knew it to be so 
(heard directly, saw directly, heard secondhand, or generally known/rumored), then any 
documentation witnesses may have had to support it. For example: 
 
The first article states that Vogelmann was Burggrave, councilor and servant for 
the prince-bishop of Augsburg, etc. The Bishop of Augsburg confirms this, as the 
first witness. The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth 
witnesses from Dillingen, and also the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and 
twenty-first witnesses from Weyssenhorn, and the third witness from Memmingen 
confirm it also. And an even greater report in support of the first articles is to be 
found in the Examine Testium at Weyssenhorn, where the prince-bishop of 
Augsburg testified that he first of all appointed Vogelman as a secretary, and then 
took him on as a Burggrave; contents of the appointment letter are inserted in the 
Rotulus, and these clearly show [that he had these roles].162 
 
Thus, though most of the language of the Rotulus was formulaic and predictable, some 
documents thematized the question of whether the dispute was a matter of religion. In one 
document, for instance, two citizens of Memmingen, Walter Isenberg and Veitt Buschler through 
their appointed lawyer, Gerung, refuse to take part in the witness testimony commission.163 They 
said that Vogelmann had committed multifarious guilty, highly shocking, uproarious, heavy and 
treasonous actions against the city of Memmingen, forgetting the oath that he was obligated to 
uphold as a sworn citizen of the city, also against his own safe passage letter, and three city 
statutes and laws,164 that had as their punishment death. And also he, freely, without especially 
heavy questioning, in his own handwriting, and also right before his death before more than a 
thousand people, publicly read out and testified to having done those things. So, they said, it is 
very clear and obvious that one should not have acted any differently than Memmingen did; that 
Memmingen was ready to answer to God, all nobility, and also all unbiased judges and courts, as 
an obedient city of the Emperor and Holy Empire, and that the city was obligated to carry out its 
punishment against his evil and wrongdoing. These two citizens refused to take part in the 
proceedings, they wrote, because the matter and proceeding had “its origin and beginning out of 
the religion, and truthfully followed and originated from it,” and therefore has been accepted as a 
matter of religion by the protesting estates, who collectively participate in this case, and who 
have recused the Court President and Judges of the Imperial Chamber Court regarding all such 
matters as suspicious.165 
To this, Wolfgang Vogelman (the son of Ludwig Vogelmann, principal plaintiff) 
responded with incredulity and rebuke.166 Ever since Memmingen’s tyrannical, illegal 
                                               
162 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538; and Q36, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538/39. 
163 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538, in section beginning with “Dern von Memmingen 
Recusation und Protestation.” 
164 Namely: violating the Ulm contract, disgracing the city before the Emperor, and provoking unrest in the 
city. 
165 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538, in section beginning with “Dern von Memmingen 
Recusation und Protestation”: “arckwonig und verdechtig.” 
166 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538. It seems that this was a transcription of an oral 
statement by Wolfgang. The Rotulus prefaces the statement thus: “Auff solche, in dess Memmingischen Anwalds 
verleßne schrufften hat bemelter wolfganng voglmann fur sich selb und in namen wie obgemelt bedachts begert 
167 
decapitation committed against the pious and innocent Ludwig Vogelmann, he said, and ever 
since the Fiscal and the Vogelmann family sued the city at the Imperial Chamber Court for these 
acts, Memmingen had been outrageously and illegally trying to find ways of escaping being 
brought into the case.167 They attempted to “pull their unchristian, tyrannical, punishable actions 
into an alleged religion in order to evilly cover with the holy Gospels their shame and murder, as 
they do even today.168 They think that if they say with their mouths that they are evangelical, that 
no one will proceed against them for their punishable actions.”169 The Court, he said, had 
rejected this improper escape and excuse, and on multiple occasions had ordered them to settle 
the litis, and then to take part in the witness testimony, but they remained contumacious. The 
Memmingers had persisted through their disobedience, in their insult and minimization of the 
Court’s authority. 
Wolfgang Vogelmann’s response suggested that for him, the protesting estates’ 
invocation of the case as a matter of religion was simply a means to escape the Court’s 
jurisdiction; to continue to persist in this line of argumentation even after the Court has rejected 
it as improper, made them contumacious. Moreover, for Wolfgang, it was doubly egregious to do 
this because of the mismatch between their “unchristian, tyrannical,” murderous actions and their 
cover of the holy Gospels. 
In his summary of the witness testimony, the lawyer for the family, Gottfried, argued that 
the testimony overwhelmingly supported his case for the plaintiff family.170 He described the 
protestation and recusation submitted by Memmingen and the other protesting estates as 
“insulting, fictitious, and unfounded” and “invalid and wicked.” Gottfried contrasted this with 
the piety, ability, and good reputation of Vogelmann. He stressed that the safe passage letter was 
valid, and it was fully within the Emperor’s powers as the highest natural and orderly ruler over 
those from Memmingen, to expect their adherence to it; their violation of it clearly left them in 
the penalty of that letter. Again, Gottfried was recentering the legal issue under which the case 
was brought—the violation of the imperial protection letter—and decentering the context of that 
violation as a Reformation-related dispute, while stressing the disproportion of Memmingen’s 
claim that the case was a matter of religion by highlighting the “wicked” quality of their actions. 
 
Imprisonment of a Priest as a “Matter of Religion” 
 
 Another case involving this sort of use of “matter of religion” as a commonsense moral 
category was the case of Benedict Bautz. In the Autumn of 1532, Benedict Bautz, a priest who 
was at the time appointed Chaplain of the Cathedral at Speyer, and parish administrator in 
                                               
dieselben nottrufftiger weise wissen zu verantwurten, hat auch zu anfanng des ersten actu ferner mundtlich 
furgepracht […].” 
167 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538: “frevenlicher, unfuegsamer, und unrechtmessiger 
auszug.” 
168 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538: “sonder ir unchristenliche tyrannische und straffliche 
verhanndlung in ein vermainte Religion ziehen, ir schannd und mord mit dem hailigen evangelio bößlich bedecken 
wollen, wie si dann jetz und noch heuttigs tags thuen.” 
169 Munich 5657, Q30, “Kommissionsrotulus,” 1538: “und vermainen dieweil sy sich mit dem Mund 
evangelisch nennen, so sollen oder dorffen si umb ir straffliche verhandlungen niemand mer weder recht noch 
antwurt geben.” 
170 Munich 5657, Q44, “Probation unnd in eventum conclusion schrifft,” 1540. 
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Hedelfingen, brought suit against the mayor and city of Esslingen for events that allegedly 
happened one year prior.171 He was represented by Dr. Ludwig Ziegler.  
 One morning in October 1531, Bautz was sitting at breakfast at the Speyer Cathedral’s 
Zehnthof (the building storing church wares especially wine) in Esslingen, along with various 
“lay and clergy persons from the Cathedral at Speyer,” when suddenly, four officials of the city 
of Esslingen erupted into the room, pushed Bautz backwards from the table, ripped his hunting 
knife from him, said they were putting him under arrest, and led him away. They brought him to 
the tower, left him to lie on the floor, and gave him only water and bread. After ten days, in order 
to be released, he was forced to swear an oath “to God and the saints” to stop collecting tithes in 
Esslingen, to stop coming there, and to not take any action against the city’s imprisonment of 
him in any way, “with or without law.” When Bautz asked after the causes of his arrest, they 
answered that they were following orders from the mayor and council of Esslingen.172  
But, Bautz argued, the city had no right or reason to injure, abuse, imprison and detain 
him, and in doing so they violated spiritual and worldly law, as well as the Land-Peace.173 Bautz 
asked that the city be required to pay 400 gulden in damages.174  
 A few weeks later, the protesting estates submitted their power of attorney document, 
proposing to enter as co-litigants with Esslingen on the grounds that the dispute concerned the 
religion.175 In January 1533, they submitted a document titled “why this matter, in light of the 
imperial majesty’s contract, and both of their majesties’ letters delivered to the Court President 
and Judges, should not, cannot, and may not proceed further; with appended protestation.” In it, 
they argued that this case involving the alleged injuries of Benedict Bautz was governed by the 
terms of the Nuremberg Peace (the “contract” (Vertrag) mentioned in the title of the document), 
and therefore should be suspended from further litigation, “because the causes why Benedict 
Bautz was imprisoned and punished with the tower for several days had everything to do with 
the honor of God, the holy Gospels, and one of the highest and biggest points of the Christian 
faith.”176 The document then went on to quote from a report produced by the mayor and city 
council of Esslingen explaining their reasons for punishing Bautz. It read: 
 
When, in the previous year, we undertook the holy Godly truth—pure, clear, 
unmixed with human extras—in our city and domain, through God-fearing, pious, 
appropriate preachers, who we brought to our city to let preach; we, as a Christian 
authority (obligated to work energetically to protect against all manner of division 
and disunity) let it be seriously ordered, among us and especially among the 
priests at the parish properties and among monastic persons, that no one may 
                                               
171 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 193 (“Stuttgart 193”). See Sprenger, 134; and Dommasch, 89. 
172 Stuttgart 193, Q1, “Ladung,” 1532: “Als er auch die gemelten ewer Statt diener ein antzeygung der 
ursachen, das sie dermaßen mit jene handelten, gefragt, die selben jene, das sy von euch deß befelh hetten 
geanttwurt.” 
173 Stuttgart 193, Q1, “Ladung,” 1532: “kein fug, recht, noch ursach, gehabt haben […] Alles unpillicher 
weyß, wider geistliche und weltliche recht, auch unsere und des reichs ausgekundte Landfridt, und abschidt 
174 Stuttgart 193, Q2, “Petitio Summaria,” 1532; also Q7, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1536. 
175 Stuttgart 193, Q4, “Copia mandati constitutiones generales der protestierenden chur und fursten graven, 
frey und reichs stetten darinn benennt, unnd Esslingen,” 1532. 
176 Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht warumb inn diser sachen vermoge kay. Mt vertrags und baiden irer mt. 
schreiben an cammerrichter und beysitzer ausgangen nit ferrers mehr soll kan noch mag procediert werden cumm 
annexa protestatione,” 1533: “Dieweil die ursachen darumb Benedict Butz gefennglich angenommen und ettlich 
tage mit dem thurm gestrafft, allain die eher gottes das heilig evangelium und fast ainen den hochsten und grösten 
puncten des cristenlichen glaubens belangt und antrifft.” 
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resist/oppose the Godly truth, nor smear, insult or in any other way injure another 
[on its account]. 
 
Despite all of this, however, it happened after a certain amount of time, when our 
preacher Master Ambrosius Blarer177 came to deliver the Godly truth, that many 
Christ-believing people came [to hear him preach] from the [neighboring] 
principality of Württemberg in secret, out of great fear of their rulers. They 
indicated to us that one of the priests who was a follower of papist statutes and 
oppositional to the Godly truth, named Benedict Bautz, who had been appointed a 
parish administrator in the principality of Württemberg in a small village called 
Hedelfingen, had been heard publicly by several persons saying evil things,178 and 
he would zealously point out each and every farmer from this village Hedelfingen 
who would go to hear the preachers, and afterwards, those same would be 
punished by the government of Württemberg as heretical knaves.179  
 
The second point they raised was that Bautz forced “weak and ill people who had called 
for him in their hour of death,” to let him perform the holy sacraments in the papist manner, 
which was “unchristian and against the clear order of Christ, our eternal redeemer,” and therefore 
made them go against their own consciences, and “against the correct Christian usage as was 
established by Jesus Christ himself and as it had been carried out at the time of the holy apostles, 
instead using human fictitious statutes.”180 Through these actions, Bautz not only burdened the 
consciences of many in their most vulnerable hour of need by carrying out unchristian death 
rites, but also, he brought significant “damage and disadvantage” to many who were targeted by 
the rulers of the old-faith principality of Württemberg “only on account of their hearing the 
Godly truth.”  
So these two points went towards explaining (1) why the case at hand was a matter of 
religion, governed under the terms of the Nuremberg Settlement, and perhaps also (2) why Bautz 
deserved to be punished by the city—why the city had cause to punish. But the lawyers for 
Esslingen and the protesting estates then move on to arguing (3) why they had the right to punish 
                                               
177 Ambrosius Blarer was a prominent Zwinglian preacher who served in many cities. See Brady, 
Protestant Politics, 84; also Theodor Keim, Ambrosius Blarer, der schwäbische Reformator: aus den Quellen 
übersichtlich dargestellt (Stuttgart: Besler, 1860). See correspondences between Constance, Ulm, and Memmingen 
regarding Blarer in Ekkehart Fabian, Die Beschlüsse der Oberdeutschen Schmalkaldischen Städtetage, Part 2: 1531-
2 (Tübingen: Osiander, 1959) [BOSS II], 30, 40.  
178 Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht etc.,” 1533: “das ainer aus den pfaffen, so zurselben zeit auf dem pfarhofe 
bei dem alten pfarherrn so den pabstlichen sazungen anhengig und gotlicher warhait widerwertig gewesen Benedict 
Bautz genannt unnd ettwa im Bapsthumb ain Pfarr verweser im furstenthumb wirtemberg inn ainem flecklin 
Hedelfingen offenlichm borsen etlicher personen horn und vernomen lassen.” 
179 Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht etc.,” 1533: “Wie das er alle unnd jede Baurn so aus bestimptem flecklich 
hedelfingen in unser stadt und oberigkait an die predig geen, wol mit vleis ufzaichnen und volgents dieselbigenn als 
kezerische buben der regierung in wurtemberg zuverdienter straff anzaigen.” 
180 Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht etc.,” 1533: “Desgleichen hat sich bemelter pfaf bei schwachen krancken 
leuten zu denen er in iren sterbenden notten berufft mit reichung der hailigen sacramenten ganz ongepurlicher 
oncristenlicher gestalt und wider denn hellen bevelch Christi unsers Ewigen erlosers uff die erdichte Bebstliche 
weiss erzaigt gehaltenn und die armen ainfaltigen schwache bekomerte herzen dahien nötten wollen dieselbige 
hailige sacramenten wie es bishieher im Babstumb mit anruffung der hailigen und anderer wais gehalten 
zuentpfahen und sie also von dem rechten christenlichen geprauch wie der durch christum jesum selbst eingesetzt 
und zur zeit der hailigen appostel gehalten abwendig zumachen uf menschliche erdicte sazungen wider ir selbs aigen 
gwyssenn zuweisenn.” 
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him. “It is right and proper,” they said, “for any Christian ruler to take this kind of action,” 
especially as they had already passed the law mentioned above—namely, that no one may 
resist/oppose the Godly truth, nor smear, insult or in any other way injure another [on its 
account]—which Bautz violated through his unchristian burdening of the consciences of ill and 
dying people, [a law] which he had no right to circumvent.”181  
Bautz and his lawyers responded to this “report” and protestation in May 1533.182 The 
narration, they said, not only failed to conform to the Imperial Chamber Court ordinances (a 
technical argument regarding orderly legal form), but was also false and libelous. He requested 
that their report be rejected and thrown out, and that the defendants be required to settle the legal 
issue as to the substance the plaintiff brought up in his suit, namely his arrest (aggravated 
through violence), his imprisonment (aggravated through near starvation), the forced oath, his 
banishment from Esslingen, and their forbidding him taking in tithes, all of which “do not at all 
concern the religion.”183 
He expressed incredulity regarding the claim that this was a matter of religion, suggesting 
that “they themselves must testify and say [i.e. admit, or on some level know] that this does not 
concern the religion.”184 Whatever it was that concerned Esslingen in matters of religion, and 
whatever the Emperor agreed to, and whether they had the right to punish on those grounds—
none of that had to do with him, Bautz argued; and if the city wanted to say that their outrageous 
and libelous actions against Bautz had some justification, then they should pursue those claims 
through the ordinary channel, namely, to follow through with the litis contestation in this Court. 
The plaintiff and his lawyers also argued that since Bautz had only sued Esslingen, the Court 
should not allow the protesting estates to get involved, nor should they be allowed to hinder the 
proceeding and litis contestatio or insert their “incongruous and smearing” claims.185  
In a later document, Bautz and his lawyers responded to the substantive accusations by 
the city. First, no lay ruler, they said, may capture and imprison a priest; or if he does so for good 
                                               
181 Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht etc.,” 1533: “verhoffenn und wissenn auch aus erzelter ursachen nichts 
anders dan das einer jeden christlichen oberigkait wol angestanden und gepurt hat, wir auch pfaff bauzen berumbte 
vorhabende prodicon(?) und onchristlicher der krancken und sterbenden gewissen beschwerung halber uber darvor 
obbemelt unser geschehen verbot zuthun schuldig und pflichtig gewesen und des keins wegs habenn konden oder 
sollen umbgehen.” Esslingen also indicated here that there was precedent for punishing priests by secular 
authorities, including by the Imperial Government (Reichsregiment), that had been in existence from 1500-1531 as a 
form of imperial enforcement representing not only the Emperor but also Estates of the Holy Roman Empire, which 
once punished a priest “on account of his shocking, malicious, murderous actions, by placing an iron collar on him 
and letting him be hit with reeds by the informants”; see Stuttgart 193, Q5, “Bericht etc.,” 1533: “So ist es bey uns 
das wir ein pfaffenn straffenn kein neues dann menigclichen im hailigen reich onverborgen das wir hievor da das 
key. regiment als die damals an stat ro. key. mt unsers aller gnedigsten herrn im hailigen raich die hochst oberigkait 
gewesen und das camergericht sich wesentlich bey uns enthalten auch ein pfaffen seiner erschrockenlichenn 
begangenen boßwichtischen unnd morderischen stuck halber an das halseisenn habenn stellen unnd mit riden durch 
denn nachrichter außschlagenn lassenn und haben das ort weder vonn gaistlicher oder weltlicher oberigkaitt nie kein 
verwaisung intrag oder vehinderung gedulden noch leidenn durffen, wollen auch geistlich darfur halten, wir wern 
alles verclagens vonn Benedick bautzen wo andere neidsiche und rachselige verhezer und anstiffter nit wern Auch 
wol vertragen gewesen das sey aber alles Got bevolhen.” 
182 Stuttgart 193, Q6, “Replice et esslingenschen protestationem et excogitationem facti narrationem,” 
1533. 
183 Stuttgart 193, Q6, “Replice etc.,” 1533: “die dan die religion gar nicht belangen thutt.” 
184 Stuttgart 193, Q6, “Replice etc.,” 1533: “in sachen die sie selb bekennen und sagen muessen das es die 
religion nit betreffen.” 
185 Stuttgart 193, Q6, “Replice etc.,” 1533: “mit ongereiempttn schmelichem bericht.” 
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reason, then he must turn him over to his spiritual authority in a specific amount of time.186 
Furthermore, it was not proper for any worldly ruler to punish a priest and to expel him from a 
city because he had no jurisdiction over the priest; so the defendants committed the highest 
injuries against the plaintiff when they brought him to the tower.187 Second, they denied and 
called “fictitious” the claims that Bautz had reported farmers from Württemberg to the 
authorities there for going to Esslingen to hear Blarer preach.188 They likewise denied the claim 
that he “forced” people to receive the holy sacrament according to the form of the Christian 
church, because “he did not force anyone rather it was requested of him, and he gave it to them 
as he is obligated to do, according to the ordinance of the holy Christian church, under one 
kind.”189 These two reasons that the city gave justifying their imprisonment of Bautz were 
nothing more than smears.190 Bautz also noted that the only reason he did not administer the 
parish of Hedelfingen was because he did not “adhere to the changed religion, did not preach the 
new errors, nor wanted to follow those teachings”—obliquely referring perhaps to the popular 
demand for “new faith” preachers there.191  
When the judges discussed the case in April 1536, one judge noted that Esslingen was not 
one of the protesting estates at the time of the incidents in question, and that they had even 
signed onto the antireform imperial recess at Augsburg in 1530. Another judge noted that Bautz 
suggested in his supplication quite other reasons for his imprisonment, that had nothing to do 
with his being of the old faith; it was for those reasons that the city was obligated to settle the 
litis so that those claims could be litigated. One of the judges opined that the city of Esslingen 
was justified in imprisoning Bautz, who violated the city’s edict by celebrating the mass there. 
Another judge noted that no authority, not even the Emperor, let alone a city, could proscribe 
faith with an edict.192  
Even after the Court ordered the legal issue to be settled in contumacy (litis contestatio in 
contumatiam) on April 3, 1536, Esslingen sent an instruction to its lawyers, stating that 
                                               
186 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “so gepurt keinem laien ain priester 
zu fahen unnd in gefencknus zu halten […] wann aber ain weltlicher arriert priestern in zugelaßnen vallen, als in 
begangnen lassenn fahet, ist er schuldig den priester seinen gaistlichen oberkeit in bestimpten zeit zu antworten, 
sonst thut er wider recht.” These laws are given citations. 
187 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “gepurt kainer weltlichen oberkeit 
einen priester zustraffen, unnd den stat zuverweisen, dann sie ber die priester kein gerichtszwang haben.” 
188 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “die erst ist erdicht, und der cleger 
hat nie gedacht die wirtenbergerischen pawern so gar esslingen in des plarers predig gangen, iren oberkait 
anzugeben, wirt es auch kain bidenman mit warheit von im reden, oder schreiben, und so er gleich das gesagt und 
gethon, wen er mer darum zu loben dann zu schelten, dann es auch den beclagten und den iren wol vil nutzer sein 
solt, wann sie den plarer nie gehort hetten,.” 
189 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “Die ander ursach, das er die leuth 
hab zwingen wollen nach form der cristlichen kirchen das heilig sacrament zuempfahen, ist auch nit war, dann er 
niemantz gezwingen, sonder wen das von im begert, dem hat ers, wie er schuldig gewest nach ordnung der heiligen 
cristlichen kirchen geraicht under ainerlai gestalt, daran er dann nit unrecht gethon.” 
190 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “und hat also dan beclagten den 
baiden angezogen ursachen halb nit gepurt den cleger zu fahen und fencklich im thorm zuenthalten, und haben ine 
damit unpillich wider recht geschmecht.” 
191 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “das dem cleger das landt 
wirtemperg je verpotten worden sei, das er aber diser zeit sein pfar hedelfingen bei esslingen nit bersicht, unnd daruf 
wonet, das geschicht darumb das der cleger inn den geenderten Relligion kain pfarr versehen, die newein irrungen, 
nit predeigen, leeren noch denen anhangen will.” Referring here probably to Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 
3942 (1531-1532). 
192 Sprenger, 64. 
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Esslingen wanted them to proceed with the same strategy they had had until this point, because 
“the matter is so clearly a religion matter that violates the imperial peaceful truce [the 
Nuremberg Settlement], and the many directives that were given to the judges after that 
agreement.”193  
Over the next few years, the case crawled along.194 The Court established a witness 
testimony commission for the case, and gathered testimony in 1538, with Esslingen still in 
contumacy.195 The proceedings paused temporarily after the 1539 murder of Hirter.196 
In 1540, Bautz and his lawyers submitted the Probationes et in eventum conclusiones.197  
This was a document in which a party summarized the evidence for their claims after the 
conclusion of the witness testimony commission, and sought to make their account credible to 
the judges, or even to discount the credibility of the other party’s account, not only through the 
summary of facts but also the citation of laws.198 Among other things, the document used the 
protesting estates’ “religion” claim as a way to challenge the trustworthiness of the defendant 
party to engage in a good-faith manner with the proceeding. Specifically, in describing the 
evidence for the point that the city of Esslingen had held Bautz in the tower for ten days and 
sustained him only with bread and water, “the plaintiff knows of no other way to prove this, 
other than with the city’s vassals [who were holding him in the tower], but the defendants, no 
doubt, would not provide for such testimony.”199 Why? “Because the defendants allegedly make 
this matter as ‘religious,’ and according to their unlawful interpretation and practice, pull it into 
the agreement in the Nuremberg Peace-Settlement (which they themselves never held) which 
excepted the Court’s jurisdiction.”200 In other words, though Esslingen itself had not adhered to 
the terms of the Nuremberg Peace Settlement (those portions that were publicly promulgated as 
the Peace Mandate that forbade any violence until a Christian council) they sought to include this 
case as those excepted from the Court’s jurisdiction under the terms of that treaty, on the 
justification that the dispute concerned the religion. Through this argument, Bautz and his 
                                               
193 Stuttgart 193, Q8, letter from city of Esslingen to Dr. Ludwig Hirter, 1536. 
194 The judges discussed the case again in September, 1536 but little is to be gleaned from the judges’ 
notes, other than a repetition of some of the facts of the case, and that Hirter submitted a protestation that they do not 
let themselves into the case because it is a “causa relligionis.” See Berlin, AR 1 Misc. Nr. 530. f. 28v. 
195 In Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540, Ziegler asked the Court to add 
the witness testimony to the case file; and if the witness testimony was not to be found in the chancery for whatever 
reason, then the gathering of witness testimony should be carried out again. Indeed, the case file lacks a Rotulus, the 
document produced by the commissioner of witness testimony. But Bautz submitted the testimony of two witnesses 
in Stuttgart 193, Q12, “Zeugen sag,” 1540. 
196 See Baumann, Visitationen, 143, and the literature cited there, on the suspicion that the Court President 
was behind the murder. 
197 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540. 
198 See Oberländer, Lexicon Juridicum Romano-Teutonicum, s.v. “Probatio,” 561. Though I have only come 
across a small handful of these documents in the case files I gathered, it seems that they contain the most detailed 
references to Roman law. 
199 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “Dann das die beclagten den cleger 
im thorm zehen tag allain mit wasser und prot gespaiset, waist er cleger anderst nit dann mit den beclagten stat 
knechten zubeweisen, dienen wurden aber die beclagten on zweifel nit gestatten khunt schaft zugeben.” 
200 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “dieweil die beclagten dise sach 
vermeintlich als religioß machen und nach iren onrechtmessigne ußlegung und uben in selb gerichtlich geschehen 
zusag bewilligung und e.g. gerichtlich vorbehaltung in den nurnbergischen fridstand (den sie selb nie gehalten 
haben) zu ziehen und enstanden.” Interestingly, in no other cases have I seen the use of the adjective “religiös” to 
describe the case; “religion” is always in the nominal form. Twice in Q11, including: “dieweil Esslingen dise sach 
fur Religioß vermaintlich halten wollen” (because Esslingen allegedly wants to hold this matter as religious). 
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lawyers argued, Esslingen had given themselves license to carry out all manner of contumacious 
and illegal behavior in the context of the proceeding. Bautz and his lawyers noted, for example, 
that in another case involving Esslingen, in which they were sued by the Cathedral at Speyer, the 
mayor and city council forbade their citizens from giving testimony under threat of punishment 
of limb and property.201 The city of Heilbronn, in reliance on the same lawyers and also with 
involvement of the protesting estates (including Esslingen), did the same in a case involving the 
Beginen monastery there.202 Thus, though in order to prove their statement that Bautz had indeed 
been mistreated in the tower, they required the testimony of Esslingen city servants, they would 
certainly not receive such testimony, because the city of Esslingen would prevent their testimony 
through threats. That the justification for all of this—not only the imprisoning of Bautz, but also 
the coercion of potential witnesses—was that the dispute was a matter of religion, this, Bautz 
said, was an “unlawful interpretation” of the issue, that inspired the rebuke of him and his 
lawyers. 
In November 1540, the Court ordered the city of Esslingen to pay 300 gulden to Bautz 
for his court costs and damages, and 20 gulden for chancery costs.203 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Taking it Back 
 
 In some cases, the plaintiffs literally retracted all language from their original petition 
that would indicate the Reformation context, when doing so threatened to derail the suit. 
 In a dispute that began in the Court in 1529, for example, the plaintiff was Thomas, the 
Archbishop of Riga (in modern-day Latvia), and the defendant was the mayor and city council of 
the city of Riga.204 The Archbishop sued the city for denying the lordship rights of the 
Archbishop over the city, in violation of the Kirchholm Treaty. That treaty, agreed to in 1452, 
stated that the Archbishop of Riga and the Teutonic Order would share worldly lordship over the 
city of Riga.205 Against this, said the Mandate of July 1529, the city recently swore obedience 
only to the Order and declared that henceforth, the city would have no Archbishop as its lord.  
 Then, “on the basis of the currently circulating innovations,”206 in addition, the city took 
over the Cathedral of Riga and its properties; abolished the “praiseworthy inherited worship”; 
confiscated the churches’ spiritual treasures and jewels207; forced the clergy out of the city; 
displaced the canons of the two parish churches, St. Peters and St. Jacobs, of their prebends; and 
took from the Archbishop and his clergy the lands, fields, properties, mills, tithes, and incomes 
                                               
201 Stuttgart 193, Q11, “Probationes et in eventum conclusiones,” 1540: “dann sie hievor inn sachen des 
dhom capitls zu speier iren burgern khuntschaft zugeben, de facto auch bei straf leibs und guts verpotten wie e.g. 
dessen sonder zweifel von der parthei und commissario wol werden bericht sein, dergleichen haben auch 
heilpronnen wider ire begeinen practiciret.” Referring to Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 3943, see there 
especially Q31, “Supplicatio und weither bevelh dem commissarien der zeugen halb zuthun ains erwir. dhombcapls. 
zu speir in deren sachen g. stat Esslingen,” 1536, and related documents. 
202 Referring to Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 1732, see there especially Q7, Citatio Comissarii,” 
1535, and documents following. 
203 Stuttgart 193, Q14, “Executoriales,” 1541. 
204 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde AR1-A Nr. 271 (“Berlin 271”). 
205 Carl Eduard Napiersky, Riga’s ältere Geschichte in Übersicht, Urkunden und alten Aufzeichnungen 
zusammengestellt (Riga; Leipzig: Eduard Frantzen’s Verlags-Comptoir, 1844), lvii-lviii. 
206 Berlin 271, Q1, “Copia mandati penalis cum annexa cita[tionis] und zu end geschribner execution,” 
1529: “uff ytzschwebenden neuerung.” 
207 Berlin 271, Q1, “Copia mandati penalis etc.,” 1529: “den loblichen herprachtenn gotsdinst abgethan, der 
kirchenn unnd geytslichen kleinot unnd geschmeyde, uss den kirchen zu euch genommen.” 
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that they had in and around the city. They even took lights and bells, and defaced the gravestone 
of a deceased Archbishop. The city also forbade the mass and holy sacraments at the nunnery in 
Riga, which was under the protection of the Archbishop, and confiscated their gardens and their 
incomes.  
 The Archbishop pleaded with the city, continued the Mandate, to recognize him as their 
“natural lord,” to restore the clergy to their positions, to repair the damages and to return the 
confiscated property, incomes, and goods. None of this, however, happened. Instead, “against 
common law and our imperial edicts, ordinances, reformation and land-peace,” they did not. The 
Mandate ordered that the city pay 400 marks lötigen golds, and that within three weeks of 
receiving this Mandate, the city recognize the half lordship of the Archbishop and also, at risk of 
outlawry (the Acht), restore all of the damages and positions, allow them to carry out the 
customary worship, and return everything to its prior state. 
 Then, in August 1530, the Archbishop let the Court know in a Petitio that he and the city 
of Riga had come to an out-of-court agreement that for two years, both parties would cease all of 
the conflicts described in the Mandate, with the hopes of laying the matter to rest, but that if 
either side stirred anything up in this period, they would return to the Court to continue the 
litigation.208 
 In 1532, the Archbishop submitted a Petitio Summaria in which he said that the two-year 
period saw neither friendship nor goodwill between the parties; indeed, the Archbishop 
suspected that the city made the agreement in 1530 simply in order to delay the necessity of 
carrying out the terms of the Mandate.209 “Although the defendants seemed, after receiving the 
Mandate, that they wanted to actualize all of its demands, and through words they restituted 
everything, yet it is undeniably true that they did not do what they said they would do.”210 
Therefore, the Archbishop asked that the Court require the other party to come to litis 
contestatio. The Petitio repeated the allegations contained in the Mandate, and added the 
violation of having failed to obey the terms of the Mandate. All of this was in violation of the 
common law, the Golden Bull, the imperial and kingly reformations, also the Empire’s 
constitutions, ordinances, statutes, edicts, decrees, and especially the imperial Land-Peace; in 
addition, this went against the “long peacefully held” Kirchholm Treaty, as well as the possessio 
vel quasi and usages of the Archbishop and his clergy, and also thereby implicitly minimized the 
jurisdictional authority of the Imperial Chamber Court.211  
                                               
208 Berlin 271, no quadrangle, second document in case file, “Petitio A,” 1530. 
209 Berlin 271, Q2, “Petitio Summaria Articulate,” 1532: “Sonnder jezernnante Burgermeister Rath unnd 
gemein, uber vielfeltig ir f.g. vermanen, die z[eyt?] verbeygehn, unnd on alle fruchtbarliche vereinigung verfliessen 
habenn lassen, Also das darab menigklich woll abzu- nemen hatt, durch sie nichts anderß dann verlengerung der 
zeit, dem kay. mandat volg zuthonn gesucht wordenn.” 
210 Berlin 271, Q2, “Petitio Summaria Articulate,” 1532: “Item ist auch war, wiewoll dickgenante 
Burgermeister, Rath und gemeinde zu Riga, als baldt nach verkhunthen kay. mandat, anwaldts g. principaln seiner 
f.g. Capittell und verwanten, under einem angenomne schein, als wollten sie dem mandat gentzlich geleben, inhalt 
und nach außweysung instruments und brieffen gentzlich mit worten restituiert haben. So ist doch die 
onwiddersprechlich warhaitt, daß sie in der thatt auß allen entsezten stucken inn dem kay. mandat gesezt und clag 
wiß erzellt seiner f.g. und deren capittell allein ettliche stuck, nemlich irn f.g. hoff den stiefft huolm etlich ecker und 
dannoch nit all auch gar nit mit der freyhaitt wie die ir f.g. und deren capittell furmals und von altem her ingehabt, 
zwgestelt haben.” 
211 Berlin 271, Q2, “Petitio Summaria Articulate,” 1532: “zu schmelerung ir maiestat und ewere gnadenn 
jurisditionn unnd gerichtszwanng.” 
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 In October 1533, the city of Riga responded with an Exceptiones document to decline the 
forum of the Court.212 They did so on the grounds that the city was not reichsunmittelbar (was 
not directly subject to the Emperor). Only if the dispute were a violation of the Land-Peace, they 
said, could the Court pull the city before it in the first instance. But the Archbishop’s suit was 
primarily aimed at restoring the abolished ceremonies and the lost church property. Therefore, 
the first-instance ordinary judge in this case should be their direct lord, namely the Master of the 
Teutonic Order, whose jurisdiction and lordship over the city were “indivisible and 
impartible.”213 The city did not address the Kirchholm Treaty, though this last claim obliquely 
rejected the shared lordship with the Archbishop. Nor did Riga address any of the specific 
allegations in the Mandate and Petitio, other than to say that the allegations were “unfounded.”  
 Then, the city said that if these arguments to decline the forum of the Imperial Chamber 
Court do not convince the judges, then they “protest the entire proceeding as null,” in reliance on 
“the imperial peace and standstill on account of the religion,”214 referring to the Nuremberg 
Settlement. Though the city of Riga was not a co-signer of the Settlement, they were covered 
under the terms of the agreement, they said, because it stated that it applied to “all who confess 
and accept the word of God, and all who will do so.”215 To corroborate this reading, the city 
submitted a letter from Philip the Landgrave of Hessen, dated August 1, 1533, written to the 
lawyers for the evangelical estates, Dr. Hirter and Licentiate Helffman, in which Philip stated 
that the city of Riga should be included in the terms of that settlement.216  
 
The Archbishop’s “Corrections” 
 
 In 1534, the Archbishop again and again asked the Court to declare the city in the Acht 
for its recalcitrance and contumacy. Finally, he submitted a document as a “correction” to several 
articles in his 1532 petition “insofar as it concerns the ceremonies and the faith.”217 First, he 
wrote, he wished to correct the eleventh article of that petition; he wanted to “expunge the words 
                                               
212 Berlin 271, Q5, “Exceptiones articulate declinatoriy fori cum annexa protestatione,” 1533. 
213 Berlin 271, Q5, “Exceptiones articulate declinatoriy fori cum annexa protestatione,” 1533: “indivisibilis 
unnd ontailbar.” 
214 Berlin 271, Q5, “Exceptiones articulate declinatoriy fori cum annexa protestatione,” 1533: “Sindicus 
protestirt auch hiemit offentlich wo e.g. uber und wider vorgeschriebenn exceptiones die sach fur derselbigen 
behalten wurd, des er sich doch vermog des reichs recht unnd ordnung keins wegs vorsicht das er ime und seinen 
herrn alsdan furbehalten woll, denn kay. frieden und stilstandt der Relligion halben ufgericht furzuwenden dweill die 
von Riga auch darin begriffen.” 
215 Berlin 271, Q5, “Exceptiones articulate declinatoriy fori cum annexa protestatione,” 1533: “in ansehung 
das der obengemelt kaiserlich vertrag unnd stilstant vermag das alle die das wort gots bekent und angenommen 
haben, auch annemen werden sich des selbigen gepruchen und frewen sollen und mogen.” 
216 Berlin 271, Q5, “Exceptiones articulate declinatoriy fori cum annexa protestatione,” 1533: “inhalt des 
durchleuchtigen hochgebornen fursten herrn philipsenn lanndtgraven zu hessen an den hochgelerten doctor 
ludwigen hirter und ire sindicum als der evangelischen stend Anweld mit A verzeichnet ausgangen.” For the letter, 
see Berlin 271, Q6, “Dem hochgelerten unsern lieben getrewen Ludwig hertter doctor johann helffman licentiat 
baide kay. Cammergerichts advocaten procuratorn,” 1533. See also Berlin 271, Q13, “Bericht und Protestation,” 
1535, in which Helffman explains to the Court that at the recent Schmalkaldic Diet, the Elector of Saxony, the 
Landgrave of Hessen, and the other evangelical and protesting estates “accepted and recognized” that “the matter of 
the city of Riga is a matter of religion” (“vermög des schmalkaldischen abschaids der statt Riga sach fur ein 
religionn sach anngenummenn unnd erkhannt habenn”). 
217 Berlin 271, Q10, “Correction etlicher ingeprachter clag cum addicionali unnd protestationem,” 1534: “in 
willenn und mainung etlich punctenn in seiner furprachten articullierten petition den 2. decembris anno 32 sovil die 
Ceremonien und den glauben belangen möchte zu corrigirenn abzuthon und yetz zur zeit fallenn zulassen.” 
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‘abolished the praiseworthy inherited worship’ and have the article instead read like so: ‘that the 
defendants in this and other churches at Riga violently took away the church silver treasures, 
jewelry, silk, gemstones, liturgical vestments, chasubles, lights, bells, altars, etc. In summary, 
everything that was inside of them.”218 Second, he corrected the fourteenth article of the original 
petition, which had included the words “the office of the holy mass and the holy sacrament” to 
be substituted with the words “that the defendant prevented the priests from carrying out 
necessary service in the nunnery in Riga, over which the Archbishop had protection [Schutz und 
Schirm].”219 Third, he corrected the twenty-first article of the original petition, which had 
included the words “customary worship.” Those words should be expunged and replaced, he 
said, with “necessary worship.”220 “And,” he continued, “throughout the complaint and petition, 
everything that concerns the religion, ceremonies or the faith and their restitution, now, at this 
time, and in this proceeding, should not be stated or demanded.”221 In other words, the 
Archbishop asked to remove any component of his complaint that touched on things that could 
be construed as matters of religion.  
 Then, continuing this point, in his 1534 Replik, the Archbishop denied that the case was 
principally about restoring the abolished ceremonies. Primarily, he argued, it was about lordship 
and jurisdiction, and the way in which the city had rejected doing proper homage to the new 
Archbishop, and it was also about the illegal confiscation of goods. All of this “touches upon 
neither the Christian faith nor the religion, and have nothing in common with it, because the 
spiritual religion or our faith does not stand upon temporal goods or their confiscation, rather, 
goods do not concern the faith at all.”222  
 “It is true, however,” he continued, in a moment of rebuke, “that it is unfitting of the faith 
and the Gospel, and also outside of law, to confiscate temporal goods with violence, and it is not 
proper for any evangelical to do so, as anyone can contemplate by themselves.”223  
 He also argued, drawing on language from the 1529 Speyer Recess, that it was 
undeniable that in matters of plunder and confiscation of lordship, jurisdiction, and property 
                                               
218 Berlin 271, Q10, “Correction etc.,” 1534: “Item in den ailfften artickel seiner ubergebnen petition will 
anwalt corrigirt unnd uß dem selbenn artickel gethon habenn unnd dispungirt die wort den loblichen langherprachten 
gotzdienst, abgethonn und den artickel also wie nachvolgt gestellt habenndt: Item war das ehegenante beclagte in 
yetzgemelten und annderen kirchen zu Riga alle der kirchenn silver klinodien Cleynoten geschmeid von Seyden 
edegestein Meßgwandt Caselen leichter glockenn altar etc. und in summa was darin gewesenn, darauß zu irenn 
handen und gewalt genomen und noch habenn.” 
219 Berlin 271, Q10, “Correction etc.,” 1534: “Und dan in dem 14. artickel will er corrigirt und herauß 
gethon haben diese wort die ampt der hailigen meß unnd die hailigenn Sacrament geraicht und anstatt derselbenn 
andere substituirt, und den artickel wie nachvolgt gestellt haben: Item zum 14. war und offenbar das die vilberurte 
beclagt den Closter jungfrawen in den statt Riga die unnder hochgedachts ertzbischofs unnd Clegers schutz und 
schirm seyen ire priester so inen die notturftige diennst thun sollten abgestellt unnd entzogen habenn.” 
220 Berlin 271, Q10, “Correction etc.,” 1534: “Der gleichenn will auch anwalt in dem 21. artickel seiner 
articulirte clag und in der petition derselbenn das wortlin gwonlichs gotzdiennst expungirt und corrigirt darfur 
notturftige gotzdiennst substituirt und gesetzt.” 
221 Berlin 271, Q10, “Correction etc.,” 1534: “und durchauß in der clag und angehengter petition alles die 
so die Religion Cerimonien oder den glauben unnd derenn Restitution belanngt yetz zur zeit und in diser 
Rechtvertigung nit gesetzt oder begert haben.” 
222 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “die wedder den cristenlichenn glauben noch 
Religion berurenn, auch damit kain gemein haben dieweil die gaistlich Religion, oder unnser glaub nit uff 
zeitlichenn gutern oder deren endtsetzung stat# sonnder die guter den glauben gar nichts belangen.” 
223 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “Aber wol die warhait das es dem glauben und 
Evangelium ungemeß ain andern usserhalb rechtenns mit gwallt dess seinen und zeitlich guter zuenntsetzen auch 
kainem evangelischen zusteet noch gepurt wie menigklich bey im selbs erwegenn khan.” 
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concerning churches, clergy, princes, prelates and others, by those of whatever estate they may 
be, that the Imperial Chamber Court would be the proper forum for such a case. He also argued 
that the basis of the city of Riga’s argument about the proper forum being the Master of the 
Teutonic Order alone was “entirely false,” and “injures [the city’s] own honor and oaths,” as the 
Archbishop had been their lord there in Riga since the city was established. The Order in Latvia 
could not be the judge in this case because it would be doing so on the basis of a “confiscated 
lordship and jurisdiction,”224 which it properly shared with the Archbishop since 1452. In cases 
of contested shared lordship, he said, the Imperial Chamber Court was the proper forum. If the 
Order had jurisdiction in this case, it would result in the situation that the Order would decide on 
the status of the lordship of the Archbishop over Riga, which cannot be the case because “pars in 
parem imperium non habeat” (equals have no sovereignty over one another).225 
 The Archbishop also responded in this Replik to the city of Riga claiming that the 
Nuremberg Settlement applied to them, and that this case should be paused as a matter of 
religion. He said this claim went “against the truth and public laws” and moreover was not 
pertinent and therefore should not be permitted. “The other party themselves cannot be so 
unclever, also anyone can well understand, that there is a big difference between [on the one 
hand] confiscation of temporal lordship and jurisdiction or robbery of temporal goods, which this 
petition is about, and [on the other] religion and faith.”226 He then referred to what he said in his 
“Corrections” document, protesting that he hereby intended to remove any mention of the 
abolishing of ceremonies or about the faith in his petition, that he no longer sought anything with 
regard to those matters in this case.227  
 Also in the Replik, responding to the letter sent by the Landgrave of Hessen indicating 
that Riga should be covered by the terms of the Nuremberg Settlement, the Archbishop’s lawyer 
wrote that his principal “regrets that the Settlement applies alone to religion and faith and not at 
all to temporal lordship, jurisdiction and goods or their violent confiscation.”228 This could be a 
sarcastic statement—for if the case were actually about religion and faith (which it was not), then 
the Settlement would actually apply to it (which it did not). Alternatively, he could be saying that 
if the Settlement applied to temporal lordship, jurisdiction, and goods, then perhaps the city of 
Riga would have ceased their behaviors; in other words, if the city of Riga respected a 
suspension to courtroom disputes concerning the religion, then maybe it would respect a 
Settlement that demanded a suspension to violent confiscations. The Archbishop also suggested 
that if the city of Riga heeded “human nature, which does not desire the goods of another,” as 
well as “God, justice, and all laws and equity,” then “all of this strife and many other quarrels 
                                               
224 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “enntsetzter oberkait und jurisdiction.” 
225 Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007), 168. 
226 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “dan gegenthail selbst nicht so unbehenndt auch 
menigklich wol verston kann das es ain grosser unschied seye zwischenn endtsetzung zeitlicher oberkait unnd 
jurißdiction oder beraubung zeitlicher guter darauff anwalt petition gestellt und zwischenn Religion und glauben.” 
227 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “will auch anwalt hiemit wo etwas im mandat oder 
seiner articulierter petition gesezt die cerimonien oder glauben berurenn dasselbig yez zur zeit corrigirt abgethon 
unnd enndtsezt habenn dasselbig auch gentzlich fallen laseenn darauff etwas zuerkhennen noch zur zeit und in diser 
seiner petition nit gebeten noch begert haben des er sich offentilch protestirt.” 
228 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “Mag anwalts g. principal woll leyden das sie sich 
desselben anstands so allain uff die Religion und denn glauben unnd gar nit uff zeitlich oberkait jurißdition und 
guter oder derenn gewalthattliche enntsetzung gestellt wol hielten unnd auß dem nit giengenn.” 
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would not be necessary.”229 The case, he said, should be able to proceed on the basis of the 
property and jurisdiction dispute, quite separately from the matter of religion.230 
 In 1534, Riga submitted the Recusation document of the protesting estates, which the 
Court deemed null in an administrative ruling, but the city nonetheless declined to participate in 
the witness testimony commission on the grounds that that it was commissioned by a “biased 
judge.”231  The witness testimonies confirmed the Archbishop’s claims, adding more detail to the 
events in question. Interestingly, several of the witnesses made it clear that the Rigans did not 
accept the Archbishop as their lord “because of Lutheranism.”232 Another witness noted that the 
Rigans took control of the churches and placed Lutheran preachers in them.233 All of this, despite 
the Archbishop’s efforts to remove the context of the divided religion from the case. 
 
“Religion” with a Narrow Legal Referent 
 
 While “matter of religion” was often used in this general, commonsense, moralistic way 
by plaintiffs, the term came to have the character of a narrow legal category, bootstrapped into 
the terms of the protesting estates’ power of attorney and other related documents such as the 
1534 Recusation,234 and codified in the Nuremberg Settlement of 1532, as well as numerous 
agreements made thereafter that promised a suspension of proceedings before the Imperial 
Chamber Court in “matters of religion”—including the Kaaden Treaty of 1534 and the Frankfurt 
Treaty of 1539.235 
 An instructive example of this comes in the case of Johann Fabri discussed in Chapter 3. 
Fabri—the parish priest of Lindau, but concurrently in the service of the Bishop of Constance, 
then in the service of Archduke (later King) Ferdinand, and then, by the time the Imperial 
Chamber Court case was drawing to a close, himself becoming the Bishop of Vienna—sued the 
city of Lindau for having in effect stripped Fabri of all of his rights as a parish priest, blocking 
even his attempts to send in new administrators, illegally appointing Zwinglian preachers who 
                                               
229 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “Möcht auch leiden das sie die menschenn natur 
hieltenn kaines frembdenn gutz begerthenn noch ainen andern seines zeitlichen gutz widder gott Rechte unnd alle 
gesatz und billigkait enntsetzenn wurde diß zanncks unnd vil anders haders nit von noten sein.” 
230 Berlin 271, Q11, “Replice et conclusiones,” 1534: “Sie wurden auch obbemmelten anstanndt so 
strictissimi juris dieweyl er juri communi entgegenn nicht so weyt allem iren geilz(?) dadurch zuersettigenn 
außtheinen(ausdehnen?) oder streckenn das er auch dass jhenig so von der Religion ganntz abgesundert der gar nit 
anhengig begreyffenn sollt das sie on das das evangelium stricts(?) verstann(?) wollenn unnd nicht leidenn konnen 
das man denselbenn etwas an warten zuthue. Aber was an guter dem angestossenn werden möcht, sollt bey inen 
angenomen werdenn unnd erstreckung leidenn, das dan anwalts ewer gnad billichenn und rechtmessigen zu 
bedenckhen under wegen wis recht es sie gesezt habenn will.” 
231 More on this in Chapter 5, section on recusations. 
232 Berlin 271, Q16, “Attestationes,” 1537, Peter Wampe’s testimony (ninth witness): “die Rigesschenn 
habenn dem jzregerenndenn unnserem gned. herrnn erzbysschofe vonn wegenn der Luthery vor irenn hernn nycht 
annehemen wollen.” 
233 Berlin 271, Q16, “Attestationes,” 1537, Jaspar Korb Pfharher zw Ronneburgk’s testimony (seventh 
witness): “und habenn die rigeschenn die kyrchenn ingenommen unnd Lutherisschenn predicantenn darinn gesatzt.” 
Also Henrich Wedekynth pfharher zwr pernigell’s testimony (twelfth witness): “die pfhar herrnn darvonn verjagt 
unnd ire lutherisschenn predicantenn darinn gesazt. Also Bartholdt Kuebus pfharher zw zuntzell’s testimony 
(thirteenth witness): “unnd habenn alle kyrchenn gespliirt unnde verwusth die altaria zwrbrochenn unnd habenn 
solliche kyrchenn noch inn weherenn unnd brawchenn sie nach der Luthery.” 
234 On these see Chapter 5. 
235 See footnotes 40 and 42 above. 
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had participated in the Peasant Uprising elsewhere, and giving to them the parish’s incomes.236 
Lindau first attempted to decline the forum on the basis of an imperial privilege, and also alleged 
subreption and obreption on the part of Fabri, who had withheld, they said, that he was an 
absentee priest. Then, in 1531, Lindau submitted the Mandatum Constitutionis Generalis of the 
protesting estates, appointing Dr. Hirter and Licentiate Helfmann as their attornies, in which it 
was indicated that they now considered the dispute a “matter of religion.”237  
  In 1536, Fabri submitted a document titled “Duplik and Information that this matter is not 
one of religion, rather one of plunder and public violence.”238 The document provided several 
arguments or indications that the dispute was not a matter of religion, as Lindau and the 
protesting estates were claiming.   
  First, he noted that this case had been pending in the court for many years before the 
protesting estates entered, and before they submitted their protestation and recusation of the 
Court in matters of religion. According to Fabri, if it were truly a matter of religion, why did the 
city not decline the forum on that basis in the first place?  Second, “it is evident,” he said, that 
the case rested on Lindau’s having taken from Fabri, without the right to do so, certain items of 
great value, including beautiful mass robes, mass books, silver oblations and other things, and 
then sold everything and made money out of it.239 “And since they do not want it, they should 
equitably have given those things which had been with [Fabri] back again.”240 That the city 
simply sold the items for money was offered by Fabri as proof that their alleged actions were 
within the category of spoliation—the illegal taking of property through secretive or destructive 
means—and had nothing to do with religion.241 Third, “even before they accepted 
Zwinglianism,” the city council and citizens of Lindau, though obligated to pay tithes, reneged 
on this duty.242  
  Fourth, said Fabri, Lindau confiscated various church income streams and properties, and 
even the tithe registry.243 This was not a matter of religion but one of spoliation, said Fabri, 
“because at every Imperial Diet, the protesting estates had agreed to not take the property of 
others.” This rather opaque sentence turns out to be revealing. What difference would it make as 
to whether it was or was not a matter of religion whether the city had signed on to the various 
imperial recesses forbidding the taking of others’ property? This sentence makes sense if we 
realize that Fabri and his lawyer Landstrass knew that to say that something was a “matter of 
                                               
236 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 5083 (“Munich 5083”). 
237 See protocol of the case file for information on events in the intervening years. The protocol is not in my 
possession. I am not sure why there were such long gaps in this case, or what was happening in the intervening time. 
238 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio und Information das diese sach nit ain religion sach sunder spoliren 
und ein offentlicher gewalt sey,” 1536. 
239 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio etc.,” 1536: “Zum andern ist beweyslich außs der handlung das die 
clag und sach an dem stehe, das die von Lindau anwalts hern und principalen das sein on recht genomen schone 
meßgewantt meßbucher silberne opferkande und anders das anwalts hern und principalis zu der kirchen geben […] 
alles verkaufft und gelt darauß gemacht.” 
240 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio etc.,” 1536: “und do sie es ye nit wolten solten sie pillich das thenige 
so den hern principalen gewesen widerumb geben haben.” 
241 Oberländer, Lexicon Juridicum Romano-Teutonicum, s.v. “spoliare, spoliiren,” 657: “ausziehen / 
berauben / plündern / einen mit Gewalt oder heimlich aus dem Besitz einer cörperlichen oder uncörperlichen Sache 
setzen.” 
242 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio etc.,” 1536: “Zum dritten so ist auch war das gedachte vonn Lindau 
unnd ir burger meinem gnedigenn hern von wyen schuldig und austendig und von der Zeit do sy den Zwinglismum 
noch nit angenomen das wollen sie nit betzalen und sein Gnad hat doch ire burger betzalen mussen.” 
243 See Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 5082 concerning the tithe registry. 
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religion” was distinct from saying that something was covered under the various recesses 
“concerning the religious divide” (the Zwiespalt in der Religion) that had been arrived at in 
imperial assemblies. In other words, Fabri was saying in effect here: this case is not a matter of 
religion because it is a matter of the religious divide. Without understanding the narrow legal 
referent that “religion” had in each of these usages—the cases covered by the Nuremberg 
Settlement, on the one hand, and the imperial recesses forbidding innovations, on the other—the 
sentence makes little sense. According to the 1530 Augsburg Recess, for instance, the kinds of 
actions Lindau had undertaken, though explicitly about “the division in the religion,” were 
categorized as violations of the Land-Peace, and therefore were definitely justiciable in the 
Imperial Chamber Court. The plaintiffs also knew that if they said this was a “matter of 
religion,” then it meant precisely that this case could risk not being litigated in the Imperial 
Chamber Court—according to the protesting estates’ argument. To concede that the dispute was a 
“matter of religion” would risk taking the dispute outside of justiciability. This indicates the way 
in which “matter of religion” was being used categorically as a matter of legal classification to 
refer only to those disputes that would be governed by the terms of the Nuremberg Settlement. 
  Fabri went on to say that if Lindau did not want Fabri as their priest, and instead wanted 
someone else to serve them as preacher who had the false religion, then they should support him 
with their own income sources, not the annuities and incomes of Fabri.244 This he took to be 
further confirmation that it was primarily a matter of confiscation and spoliation. If Lindau had 
supported their preachers, even preachers of the false religion, with their own sources of income, 
Fabri said, he would have had no cause to bring the case. 
  Fifth, the Lindauers, while taking part in the pending litigation in front of the Court, sold 
some of the property in question—though completely unauthorized to do so. This action, Fabri’s 
lawyer argued, violated the Nurnberg Settlement, which the Estates had agreed upon, and 
showed contempt to the Court. 
  The petition concluded by repeating that this was not a matter of religion, but one of 
plunder and a violation of the common Land-Peace, and also against all that had been proffered 
by the protesting estates, namely, that they would not take anything from anyone, and that they 
did not wish to dispute with anyone at the Court about true or false religion at this time.245 Put 
another way, if the protesting estates were serious about not wanting to dispute about true and 
false religion at the Imperial Chamber Court, then they would litigate this dispute as a matter of 
property; by insisting that it was a matter of religion, they were saying that the only way for the 
Court to litigate was to adjudicate on true or false religion—which of course it may not do. In 
other words, they were making it a “matter of religion” not on the substance but precisely in 
order to escape the jurisdiction of the Court.  
   
Leaving in Place the Predicate That There Was Such a Thing as a “Matter of Religion” 
 
 In Chapter 3, we learned about the 1537 suit brought by Philip von Rechberg, who was 
both the Cathedral Provost at Worms and the Cathedral Dean at Augsburg, against a noble citizen 
                                               
244 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio etc.,” 1536: “wollen si ye meinen Gnedigen hern zu einem pfarher nit 
haben und einem anden der falsam religionem habtt, solten sie den selben erhalten mit Irem und nit mit meins 
Gnedigen hern von wyen gulte und renthe.” 
245 Munich 5083, Q20, “Dupplicatio etc.,” 1536: “das diese sach nit ein religion sach sein sunder spoliirn 
ein offenlicher gewalt wider den gemeinen landfriden auch wider aller protestirende stendt erbietten das sye 
khainem das sein nennen[nemen] wollen und niemantem an diesem kay. Camergericht veram oder falsam religionen 
diser Zeit nit disputiert.” 
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of Ulm named Ludwig von Freyberg.246 Philip alleged that Ludwig, without authority, had 
ordered then-vicar, Hans Moßberg, to leave the parish church, had confiscated large quantities of 
parish goods, and had redirected the tithes, annuities, and incomes of the parish. These actions 
were in violation of imperial protection, common written laws, the Golden Bull, the Land-Peace, 
the Speyer Recess of 1526 and the Augsburg Recess of 1530. The only indication in the language 
of the Summons about the Reformation context came at the very end, as the plaintiff asked the 
Court to order Ludwig von Freyberg to return the confiscated wealth, redirect the incomes to 
Hans Moßberg, release administrative control of the parish, and to “let the plaintiff and his 
administrator remain with the parish and the old Christian usages and ceremonies, safely and 
uninjured.”247  
 In response, Ludwig argued that in fact he had the right to appoint the vicar of the parish, 
and though that appointment was conditional on the approval of the Bishop of Constance, 
historically, that condition was nominal only; every recommended appointment had been 
subsequently approved without incident. He argued to the Court that the only reason Phillip 
brought this suit challenging his jus patronatus claims was because he objected to the vicar 
which he had appointed, namely someone “who would deliver the pure, clear, plain Gospels and 
word of Christ” without “any human ornament or addition.”248 On these grounds, Ludwig 
declined the forum of the Court on two grounds. First, because “the matter is purely and clearly 
dependent on the religion and incontrovertibly has its origins and beginning in it.”249 As such, it 
fell under the terms of the Nuremberg (1532), Kaaden (1534), and Frankfurt (1539) treaties that 
declared all such cases should be paused until a future Christian council.250 Being a matter of 
religion, it “involves electors, princes and other estates of the holy religion, our holy Christian 
faith, who had previously protested the imperial recesses.”251 Second, there was no spoliation or 
improper confiscation, as the plaintiff claimed; rather, the defendant was acting within his rights 
to appoint and to direct the incomes of the parish to the appointed vicar, as was customary. If the 
plaintiff wished to challenge his patronage rights, then he must sue the defendant in front of their 
ordinary judge in the first instance, and not for a Land-Peace violation in the Imperial Chamber 
Court.252 In other words, Ludwig von Freyberg was not obligated to respond to this matter before 
the Imperial Chamber Court, not just because “the present matter truly and foundationally 
concerns the division of the holy religion,” but rather also that even if it did not concern the 
religion, it did not rise to the level of a Land-Peace violation, and therefore the Imperial Chamber 
                                               
246 Munich 2019. 
247 Munich 2019, no quadrangle, third document in case file after protocol, “Ladung cum Executione,” no 
date; and Munich 2019, Q21, “Positiones et Articuli,” 1541. 
248 Munich 2019, Q7, “Ursachenn cum Annexa petitione et protestatione,” 1538: “gedachts Lutzenn vonn 
Freybergs beger und gemuth allein sey zu seiner hohen und nider oberkhaitt ein Cristenlichen verkhunder des 
hailigen wortt gotts, dasselbig auch on allen menschlichenn thant [Tand] oder zusatz, rhein, lautter zu predigenn und 
zuverkhunden, zu habenn.” 
249 Munich 2019, Q7, “Ursachenn cum Annexa petitione et protestatione,” 1538: “dise sach auch pur lautter 
der Religion anhengig ist, und unwidersprechenlich daher irenn anfang und ursprung hatt.” 
250 See this argument in Munich 2019, Q7, “Ursachenn cum Annexa petitione et protestatione,” 1538; and 
Q16, Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn cum annexa petitione,” 1540. Like the Nuremberg Peace, the 
Treaty of Kaaden (June 1534, i.e. six months after the protesting estates’ Recusation of the Court), and the Treaty of 
Frankfurt (1539) promised a standstill to cases, and likewise had no teeth. See footnotes 40 and 42 above.  
251 Munich 2019, Q16, Exceptiones etc.,” 1540: “Churfursten und fursten und andern steenden so sich in 
der heiligen relligion unsers hailligen christenlichen glaubens.”  
252 Munich 2019, Q16, Exceptiones etc.,” 1540. 
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Court was not the appropriate forum.253 They thus testified and protested that in this matter of 
religion, they were not obligated to enter the case, to settle the legal issue (litis contestatio), or to 
proceed. 
 The lawyer for the plaintiff responded that the allegation that this was a matter of religion 
should not be countenanced. First, Ludwig von Freyberg did not become a citizen of Ulm until 
two years after the events in question.254 So the lawyer for the protesting estates improperly 
accepted this dispute as a matter of religion. Second, this was a violent Land-Peace violation,255 
so the claim that it was a matter of religion should not give it cover.256 He asked that the judges 
not hear them, declare them in contumatiam, and require them to pay contumacy expenses.257 He 
gestured to the willfulness of the claim that this was a matter of religion, its constructed quality, 
when he said that the other party’s mere allegation should not be accepted on its face; the 
defendant lawyers have “made a protesting and religion matter out of it” although this matter did 
not relate to the religion, but rather was materially, substantively governed by law, a spoliation 
matter that violated common written laws, and the two recesses.258 Nonetheless, Philip left 
untouched the premise that there was such a thing as a “matter of religion.”  
  Ultimately, the Court required the settling of the litis, and proceeded with the defendant 
in contumatiam. But it does not go far past the Positions and Articles stage, as the defendants 
refused to take part, and the case file fizzled out in 1541. 
 
Bricolage Jurisprudence 
 
 This dissertation contributes to the “religion” literature by excavating the messy, 
litigation context in which “religion” was first used as a legal category in the Reformation 
period. It shows that we cannot understand the meaning of “religion” in the Augsburg Religion-
Peace of 1555—and arguably, “religion” as a secular legal category thereafter—without 
                                               
253 Munich 2019, Q16, Exceptiones etc.,” 1540: “das der gemelt Ludwig vonn Freyberg diser sachen halb 
vor dem hochloblichenn kaiserlichen CG antwurt zugeben nit schuldig, nit allain darumb das gegenwurttig handlung 
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Ludwig vonn Freyberg vor e. g. antwurt zugeben schuldig.” 
254 Munich 2019, Q8, “Petitio,” 1538: “so sey wissentlich das zu der selben zeyt Lutzen von Freyberg auch 
sein sun noch nit Burger zu Ulm sein ge- wesen auch anwaldts herrn und principalenn oder seinem vicarius noch nit 
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citizenship in cities of nobles from surrounding regions was important in the medieval and early modern periods. It 
was a way for nobles to benefit from the comforts of city life, as well as be protected in times of unrest. It was a 
matter of negotiation for example how long they could reside in the city, how expensive of a property they could 
purchase, and what the city would get in return. Since 1534, von Freybergs had sought citizenship in Ulm; they were 
finally given citizenship rights in 1537. See Sailer, “Öpfingen im Mittelalter.” 
255 Munich 2019, Q8, “Petitio,” 1538: “darauß dann mit der warheitt volgt das mer gemelte der protestirend 
stendt anweldt sich unpillich diser sach annemen dan sy ir vermeint angeben als solt diesse sach ein Religion sach 
sein welche ein gewaltsame und Landt zu Schwaben fur ein landt fridpruchigen sach gehalten gar nit schirmen oder 
furtagen mag.” 
256 Munich 2019, Q8, “Petitio,” 1538: “dan sy ir vermeint angeben als solt diesse sach ein Religion sach 
sein welche ein gewaltsame und Landt zu Schwaben fur ein landt fridpruchigen sach gehalten gar nit schirmen oder 
furtagen mag.” 
257 Munich 2019, Q8, “Petitio,” 1538; and Q15, “Anzaig cum annexa peticione,” 1540. 
258 Munich 2019, Q15, “Anzaig cum annexa peticione,” 1540: “ein protestierende und Religion sach darauß 
gemacht.” 
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understanding the meaning of “matters of religion” in the context of the Reformation-related 
litigation of the decades prior to it. 
 This dissertation also brings more nuance and detail to familiar tropes about the 
“religion” category that have circulated in the historiography of the Reformation cases since at 
least the late nineteenth century.  
 In the early Reformation period, the “religion” category in legal discourse gained its 
particular definition and contours in response to certain demands endogenous to law—
specifically, the techniques of litigation, and the constraints of Roman-canonical legal procedure. 
In this chapter, we have seen moments of articulation, in which actors—in particular, old-faith 
and evangelical litigants and their lawyers, as well as judges—not only used the phrase, but 
moments in which disagreement about its contours elicited more language about it. Importantly, 
these moments did not yield reflective, second-order deliberation; the discussions were always 
tied to tangible disputes. In other words, the meaning of the phrase “matter of religion” was 
being worked, reworked, and reworked again by interested parties in high-stakes disputes. 
Litigation at its core is interested; thus, to speak of the “interests” of the parties is not to reduce 
the legal to the political, but to get at a structural characteristic of litigation.  
 Each attempt to use the term, and each move to challenge it, or to brush it aside, added 
another piece to this bricolage legal category. The concept of “bricolage” helps us understand the 
way in which the category emerged, in particular, the heterogeneous, contingent, and 
retrospective quality of its production. Claude Lévi-Strauss described bricolage as a particular 
mode of production in which the bricoleur confronts particular material constraints: “his universe 
of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at 
hand.’”259 The tools and materials he has to work with are “closed” because they were not 
selected for the purpose of carrying out the particular project before him; instead, they are “the 
contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain 
it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions.”260 The principle of selection, 
collection, and retention of these tools and materials is simply that “they may always come in 
handy.”261 
 Each time the litigants, judges, and lawyers invoked the term “matters of religion,” they 
were not setting out to define a new category of legal issue. They were, rather, setting out to win 
a case, or to settle a dispute, to regain lost property and lost rights, or to avoid punishment or 
outlawry—using the techniques that were “at hand.” In the litigation, we see the repeated and 
insistent use of this term, and its repeated and insistent rejection; these were “driven by the 
efforts of litigants representing conflicting interests to restate the law to favor their side, under 
the supervision of courts with a role commitment to deciding according to rational and 
universalizable criteria.”262 As the stakes shifted from case to case, the meaning of “matter of 
religion,” its centrality, and its contours shifted in turn. Its use in a particular case was not 
predictable as all parties experimented with how to mobilize their arguments, and how to 
respond, based on a hunch that their approach would work in a certain way for the case before 
them.  
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 Thus, the sources of this category were multiple, and therefore often contradictory. Its 
content was not the product of self-reflexive or self-conscious deliberation, but of “practice”—
gambits in the context of litigation, that sometimes hit or missed and yet remained part of the 
stuff of the category as a matter of naming.263 Its authors were not singular, nor can we point to a 
single bricoleur. Our focus, therefore, is not on any particular actor or group of actors, but on the 
“modes of operation,” and “schemata of action” available at law to the people involved.264 
Embedded as these practices were in existing civil procedure and the legal culture of the Holy 
Roman Empire of the early sixteenth century, the term accrued certain tropes that cleaved to the 
“religion” category as a matter of habit, strategy, or memory. More than a term referring to 
something existing “out there” in society, “matter of religion” was a modality of legal language 
that operationalized certain strategies, that indexed certain constitutional conundra, and that 
expressed certain suspicions or concerns. 
 In particular, the matter of religion category bore three tensions. The first tension 
concerned the term’s referent. For the protesting estates, if the dispute in question had at its root 
“the affliction of their conscience alone” that the word of God be clearly taught,265 or a different 
theological interpretation,266 or if the other party was motivated by old-faith zeal to obliterate the 
“new teachings,”267 for instance, then it was a matter of religion. But for plaintiffs, these 
arguments that placed at the center the context of correct worship, correct teachings, and pious 
motivation—these were subject to the criticism that the Imperial Chamber Court did not have 
jurisdiction over such matters anyway. As a worldly court, it could not adjudicate “pure spiritual 
matters.” In other words, even if one took the pious context of the dispute away, the cause of 
action that brought them to the Imperial Chamber Court—concerning peace, property, or 
jurisdiction—remained.268 For the protesting estates, however, the material context was what 
distinguished the nonjusticiable “matter of religion,” that required the involvement of a Council 
to resolve, from ecclesiastical matters belonging before a church court. The matter of religion 
was always bound up with the material conditions, and therefore would always touch on matters 
of property, peace, and jurisdiction269; analogous to the necessity to determine the legitimacy of a 
child before determining the distribution of family inheritance.270 
     The second tension concerned the term’s valence. Plaintiffs often assumed a generic 
meaning of “matter of religion,” to mean something good and pious. They often expressed 
incredulity and rebuke when defendants claimed the dispute was a matter of religion, especially 
in cases involving violence, or in which long-standing dynastic interests were at play. As the 
protesting estates’ usage of the matter of religion term became increasingly tied to the subject of 
imperial negotiations and recesses, in which “matters of religion” would be suspended at the 
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Court, plaintiffs found themselves in the position of arguing that a dispute that they otherwise 
had shown had a Reformation context was not a “matter of religion.” In these cases, we see the 
term’s valence narrowing to that of a specific legal category. 
 The third tension concerned its scope. On the one hand, to invoke the term had the effect 
of lifting a dispute out of its particularity, and isolating the only important legal claim about that 
case as being that it was a matter of religion. On the other hand, the claim that a dispute was a 
matter of religion was only ever defined through examples and lists, embedded in the particular 
circumstances of a dispute. 
 In chapter 6, we will see that the religion category, as it was naturalized, domesticated, 
enclosed, and contained within imperial law in the 1550s, never lost this heterogeneous, 
contingent, quality; rather all of the varied referents, techniques, and affective associations 
cleaved to the category. Its content was “pre-constrained,” “limited by the particular history” of 
each of those contexts and articulations.271 Arguably, the legal category “religion” never lost this 
“constitutive indeterminac[y]”272 as vagueness and ambiguity became the ultimate virtue of the 
post-Augsburg imperial order.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROCEDURAL PROXIES FOR THE RELIGION QUESTION 
 
Moving away from the previous two chapters’ focus on substantive law, this is a chapter 
about the details of legal procedure and its surprising role in the Reformation cases and the 
construction of the “religion” category. I argue that some of the most consequential legal 
transformations of the early Reformation happened through experimental uses of mundane, 
formulaic instruments of Roman law civil procedure in the context of Reformation-related 
litigation. A close examination of three legal instruments in particular—the power of attorney, 
the protestation, and the recusation—shows the ways in which litigants and lawyers inserted 
claims, advanced possibilities, and manufactured precedents that were met variously with 
opposition, confusion, or a wait-and-see attitude, shaping not only the course of litigation in an 
individual case, but also, the Empire’s constitutional development.  
 Indeed, some of the most significant elements of the post-1555 legal order—its 
recognition of multiple “religious parties,” its increased investment in the consolidation of 
imperial institutions to manage agonistic difference, and the formation of two distinct legal 
interpretive universes along confessional lines which eventually destabilized the Augsburg 
system in the seventeenth century—all have traces in experimental gambits and “juristic 
techniques” by proto-Protestant litigants.1 First, the protesting estates’ usage of the “power of 
attorney” document was drawing on a legal culture of combination and corporatism, and in the 
process proposing a new form of legally legible group identification and belonging in terms of 
confession—the beginning of the idea of a “religious party” as a legal category. Second, their 
usage of the protestation instrument was drawing on centuries worth of customary legal practice, 
while at the same time mobilizing it in order to articulate a new way of relating law and 
conscience. The protestation instrument became a mode of “veridiction,” a bearing truth about 
the event and about oneself in a high-stakes context. In the process, it stabilized imperial 
institutions as the meaningful contexts in which pious utterances would take place. Finally, the 
recusation instrument, though tapping into familiar principles and doctrines against judge bias, 
became a means of making accusations of confessional partisanship, and making legible a whole 
set of suspicions linked to questions of authority and legal validity, paving the way for inherently 
unstable confessionally-distinct jurisprudences within the imperial legal system. 
 Each of the mundane instruments of legal procedure discussed here operated as vehicles 
for legal speech acts. To understand the significance of the usages of these legal instruments, we 
must look at more than the propositions made in them, whether those propositions were true or 
false, valid or invalid, sincere or insincere, or the motivations and strategies that underlie them. 
A speech act analysis of these legal instruments helps us to see, instead, the “verblike” quality of 
an utterance. Actors make claims about law, about who “we” are, and what kind of shared world 
we should build—all of which are “constitutional” questions—not just through what is being 
said, but in the saying itself.2 The speech act aspect of an utterance indicates the horizon of that 
shared world even as the language does not fully state it explicitly.3  
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 In the three sections that follow, I analyze how three instruments of Roman law civil 
procedure—the power of attorney, the protestation, and the recusation—were used by or on 
behalf of evangelical litigants in the period before 1555. This chapter attends to the 
“performative” and “passionate” dimensions of the usages of these instruments. The 
“performative” aspect gets at the circumstances of an utterance, the conventions and formal rules 
that make it so that something is effected precisely in being said.4 Through drafting and uttering 
the words of these instruments, the proto-Protestants sought to empower their lawyers in 
common, to protest the 1529 Recess and others following, and to recuse the Judges of the 
Imperial Chamber Court. Insofar as these speech acts were bound by conventions of law, 
however, they could be declared illegitimate or invalid.5 Indeed, as we will see, the 1530 Power 
of Attorney was implicitly denied by the Court, the 1529 Protestation was not appended to the 
Recess and therefore had no legal existence as far as the Court was concerned, and the 1534 
Recusation was rejected by the judges outright. 
 The “passionate” dimension is an extension of the performative.6 It gets at the unruly and 
imaginative dimensions of a legal speech act, the aspect that appeals not to formal authority and 
rules but to others whom one singles out as standing with one in meaningful relation.7 The 
passionate dimension gets at the way in which speakers make “claims on their hearers to 
acknowledge their truth or their right,” and the measure of their effectiveness is not whether they 
are invalid or valid, but rather whether they are persuasive, or, more minimally, whether they 
stick and get repeated.8 In a passionate utterance, “I declare my standing with you and single you 
out, demanding a response in kind from you, and a response now, so making myself vulnerable 
to your rebuke, thus staking our future.”9 The proto-Protestants, in the process of undertaking 
these legal speech acts, were (1) mobilizing and stabilizing the practical knowledge that brought 
speaker and listener together in a constitutive “we,” (2) participating in, while at the same time 
interrupting and transforming, the shared legal backdrop that gave these speech acts their 
meaning, and (3) proposing through enactment very particular proposals for a possible new 
constitutional order. These were not targeted self-consciously in a propositional or policy-
oriented manner. Rather, these were the consequences of law’s “own speech escap[ing] its 
control in unpredictable ways.”10 
 
Instrument #1: Protestation  
 
 Conventional wisdom links the term “protest” in the name “Protestantism” to the general 
stance of the early reformers against the “old faith,” its Church, and its institutions. Martin 
Luther’s statement at Worms in 1521—“Here I stand, I can do no other” 11—is identified as the 
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quintessential moment of protest—a “saying no.”12 Aware that the teachings of Luther and other 
reformers eventually affected all levels of German society, many expand this single posture of 
protest into a popular movement resisting the status quo. But the sense of “protest” as primarily a 
“saying no” is anachronistic and incomplete. 
 Most Reformation historians, on the other hand, trace the provenance of the name 
“Protestantism” to the formal legal act of “protestation” that reforming rulers made in response 
to the 1529 Speyer Recess. Wandel notes that the name therefore became “an artifact both of the 
contest over jurisdiction at the heart of Reformation and of the centrality of law in the pursuit of 
Reformation.”13 We know that this is not the only place where legal terms imbricate the 
Reformation lexicon. Indeed, the term “reformation” itself, was “in contemporary usage [both] 
the technical term for revisions made in a legal code or a set of ordinances” as well as “the most 
general name for the hoped-for renewal of everything from local customs to the whole 
complexion of public and private life.” Therefore, Strauss notes, “all talk about ‘reform’ and 
‘reformation’ [...] carried associations of law and jurisdiction.”14 These kinds of tantalizing 
statements about the imbrication of legal terminology and concepts of central importance to the 
history of the Reformation, are where theorization typically ends. The overlap of these terms, it 
is suggested, are self-explanatory in a context in which law and religion were tightly coupled, 
and in which religious change always already meant legal change. 
 In the following, I argue that there is much more to be said about these moments of 
overlap. Specifically, the significance of the fact that the name “Protestantism” is linked to a 
little understood legal instrument—the “protestation”—that had its origins in classical Roman 
law and had become ubiquitous in the constitutional life of the sixteenth century Holy Roman 
Empire, has been left under-theorized.  
 The term used in the early sixteenth century was “the protesting estates” (die 
protestierenden Stände). The term “protesting” carried with it the very specific referent of the 
protestation legal instrument, and the “estates” referred to those rulers who had submitted the 
1529 Protestation. The words “Protestant” and “Protestantism” first came into widespread use 
during the Enlightenment, two-hundred years after Luther’s stand.15 
This section tells an earlier story about the provenance of “Protestant.” It offers a 
synthesis of a specialized and somewhat neglected historiography on the protestation as a legal 
instrument and its usage in the context of the early Reformation in the German lands. In doing 
so, it amends a stream of historiography that tends to collapse the two hundred-year period 
between the Reformation and the Enlightenment, encouraging us instead to slow down and linger 
in the messy years of the early Reformation, and to consider the ways in which its impacts have 
survived into the late modern period. This section is also an invitation to pay more attention to 
the most technical, formalistic, and legalistic aspects of the early Reformation in order to offer 
more careful theories about the relationship of law and religion in this period. By highlighting 
the ad hoc and tangible quality of legal experimentation, we can clear a path for understanding 
the particular constitutional, social, cultural, religious, and political “riddles” that the term 
“protesting” had originally indexed.16 
                                               
12 See e.g. Harry Pross, Protest: Versuch über das Verhältnis von Form und Prinzip (Neuwied: 
Luchterhand, 1971).  
13 Wandel, 100, 156. 
14 Strauss, 51-2. 
15 Becker, 401; Julius Boehmer, “Protestari und Protestatio, protestierende Obrigkeiten und protestantische 
Christen,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 31, no. 1 (1934): 21. 
16 Boehmer, 2. 
  189 
 In particular, I argue that protestation became the quintessential proto-Protestant form of 
“veridiction.”17 In the early Reformation, in addition to substantially transformed forms of 
penance and confession, acts of “truth-telling,” avowal, and witnessing increasingly took the 
form of legal speech acts, including the protestation. That is, the meaningful contexts of proto-
Protestant avowal increasingly became imperial legal contexts. 
 
Protestatio in Roman Law 
  
The Latin word “protestatio” in general usage was an intensification of its base verb 
“testor, testari, testatus” which means to bear witness, testify, swear, or give as evidence.18 In 
the everyday language of the antique period, protestatio was also used to refer to an open 
declaration or announcement.19 In classical Roman law, the protestatio was a formal legal act, 
carried out in writing, reserved for private law contexts. Its function was that, through making a 
clear statement, persons could hinder an incorrect interpretation of their actions, which might 
otherwise arise if they were to remain silent, when they predict that remaining silent would be 
prejudicial, i.e. create a presumption against them at some future date.20 The Roman law source 
texts that provided the basis for this type of legal instrument are not to be found within a single 
rubric, but rather, are spread throughout the Corpus Juris Civilis—in sections having to do with 
subjects as varied as statutes of limitation, contract law, and the conduct of funerals.21  
 One section, for instance, describes a situation in which persons bury someone to whom 
they could become heir, from whom, however, they do not desire to inherit. It states that in order 
for such persons to positively prevent the presumption that by burying this person they intend to 
inherit, they should protest before witnesses “that they are performing the burial out of a sense of 
duty.”22 Thus, the protestation was the legal form used to declare what one was doing when one 
did something. It was a way of anticipating and foreclosing interpretations of one’s actions that 
would lead, directly or indirectly, to unfavorable or undesirable outcomes. 
 Protestation was also a way of interrupting a prescriptive period. In a context in which, 
for instance, possession over property for thirty years could create a claim of ownership, owners 
had the right to publicly protest each year, effectively interrupting the clock by declaring that by 
permitting the lessees to hold possession over their property for this time, they did not intend 
thereby to create a right of ownership.23  
 With the revival of Roman law beginning in the eleventh century, protestatio gained 
more discussion, attention, and definition.24 Lifted from its contextualized descriptions in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis, canonists recommended using the protestation instrument in general 
anytime where silence could be misinterpreted as implicit agreement.25 Even more expansively, 
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canonists explained that the protestation could be used anywhere where one does not want the 
legal conditions to be finally settled, rather one wants to keep multiple possibilities open, in 
order to secure greater freedom of action later.26  
 With the increased usage of this instrument in the medieval period, there was also 
increased experimentation and, arguably, abuse. Formulas popped up in books of legal forms to 
make protesting easier and more regular.27 Already in the thirteenth century, we see efforts by 
jurists to work out the various kinds of protestatio, its permissibility in different contexts, and its 
legal consequences.28 
 In addition, the sites of usage proliferated well beyond the private law sphere. Indeed, 
there was barely any area of legal life in which protestatio did not find some application in the 
late medieval period, including heresy law, treaty-making, coronation law, and more.29 An 
interesting case of this can be seen in election and coronation law, which also highlights the 
layered and multivalent quality of protestation.30 In 1308, after long negotiations, Henrich VII 
was voted king of the Holy Roman Empire by the imperial electors. But the Duke of Lauenburg 
occupying the Saxon electoral office had a disputed claim to that position. So, another elector, 
the Archbishop of Trier, insisted that the decree announcing the election contain a protestation, 
stating that the presence of those who are improperly occupying an electoral office should have 
no influence on the validity of the election.31 The formal purpose of the protestation was to 
protect the validity of the election, and to hinder any legal challenge that may arise later, on the 
basis that one of the electors was improperly occupying the office. But the protestation had 
another purpose, which was to preclude any presumption that by participating in a valid election, 
the Duke who had a contested claim to the Saxon electoral office had thereby resolved the 
validity of his own office. At yet another level, the purpose of the protestation was to register the 
Archbishop’s position on the matter, a way of protecting himself from any consequences—
political, legal, or otherwise—that may have resulted from his actions being presumed to have 
been a declaration of support of the Duke’s claim to the disputed Saxon electoral office. 
 In high politics, protestations were used not only to hinder potentially prejudicial 
presumptions, but also to indirectly communicate to relevant audiences. A protestation could be 
made into propaganda, or kept secret and publicized at the right political moment.32 It was a kind 
of non-confrontational way of registering one’s position in a long-running dispute. In the 
process, it signaled an expectation of future engagement on the issue. The protestation could also 
become a means of declaring one’s neutrality in a dispute.33 Formally, the purpose of such a 
protestation would be to foreclose any punishments or censures that may, after all the chips had 
fallen, have resulted from taking sides.  
 Protestations also became public or secret amendments to oaths, contracts, treaties, and 
agreements, and often had the effect of undermining the very terms of such agreements. This 
form of nullifying protestation, in which the behavior of the protesting party does not permit of 
the interpretation they posit (“protestatio facto contraria non valet”) was controversial, and its 
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legal permissibility was contested.34 In one instructive case in 1530s England, the person hand-
selected by King Henry VIII to be the Archbishop of Canterbury insisted on amending his oath 
of canonical obedience to the Pope with a protestation, in which he stated that “it is not nor will 
it be my will or intention by such oath or oaths, no matter how the words placed in these oaths 
seem to sound, to bind myself on account of the same to say, do, or attempt anything afterwards 
which will be or seems to be contrary to the law of God or against our ... king35 [...].” In his 
heresy trial years later, this protestation was likened “to a man who killed another but thought 
himself safe because he had protested before the deed that it was not his will to kill.”36 
 By the beginning of the sixteenth century, protestations had become a ubiquitous legal 
instrument. It was the bread and butter of the lawyerly craft. In the sections that follow, we will 
see the use of protestations both in Reformation litigation, as well as in deliberative contexts 
surrounding them especially imperial assemblies. The protestation produced by the evangelical 
party in response to the 1529 imperial assembly at Speyer became a touchstone not only in future 
diets, but also in the Imperial Chamber Court, and was the legal speech act that gave the 
evangelical party the epithet by which they most became known: “the protesting estates.” 
 
The 1529 Assembly 
 
 As noted in Chapter 2, the Recesses produced at the end of imperial diets throughout the 
1520s were ambiguously worded, and always looked forward to a future Christian council which 
would resolve the stewing theological and liturgical conflicts.37 These Recesses were interpreted 
by some proto-Protestant rulers to give them license to reform church and polity in their 
domains, until such a Council took place. 
 The 1526 Recess from the Diet at Speyer was similar in its effects. Unanimously agreed 
upon by the Emperor and Estates, it stated that they would wait to reconcile the core issues of 
faith and practice at a future Christian Council; that innovations regarding religion would not be 
tolerated, but (Article 4) that when it came to enforcing the Worms Edict, until a further decision 
came down, each of the Estates was given authority to “live, govern, and behave with their 
subjects in matters of the Worms Edict, as each hopes and trusts himself to answer to God and 
the Emperor.”38 Having been made unanimously, it could—in theory—only be changed or 
undone unanimously, and it stated that this Recess would remain valid until the Christian 
Council took place.39  
 Old-faith estates interpreted the Recess to mean that though changes already made may 
temporarily be allowed to stand, no further innovations should be allowed, and for them, the 
notion that rulers were responsible before God and the Emperor was a clear statement in favor of 
the status quo.40 Yet, the 1526 Recess—in part because of its being passed unanimously, in part 
because of its claim to be valid until a Christian Council would settle the core issues of theology 
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and practice—was interpreted by the evangelical estates as embedding into fundamental law a 
justification for local reformations, their ius reformandi.41 Insofar as the evangelical estates felt 
bound in conscience to create pathways for the word of God in their lands, they were ready to 
answer to God and the Emperor about their actions.42  
 The Emperor called the 1529 assembly with, among other things, the express purpose of 
clarifying Article 4 of the 1526 Recess.43 Far from bringing about peace, the article “concerning 
our holy faith and Christian religion” had resulted in some cases in uproar, opposition, violence, 
violation of the Land-Peace, and disobedience. These actions, he announced, required that the 
assembly reconsider how to achieve peace in the Empire until a future Christian Council is 
scheduled.44  
 The Recess produced at the end of the 1529 Diet at Speyer called for the Emperor to 
fulfill his promise within the year of convening a free Christian Council, so “that the German 
nation can be united in holy Christian faith”; further delay could not be endured (Article 1). It 
suggested that if a Council could not be called within that one-year timeframe, that instead the 
Emperor call a special assembly of all estates of the German nation specifically for the purpose 
of resolving these issues (Article 2). The document went on to describe an article of the Speyer 
1526 Recess that “has been interpreted by many in such a way as to pull them into a great 
misunderstanding, and to excuse all kinds of terrible new teachings and sects” (Articles 3 and 4). 
Therefore, in order to prevent this, they agreed upon new standards. First, that until the future 
Council, all estates who until then had enforced the Worms Edict should continue to do so. 
Second, that all those estates in whose domains the new teachings had emerged because 
suppressing them would have led to uproar, should prevent all future innovations as much as 
humanly possible (Article 4).45 Teachings and sects that went against the sacrament of the true 
body and blood of Jesus Christ should not be accepted by any estates of the Empire; and the 
mass should not be abolished or hindered, even in those places where the new teachings had 
emerged (Article 5). Anabaptists should be executed without a preceding trial; only if they go 
through penance might they be pardoned (Article 6). No ruler should tolerate the subjects of 
another ruler who had fled due to prosecution of Anabaptism (Article 7). Preachers should avoid 
anything that could cause uproar among the common man against rulers; preachers should 
preach the Gospels only according to the interpretation approved by the holy Christian church, 
and should avoid teaching disputatious matters until a decision of the Christian council (Article 
8). Finally, no estate should in any way violate the rights of another estate, and no estate should 
give special protection to the subjects of another estate on the basis of the faith (Article 10).46  
 
The 1529 Protestation 
  
The jurists and chancellors of reforming princes and cities began mutual consultation 
about a protestation as soon as the Emperor’s purpose for calling the assembly became clear47—
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evidence that the protestation was not a spontaneous, improvised act, but the product of many 
drafts and of negotiations among proto-Protestant rulers and their delegates.48 
 The Protestation, written on behalf of one elector,49 four princes,50 and fourteen cities,51 
was read aloud on April 19 in the assembly. It identified a series of procedural problems and 
internal contradictions as the basis of their argument that the Recess was invalid overall, and 
invalid as to them in particular, such that they were not obligated to enforce it.52  
 First, they argued that the 1529 Recess effectively annulled certain articles of the 1526 
Recess, even though the 1526 Recess, having been made unanimously, had achieved the status of 
a “perpetual, fixed, and inviolable” law; “we cannot and may not consent to the annulment of the 
aforesaid articles, to which we unanimously agreed and which we are pledged to uphold.” This 
argument clustered together three challenges to the 1529 Recess. First, there was an argument 
that a category mistake had been committed—the 1529 Recess is not like the 1526 Recess, and 
cannot therefore abolish or replace it. Second, there was a procedural argument that “a 
unanimous vote cannot and may not be altered with honor, reason, and justice except by 
unanimous consent.” Third, there was an argument about acceding to majority rule in matters of 
religion: when it came to the command of God, the salvation of souls, and the conscience, one 
cannot point to any majority to justify one’s actions.  
 This latter point, about ultimate obedience to God, again, was bound with procedural 
concerns. Since the 1522 imperial assembly, the Emperor had been promising a Christian council 
to resolve the division in the religion. The grievances that had given rise to that promise had not 
gone away, and all assemblies since then had determined that resolution could not come about 
any other way. Yet, the protesting estates argued, the 1529 Recess was a thinly veiled attempt to 
settle disagreements about doctrine and practice (properly reserved for a Council) through the 
workings of an imperial assembly. The remainder of the document attempted to prove that this 
was the case. 
 The first way the 1529 Recess improperly attempted to settle matters of doctrine and 
practice, they said, was buried in the statement that those who had been enforcing the Worms 
Edict hitherto should continue to do so until the future Christian council (first clause of Article 
4). Being among the estates that had opted not to enforce the Worms Edict, this statement 
seemed not to apply to the evangelical estates. But if they agreed to it, then “it would be enjoined 
on us that, against our own consciences, we ourselves should now condemn as unjust the 
doctrines that we have thus far held to be unquestionably Christian and still think to be such.” 
That is, they would be agreeing not only to the validity of the enforcement of the Worms Edict in 
some domains, which involved a variety of strong-handed methods against Luther himself, 
anyone who gave him protection, and his followers, but also, they would be indicating support 
for prosecuting the underlying doctrines, which they believed in. Moreover, the protestation 
continued, the Worms Edict was suspended and annulled at the 1526 Recess, when they 
unanimously agreed that “every estate in the Empire, in such matters as concern the Edict, may 
live and rule for itself and its people as it hopes to answer for itself, first of all before God and 
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his imperial majesty.” In summary, not only did the 1529 Recess violate their consciences by 
forcing them to give an indication that the Worms Edict was, in some places, substantively 
correct, but also, since 1526, the Worms Edict had not been valid law; the 1529 Recess was 
touching upon matters that they had all agreed at 1526 were properly left to a Council to resolve. 
 The second way the Recess slipped in matters of doctrine and practice properly reserved 
for a future Christian Council (the Protestation continued) was through the clause which stated 
that in those domains in which the new teachings had arisen, and where such teachings could not 
be suppressed without complaint and peril, all further innovations should be prevented as far as 
humanly possible until the Council (second clause of Article 4). The implication here, said the 
Protestation, was that the only reason the new teachings had not been suppressed was because 
doing so would lead to conflict and uproar, but that ideally these teachings would be suppressed 
because erroneous. Agreeing to this article would require them, argued the protesting estates, to 
implicitly admit that they had articles in their faith that “were not well-grounded.” 
 Third, regarding the article concerning the mass (Article 5)—“there is the same and much 
more trouble.” First, the protesting estates explained that their ministers had rejected the papal 
mass on the basis of the scripture, and had justified a new evangelical mass based on the example 
of Christ and the usage of the holy Apostles. If they agreed to this resolution, then they would be 
saying thereby that their ministers were erroneous, and doing so would go against their 
conscience. Second, if it were allowed in their domains to hold different, opposing masses, even 
if the papal mass were not erroneous (which it was), still, that itself would bring about 
contention, tumult, and revolt, and would fail to promote peace and unity. Third, the article on 
the mass was clearly intended only for those places where the new doctrines had arisen. Thus, it 
proposed that those “adhering to the clear, pure word of God” should set up a standard and 
establish order and regulation only in their cities, towns, and provinces. This, the protestation 
asserted, the majority of estates would not be willing to suffer if the conditions were reversed 
(suggesting that it was uncustomary to set up a regulation only with respect to certain domains). 
Fourth, the article on the mass clearly, based on its substance, was the kind of thing that it was 
necessary to treat in a Christian council. 
 On the article about the ministers preaching and teaching the holy Gospel according to 
interpretations of scripture approved and received by the holy Christian Church (Article 8) – 
“that would pass very well if all parties were agreed as to what is the true, holy Christian Church. 
But, so long as there is great contention about this [...] then we propose to abide by the word of 
God alone.” They proposed that “only the word of God and the holy Gospel of the Old and New 
Testaments, as contained in the biblical books, shall be preached clearly and purely, and nothing 
that is against it. For with that, as the one truth and the correct rule of all Christian doctrine and 
life, no one can err or fail.” 
 They then argued that the Recess was not conducive to the maintenance of peace and 
unity pending the coming Council, but rather, directly opposed to it. This they said was to be 
clearly perceived from the fact that no distinction was made in the first clause as to what and 
how far such obligation to the penalties of the Edict should extend. This had given license to 
some rulers, under color of the Edict, to bring some of their ministers under the jurisdiction of 
their courts, forcibly taking or withholding their tithes, rents, interests, tributes, debts, and 
inheritances. Under the pretext of the Edict, other kinds of acts could be licensed, including 
declaration of the Acht, violent action, and attempting to compel them to do that which was 
against God, his holy Word, our souls and good conscience. “And you can consider what a 
Christian ruler would be bound to do to protect the souls, bodies, lives, and property of himself 
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and his subjects.” This last sentence seemed a promise of escalation if they started enforcing the 
Edict. Given that the Edict had been annulled beginning in 1526, the protestation suggested, but 
still these forcible takings of their subject ministers’ property had proceeded under its pretext—
imagine how much worse it would be if the door of the Edict should be opened again? 
 
If this announcement of our evident grievances shall not be allowed by you, the 
princes, and others, then we herewith protest and testify openly before God, all 
men and creatures, that we, for ourselves, our subjects, and on behalf of all, each 
and every one, consider null and void the entire transaction and intended decree—
which was undertaken, agreed and passed against God, his holy Word, all our 
souls’ salvation and good conscience, likewise against the 1526 Recess. And we 
protest not secretly, not willingly, but for reasons above stated and others good 
and well-founded.  
 
 The protestation ended by stating that they committed to acting in conformity with the 
1526 Recess; and to be incorruptible as concerns the clergy; and to carry out the articles relating 
to Anabaptism. 
 Throughout, the document intermingled arguments from piety, procedure, pragmatism, 
and the conscience and autonomy of rulers. The protestation was more than a series of arguments 
and objections, or a statement of dissent, however. Its purpose was not to convince; the 
protestation was precisely the instrument used when efforts to convince had failed, when facts 
were moving in a different direction. The purpose of the document was to hinder any 
interpretation of their behavior that would validate the 1529 Recess or the Worms Edict, or that 
would signal that a Council was no longer necessary, or that would suggest that they were simply 
being willfully disobedient. Its purpose was to destabilize the 1529 Recess, and remove any 
argument—including those made in the context of litigation—that they were obliged to abide by 
its terms.53  
 
Protestation in Litigation 
 
 In the most comprehensive book to date on Imperial Chamber Court procedure, there is 
no reference to “protestation” as a legal instrument. The author only mentions it in quoting a 
sixteenth century formula book that used “protestation” synonymously with Einrede 
(objection).54 Given the high rate of use of protestations in the cases I examine, and given that 
Dick’s source base was primarily the various Court ordinances (rather than case files), this 
absence suggests that it was a ubiquitous but not a heavily regulated legal instrument. 
 It also indicates, born out by a close look at the use of protestations in the case files 
themselves, that the term protestation was at times used broadly and generically as a vehicle to 
make objections and raise points of disagreement with the other party’s account. For instance, 
one party referred to the Recusation of the Court in 1542 as the “Recusation und Protestation.”55 
                                               
 53 On the significance of the form the protestation took as a notarial instrument, see Hermann Conrad, "Ein 
Notariatsinstrument als rechtliche Form des Protestes und der Appellation in Glaubensfragen auf dem zweiten 
Reichstag von Speyer (1529)," in Festschrift für Alexander Knur, ed. Werner Flume and Richard Hamm (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1972), 55-64. 
54 Dick, 151. 
55 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 4375 (“Stuttgart 4375”), no quadrangle, last document in case file, 
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Likewise, a document that made reference to the protesting estates’ 1530 Protestation of the 
1530 Augsburg Recess referred to it as the “Appellation und Protestation.”56 Protestation was a 
polysemius term. It was thus a vehicle well-suited to the production of legal speech ungoverned 
by the rhythm of normal procedure of litigation, the back-and-forth of articulated responses. 
There was no one form of a protestation. A protestation declared a posture; it was not a narrowly 
defined legal speech act with predictable legal effects. 
Protestations in civil litigation were used to clarify and qualify the nature of the 
involvement of the defendants in a sort of total declaration of their position. A protestation was 
often made at the beginning of an Exceptiones Fori Declinatorie document, for instance, to make 
it clear that the defendant did not intend, by submitting the document, in any way to 
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber Court in that case. This was in line with 
the canonist doctrine that if one engaged in a proceeding through protestation, one could respond 
to the suit of the opponent without thereby committing to settle the litis, provided one did so 
“animo informandi iudicem” and not “animo contestandi.”57 In other words, this form of 
protestation hedged against the risk that even by submitting a document that aimed precisely in 
the pre-trial stage to decline the forum of the Imperial Chamber Court, the party might implicitly 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction.58   
Another oft-used clause stressed that a protestation was intended to be repeated at every 
court appointment until the desired act (nullification of case or remission to another court) 
occurred. In Goslar’s protestation to Duke Heinrich’s suit, for instance, there was a clause in 
which Goslar’s lawyer wrote that by submitting this instrument, the city of Goslar was not 
formally entering the case, and whatever further action they had to take in response to the 
mandate, they wished to have this protestation repeated with respect to it.59  
A protestation could be a vehicle for declaring that even though the defendant declined 
the forum or requested the nullification of the suit, that he would obey the terms of the Mandate 
that launched the suit insofar as it forbade further violence.60 In other words, it was a way of 
declaring the defendant’s obedience in relation to one aspect of the Mandate, while preserving 
their oppositional posture in relation to the Mandate and its accusations overall. 
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56 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 4524 (“Stuttgart 4524”), Q6, “Instrumentum Protestationis,” 1532. 
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58 Examples of this usage: Stuttgart 4524, Q10, “Exceptiones articulate,” 1532; Niedersächsisches 
Landesarchiv Hannover, Hann. 27 Hildesheim 467 (“Hannover 467”), Q1, “Protestationes cum annexis 
exceptionibus petitione unnd erbietung,” 1529; Munich 1476, Q6, “Exceptiones cum annexa peticione,” 1540; 
Munich 2019, Q16, “Exceptiones protestationes unnd erpieterrn cum annexa petitione,” 1540; Munich 8281, no 
quadrangle, last document in case file, “Exceptiones fori declinatorie,” 1555. 
59 Hannover 467, Q1, “Protestationes etc.,” 1529: “zu dem daß sich ein erbar rhat und gemeind als 
universitas dieser sachen nit weiter dann sy als universater belanngen mocht (das sy doch keins wegs verhofen) 
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But protestations were unstable legal ground on which to stand; though intending to 
preserve a legal way to extricate from the case, the result was often that a protesting litigant 
would be treated as contumacious. This was the outcome in many Reformation cases.  
I do not see any usage of the protestation in the Reformation cases that is specific to the 
protesting estates. If anything, exceptions declining the forum (Exceptiones Fori Declinatorie) 
became their signature move. Rather, my argument is simply that the logics and particular 
character of this instrument, which had its origins in Roman private law and was used 
ubiquitously in litigation in the Imperial Chamber Court, are evident in the protestations made by 
the evangelical estates in the imperial assemblies of 1529 and following. To understand why the 
name “protesting estates” and eventually “Protestant” stuck, we need to understand that the name 
references a specifically legal instrument and what it made possible in terms of performative and 
passionate legal speech acts, not simply as a political declaration, a “saying-no.” 
 
Protestation as Veridiction in Constitutional Context  
 
 The 1529 Protestation and the protestations used in Reformation litigation had polyvalent 
functions and meanings. Like the classic protestatio, they were intended to hinder any prejudicial 
interpretation of future action. Protestation was a way of narrating their motives for not 
implementing the 1529 Recess, or for not following the directed course of a legal proceeding, in 
terms of a divergent legal interpretation, rather than as mere disobedience, contumacy, rebellion, 
crime against the Emperor, or a violation of the Land-Peace.  
 Their protestations also indexed disputed ground. In the case of the protestations made by 
the evangelical movement, these protestations almost always worked at the nexus of law, legal 
procedure, and conscience. Over and over again, they were using the protestation to make it clear 
that the status quo implied the falseness of the new teachings, or that a standard procedure would 
imply that they tacitly recognized the validity of the majority’s decision or the judges’ acts.61 The 
protestation of 1529, for instance, described specific articles of the Speyer Recess as traps, that if 
they were to agree to them, they could be presumed to adhere to a set of views on the falseness 
of the new teachings and be held to a set of direct and indirect legal consequences that would go 
against both their consciences and their rights as estates and rulers.  
 The protestation was not an instrument with stable, predictable legal consequences; it was 
subject to certain “infelicities.”62 It was a gambit, made with the hope that it would leave them 
better off than no action; it was a way of throwing into question the Recess’ and the proceedings’ 
validity. While the formal legitimacy of the protestation was unstable and perennially an object 
of dispute, it produced the desired effect, which was to cast into doubt the legal status of the 
Recess or the case itself, and to keep its terms—and the whole question of how to live together 
constitutionally without a common confession—open for future debate.63  
In order to understand the evangelical usage of protestation, we must first understand the 
conditions in which they felt that this kind of flank protection was necessary. In this period, the 
implications of one’s actions in one place might produce significant legal consequences in 
                                               
61 That presumption would not have been automatic, however. See Chapter 2; the standard for the 
contractual quality of a Recess was that of unanimity, codified in the quod omnes tangit (what touches or concerns 
all) principle. It is not a complete picture to imagine the protestation as a kind of minority vote in a system of 
majority rule, with the presumption that those in the minority would nonetheless fall in line. 
62 Branz, 79. 
63 Branz, 75; Becker, 400. On “infelicities” in speech acts, see Constable, 23ff. 
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another domain. At imperial assemblies—such as the one held at Speyer in 1529—protestations 
played a particularly important role. Imperial assemblies were densely inflected with legal 
purpose; its literal staging had constitutional significance. Like a tableau, the arrangement of 
bodies in space actually embodied, in a legally meaningful way, the constitution of the Empire.64 
If, in everyday life, law was always just beneath the surface, at imperial assemblies, participants 
were attuned to seeing law right at the surface; every motion, object, or word had the ability to 
create legally meaningful presumptions. The imperial assembly was thick with legal and 
constitutional implications; almost nothing could be left without some registering of stances, 
some mapping of pathways for future action. In this context, protestations were an essential, 
ubiquitous, and powerful instrument. While ceremonies, rituals, and seating arrangements 
constituted the primary text of the imperial constitution, protestations were the subtext—
indexing disputed claims and intending to undermine the creation of a precedent. Protestations 
were “ways of preserving a contrafactual legal claim, thereby keeping a conflict that could not be 
resolved amicably, open and present in ritualized form.”65  
Protestations thus had multiple temporalities. On the one hand, protestations were 
situated in a particular present; they had to be invoked at just the right moment in order to 
preserve a claim. On the other hand, protestations were oriented to the future, enclosing a dispute 
within the terms of a protestation, with the intention of reaching some compromise, or decision 
in one’s favor, at a later date, when conditions were more conducive to negotiation. In this way, 
protestations dotted the constitutional tableau, and the court proceeding, at high context 
moments, with alternatives and possibilities.  
Protestations signaled fealty to the constitutional order by utilizing this customary 
instrument that was recognizable even to those who disagreed with its particular usage in this 
case.66 Protestations registered the commitment of the protesting party to the overall 
constitutional order. In this way, protestations were also part of the glue of the imperial order; a 
means of registering a dispute without cutting the bonds of obedience, and bonds of what 
brought them into constitutional conversation in the first place.  
Protestations had a double character: both protective and oppositional.67 The protestation, 
in indexing the desire to foreclose certain misinterpretations, or to hinder certain presumptions, 
also implied a rejection of those misinterpretations or presumptions. Thus, there was an inherent 
negative stance in a protestation—the protestation was created so that a certain state of affairs 
would not come to pass, where inaction might have otherwise done so.  
But this inherently negative stance, the oppositional character of the protestation, as 
primarily a “saying no,” became more central over the course of the sixteenth century than it 
ever had been before.68 Several things contributed to this development. First, in some 
protestations, the legal stakes became much less tangible; the specific prejudicial presumption 
that was avoided, or the interests that were protected through it, became much more loosely 
defined. In the process, the state of affairs to which the protester was in opposition rose to the 
surface as the key idea of the document.69 Over time, it became less and less important to 
describe the legal right or interest that was being protected through the protestation, until protest 
                                               
64 Stollberg-Rilinger, Old Clothes, 2. 
65 Stollberg-Rilinger, Old Clothes, 83. 
66 Schlütter-Schindler, 83-5. 
67 Becker, 402. 
68 On modern Wechselprotest, see Becker, 387. 
69 Becker, 402. 
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became something much more like a means of indexing “dissent.”70 Second, as a corollary, 
inasmuch as the protestation came to have the effect of foreclosing future deliberation, it lost one 
of its key functions. The original protestation was designed to poke a hole in an otherwise 
undifferentiated legal scenario, to interrupt a legal process that otherwise would proceed 
predictably, increasing the zone of possible actions for the protester, while hindering a certain 
course of action for the other party. The newer forms of protestation, insofar as they prioritized 
expressing opposition to the course of action of the other party, rather than carving out a zone of 
potential future action for the protester, contributed to the locking down of oppositional views. 
While the older form of protestation was a declaration concerned primarily with the map of 
potential legal action itself, the newer form of protestation was a declaration concerned primarily 
with positions, and therefore more agonistic.71 Finally, these transformations were happening as 
the legal world of the Holy Roman Empire was transforming. The fragile patchwork of 
privileges, freedoms, contracts and treaties, gave way to a process by which “dynastically 
secure” princes established stable institutions and jurisdictional authority by fusing together the 
motley set of “rights, immunities and prerogatives” that he had gained in his conquests, recasting 
what was simply a “preponderance of power” into a cohesive sovereign authority originating 
from a single legal and legitimate “source.”72 The need to stabilize the complex multilateral 
relations that had hitherto constituted the Empire gave way to the work of “defin[ing] coherent 
legal orders for particular places” in a process conventionally called “territorialization.”73 The 
value of protestations waned in this context of decreasing legal particularism. 
I argue that a missing part of this story of the development of protestation from its 
primarily protective and legalistic to its primarily oppositional and conscientious valence is the 
role of the protesting estates. It is not simply a coincidence, a shorthand, or a reflection of the 
structural linkage of religion and law in this period that the term “protesting estates” (which 
eventually became the basis of the name “Protestants”) became the dominant signifier for this 
proto-confession. The significance of their name has to do with the way in which, over and over 
again, proto-Protestants were both speaking truth and speaking law—the ways in which their 
utterances worked at the nexus of veridiction and jurisdiction. For the Protestants, civil legal 
instruments, especially the protestation, became mechanisms of avowal and veridiction. 
In his 1981 lectures Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice, 
Michel Foucault writes that “one of the most fundamental traits of Christianity is that it ties the 
individual to the obligation to search within himself for the truth of what he is…as a condition of 
salvation, and to make it manifest to someone else.”74 Foucault calls the “verbal act” or “speech 
act” that this obligation elicits “avowal” and it has certain elements.75 For one, it involves 
“passing from the untold to the told,” “within a power relation” where there is “a certain cost of 
enunciation.”76 Second, through avowal, the subject “ties [himself] to what he affirms”; he 
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72 Strauss, 139. 
73 Teuscher, 140. 
74 Foucault, 92. 
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“promises to be what he affirms himself to be…because it is true.”77 And third, at the same time, 
the avowal “modifies … his relationship to himself”; his avowal foretells a transformation.78  
Foucault makes a few suggestive references to the ways in which the Reformation both 
inherited and overturned some of these logics of avowal. He writes that Protestantism was “the 
great enterprise through which [...] Western Christianity tried [...] to pose anew the link between 
the obligation to believe in the truth and the obligation to discover within oneself something that 
is truth, which would be at once the truth of the text and the truth of oneself.”79 In other words, it 
posited that “a textual hermeneutics and a hermeneutics of one’s conscience [could] be mutually 
articulated” 80—“such that the truth of the text, I would find it within me; and what I would find 
within myself would be the truth of the text.”81 Thus, the name they often chose for 
themselves—“Evangelical”—reflects this link to the text of the Gospels. 
For these proto-Protestant rulers, while exposing the truth of oneself, through speech or 
writing, to the institutional authority of the Church no longer held the purifying power of 
absolution, the legal speech act of protestation in the context of imperial institutions—assemblies 
or the Imperial Chamber Court—was a kind of avowal that carried a certain salvific quality. This 
is not to say that protestation replaced confessional and penitential practices.82 Rather, the point 
is that the logics of veridiction extended to this new domain.  
Whether in the context of the 1529 imperial assembly and the high-stakes assemblies 
following that, or in the back and forth of Reformation litigation, the proto-Protestants were 
using legal instruments, especially the protestation, in order not just to contest disputed facts or 
offer divergent legal interpretations, but also to offer a hermeneutics of the event, to narrate the 
truth of what was happening. They wanted to say “what meaning [they] gave to [their] 
gestures.”83 They were insisting on “the need for another type of knowledge than the one that 
allowed them to establish the facts.”84 If acts and events were seen by Catholics as heresy (in the 
context of assemblies), or as wholly civil/temporal in nature (in the context of litigation), the 
Protestants were arguing that there was something pious but not churchly, religious but not 
ecclesiastical in these disputes. They were rebuking what they saw as the full absorption of 
events into the relationship between man and Church as rights-bearing institution, as property-
owner, as juridical instance, calling instead for legibility of events in public law in terms of the 
relationship between man and God. 
The protestation instrument became a home for these forms of speech acts, existing 
exactly at the boundary of spiritual veridiction and juridical veridiction.85 But unlike the 
inherited Christian forms of avowal that had qualities of mortification, penance, and a suspicion 
of the self, or the articulation of creeds and confessions, as we saw at the 1530 Augsburg Diet, 
the proto-Protestant avowal had more the quality of a declaration, designed to align “the 
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discursivity of the [legal] inquiry that sought to establish the truth of the fact,” on the one hand, 
with the proto-Protestant hermeneutics of the event, on the other; to offer their own “imperfect 
and incomplete accounts of law” which at the same time would establish the truth of who they 
were.86  
In the end, the proto-Protestant protestations dramaturgically stabilized these contexts of 
avowal—imperial assemblies and the Imperial Chamber Court—as the meaningful institutional 
structures and the meaningful power relations87 within which these pious utterances would take 
place.88 
 
Instrument #2: The Power of Attorney 
 
 In this section, I consider a mundane, formulaic legal instrument—the “power of 
attorney”—and how it became the unlikely vehicle for asserting exploratory claims about 
potentially new legally legible forms of identification in early Reformation Germany.89 It is 
surprising but true that the protesting estates made themselves legally visible not first of all in the 
political settlement of 1555 but in the tussle of courtroom documents. Here, again, we see that 
1555 is not the beginning of something, but rather, the end of a decades-long process of 
rendering this group formation legible at law. 
 The “power of attorney” (mandatum constitutionis generalis) was a long-winded 
document in which a litigant designated his lawyer, and identified all of the legal acts the 
empowered procurator may carry out on the principal’s behalf. A clause at the end of the list 
emphasized its intended exhaustiveness: “And if our lawyer or his substitute in a given matter 
requires more license to employ a certain instrument conventionally used in this Court than is 
herein specified, we intend through this instrument to also have given them such authority.”90 In 
general usage, the legal reason for the power of attorney was contained in a formulaic clause in 
which the principal explained that other business kept him from appearing at the Court himself, 
hence the delegation of his agency. This clause revealed an inherited principle that the gold 
standard of litigation was the personal presence of parties; by this period, that expectation had 
turned into a legal fiction, as the rise of learned law and an expert lawyerly class made legal 
representation necessary for reasons other than mere delegation of agency.91 The “power of 
attorney” was an essential element in all case files of the Imperial Chamber Court; without it, no 
one except the party her or himself could act.92 Indeed, a common delaying tactic in litigation 
was to challenge the validity of the power of attorney. By the end of the sixteenth century, the 
document had been standardized as a pre-printed form, drawing the eye to those handwritten 
                                               
86 Foucault, 215. Constable, 14, 75; on “imperfect” see Constable’s discussion on grammar as metaphysics 
(Constable, Chapter 2), and on law’s temporalities (Constable, Chapter 3). Also see discussion in Blum, in which 
she argues that Protestants invented Bekenntnis (statement of creedal confession) as a kind of testimonial or 
attestation (Blum, 28).  
87 Foucault, 28. 
88 Foucault, 207-10. 
89 On “identification” see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 
29, no. 1 (February 2000): 1-47. 
90 Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart C3 (RKG) 1732, Q3, “Copia Mandatum Constitutione generalis,” 1534. 
91 Eduard Leszynsky, Die abstrakte Natur der Bevollmächtigung: eine Studie zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 
unter Berücksichtigung des gemeinen Rechts (Jena: A. Kämpfe, 1901), 1-3. 
92 Dick, 79. 
  202 
elements that linked names and dates for ease of collation in the case file.93 In the archives, one 
quickly learns to thumb past the power of attorney on the way to more narrative and 
argumentative documents.  
 But the power of attorney document drafted on June 9, 1531 by the protesting estates, 
which re-appeared in dozens of Reformation litigation case files, broke the mold in three 
consequential respects. First, the narrative portion of the document contained apparently 
excessive detail about the reason for the appointment of the lawyers, and was written in a 
hypothetical, pre-emptive mood. Second, the protesting estates declared themselves co-litigants, 
or “associates of the same legal dispute” (eiusdem litis consortes) for all cases involving a fellow 
protesting estate. Third, they went on to elaborate that they would enter as co-litigants not just in 
any case involving a fellow protesting estate, but in those cases concerning “our holy faith, 
religion, ceremonies, and what attaches to them.”  
 This power of attorney played a subtle but essential role in the direction that 
Reformation-related litigation unfolded. Long before the Protestants, as a group, and 
Lutheranism, as a confession, were given legal status in the Holy Roman Empire in 1555, the 
protesting estates had achieved ad hoc legal legibility in the shuffle of courtroom disputes 
through the power of attorney document. 
 
Proto-Confessionalization? “Identification” in law  
 
The protesting estates’ power of attorney document had important symbolic and legal 
consequences in the early German Reformation. It became the unlikely vehicle for asserting 
exploratory claims about potentially radically new forms of belonging and combination in the 
German lands of the Holy Roman Empire. In the context of messy, high-stakes civil litigation, 
the power of attorney became an unexpected site and means of rendering the Protestants legible 
as a group at law, long before they or their confession gained formal legal recognition or legal 
status in 1555—long before, that is, they became recognized bearers of “religion” rather than 
“heresy.”  
A close examination of this power of attorney document shows that even in the most 
apparently formalistic or legalistic documents of a case file, we can identify a new vantage point 
from which to explore the process by which the “protesting estates” became legible as a group. 
Other historians have accounted for this process in a number of ways. Some assume that 
substantive differences in creed and confession led naturally to the differentiation and 
consolidation of groups around those beliefs.94 Others focus on the range of discursive or 
disciplinary processes that produced new conceptions of orthodoxy and heresy.95 Others still 
decenter creed and theology entirely, explaining confessional pluralism through the 
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consolidating mechanisms and processes that characterized the early modern state.96 Newer 
work, in turn, decenters the role of the state, identifying instead processes of confession 
formation that occurred in everyday life, as well as social practices that worked against or around 
territorial rulers’ attempts to consolidate uniform confessions and churches.97 Almost none of 
this work, however, takes a close look at the early Reformation, focusing instead on the 1550s 
and later as the beginning of church and confessional consolidation.98 Almost all of these 
accounts, moreover, regard law and legal idiom as epiphenomenal to or derivative of the stories 
of theological, social, moral, and political formation.99  
This study illustrates the benefits of looking more closely at the work of classification 
itself. By attending to the most legalistic aspects of litigation, we can begin to think through the 
question of group legibility or “identification”100 in terms of juridical technique, understanding 
the piecemeal processes of first of all “setting apart,” that operated as unexpected proxies or even 
pre-requisites for larger constitutional questions of status and recognition.101   
 
Drafting the Power of Attorney 
 
At the end of December 1530, just a few months after the Augsburg Diet, in the 
southwestern town of Schmalkalden, the protesting estates formed an alliance that would require 
mutual advice and aid in matters legal, political, and military.102 Even as internal debates were 
continuing about what brought them together in terms of creed, and how to organize themselves 
for effective and fair military defense, these princes and cities came up with a plan for collective 
action regarding the potential flood of suits.103 Their first step, outlined in the first Schmalkaldic 
League Recess, was to seek from the Emperor a Stillstand (suspension) of the cases.104 In the 
likely event that this would not work, the estates asked Johannes Feige, the learned secretary for 
                                               
96 Harrington, “Confessionalization”; Reinhard, “Reformation.”; and Schilling, “Confessionalization.” 
97 Such as naming practices, and professions. See Benjamin Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict 
and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap, 2007); David Luebke, 
Hometown Religion: Regimes of Coexistence in Early Modern Westphalia (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 2016); Thomas Max Safley, ed., A Companion to Multiconfessionalism in the Early Modern World 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011); Paul Warmbrunn, Zwei Konfessionen in einer Stadt: das Zusammenleben von 
Katholiken und Protestanten in den paritätischen Reichsstädten Augsburg, Ravensburg und Dinkelsbühl von 1548 
bis 1648 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1983); Anna Maria Balbach, Sprache und Konfession: Frühneuzeitliche 
Inschriften des Totengedächtnisses in Bayerisch-Schwaben (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag 2014).  
98 William Bradford Smith, Reformation and the German Territorial State: Upper Franconia, 1300-1630 
(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2008), 4: “scholars have been reluctant to extend their examination 
of confessionalization back into the early sixteenth century, much less into the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries.” 
99 For more on the question of law’s autonomy see: Roger Cotterrell, “Law in Social Theory and Social 
Theory in the Study of Law” in Blackwell Companion to Law & Society, ed. Austin Sarat (London: Blackwell, 
2004): 15-29; Christopher Tomlins, “How Autonomous is Law?” Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 3 (2007): 45-68. 
100 Brubaker, 14-17. 
101 Paul Dresch and Hannah Skoda, eds. Legalism: Anthropology and History (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 20. 
102 On the establishing of the Schmalkaldic League, see Schlütter-Schindler, 17-18. 
103 Certain theological and liturgical questions remained unsettled in the League, in particular between the 
Zwinglian-inclined Swiss and southwestern cities and the Lutheran-inclined domains to the north. See Thomas 
Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489-1553) and the German Reformation (Atlantic Highlands, N.J: 
Humanities Press, 1995). 
104 For a modern German translation of the first Schmalkaldic League Recess, dated December 31, 1531, 
see Winckelmann, PC II, 2. See Chapter 4 of this dissertation on the 1532 Nuremberg Setttlement, which promised a 
suspension of the cases but was ineffective. 
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one of the leaders of the protesting estates, Landgrave Philip of Hesse, to draft a memorandum 
on a litigation strategy to respond.105  
Feige’s memorandum stated that the motivation for their collective action was concern 
that the imperial prosecutor would proceed against anyone who protested those parts of the 
Augsburg Recess that had to do with protecting, as Feige derisively described them, the 
“abrogated ceremonies, the unchristian abuses and misunderstandings of the word of God, and 
the alleged spiritual jurisdiction.”106 The intention of such a prosecution, the memorandum 
stated, would be “to force evangelical estates to accept those articles, or else to bring them into 
censure,” and to embolden old-faith litigants to seek restitution through the Court. 
Feige proposed that all electors, princes, and estates who “adhere to the Gospel and to the 
word of God” respond to the threat of prosecution together, acting as “associates of the same 
legal dispute” (eiusdem litis consortes), and that they appoint two procurators at the Imperial 
Chamber Court, as well as one or two advocates (another form of legal counsel, who lacked 
authority to present in public audience at the Court), with sufficient power to act in all of their 
names, and that they collectively compensate them for doing so.107 
In addition to proposing their formation into Litisconsorten and appointing lawyers in 
common, Feige offered a set of objections for the lawyers to make in the event of litigation. The 
first objection was a protestation of non-consent, rejecting the jurisdiction of the Court. Feige 
argued that no matter what the specific facts of a dispute might be, this protestation would be 
appropriate because “at this time, significant misunderstanding” would be bound to plague any 
case involving one of them. Instead, a free, Christian council should be the only appropriate way 
to resolve the disputes “in an unbiased and Christian manner,” as “neither God nor worldly law” 
accords such “matters concerning salvation of the soul, conscience, and the word of God,” to a 
worldly forum such as the Imperial Chamber Court.108 
Feige asserted another ground for the protestation of non-consent, namely, that the 
Imperial Chamber Court was “suspect and suspicious” (suspect und verdacht) because its judges 
have sworn to uphold the Augsburg Recess, which protected “the old papist ceremonies, abuses, 
and judgments of the Pope and his churches, all of which go against the Gospels.”109 If the Court 
declared a case, whether brought by old-faith litigants or by the imperial prosecutor, within its 
jurisdiction, the procurators, Feige said, should allege judicial partisanship, as ignorance 
regarding the plaintiffs’ “unchristian ceremonies and lifestyles” willfully neglected precisely that 
fact of a dispute that would make it a “matter of religion” and therefore beyond the Court’s 
competence to adjudicate. Though this final “suspicion” objection first took form in the 
protesting estates’ recusal of the Court several years later in 1534, by June of 1531 the protesting 
                                               
105 See Winckelmann, PC II, 568 showing that the committee dedicated to dealing with the “fiscalisch 
sach” appointed Feige on December 27, 1530, to draft an instruction on how to deal with these matters. Also see: 
Ekkehart Fabian, Die Beschlüsse der Oberdeutschen Schmalkaldischen Städtetage, Part 1: 1530-31 (Tübingen: 
Osiandersche Buchhandlung, 1959) [BOSS I], 75, in which the committee appointed Feige with the instruction to 
describe the sorts of objections to use if a member were proceeded against, “and other ways to resist (about which 
the scholars must discuss).” See also Friedrich, Territorialfürst, 133ff. For more on chancellor Feige, see Schlütter-
Schindler, 18-20, and the literature cited there.  
106 Fabian, UARP I, 19. 
107 Fabian, UARP I, 18-24. Winckelman, PC II, 289, is a modern translation and summary of the opinion. 
108 Fabian, UARP I, 19-20. 
109 In order to address the question of suspicion, Feige proposed the appointment of arbitrators 
(Schiedsrichter), whereas for recognition of the Imperial Chamber Court’s lack of jurisdiction (“noncompetence”) 
he proposed the assembling of a free, Christian council. See Schlütter-Schindler, 19n16. 
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estates had signed onto all other elements of Feige’s proposal.110 With their approval, he then 
drafted a power of attorney document, which was invoked in dozens of cases between 1531 and 
1544.111  
Opening with the impressive list of all estates in whose name it was written, the 
protesting estates’ power of attorney document was formulated to make a splash, proposing to 
reconfigure a regular civil dispute between two discrete parties in a certain locality into a matter 
of Empire-wide concern involving estates from all parts of the German lands, in some cases after 
months or years of litigation had already ensued. This remarkable intitular, consisting of 
paragraphs worth of names of some of the most powerful electors, princes, dukes, and cities in 
the German lands, was followed by an equally remarkable narrative preamble that contains 
arguably disproportionate detail about the reasons for the appointment of the lawyers. Most 
powers of attorney of the period named the parties in the suit and briefly described the facts of 
the case and its legal issue, such as “in the matter of X versus Y, concerning issue Z in city A”—
a practice designed to ensure correct sorting of the masses of documents that gave form to this 
writing-based court procedure.112 Other powers of attorney were even more generally worded, 
leaving out the particular legal proceedings for which the power of attorney was being submitted, 
and simply empowering a procurator to represent them in all litigation that may occur. Yet here, 
the document began by recalling the recent events at Augsburg:  
 
Because at the recent Augsburg Diet, a set of articles concerning the Christian 
faith were discussed, decided and decreed by the imperial majesty and many 
estates, which we, the above-mentioned, neither authorized nor accepted, but 
rather protested; and because perhaps the imperial prosecutor or any other estate 
would sue or proceed against the above-mentioned electors, princes, counts, or 
cities, collectively or individually, on the authority of that Recess; and since we, 
due to other business, cannot come to the Imperial Chamber Court in person; 
therefore we appoint Dr. Ludwig Hirter and Licentiate Johann Helfmann to 
represent us individually and collectively in future matters concerning the faith, 
religion and what attaches to them. 
 
Though this back-story served no strict legal purpose (the legal purpose of the document already 
having been achieved in the clause “and since we, due to other business, cannot come to the 
Imperial Chamber Court in person”), it supplied the basis for the experimental declaration that 
followed: that the participating estates be considered eiusdem litis consortes or “associates of the 
same legal dispute.” The document continued:  
 
[…] where one or more of us is proceeded against or sued on account of our holy 
faith, religion, ceremonies and what attaches to them, because the matter concerns 
us collectively and individually, we now hereby make ourselves 
Kriegsverwandten and consorten eiusdem causae et litis.113 
                                               
110 For the 1534 Recusation, see Fabian, UARP I, 253-276; and below in this chapter. 
111 On the lawyers, see Anette Baumann, “Die Prokuratoren am Reichskammergericht in den ersten 
Jahrzehnten seines Bestehens,” in Das Reichskammergericht: Der Weg zu seiner Gründung und die ersten 
Jahrzehnte seines Wirkens (1451-1527), ed. Bernhard Diestelkamp (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), 190-4; Schlütter-
Schindler, 68; and Smend, 140. 
112 On the writing-based court procedure, see Dick, 119-22; and Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
113 Kriegsverwandten can be translated as “co-litigants,” though its literal meaning is “war kin.” The term 
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In other words, a suit against one signee would trigger the involvement of all others. This is the 
second way in which the document exceeded its strict legal purpose—the Litisconsorten clause 
was inserted in a preemptive, hypothetical mood. The signees claimed that their assemblage as 
Litisconsorten was justified because they regarded themselves as the potential targets of the 
Augsburg Recess, affected collectively by its threat.  
Finally, while it might have been enough to justify their assemblage as Litisconsorten by 
stating their unified defense against the Recess’ likely effects, the protesting estates also named 
the nature of the suits in which they would act as co-litigants: those concerning “our holy faith, 
religion, ceremonies and what attaches to them.” Thus, in the process of insisting that their 
relations to one another were meaningful at law, the protesting estates set in motion a new 
category of legal issue; their hand-picked selection of suits to enter into as Litisconsorten were 
dubbed “matters of religion” (Religionssachen).114 
Their assemblage into Litisconsorten was unusual, perhaps even experimental. In the 
middle of the nineteenth century, German legal scholars uncovered that the Litisconsorten 
concept as they had inherited it had no precedent in classical Roman law, its elements having 
emerged through a series of linguistic and interpretive mistakes.115 The textual reference that 
supplied the germ for this concept was a single rubric in Justinian’s Codex (Book III, Title 40), 
restating two rules originally promulgated by two fourth-century Emperors. One stated: 
 
Disapproving and rejecting the exceptions that litigants have been accustomed to 
contrive, under the pretense that there are co-parties and in a bid to protract the 
suit, we permit litigants, whether they are living in the same jurisdiction or in 
different provinces, to sue or defend (only) so far as their own interests are 
concerned, despite the absence of a co-party or co-parties.116   
 
In other words, the Emperor ordered litigation to proceed despite the absence of a co-party, with 
the intention of undermining what had become a practice by some to protract a lawsuit by 
contriving the absence of the co-party and then claiming that they could not proceed without the 
co-party’s presence. The second rule stated:  
 
[I]f some of the interested parties are absent, a common matter can be litigated for 
all parties without special authorization, providing those present are ready to give 
security that the absent parties will consider the outcome legally valid, [or] if 
some claim is made against [the absent parties], the parties who are present will 
give bond with sureties that they will satisfy the judgment.117 
 
Both of these rules aimed to address some of the potential abuses or unfair consequences of co-
litigation that had cropped up. To the extent the early modern Litisconsorten doctrine was based 
on these two citations, it was modeled on what were framed as abuses of the practice of 
                                               
Krieg corresponds to the Latin causa/causae, or lis/litis. 
114 See Chapter 4. 
115 See Johann Julius Wilhelm von Planck, Die Mehrheit der Rechtsstreitigkeiten im Prozeßrecht: 
Entwicklung der prozessualischen Erscheinungen, die durch den Einfluß mehrerer Rechtsstreitigkeiten auf einander 
hervorgerufen werden (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1844), 260-3, 105-61, 385-430. 
116 Blume, The Codex of Justinian, 775. 
117 Blume, The Codex of Justinian, 775. 
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combination. These abuses, and the rules designed to limit them, marked a change from the 
practice of combination that had been established a few centuries before.  
 In the classical period (spanning roughly the first 250 years C.E.), judges had had the 
option of combining cases under certain circumstances. If multiple disputes came forth at 
roughly the same time, with congruent legal questions, and if, in the judge’s opinion, combining 
the cases would facilitate a speedy trial by removing repeated enactments of an identical 
procedural course, then he had the option of doing so. In general, these were disputes in which 
complex familial or contractual relations translated into a domino effect of claims-making, such 
as contested inheritances. However, the integrity of each individual suit was not lost in the 
process; always intact was the cause of action that linked a singular plaintiff with a singular 
defendant. Furthermore, combination was a matter for the judge’s discretion; though a party 
might petition for combination of his suit with another, its justification had to conform to the 
judge’s purposive logic of saving time and effort, and avoiding contradictory rulings. A petition 
for combination was never understood to articulate a right; it was a bureaucratic 
determination.118 
Furthermore, in the classical period, the combining of cases did not create a new, legally 
salient relationship between litigants with shared interests. For the Romans, combination 
happened to cases, not to parties. Where the term “consortes” was used, it referred to pre-
existing legal relationships, such as co-ownership, or family bonds.119 For early modern German 
civil lawyers, by contrast, the legal instrument could be used to produce a combination of parties 
where none existed before. By the time Oberländer wrote his 1723 Latin-German legal 
dictionary the term “consors litis” was defined simply as “one who, with another at the same 
time, has a dispute or cause against a third.”120 The term had come to mean any combining of 
several persons as parties in a case, loosely equivalent to our “class action” or “joinder.” Thus, a 
merely descriptive phrase in a rubric in Justinian’s Codex (“persons with interests in the same 
case”) transformed into a generic reified noun of identity.121   
Though more study would be required to determine this for certain, it is possible that this 
capacious, party-centered definition in use in early modern Germany has its origins in this early 
sixteenth-century, proto-Protestant usage. This is not outside of the realm of possibility, since, as 
discussed in chapter 2, the early Reformation period coincided with the formative years of the 
                                               
118 Julius Weiske, ed., Rechtslexikon für Juristen aller Teutschen Staaten: enthaltend die gesammte 
Rechtswissenschaft. Vol. 8: Pfandschaft - Quittung (Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1854), 700-27. The forms of combination 
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120 Oberländer, Lexicon Juridicum Romano-Teutonicum, s.v. “Consors litis,” 179. 
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Roman Law: Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects, The Gray Lectures, 1966-1967 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press; Aldine Publishing Company, 1969). 
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civil law tradition in Germany, and the Imperial Chamber Court played a central role in the 
increased institutionalization of Roman law in the German lands.122  
The Imperial Chamber Court was clearly hesitant to use the term Litisconsorten. In case 
files, when they acknowledge the protesting estates at all, they used two other terms to describe 
the protesting estates: Interessenten (those who have a common interest with one party) or 
Intervenienten (those who enter a dispute between parties because it involves their interests).123 
In the first half of the sixteenth century, these terms seem to have been used interchangeably to 
refer to two types of circumstances: cases in which a person in a position of lordship over a 
litigant stepped in, under the mantel of fulfilling his lordly duty to protect (schützen und 
schirmen), in order to demand transfer of the matter to his jurisdiction, or perhaps to provide 
legal support to the litigant.124 Or cases in which a person who would be indirectly affected by a 
decision registered this fact with the Court—for example, a creditor who was suing for debt 
payment may be an Intervenient or Interessent in the suit of another creditor to the same person. 
When the Court used Intervenient or Interessent at the entrance of the protesting estates in a 
given dispute, it suggested that the Court was either unsure how to understand what kind of pre-
existing, legally legible relationship the protesting estates were proposing they had to one 
another, or were unwilling to go further to recognize what was specifically new about it.125  
 
Making Use of the Power of Attorney 
 
Despite the judges’ sometimes inscrutable responses to the protesting estates’ power of 
attorney, we see in many cases that opposing parties vehemently challenged their claim to be 
Litisconsorten. Take, for example, the dispute in the Imperial Chamber Court following the city 
of Memmingen’s public execution of Ludwig Vogelmann, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.126  
The case was already underway for about a year before the protesting estates submitted 
their power of attorney document. In that first year of litigation, spanning the greater part of 
1533, the lawyer for Memmingen, Dr. Ludwig Hirter, appealed in vain directly to the Emperor 
for an end to the case; he protested the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a privilege that 
the city had been given in 1471 and on the basis that the case was a “matter of religion.”127 Then, 
in early December 1533, with none of these early challenges taking root, Hirter submitted the 
                                               
122 Karl Kroeschell, “Die Rezeption,” 279-288; Trusen, Anfänge, 2-3, 21. Also see Chapter 2. 
123 Oberländer, Lexicon Juridicum Romano-Teutonicum, s.v. “Interessenten,” 383 and “Interveniens,” 387. 
124 For example, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 9654 was a Land-Peace violation case regarding 
stolen timber. An Elector stepped in as Interessent saying that since the defendant was his servant and vassal, the 
case should be in his jurisdiction, not that of the Imperial Chamber Court. Another example: Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 9876, in which the imperial city of Nuremberg entered as Intervenient in a dispute about 
tithes, on the side of the plaintiffs who were their citizens. 
125 Note that it was not the Schmalkaldic League’s “league-ness” that functioned as the basis of the 
combination claim. Neither in the power of attorney, nor in the case files, did the Schmalkaldic League enter as the 
co-litigant. Furthermore, in many cases in which the Protestant power of attorney was used, the defendant city in 
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the same; see Jahns, 127 on the case Frankfurt Stadtarchiv (RKG) 1035 (M1b/213). The cities of Brandenburg and 
Nuremberg signed onto the litigation strategy while declining membership in the League (Winckelmann, Der 
Schmalkaldische Bund, 109). 
126 Munich 5657. 
127 Munich 5657, Protocol, and Q13, “Articuli additionales fori declinatory,” 1533. See Frieß, 105-7. 
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power of attorney document of the protesting estates, asking that all the listed estates be regarded 
as co-litigants with Memmingen. 
The lawyers for the opposing parties—the imperial prosecutor Weidner on the one hand, 
and Licentiate Valentin Gottfried for the Vogelmann family on the other—responded to this 
power of attorney with a general objection that the protesting estates should “in no way be let 
in.”128 Over the course of months, for each time that Hirter presented a technical or formal 
challenge to the proceedings, Gottfried and Weidner responded with this refrain as they pushed 
the Court to act quickly to settle the legal issue. 
At several points, Weidner and Gottfried elaborated on this general objection with three 
clusters of argumentation. It is important to note that they were making these arguments during 
the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.129 This was Hirter’s strategy here; he was challenging the 
legal basis of the suits in order to show that his party had no obligation to settle the legal issue. 
Often, even more than the argumentation we see during the substantive trial itself, debates in this 
highly technical pre-trial stage unfolded in terms of legal categories and instruments that 
operated as unexpected proxies for larger constitutional questions.  
The first argument Weidner and Gottfried offered in support of their general objection 
was that “besides the city of Memmingen, no one was summoned with regard to this matter.”130 
The basis of this argument was that the core of a civil case was a dispute between two named 
parties; their dispute was with Memmingen, and not with any of the other protesting estates who 
claimed to enter as co-litigants.131 This meant not only that Weidner and Gottfried were not 
obligated to respond to petitions submitted by the protesting estates, but also that they had no 
duty to send copies of documents, which would normally be provided by opposing parties to 
each other, to anyone “besides those from Memmingen who are themselves the perpetrators,” for 
he, Gottfried, “knows nothing about the protesting estates and has no obligation to send them 
anything.”  
Second, the opposing lawyers alleged bad faith. The city of Memmingen, they argued, 
was “seeking escape” from the case by involving the protesting estates.132 The power of attorney, 
and the various protestations and petitions submitted on its authority, represented a strategy of 
“silent avoidance” of the consequences of the city’s illegal actions.133 It is not entirely clear what 
the imperial prosecutor means here by “escape”; was he referring to the spreading out of 
culpability that co-litigation may result in—the sort of abuses that fourth-century Emperors were 
legislating against? Or was he speaking from specific knowledge having to do with the 
Nuremberg Settlement, that the defendant’s intention was to add the Memmingen suit to their list 
of “matter of religion” cases, with the hope of “escaping” the proceeding in that way?134 
Third, Weidner and Gottfried argued that the dispute “in no way touches upon the 
religion,” and that it was “strange and shameful to hear that this case—regarding a violation of 
imperial protection and kingly privileges, as well as the torturing of a poor person speedily done 
                                               
128 Munich 5657, Protocol: “sich mit den protestierenden stend diser sachen halb mit nichten inzulassen.” 
On the “general objection” as a legal form, see Dick, 154. 
129 Also called extrajudizial and ante iudicium. See Dick, 148-50. 
130 Munich 5657, Protocol: “ausserhalb der stat Memmingen auch von im diser sachen halb nymant 
geladen.” 
131 Munich 5657, Protocol: “das di sach mit ime wider Memmingen und nit wider di protestierenden.” 
132 Munich 5657, Protocol: “dweil der widerteil ir dis ausflucht suchen.” 
133 Munich 5657, Protocol: “meydung tacite” 
134 On the Nuremberg Truce of 1532, see Chapter 4. 
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without a legal proceeding, and his beheading—should be named a matter of religion.”135 On the 
one hand, the two plaintiff lawyers here were responding to one of the substantive jurisdictional 
arguments that Hirter had made in his 1533 protestations, declining the forum of the Imperial 
Chamber Court on the grounds that the dispute was “a matter of religion.” On the other hand, 
Weidner and Gottfried consistently made this argument in the context of rejecting the 
involvement of the protesting estates, for it was a premise of the protesting estates’ own power of 
attorney document that they entered into a dispute where “one or more of us is sued on account 
of our holy faith, religion, ceremonies, and what attaches to them.” Weidner and Gottfried may 
have reasoned that, to the extent they could show that the case is not a “matter of religion,” they 
would simultaneously have rebuffed the claim of the protesting estates to have a right to co-
litigate. By choosing this strategy, however, the lawyers were leaving intact several powerful 
premises that the protesting estates had experimentally inserted into their power of attorney 
document: that there was such a category of legal issue called “matters of religion,” that some of 
the parallel civil and public law disputes unfolding at the Court ought to be understood as 
belonging to this category of legal issue, and that in those cases, the protesting estates might have 
a right to enter as co-litigants.  
In addition to introducing a stream of technical and formal challenges, Hirter responded 
to Weidner and Gottfried’s arguments by stressing that his actions were both correct and legal, 
and that it was his duty to carry out his oath to his party and to serve the victory of their rights 
and interests, and “in the name of God, he will continue to act for them so long as he has an 
order to do so.” Apparently summarizing the crux of a petition he had submitted on December 
17, 1533, Hirter stated that indeed Memmingen refused to enter the case without the protesting 
estates.136 Even after the Court ordered Hirter, on September 23, 1534, to settle the legal issue, 
rejecting all of his pre-trial challenges, Hirter continued to claim that “these matters concern the 
religion.” 
The Court seems to have remained passive, or deliberately silent, about the issue of co-
litigation. Never explicitly forbidding the protesting estates’ involvement, the Court simply 
continued to speak of the defendant party singularly as the city of Memmingen: “the dispute 
between the imperial prosecutor and the children and heirs of the late Ludwig Vogelmann, 
plaintiffs, against the city of Memmingen, defendant.” Despite these persistent challenges by the 
opposing lawyers, and despite the litis contestatio taking place in contumacy, the protesting 
estates remained involved alongside Memmingen in the case to the very end in 1545.137 
 
Combination, Corporatism and Fellowship 
 
The proto-Protestant usage of the power of attorney is best understood in the context of 
the overall legal culture, in which a variety of forms of sub-imperial combination was the 
norm.138 The evangelical party was creatively using this nondescript procedural instrument in a 
                                               
135 Munich 5657, Protocol: “frembd und schimpflich.” See Chapter 4 discussion on “religion” as 
commonsense moral category. 
136 Munich 5657, Protocol: “sich von wegen der stat Memmingen allein ausserhalb der protestierenden 
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138 See Wilson, 547-602. 
  211 
litigation context to achieve something that was familiar within the “rules of the game” of this 
period.139 The form was novel (co-litigants), the grounds of their combination was new (shared 
belief), but the idea of combination was not new.  
In this section, I argue that the power of attorney is a perfect metonym for understanding 
the ways in which the Reformation transformed the legal culture of combination in the German 
lands. By understanding the relationship between the League form and the co-litigation strategy, 
we can see how the proto-Protestants were operating at the cusp of a constitutional 
transformation on the issue of sub-imperial combination. In particular, the power of attorney 
registers a move towards combination as a gift of state. 
It is important to note that the co-litigation strategy was not simply a translation of the 
Schmalkaldic League into a form conducive to civil litigation procedure.140 First, no litigation 
mentioned the League qua league. The League was never regarded as a litigant, not even as a 
shorthand for the estates who were members of the League. The litigation, including the 
protesting estates’ power of attorney document, rather, listed all the names of those involved, and 
if they used shorthand unifying terms, they were “protesting” or other contextual referents. 
Indeed, it was not the norm for a league to litigate; leagues more typically adjudicated disputes 
among members than participated in litigation themselves. Second, as we saw in chapter 4, not 
all of those who were part of the legal strategy were members of the League, and not all 
members of the League were approved to partake in the legal strategy.  
Indeed, the League represented a specific kind of German corporatism or “fellowship” 
that was on the wane in the early sixteenth century.141 I argue here that the proto-Protestant 
experiment with the power of attorney contributed to the shift in the legal culture of combination 
and corporatism in this moment.  
The term “league” (Bund), much like “society” (Gesellschaft), is a term with as many 
meanings and valences as there are historical contexts.142 In the late medieval period, with the 
decline of the great imperial dynasties, and as the capacity of the Empire to manage affairs of 
common life depleted, associations emerged to fill the vacuum, taking a variety of forms: craft 
and professional guilds, allied city unions “that aimed to stabilize regions of the [Empire],”143 
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commercial and trade leagues (like the Hansa), confederations to maintain the peace,144 and the 
estates, which organized the varied imperial landscape according to office and nobility. 
According to von Gierke, these societies, leagues and confederacies “established and defined the 
public law of the age.”145  
Beginning in the late fourteenth century, various emperors attempted to “coordinate the 
activities of such leagues, or even create an ‘imperial league’ extending over the whole [Empire] 
as an instrument for the maintenance of peace, stability, and imperial authority.”146 The Swabian 
League, formed in 1488, was by far the most successful of these.147 Leagues had jurisdictional, 
commercial, and administrative functions vis-a-vis their members, including internal decision 
and adjudication procedures, membership rights and obligations, and taxation and military 
components. They were brought together through shared interests (usually regional) having to do 
with land, authority, and commerce.148  
The purpose of these fellowships was varied, having internal and external functions. But 
so were their constitutive acts, the acts that brought these forms into existence. Some were 
“simple contractual agreements.”149 Some involved regular “swearing of an oath or solemn 
vow.”150 If someone breached the agreement, the group might use fines or penalties or other 
“positive means to compel an individual to obey.”151 The groups often had determined in 
advance their own courts of arbitration, “from which there was no recourse, or only limited 
recourse, to the regular courts.”152 Some involved “regular assemblies..., permanent leadership 
and committees.”153 Often these groups were not formed to continue indefinitely or permanently; 
rather they had a specific time limit; “they could be terminated on notice, tacitly or expressly 
prolonged, or merged into other unions.” Furthermore, “a firm conclusion as to the legal and 
moral nature of the individual associations is made especially difficult by the fact that it 
frequently cannot be established whether the unifying agreements and contracts of the societies 
were constitutive acts or only a manifestation of the joint will of an already existing 
fellowship.”154  
The Reformation brought about the first leagues “defined by confessional allegiance.”155 
Peasants were the first to draw on this language of a Christian union, based on the idea of a kind 
of Christian social contract.156 And in the context of the period’s widespread apocalyptic 
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thought, the possibility of a divine league—a “Pundtnus mit Gott”—became more imaginable.157 
These leagues had no end-dates, and lacked some of the institutional attributes that otherwise 
characterized leagues, because they aimed to be unworldly, to actualize a Christian brotherhood 
in preparation for the apocalypse.158 Koselleck speculates that this combination of a Bund form 
with these theological, pious motivations became a “vehicle of radicalization.”159 Guilds are 
another form of combination that played a key role in the Reformation.160  
Among the rulers and estates of the Empire, the first confessional leagues were of the 
old-faith. In June 1524, an “old-faith” league formed under the leadership of Ferdinand (regent) 
and Campeggio (papal legate) that included the dukes of Bavaria and representatives of twelve 
south German bishops.161 The attendees came to an “agreement on mutual assistance in the 
execution of the Edict of Worms.”162 Dynastic divisions within the league made it very short-
lived, ending in 1525. Other leagues of old-faith and of Lutheran estates emerged, but were 
equally short-lived.163 
Koselleck argues that it was in part thanks to Luther’s translation of the Bible that the 
concept of a Bund took on a theological dimension.164 There are many references in the Bible to 
compacts made between humans, as well as compacts made between God and the people of 
Israel. Latin and Greek translations translated the original terms in ways that produced a variety 
of valences.165  For Luther, his translation of the Old Testament used almost exclusively the term 
Bund, stressing its legalistic, worldly connotations, while his translation of the New Testament 
almost exclusively used the term Testament, highlighting the notion of a divine covenant. Even 
when identical phrases appear in the Old and New Testament, he stays with this differentiated 
word choice.166 What was theologically ground-breaking with Luther was that there could be no 
human participation in the contract with God; it was divinely rendered, it was a covenant of 
grace that had nothing to do with human works.  
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Luther warned the Elector of Saxony against the “league-making” of the princes.167 
When the Schmalkaldic League of proto-Protestant princes and cities nonetheless formed in 
1530/31—as concerning or threatening as it may have been for the Emperor and old-faith 
Estates—they were in participating in a form familiar in the German lands. Yet, the experience 
of the peasant leagues in the wars of 1525 meant that for some rulers, the term “Bund” became 
synonymous with “Aufruhr” (rebellion). They therefore often avoided the term Bund, preferring 
terms like “Einung” (union) and “Verständnis” (agreement). Indeed, even before the 
Schmalkaldic League had been formalized, even before confession had been settled, there was a 
“de facto relatedness/solidarity” (faktische Verbundenheit) that brought them into conversation in 
the first place.168  
Its articles of association made clear their purpose: they had formed themselves in 
response to the threat posed by various articles of the 1530 Augsburg imperial assembly 
“concerning our holy matters of faith,” prosecutions and lawsuits in the Imperial Chamber Court, 
and they were a defensive alliance.169 Their institutional organization was minimal, focused not 
on maintaining the peace in a certain territory, but facilitating information and cooperation for its 
members with regard to this specific issue, and coordinating military defense when necessary. 
Thus, the Schmalkaldic League was not a sui generis confessional formation. It was an 
alliance of evangelical rulers who felt targeted by imperial law.170 “It was a union of Protestants, 
yet it never moved to develop a common Protestant Church ordinance.”171 It did not claim to 
unite all evangelicals, only those who had some position of rulership.172 Their formation blended 
traditional concerns about freedom of the estates vis-a-vis the Emperor, freedom of the German 
nation vis-a-vis Rome, defense against perceived rights violations, old regional alliances and 
constellations, and emerging territorial ambitions expressed through the “right to reform” (ius 
reformandi). But this does not mean confession was a cover for or derivative of true political 
motivations, as it is often glossed; the formation of a league was less political than simply a part 
of the constitutional landscape of the late medieval and early modern Empire. It was how things 
were done. That they did not model their group on the Church but on a league gestures to the 
constellation of issues that defined “religion” as a problem-space; not confession alone, but also 
jurisdiction, freedom, and authority (or sovereignty) were central. This was a union of estates for 
whom preservation of their freedoms was tightly linked to their duty to be an “instrument of 
God,” and to create a Christian order in their domains.173 
According to Gierke, in the period following 1525, as religious reform became ever more 
tightly tied to emerging forms of territorial sovereignty, the varieties of fellowship of the late 
medieval period narrowed into “chartered corporations,” increasingly specific associations 
established “for single purposes.”174 Whereas in the past, fellowships were pre-existing groups 
that might in the course of their existence seek privileges, now the corporate group came into 
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existence in order to safeguard a particular privilege.175 In other words, it was the privilege—and 
therefore the entity that gave privileges, i.e. the emerging territorial state—itself that had the 
cohering function. Gierke singles out the sixteenth century as a hinge in this change. Any 
association with a public role or purpose became “components of the state”; all other 
associations were governed by private law, granted group status for a particular purpose by the 
state.176 In other words, the association slowly became a legal fiction, understood as a 
construction of law, with no prior meaningful existence. Gierke attributes this to the rise of 
Roman law in the sixteenth century.177 For Gierke, “the jurisprudence of late Rome and the 
medieval papacy” supplied the origins of the view that “groups have a merely fictional 
personality and legal status.”178 Medieval forms of fellowship were “betrayed by jurists and 
philosophers, who opted rather for the ‘Roman’ notion of merely fictional collective personality 
(according to which corporate status was the gift of the state).”179 One of the great problems of 
the post-1525 era, according to Gierke, was that groups become “mere creatures of the state” and 
the state decided “when and to which groups associational freedom and corporate status should 
be permitted.”180  
Whatever one makes of Gierke’s evaluative or even nostalgic language here, it does seem 
that the proto-Protestants were exactly on the border of this older vision of fellowship and this 
newer version of modern association. The form of the Schmalkaldic League was like that of a 
medieval league that touched many aspects of public life; but its orienting vision was the single 
issue of the “matter of religion.”  
The suggestion here is that in the context of Reformation litigation, the power of attorney 
document participated in this shift from combination as a capacious medieval formation to 
combination as state-gifted. Their rendering of their group through the Roman law categories of 
consortes eiusdem causae et litis moved them towards the containment of the religion issue as a 
matter of state. They prepared themselves in medieval group formation to walk into a new legal 
regime in which they would be a particular type of association under a new public law regime 
called “religion,” codified in the Augsburg Peace.  
 
 
Instrument #3: Recusation  
 
 In 1534, the protesting estates formally accused the Court President Adam von 
Beichlingen and a “majority of the judges,” of being biased (parteysch) and hostile (widerwertig) 
against them in their rulings, through a recusation. This recusation instrument (not to be confused 
with self-recusal) would be cited again and again, in case after case involving the protesting 
estates.  
 In this section, I argue that the recusation operated not only as a formal accusation of 
judge bias, but also structurally linked the “matter of religion” with an affect of suspicion, and 
paved the way for distinct confessionally-based jurisprudences of imperial law. 
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 One of the causes of the wars of religion in the seventeenth century was a breakdown of 
the legal order created through the Augsburg Peace of 1555. Historians have long sought to 
account for the roots of this breakdown. Heckel argues that already by the 1560s, Catholic and 
Lutheran jurists and rulers were developing distinct interpretive universes of the Peace, so that 
one party’s claim to make a correct constitutional interpretation would be declared by the other 
party as an attempt to surreptitiously change the law in line with their violation of it.181 He shows 
that the basis of these variant interpretations were practical-political, theological, and also an 
outgrowth of the Peace itself, which established parity between the two confessions as they 
related within the institutions of the Empire.182  
 My research suggests that we need to look to events before 1555 to understand this 
“double jurisprudence” of the Augsburg Peace and the imperial legal order that followed.183 In 
particular, we need to look at the protesting estates’ relentless use of the recusation instrument in 
the Reformation cases as a key moment in the development of the jurisprudence of suspicion that 
characterized post-1555. 
 
Recusation as Legal Instrument 
 
 The 1534 Recusation began by citing Tancred’s thirteenth century Ordo Iudiciarius 
section 2.6 titled “De recusationibus iudicum.” “You without a doubt know well” the document 
began, “what a terrible thing it is, and what sort of exceeding disadvantage it brings to stand at 
law in front of a biased, antagonistic judge and to await a judgment that will be based on his 
hostility.”184 Therefore, the recusation continued, legislators have sought to ensure that judges 
undertake their duties with an eye to equality, lack of bias, and without any distrust and 
suspicion.185 Hence the law provides a way through which to resist the jurisdiction of a judge 
whom one suspects of bias by recusing him, so long as the causes of that suspicion are fair. The 
parties (listed) therefore make use of this legal means “not with the notion to injure or vilify 
anyone,” but rather to address the adversity they have been dealt at law through the suits. At the 
end of the petition, the lawyers proposed that they present the allegations in front of a bench of 
arbitration judges. 
 Though the Imperial Chamber Court ordinances lacked any regulation specifically on an 
instrument for recusing judges, in practice, the Court inherited as part of medieval Roman-
canonist legal procedure a general recognition of “judge rejection” (Richterablehnung) petitions 
in its competence, evidenced in the use of recusations in case files.186 Recusation was just one 
form of judicial discipline in the sixteenth century. Court visitations by appointed authorities 
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provided another means.187 German legal texts provided for judges to publicly critique the 
improper decision of another judge in the form of an Urteilsschelte.188 But scholars have argued 
that the judge’s oath provided the main protection for litigants against biased decisions, in 
particular, in the form of the criminal consequences for a judge who violated his oath.189 The 
oath required judges to refrain from delaying a proceeding, to honor the court, to keep records 
and discussions secret, and to be unbiased in judging, neither warning nor advising one party or 
another.190 
 Recusation was a form of dilatory objection (dilatorische Einrede) that had to happen in 
the pre-trial stage, that is, before litis contestatio.191 It was within the subset of objections that 
aimed to decline the forum (forideklinatorische Einrede).192 Its aim was to bring a stop to the 
case. Unlike an appeal, the recusation did not require as part of its petition a claim that the judges 
had already made an incorrect legal decision; it could be preemptive.193  
 In Romano-canonist legal procedure, “suspicion alone was a sufficient basis for recusal, 
and simply raising the exception automatically suspended the judge’s power to proceed with the 
case. The action could proceed no further until the issue had been resolved.”194 Once a petition of 
recusal had been presented, the judge had to step aside while the parties chose arbiters to 
determine whether the suspicion was justified. The judge, however, could set a deadline.195 If an 
objection of bias was improperly ignored by the judge in question, that was grounds for an 
appeals procedure.196 
 There were several grounds on which one could seek to recuse a judge in Romano-
canonist legal procedure. First, “that the judge’s personal status or reputation disqualified him.” 
This was referring to such categories as “excommunicants, schismatics, heretics, Jews, slaves, 
women, minors, adulterers, or those whom the law deemed infames.”197 Second, “if his 
appointment violated the hierarchical principle that persons could be judged only by their peers 
or their superiors.” These first two categories of complaint were rare, of course, because it was 
unlikely that such a person would be appointed a judge in the first place.198 
 The third basis of recusation was the most common, having to do with “suspicion that a 
judge was biased, corrupt, or had interests that conflict with those of one of the parties to an 
action.” Medieval writers on canon law procedure debated the forms this might take.199 “The 
range of situations that could raise suspicions about possible judicial bias included personal 
association or mutuality of interest between a judge and a litigant or a litigant’s advocate, such as 
close blood kinship, relationship through marriage, and other kinds of family connection, as well 
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as personal friendship, or alternatively, enmity and hatred. If the judge was the lord of one of the 
parties or had other close ties with a litigant or his legal advisers, his impartiality might 
justifiably be questioned. Likewise, if a judge or judicial assessor had formerly served as 
advocate for one of the parties, his appointment could be challenged.”200 
 The Imperial Chamber Court ordinances did not explicitly envision family relations as an 
automatic conflict of interest, though ordinances for earlier iterations of the imperial court did 
so.201 The oath was seen as sufficient, because the duty to abide by their oaths applied to judges 
equally when personal relations were involved.202 Still, there is evidence in case files that parties 
recused judges on grounds of family relations alone as a form of conflict of interest.203  
 At least in medieval canon law courts, petitions for recusal were “constant and 
commonplace.” When Martin Luther asked the Elector of Saxony in 1518 to advocate that his 
trial be in a German forum, rather than in Rome, he did so on the basis that the Roman judges 
were biased;204 an example of how logics of recusation were familiar even to non-lawyers. This 
meant the recusation instrument was also subject to abuse, given its capacity to delay a case.205 
Brundage speculates that the “threat to recuse was a successful litigation device” on its own, 
pushing parties to seek arbitration.206  
 
The 1534 Recusation 
  
A recusal of the judges had already been proposed by Johannes Feige in 1530 as a 
possible method for members of the Schmalkaldic League to respond to suits in the Imperial 
Chamber Court.207 In late 1533, the protesting estates finally agreed to draft a shared recusation 
instrument to attempt to bring about the pause of the cases that they had so far sought in vain.208  
 The document listed dozens of causes for their suspicion of the judges, “so that no one 
would have cause to think that perhaps such recusation was done unnecessarily or to delay 
proceedings.”209 The first evidence of judge bias they provided referred to the Emperor’s 
mandate to the Court in 1532, following the Nuremberg Settlement, in which it was agreed to 
suspend adjudication “in cases concerning matters of faith and thus flowing from religion.” 
Despite this mandate, the lawyers wrote, the Court had made no change in its judicature. Unless 
the Court believed that the mandate, and the negotiations that produced them, were “mere words, 
without any effect,” this failure to shift their administration of justice was evidence of their 
partisanship.210  
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 Then, the lawyers made the remarkable argument that, given how obvious it is that these 
cases grew out of disagreements in articles of faith and worship which the protesting estates have 
with the papist priests and clergy, the very fact that the judges did not make this legible in the 
cases exposed their bias.211 The judges deemed to be cases of dispossession or confiscation, for 
example, disputes involving cloistral persons continuing to take a modest income for carrying 
out pastoral duties, having decided “in front of God and out of the force of their conscience” to 
establish the correct, Christian worship.212 In fact, continued the Recusation, their taking an 
income was in line with the canon law and imperial law principle that the reward should follow 
he alone who carries out the work—a principle all too often ignored by monks and priests.213 In 
order to get to the status of that income, the Recusation continued, the prior questions 
(prejuditialarticul)—concerning the correct articles of faith, form of worship, and use of church 
property—must be handled. The lawyers offered the following case by way of analogy: a person 
who expects to inherit from a deceased parent is accused of being born out of wedlock, which 
would disqualify him from inheriting. In order to determine the civil matter of inheritance, it 
becomes necessary to address the marriage status of his parents at the time of his birth—a 
question that may not be dealt with in front of a worldly judge.214 In the same way, in order to 
address the civil matter of property, it was essential first to address matters of religion that 
undergirded the conflict. The only appropriate venue for dealing with such conflicts, they argued, 
was a common, free Christian council—not any forum that would rely on existing laws “which 
are to the advantage of the papacy alone,” but rather, one that would adjudicate without biased 
laws and without partisan judges.215 
 For the lawyers writing this recusation, it was more than biased laws that were the 
problem; rather, the judges ruled “according to their own partial thoughts.”216 “It is well known 
and public” that there have come about a large set of cases emerging from a similar set of 
circumstances, in which papists sued reforming rulers in the Court. And it was undeniable that 
when they did so, the Court always ruled in favor of the “old- and so-called right-believing 
against the new, so-called mistaken sectarians.”217 The Court had recognized very uncommon 
and outrageous mandates against the protesting estates—mandates that were not only unheard of 
in the common written law, but also contrary to customary practice.218 Several of the judges had 
even said publicly regarding these uncommon mandates that “one must recognize exorbitantia 
mandata against [the protesting estates] because they also carry out exorbitantia facta 
(outrageous deeds).”219 The judges also chronically failed to recognize imperial privileges that 
                                               
more details on the Nuremberg Settlement and the impacts of its ambiguity. 
211 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 267. 
212 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 264-5: “vor got und uß getrancknus ires gewissens” 
213 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 265. 
214 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 266. 
215 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 263: “nach den rechten, die dem bapstumb allein zu vorteil gesetzt sein”; 
“parteyschen rechten, auch vor parteylichen richtern und beysitzern” 
216 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 264: “nach iren eignen affectionirten gedanken” 
217 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 267. The Recusation also briefly describes some cases that provide evidence of 
this pattern. See Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 269-70. 
218 Many of the “Reformation cases” were mandate trials, which resulted in temporary directives for quick 
and effective legal help against threatened injury (Scheurmann, Frieden durch Recht, 131). See Chapter 1 on 
mandates. 
219 Fabian, UARP I, Nr. 99, 269. 
  220 
exempted certain parties from any litigation in the Imperial Chamber Court, which would have 
required remitting the cases to their proper first-instance judges.220 
 Moreover, the recusation alleged, although the Court had at various times defended its 
authority and duty to adjudicate such cases by citing the clause of the 1529 Speyer Recess and 
the 1530 Augsburg Recess that no one, on account of faith, should be deprived of his wealth, the 
reasoning seemed to “cut just one way,” for although the protesting estates themselves had 
complained here for those same causes, their cases sit while the papist’s cases proceed.221 
 Some of the grounds of suspicion had to do with the facts of the lives of the judges—
familial relationships that might predispose them to bias in favor of clergy, and professional 
relationships that might indicate conflicts of interest. For instance, the presiding judge raised two 
of his sons to enter into the clergy, “from which is easy to detect what feelings you may have vis-
à-vis the clergy.”222 Many of the judges had relatives and close friends in the clergy, which the 
lawyers alleged predisposed them to favor their position.223 Some of the judges had provostships 
and received other spiritual dignities and benefices which linked the judges to the papal seat 
through oaths and duties.224 This naturally inclined the judges to “those like [them]” in part 
because they were aware that how the case came out today for the suing spiritual clergy, so it 
would go for themselves, once they were no longer at the Chamber Court, should they find 
themselves in a similar situation.225 Furthermore, despite the oath they took forbidding it, 
nonetheless several of the judges had heard cases involving prince-bishops on whose council 
they had at some point served.226 Some had even carried out legal tasks for these prince-bishops 
on the understanding that they would receive their fees once they left the Chamber Court.227  
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 Another set of reasons outlined in the Recusation for the protesting estates’ suspicion of 
the judges related to the ways in which the judges exposed their feelings vis-à-vis court 
personnel and litigants. They referred to an incident, for instance, in which the presiding judge 
terminated the positions of two procurators whom he only suspected of following the new 
teachings.228 Then, later, when another procurator, who was known to be of the old papist belief, 
was suspended from his position by the commissioners of the imperial visitation, the judges 
interceded and argued on his behalf, even against the will of the imperial estates.229 In addition, 
the presiding judge initiated a new custom, a procession through the city of Speyer several times 
a year, in which court personnel were required to appear. If someone did not take part in the 
procession, “which practice is to be found in no laws, nor in any imperial decree, nor in any 
previous practice of the Court,” the presiding judge would suspect them of belonging to the 
“errant teaching,” and on that account dismiss them from their position.230 In addition, the Court, 
the recusation continued, commanded persons who followed the new teachings to swear “to God 
and all saints”—even though the estates of the Empire agreed at the Diet of Regensburg (1532) 
that, in order not to burden the consciences of any of them, an oath “to God and the holy 
Gospels” would suffice—“whereby you planned to entrap and injure the consciences of those of 
whom you have some suspicion.”231 
 The lawyers also highlighted in the recusation the ways in which the judges exposed their 
proclivities and leanings in public ways.232 “You have unashamedly let yourself be heard saying 
that you are against these teachings and the lifestyle of the Lutheran sect (as you call it) […] that 
you think nothing at all of it, and much other similar talk that is to the good of the papacy and 
that minimizes the evangelical teaching and their reformation, or their church order.”233 
Furthermore, the majority of the judges followed the presiding judge on this, even expressing 
their feelings on the matter in public, in taverns, and all manner of society and get-together.234 
The protesting estates pointed to the familiar saying that “the essence of reason is that which 
works in favor of religion” (summa ratio est que pro religione facit), which, they say, the Court 
interprets as “the essence of reason is that which works in favor of the papacy and the papists.” 
Thus, for the judges, whatever was in favor of the papists, that was in favor of the religion and, 
in turn, legal and just; everything else was heretical and damned.235 Some of the protesting 
estates had even come to believe that several of the judges incited the papist plaintiffs to use 
imperial law to deal with the conflict.236 All in all, “you are more our adversaries and 
counterparts than judges.”237 
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The Recusation in Litigation 
  
Formally, the 1534 Recusation did not argue against the jurisdiction of the Court as a 
whole, but argued that some of the judges that populated its bench had exposed themselves, 
through a pattern of behavior, to be biased in “matters of religion.” However, as with the power 
of attorney, its legal validity hinged on the soundness of their claim that there had been disputes 
concerning the religion litigated in the Court, and that the Court had been overstepping its 
jurisdictional authority by adjudicating in them.  
 Landgrave Philip of Hessen was one of a few estates who thought that they should 
formulate a general recusation of the Court in all matters—including worldly disputes. He argued 
that since there was no consensus between the evangelical estates and the Court about what 
counted as a matter of religion, a recusation that hinged on this category was bound to be 
unsuccessful.238 He also believed that if the recusation did not recuse all of the judges, then they 
would risk being responsible to respond to those judges that they did not recuse.239 The majority 
of the protesting estates, however, held that a general recusation would be an improper violation 
of imperial jurisdiction, amounting to public disobedience of an institution that had been 
established by the Emperor as well as the imperial estates.240 A general recusation would make it 
impossible to appeal to the Court about unfair lower court decisions in worldly matters, which 
would lead to a generalized legal insecurity for themselves.241 Furthermore, as the highest court 
in the Holy Roman Empire for worldly matters, with no forum from which to appeal its 
decisions, to recuse the Court generally would be formally impossible.242 The legal validity of 
the recusation hinged on the protesting estates’ argument that the Imperial Chamber Court had 
no jurisdiction in matters of religion, and that the highest forum for adjudicating disputes 
concerning the religion was a free Christian council.243 In the end the League agreed, for the time 
being, to restrict their recusation only to “all present and future disputes concerning the religion, 
faith and what flows from those,” and to recuse not all of the judges, but only the Court President 
and an unnamed “majority of the judges.”  
 When the protesting estates submitted the Recusation for the first time in the context of a 
set of pending cases on January 30, 1534, the Court quickly withdrew for deliberations, and 
refused the lawyers’ repeated requests to read the document in public audience.244 Finally, on 
March 2, 1534, the Court issued a judgment on the Recusation, declaring it null, void, and 
invalid, a violation of “common written law and the Holy Empire’s ordinances.”245 The 
administrative ruling named two reasons for its nullification. The first was formal, challenging 
the technical validity of the Substitution which ostensibly gave Hirter and Helfman the authority 
to act on behalf of all of the parties in the wide array of suits, instead of their originally appointed 
lawyers. The second reason was substantive: the Court could not accept any recusation of the 
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Court in matters of religion, since, only having jurisdiction in worldly matters, they had never 
adjudicated in matters of religion.246 The Landgrave of Hessen’s prediction came true. 
 The 1534 Recusation broke the mold in several ways.247 First, by using the formulation 
“all present and future matters,” they were straying from the specificity of a recusation—to apply 
to a certain judge, regarding a specific dispute, involving certain parties. Indeed, some in the 
League doubted whether this formulation would be legally valid.248 Also, to the extent that the 
recusation accused the judges of bias due to their being “papists,” it was doing something 
radically new. Again, several jurists serving Schmalkaldic League members doubted whether 
their proclivity to the old faith, itself, would be legally sufficient as a justification for 
recusation.249  
 After the Court declared the Recusation null and invalid, protesting estates nonetheless 
persisted in submitting the Recusation in the context of their cases going forward. They thus 
guaranteed being declared contumacious. Where the protesting estates invoked the recusation, 
again and again, as a mode of declining the forum and denying their obligation to settle the litis, 
they were met, again and again, with the response that the recusation was null and void and that 
the party should therefore be declared in contumatiam.250 
 Take for instance, an exchange recorded in the 1536 witness testimony commission 
established in the case between the Archbishop of Riga and the city of Riga, discussed in chapter 
4.251 They convened at the Turaida Castle in October of 1536, and produced a document 
summarizing the proceedings in 1537. Before the witnesses who gathered there testified, there is 
a dialogue between the commissioner and representatives of the two parties—the Archbishop 
and the City—recorded with the back-and-forth narrative form of “they said,” and “to which we 
responded.” After the usual greetings, the Riga delegates said that they were under instruction 
“from their eldest ones” to present their objections to the Commission before doing anything 
else.252 The commissioner responded over and over again by stressing the necessity of carrying 
out the specific charge that was his commission, namely to gather witness testimony. And the 
Archbishop (who seems to have been there in person), following the commissioner’s general 
line, argued that he was there to hear and give witness testimony in a manner that would not 
elicit the suspicion of either side,253 and he was not obligated to hear anything other than that.254 
The Riga delegates said that the commissioner should let the objections be read aloud, or else 
they would not take part in the commission’s proceedings.255 After the commissioner swore in 
the witnesses, the Riga delegates and witnesses recused the Commission as “suspicious” and 
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commissioned by “a biased judge,” that they did not want to take part in any of these 
proceedings. In further dialogue, they made it known that they were not suspicious of the 
Imperial Majesty as such, just the Court President and by extension the commission itself, being 
ordered by a biased judge. The reason they knew he was biased was because the Emperor 
ordered him to cease all proceedings “in such matters.”256 They expressed hope that the dispute, 
as it concerned matters of religion, would be paused until a Council. The Archbishop responded 
that this was a spoliation matter concerning property and did not have to do with the religion. 
The document that the Rigans successfully asked to have entered into the Commission’s report 
restated that they recuse the Court President, and that therefore the commission itself was 
invalid.257 The commissioner deemed the Rigans disobedient, and continued with the 
proceedings without them. 
 
Jurisprudence of Suspicion: The Law/Politics Boundary 
  
 In the opening chapter of the dissertation, I described the methodological importance of 
considering the case files on their own, treating them in their details rather than simply as a block 
subject of political negotiations. The reductivist historiographical approach that describes the 
Reformation cases as an instance simply of the instrumentalization of law for political-cum-pious 
ends, on all sides, has prevented us from seeing the legal historical effects of those cases beyond 
the intentions or even the awareness of the actors. 
 But the Recusation instrument thematizes the suspicion that law, when it came to the 
adjudication of matters of religion, was being overwhelmed by preferences, private interest, 
politics, and pious zeal. Equally, those of the old faith were suspicious that the protesting estates’ 
use of the Recusation—like their extraordinary uses of the protestation and the power of 
attorney, and the argument at the center of each of these that certain worldly disputes of all kinds 
constituted a “matter of religion”—were likewise overwhelming the law with preferences, 
private interest, politics, and pious zeal. 
 One of the stakes of these mutual suspicions had to do with the authority and legitimacy 
of the Court, and the constitutional premise that the Imperial Chamber Court would sustain the 
Land-Peace. Another stake concerned the future of the relationship between temporal and 
worldly authority, objects, and forums. 
 But the salience of these mutual suspicions was not necessarily understood until much 
later. These mutual suspicions concerning the deployment of the religion category would 
redound upon the future of legal interpretation in the post-Augsburg order. Throughout the early 
Reformation, the aporia internal to the imperial legal system regarding how to deal with these 
cases created the conditions in which one suspected the other side not for failing to accede to the 
one correct answer (because the ostensibly single authoritative source that could settle once and 
for all the one correct answer, the Christian Council, never took place), but for taking a particular 
interpretation of the law that apparently served one’s own ends, or the ends of one’s group. In 
other words, it is one thing to suspect corruption, bias, or partisanship on the part of someone 
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when “there was a right answer, but the jurist disregarded it in order to produce a wrong answer 
that fit his ideological predispositions. The defining aspect of this form is that the advocate 
claims not just that his opponent chose the wrong answer for the bad reason of covert ideological 
preference, but that there was a right answer, which countered the preference, which the 
opponent was bound by fidelity to law to adopt.”258 It is another thing, however, when the 
“opponent has made the mistaken claim that there is a single right answer, and that it favors his 
side of the controversy. The motivation for the error […] is the conscious or unconscious desire 
to turn ideological preference into legal necessity, with all the political advantages that 
transformation produces.”259 It was this latter form of suspicion that is evident in the 
Reformation cases. Each side saw its interpretation as legally necessary, and saw the other side’s 
interpretation as motivated. 
 Take for instance a letter written to the Court President and judges in the context of a 
case brought by the imperial Fiscal against Lindau for changes it had made to worship and 
ceremonies in the churches there.260 In it, Lindau argued that the cases concerning the religion 
should not proceed, that the Court should pause them, and if they do proceed, then “we cannot 
understand for what reasons and motivations [you would not pause them] other than to burden 
the city of Lindau.” 261 By failing to suspend the cases, they said, they were going against the 
Treaty of Vienna that promised a suspension of cases concerning the religion.262 The summons 
sent out against Lindau, they said, contradicted the intentions of the Emperor and the King in 
negotiating that Treaty, to bring peace and unity to the Empire.263 For the protesting estates, the 
judges continuing to adjudicate in the cases that the protesting estates considered matters of 
religion, after yet another treaty that promised a suspension of the cases, that in itself was 
evidence of their bad faith, their bias, and their desire to burden the parties for no other reason 
than that they were of the evangelical understanding. This reasoning is also evident in the 
Recusation of 1534 itself when the protesting estates make the remarkable argument that, given 
how obvious it is that these cases grew out of disagreements in articles of faith and worship 
which the protesting estates have with the papist priests and clergy, the very fact that the judges 
did not make this legible in the cases exposed their bias.264 
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 For many historians, this form of suspicion is the predictable corollary of a politicized 
legal system, a system in which the boundary between law and politics did not really exist—a 
familiar attribution about the Holy Roman Empire.  
 However, I have striven in this dissertation to show that this is too reductivist, for two 
reasons. First, it fails to take seriously the legal and constitutional culture of the Holy Roman 
Empire, and the nuanced and specific ways in which the legal and the political were co-
constituted. Second, it relies on the mistaken premise that there is a strict analytic distinction 
between law and politics, or that politics somehow delegitimizes law, or swallows it up.265 
 I have endeavored to show, by contrast, the usefulness of looking phenomenologically at 
these legal events. In particular, I show that, whatever the cause of the suspicion, whether 
justified or not, whether rooted in an incomplete legal system or not, the suspicion itself came to 
be associated with deployments of the religion category. Put concretely, anytime anybody uttered 
“matter of religion” or “the religion-peace,” inevitably questions would arise about the referent, 
valence, and scope of those terms. In answering these questions differently, and as the difference 
between the answers became more predictable, and more associated with certain alignments and 
group formations, suspicion that the different answers to the questions were the result of these 
pre-dispositions became more salient. Here we see the traces of a pattern that would persist into 
the post-Augsburg order, namely, the idea that certain legal interpretations, when it came to 
religion-peace law and matters of religion, belonged to certain confessional parties as a matter of 
course. It was this pattern of mutual suspicion that contributed to the division of legal 
interpretations of the Augsburg Peace, and led to a breakdown of the constitutional order in the 
seventeenth century wars. 
 
Bootstrapping as a Legal Strategy with Profound Consequences 
 
 Collectively, these instruments constituted the legal strategy that the protesting estates 
used to contest the Court’s jurisdiction. Together, they formed a robust if dubious challenge to 
the Court. In a way, each component leaned on the next, and all of them held tightly to the one 
concession they needed to make it all possible: the concession granted in 1532 that the Court 
would suspend cases concerning the religion. This bare recognition—we might even say, just the 
utterance of that name, since the referent was unclear and unknown to the Emperor and Judges 
with authority to define it—made it possible for the protesting estates themselves to give ad hoc 
legal personality to their technically heretical group formation through the power of attorney, and 
to bootstrap “religion” into legal existence as a category of legal issue. Even as the other parties 
and the Court ignored powers of attorney, denied the validity of the Recusation, and responded 
in a variety of ways to the argument that a dispute had its origins in a dispute about the religion, 
these instruments facilitated a de facto naming—both of the category “matter of religion” and of 
the evangelicals as a group. 
 
*** 
 
In the next chapter, we jump ahead to the 1555 Augsburg Religion-Peace. But much 
happened in the 1540s and early 1550s that are not discussed in depth here.  
In 1541, the first Imperial Diet took place since the 1532 Regensburg Diet. For the first 
time, a suspension of the Reformation cases was promised in the form of a Recess. Once again, 
                                               
265 See Christopher Tomlins, “How Autonomous is Law?” Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 3 (2007): 45-68. 
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the promise led to no drastic change in the Court’s judicature. In 1542, the protesting estates 
declared a general recusation of the Court in all of its jurisdiction, not only in matters of religion. 
Between 1544 and 1548, the Court was effectively shut down for lack of financing. In the early 
1540s, Emperor Charles V adopted a more assertive approach in the Empire, and in 1546 at the 
Regensburg Diet he declared the Landgrave of Hessen and the Elector of Saxony in the Acht for 
their participation in a 1542 war.266 In 1547, a war broke out between the Schmalkaldic League 
and forces loyal to the Emperor. The League lost; the Landgrave of Hessen capitulated and was 
taken into captivity; the Elector of Saxony was defeated and captured, his electoral title and 
territory transferred to Duke Moritz who, though he fought on the side of the Emperor in this 
war, would end up becoming the new proto-Protestant center of gravity after the fall of the 
League; and all other nobles who had followed League princes were required to pay large sums 
in exchange for the Emperors forgiveness.267 When its financing was renewed at the 1548 
Augsburg Diet, the Imperial Chamber Court reopened. While the Emperor was at the height of 
his power, despite checks in the form of papal hostility and estate solidarity, he pursued a politics 
of imperial religious reform that would be led by him. His so-called “interim politics” proposed 
“nothing less than a new hybrid imperial religion” while waiting for a Council to restore lasting 
unity in religion.268 These proposals, and the constitutional changes they required at the 
territorial and city level, among other issues such as electoral jockeying, unlocked resentment 
among the estates, who in 1551 carried out the Prince’s Rebellion. Significantly weakened, the 
Emperor was sidelined as estates, led by Duke Moritz, negotiated the Passau Treaty of 1552 with 
King Ferdinand. When the Augsburg Peace was negotiated a few years later, it was an attempt to 
bring the terms of the Passau Treaty from the status of a treaty following a specific rebellion to 
the status of imperial law.269 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
266 Whaley, Germany, 318-319. 
267 Whaley, Germany, 320. 
268 Whaley, Germany, 323. 
269 Drecoll, 85-7, 94. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CONTAINMENT OF “RELIGION” AS AN IMPERIAL LEGAL CATEGORY 
 
The Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555 is widely regarded as an “epoch caesura.”1 It is a 
fixture of German historical periodization. It was, writes Heckel “the most important 
constitutional law of the first German Empire.”2 1555, it is said, marks the end of the 
“tumultuous age of the Protestant Reformation in the German lands” and the beginning of the 
“era of confessional formation and negotiation.”3 Often, 1555 even operates as a metonym for 
the shift from the late medieval to the early modern periods.4 
In public and academic discourses alike, the Peace has been subject to a variety of 
polemical interpretations. Authors from a range of confessional and political orientations 
wrangled over questions of whether the Peace was good or bad for the development of the 
German nation-state; whether it contributed to the thriving or the confinement of the true faith 
(whatever that may be for a particular author); whether its primary effect was to maintain a short-
term peace in the decades following 1555, or to create the conditions in which the wars of the 
seventeenth century broke out; whether it contributed to unity or to polarization and division; 
among others. Some argued that the Peace hampered the spread of their true faith, and the 
ultimate unification of the religion; that the Peace represented the victory of politics over 
theology, and that had the negotiations not been dominated by jurists and diplomats—had, 
indeed, the division been let to go to war earlier on—then God’s hand could have settled the final 
resolution of the religious division in the German lands.5  
Since the mid-twentieth century, the evaluative benchmarks for the Peace have shifted, 
from the nation-state, confessional thriving, and religious unity, towards secularization, 
toleration, and individual freedom of conscience. To what extent did the 1555 Peace bolster 
imperial institutions designed to channel potentially violent religious conflict? To what extent 
did it facilitate multiconfessionalism and everyday toleration? To what extent did it pave the way 
for modern secular configurations of public law? These questions continue to motivate some 
studies of the Augsburg Peace as a proleptic event. 
These debates about the big picture value of the Peace stand in interesting contrast to the 
text of the Augsburg Peace itself, which deals with highly tangible aspects of law—especially 
peace, property, and jurisdiction. The purpose of this chapter is to tie the Augsburg Peace of 
1555 to its litigative pre-history. Jurists and diplomats, representing the Empire’s estates and 
rulers, crafted the Augsburg Peace against the backdrop of litigation in the Imperial Chamber 
Court on matters of peace, property, and jurisdiction. And they crafted it with the understanding 
that its terms would be authoritative for all related future litigation in that Court.  
Yet the specific relationship between the pre-1555 litigative history that we have been 
exploring in this dissertation, and the 1555 Augsburg Religion-Peace has been largely neglected, 
in favor of political histories that foreground the watershed treaty’s negotiations, or forward-
looking studies about the German nation-state, secularism, and the rule of law. Though there is a 
                                               
1 Gotthard, 1. 
2 Gotthard, 651 quoting Martin Heckel. 
3 “The Religious Peace of Augsburg (September 25, 1555),” accessed July 10, 2019, 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=4386 
4 Heckel, “Autonomia,” 142. See discussion in Gotthard, 500-78. 
5 For more on the reception history of the Augsburg Peace from the sixteenth century to the present day, 
see Gotthard, 587-651. 
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general understanding in the literature that the agonism of the Reformation cases contributed to 
the conditions in which crafting a Peace like that of 1555 was necessary, they do so again by 
treating the Reformation cases not as litigation events, but as political events—not in terms of the 
jurisprudential and procedural details we find in case files, but in terms of negotiations about the 
cases found in assembly protocols. 
In addition, although the Augsburg Peace is regarded as a significant event in the history 
of religion, few scholars have closely analyzed what the Peace has to say about “religion.” 
Building on the research presented in Chapter 4, I will highlight one particular aspect of the 
Peace, namely: its containment of the hitherto unruly term “religion” as an imperial legal 
category. In Chapter 4, I showed that in the 1530s and 1540s the term “matter of religion” was 
developing a bricolage legal character; that this development happened not by way of orderly 
deliberation, but piecemeal in the context of high-stakes litigation formally about matters of 
property, peace, and jurisdiction; and that the facets of this emergent legal category developed in 
terms not just of what the generic referent of “matters of religion” was (including ceremony, 
worship, and clerical offices) but in terms of strategies, forms of argumentation, affective 
associations, and nodes of agonistic disagreement that came to cleave and inhere to the category 
as it was applied and invoked at law.  
In this chapter, I argue that what the Peace did was to contain within its terms, under a 
new category of legal issue—“religion”—the range of complicated and fraught peace, property, 
and jurisdiction issues that had been the stuff of Reformation litigation since the 1520s. There 
was a continuity in the substance of the legal issues being litigated in the Court; now they were 
being litigated under the heading of the “Religion-Peace.” I argue that we cannot make sense of 
the significance of this new heading without understanding the contested nature of the “religion” 
category prior to 1555. 
I link this containment move with the legal culture and juridical technique of 
dissimulation. I argue that the character of the Peace as essentially dissimulative and ambiguous 
shaped the way that this new category of legal issue, this newly justiciable object, was 
conceptualized at its conception. In other words, “religion” as an imperial civil law category did 
not have a simple noun-like referent, rather, it gestured to a “problem-space.”6 
The heart of this chapter is an analysis of the first Imperial Chamber Court case in which 
the Augsburg Religion-Peace was the ruling law. Even in the pre-trial stage of this case, the first 
that tested the meaning of a violation of the Augsburg Religion-Peace, parties were debating the 
most fundamental doctrinal question of the relationship between the “two powers”—spiritual and 
temporal—citing authoritative texts from the Church fathers to Justinian.7 One does not see this 
level of debate and citation in the pre-1555 cases. A close reading of this case suggests that, far 
from settling the “religion” question, the Augsburg Peace simply shunted the question into a new 
holding pattern, one in which the Court was no more capable of actually resolving the case than 
it had been before. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Scott, 4. 
7 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (RKG) 264. 
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The Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555: Its References to Litigative Pre-History 
The Augsburg Religion-Peace of 15558 was one part of the Recess produced at the end of 
that year’s Diet.9 Far from a manifesto for toleration or freedom of conscience, or a declaration 
of the principle of territorial sovereignty in religious matters, as it is often portrayed in the 
historiography, the Peace was concrete and narrow in its language. It is clear that the Peace 
addressed precisely the kinds of concrete disputes that had arisen among rulers during the 
Reformation—the kinds of issues that the Imperial Chamber Court had failed to adequately 
resolve—particularly in the areas of property, jurisdiction, and peace, and that it borrowed 
language from the Recesses that had been cited in that litigation.10 Several articles, for instance, 
referred to maintaining the peace, and the inviolability of possessions and rights in general. No 
one, it stated, may for any cause engage in feuds, make war upon, rob or besiege another, nor aid 
others who do so, nor cut off any other Estate from access to provisions, or interfere with its 
trade, rents or incomes (Section 14). Nor may any one make war upon any Estate of the empire 
on account of the Augsburg Confession, nor do violence to them, nor force them to abandon their 
Confession in the dominions where it had been established, and any violation of this would be 
considered a breach of the Peace (Section 15). Neither may those of the Augsburg Confession 
commit any of the above-mentioned acts to the detriment of those who adhere to the old faith, or 
disturb them in their possessions and rights (Section 16).  
One frequent issue in the Reformation litigation had to do with clerical incomes, and the 
appointment of clergy. It is dealt with in the passage that would come to be referred to as the 
“reservatum ecclesiasticum” (clerical exception): when a spiritual estate (i.e. prince-bishop) 
abandons the old religion and becomes an adherent of the Augsburg Confession, he would 
immediately lose his office and stop receiving its incomes, and officials of the old religion 
should appoint his successor (Section 18).11 
                                               
8 Note that I translate Religionsfrieden as Religion-Peace, rather than the more conventional “Religious 
Peace.” I do so because Religionsfrieden is a compound word, not an adjective (religious, which would be religiös) 
modifying a noun (peace). This is a Peace whose subject is religion. See Gross, 29, on the way in which the 
Augsburg Religion-Peace was the final chapter of the Public Peace movement. 
9 The Recess itself is lengthy, containing 144 sections, only 20 or so of which are relevant to the “Religion-
Peace.” The other sections are about matters of governance, finance, coinage, military, criminal law, and the running 
of the Imperial Chamber Court. 
10 On the way the Passau Treaty of 1552 shaped the Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555, see in general 
Drecoll, Der Passauer Vertrag.   
11 This was a pro-old-faith exception to the ius reformandi principle, ensuring that hitherto spiritual 
territories would remain so. But the legal status of this passage was distinctive; the clause begins by stating that it 
was written without the agreement of all estates, and therefore was included in the Peace on the authority of the 
imperial majesty. Protestants would later argue that, having not agreed to the passage, it was not binding on them. 
Also, the passage speaks explicitly about prince-bishops who converted while in office, but says nothing about the 
status of a prince-bishop who was evangelical at the time he was elected—a prospect that seemed unimaginable to 
proto-Catholics at the time. Nonetheless, at the very end of negotiations, proto-Protestants managed to secure an 
exception to the exception from King Ferdinand, who appended a statement to the Peace—the so-called Declaratio 
Ferdinandea— stating that landsässig nobles, cities and communes (i.e. subject to a territorial ruler, not to the 
Emperor himself) that had already been adherents of the Augsburg Confession “from a long time and years prior,” 
and who were in the territory of a Catholic prince-bishop, might remain evangelical. This was an exception to the 
exception, and both exceptions undermined the ius reformandi principle in distinct ways—by requiring a territorial 
ruler to be of the old faith in order to keep his office, and then by stating that not all subjects would be required to 
follow the prince-bishop in faith. Like the clause to which it was an exception, the legal status of the Declaratio 
Ferdinandea was different from that of the Peace overall, being the product not of estate-level negotiations but 
promulgated unilaterally by the King; its validity was therefore always the subject of intense negotiations. See 
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Another frequent property issue had to do with the status of landsässig church property; 
that is, property that was privately held by the Church within a territory politically ruled by a city 
or a secular prince who had chosen the Augsburg Confession. Throughout the first half of the 
sixteenth century, evangelical rulers had been confiscating these properties and the Church began 
suing them in the Imperial Chamber Court for these acts. Now, the Peace said simply that 
landsässig church properties and church goods would remain in the hands of those who 
possessed them at the time of the 1552 Passau Treaty, and that the Imperial Chamber Court 
might not accept any suit concerning such goods (Section 19).  
Several sections were likewise a direct response to the kinds of jurisdictional disputes 
that were litigated in the Reformation cases. No estate, the Peace continued, should induce or 
force another’s subjects to accept his religion or abandon the other’s, or take such subject into his 
Schutz und Schirm (lordly protection) as against his orderly ruler (Section 23). Note that the 
language of this section was much more about protecting the rights of the ruler to define the 
religion of his territory, than it was about the rights or consciences of a subject. Another clause 
limited the Church’s jurisdiction within Protestant territory: the spiritual jurisdiction shall not be 
exercised vis-a-vis adherents of the Augsburg Confession with respect to the religion, beliefs, 
clerical appointments, usages, rules, and ceremonies they have established, but its jurisdiction 
still stands on other issues (Section 20). Here, too, one element of the cuius-regio-eius-religio 
principle, for which the Peace is best known, was articulated in concrete language reflective of 
litigation disputes, rather than as an abstract principle.12 
Even the way in which the Peace defined the permissible confessions (limiting it only to 
the Augsburg Confession and the “old faith,” and excluding all others, section 17) reminds us 
that it was addressing not all people, including subjects, but only princes, free imperial knights 
(Section 27), and the magistrates and councils of cities;13 in other words, it was a Peace among 
rulers, addressing the kinds of people who took part in Reformation cases in the Imperial 
Chamber Court. The section on the right of subjects to emigrate, what would come to be called 
ius emigrandi, also ultimately addressed the rights of rulers: the section stated that subjects who 
changed religion to one different from their ruler might leave that land and settle elsewhere, but 
lords had customary right to demand recompense for granting them freedom from subjecthood 
(Section 24). Far from seeking freedom of conscience when they sought the right to emigrate for 
subjects, the drafters’ purpose was rather to prevent inner-territorial uprising by subjects who 
wanted to pursue their own religion in the territories, and the Catholics and Protestants were 
largely in agreement about including it in the Peace on those grounds.14 Indeed, the ius 
                                               
Gotthard 17-8. 
12 The ius reformandi principle is composed of a variety of elements that are contained in a variety of 
clauses of the Peace. For instance, in the sections calling for an end to violence, quoted above, there is reference to 
the inviolability of the domains in which one or the other religion had been established—linking territory, 
sovereignty, and religion, and stating that no neighboring ruler might undermine this, nor might a subject oppose it 
violently. See Gotthard 100-110. Also Schneider, Ius reformandi. 
13 An apparent exception to the ius reformandi principle, though, had to do with free and imperial cities. 
The Peace says that in many free and imperial cities both religions had been practiced, and they should continue 
doing so; neither party should try to abolish or force the other to abandon its religion (Section 27). This clause is 
often cited as a guarantee of confessional parity and mutual toleration in imperial cities, or that mutual toleration 
was required in certain cities. In fact, this clause raised questions around the nature of sovereignty of imperial cities; 
were these imperial cities to remain biconfessional because this law created an exception to the ius reformandi of a 
city? Or were they required to be biconfessional because an imperial city magistrate in fact had no ius reformandi, 
being ultimately subject to the Emperor? See Gotthard, 14-6. 
14 Gotthard, 118-9. 
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emigrandi was as much a ruler’s right to expel as a subject’s right to leave.15 Though it would 
reduce the pressure of demanding conformity of religion upon individual subjects (a religio-
politics of heresy prosecution), it would prove to preserve and increase the uniformity and 
confessionalization of a territory. Therefore, the ius emigrandi clause was not envisioned as an 
exception to ius reformandi; on the contrary, it made ius reformandi practicable.16  
This link between the Reformation cases and the terms of the Augsburg Religion-Peace 
are made even more explicit in the section that addressed the Imperial Chamber Court, where we 
are reminded that the Court remained the preferred forum for litigating disputes about the matters 
of the kind outlined in the Peace.17 In particular, we are reminded here that not only was the 
Augsburg Peace backward-looking, crafted in response to the litigation of the previous decades, 
but it was also forward-looking, positioned to be the governing legal regime that would rule in 
religion-related disputes that would be litigated in the Court thereafter. The Imperial Chamber 
Court must, it said, conform to the terms of this resolution, and must inform parties of its 
relevant terms (Section 32)—a clause which effectively “deprived the Emperor of the power of 
interpreting what was or was not a breach of the law.”18 The correspondence between the 
Emperor and the Judges of the Imperial Chamber Court surrounding the Nuremberg Settlement 
of 1532, and the meaning of “matters of religion” (described in detail at the beginning of chapter 
4) provides the context for this limitation on the Emperor.  
 The Peace also stated that the Imperial Chamber Court’s personnel, including Court 
President and judges, may be appointed by those of both the old religion and of the Augsburg 
Confession (Section 104-106)—overturning a 1532 rule that no Court personnel may be 
evangelical.19 In addition, whereas the Treaty of Passau permitted two forms of oath (both “upon 
God and the saints” which excluded those of the Augsburg Confession, and “upon God and the 
holy Gospels” which was preferred by those of the Augsburg Confession) the Peace here 
changed the form of oath to the singular form “upon God and the holy Gospels” at the Imperial 
Chamber Court, which was regarded as more neutral (Section 107).20  The Imperial Chamber 
Court Ordinances of 1555, which were also negotiated at the Augsburg Diet of 1555, made 
changes to the operation of the Court that likewise reflected issues that had arisen in the course 
of Reformation litigation, such as limiting the authority of the imperial fiscal to prosecute, 
changing the number of judges that the Emperor appointed, and regulating visitations of the 
Court.21  
 
                                               
15 Gotthard, 11. 
16 Gotthard, 119. See Bernhard Ruthmann, Die Religionsprozesse am Reichskammergericht (1555-1648): 
eine Analyse anhand ausgewählter Prozesse (Cologne: Böhlau, 1996), 296-310 for more on the debate about this. 
17 Gotthard notes that neither the language nor the intention of the Peace actually limits jurisdiction of 
Peace-related cases to the Imperial Chamber Court; though it was the preferred forum for litigating under the terms 
of the Peace, suits could also be brought to the Reichshofrat (Gotthard, 405). For more on Reichshofrat, see Chapter 
1, footnote 15 of this dissertation. 
18 Smend, 179-80. 
19 However, unlike in 1648, when parity became the preeminent ordering principle of imperial public law in 
matters of religion, the parity of judicial panels was not strictly enforced under the terms of the 1555 Peace (Heckel, 
“Autonomia,” 240). 
20 See also Adolf Laufs, Christa Belouschek, and Bettina Dick, eds., Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung 
von 1555 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), 151 (Part 1, LVII. Von deß keiserlichen cammerrichters und der beisitzer eydt). 
21 Whaley, Germany, 334-5. See Dick on changes to Imperial Chamber Court Ordinances in 1555. Unlike 
the Augsburg Religion-Peace, its terms lasted until the end of the Holy Roman Empire, with some minor changes. 
On visitations, see Chapter 5.  
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The Augsburg Peace’s Ambiguity 
 
Thus, the language of the Peace was concrete and narrow, reflecting not only the peace, 
property, and jurisdiction disputes that had been litigated in the Imperial Chamber Court since 
the 1520s, but also formulated in such a way as to be the legal framework for future disputes that 
would find their way into the Imperial Chamber Court. 
Yet, the language of the Peace, as concrete and narrow as its terms were, was laced with 
ambiguities. In part, these ambiguities were at the level of interpretation of specific clauses. 
Section 19, on possession of landsässig church properties, for instance, raised all kinds of 
questions.22 Some Protestant rulers had allowed clergy to stay in monasteries in their territories 
throughout the 1520s, 30s, 40s, and 50s, and to continue receiving incomes, with the intention of 
letting them “die out,” rather than pushing them out. Would those rulers now be forced to accept 
Catholic “islands” within their Protestant territories, whereas those who had been more 
aggressive in confiscating and/or converting church property would not have to worry about 
that?23 The ambiguity of this clause unleashed a lot of litigation post-1555 about every “slanted 
shanty left over from a monastery settlement, and every muddy field that monks used to own.”24  
But even on a more foundational level, the nature of the Peace itself was deeply 
ambiguous. Some of its ambiguity was related to the nature of imperial law as a whole. The 
Peace was negotiated among the estates, with King Ferdinand representing the Emperor’s 
interests. Therefore, the extent to which this Peace, like other imperial recesses, had more the 
character of law or a contract, was bound to be disputed.25  
More to the point, the Peace was deeply ambiguous as to its purposes and timescale. The 
narratio explicitly described the Peace as an attempt to bring security and safety to the Empire, 
and to prevent the outbreak of war, mutual aggression, or rebellion, despite the persistence of the 
division in religion. Referencing earlier settlements and recesses, the narratio began by saying 
that previous agreements concerning “the disputed religion” had apparently been insufficient to 
maintain common safety and security, and the Estates, along with the Emperor’s deputy, the 
King, had agreed at this assembly that it was of the highest importance to address this issue 
(Section 7, 8). They collectively realized that compromise and agreement about the “main 
articles and matters of our holy Christian faith, ceremonies and church usages” were not to be 
found in a short amount of time, as had initially been hoped or expected, and that the more time 
passed, the more the division was causing war and rebellions that were disrupting common 
safety—and that without such safety, any further agreement among the Estates about the main 
articles and matters would be hindered (Section 9). Thus, the Estates agreed that they needed to 
set aside these core issues for the time being, for a later date (Section 10), and instead focus on a 
resolution to establish common peace and security in the German nation (Section 11), especially 
as the Land-Peace seemed, on its own, to have been insufficient to prevent such disquiet (Section 
12). The Peace also recognized that some of the imperial recesses and resolutions of the last 
thirty years had proven not only insufficient, but had even contributed to antipathy and mistrust 
                                               
22 See description of section 19 above. 
23 Gotthard, 13. 
24 Gotthard, 13. For more on post-1555 religion litigation, see Ruthmann, Die Religionsprozesse. 
25 Gotthard 5n15; Heckel, “Autonomia,” 228-33. See in general this dissertation’s Chapter 2 about the 
status of a recess. 
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among the Estates, and had shown that an immediate resolution, in matters both religious and 
profane, was not possible (Section 13).  
Thus, the Augsburg Religion-Peace was a “worldly peace”—it decoupled peace from the 
question of a substantive compromise in matters of correct confession, worship, and 
ceremonies.26 But, this worldly peace was not intended to sustain a confessional division 
permanently. Rather, the settlement of issues of faith, ceremonies, and church usages would be 
postponed, and the present Peace aimed to restore common safety and security “provisionally but 
enduringly,” in order to facilitate mutual trust and to create conditions conducive to an eventual 
settlement on those issues. Yet, the persistence of the Peace was in no way to be coupled with the 
resolution in faith matters; the Peace was to endure in spite of a lack of resolution in such 
matters. Section 25 summarized this rather nicely: the peace was provisional, designed to ensure 
security and trust among estates, so that an ultimate resolution on religious unity could be 
achieved. However, even if a coming Council or Diet did not obtain such a religious restoration, 
this Peace would still remain in force (Section 25). In the decades following, the question of 
whether the Peace was to be regarded as a temporary emergency measure (Catholic 
interpretation), or a constitutional basic law (Protestant interpretation) became more and more 
difficult to settle.27  
Heckel writes that the “durability and the temporariness conditioned each other 
paradoxically”; on one hand, to recognize the enduringness of the Peace was to violate the 
absoluteness of one’s confessional claim and of the godly law. It therefore had to be described as 
an interim instrument. At the same time, for as long as the Peace was valid, it “legally ensured 
and spiritually perpetuated division in the religion.”28  
Each of these characteristics of the Peace—that it was worldly but aimed to create 
conditions for eventual religious reunification, that it was provisional but enduring, and that it 
was both constitutional and contract-like—reflect the deep ambiguity of the Peace.  
 
Dissimulation, Vagueness, Casuistry, and Indecision 
 
Linguists and philosophers of language have long debated the status of vagueness, 
ambiguity, and generality in legal expression.29 In the background of these considerations is the 
                                               
26 Volker Henning Drecoll, Der Passauer Vertrag (1552): Einleitung und Edition (Berlin; New York: de 
Gruyter, 2000), 26. 
27 Ruthmann, 11; Heckel, “Autonomia,” 237ff. The final words in the Recess about the Peace stated that 
having agreed to postpone settling the core issues for a future imperial assembly, everyone also agreed to be present 
in person (i.e. not through delegates) at that assembly except if ill health prevented them; and in the meantime, each 
should constitute his scholars and theologians so that negotiations might proceed without delay and conclude in a 
fruitful way (Section 139-140). The document concluded, before the listing of signatories, with the exhortation that 
since such future negotiations concerned not just temporal well-being but also “our salvation and deliverance,” no 
unnecessary delay should come up. They settled on a date of March 1, 1556 to meet at Regensburg for the next 
assembly (Section 141). A resolution in matters of faith, ceremonies, and church usages never came. Charles V 
abdicated soon after, leaving the Emperorship to his brother King Ferdinand. 
28 Gotthard, 89 and the literature cited there. For more on this principle of political peace, see Gotthard 
91ff. Luebke likewise calls this aspect of the Religion-Peace a “paradoxical fact that the Empire developed a durable 
multiconfessional regime in the absence of norms that endorsed plurality. Indeed, all but a few regarded plurality as 
a sign of disorder and decay” Luebke, “Multiconfessional Empire,” 131. 
29 See Ralf Poscher, “Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Language and Law, ed. Lawrence M. Solan and Peter M. Tiersma (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
129-134. 
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primacy of the rule of law doctrine. The ideal of the rule of law requires a certain standard of 
clarity in legal expression to protect values like predictability for the community, the narrowing 
of the domain that invites judicial discretion, and the prevention of arbitrariness in that 
discretion.30  
But it is not enough to see the ambiguity of the Peace as simply an indication of an 
underdeveloped legal science, or the incompleteness of the rule of law. Instead, the ambiguity of 
the Peace indicated certain background values that were characteristic of the legal culture of 
early modern Germany.  
Gotthard uses evidence from Augsburg Diet protocols to suggest a number of reasons 
why ambiguity and vagueness were such a central characteristic of the Peace; he suggests that it 
was not unintentional, but rather very intentionally and self-consciously done. First, Gotthard 
notes that some negotiators, such as those from Dresden, when they saw that an issue threatened 
to derail negotiations or to steal time, would caution to not gamble away the whole agreement, 
and to move towards generality.31 So in addition to the basic interest in finalizing an agreement 
that would secure stability and peace, we may also identify here the immanent interests of 
participants in a process whose success or failure reflect on their abilities and capacities.32  
In contexts of limited time and incommensurable opinions, vague language permits 
legislators “to postpone decisions” and to allow “each party to the compromise [to] read […] its 
own position into the text.” Such choices can “hide disagreement,” and permit movement 
forward. Vagueness reduces decision costs.33 Carl Schmitt called this approach “dilatory formal 
compromise,” which he contrasted with “genuine substantive compromise.”34 “Its essence […] is 
simply the drawing out and postponing of [the substantive] decision. [It] consists in finding a 
formula that satisfies all contradictory demands and leaves, in an ambiguous turn of phrase, the 
actual points of controversy undecided.” These are “effective compromises, for they would not 
be possible if there were no consensus between parties. But the understanding does not affect the 
issue in question; one only agreed on postponing the decision and to keeping open the most 
varied possibilities and interpretations.”35  
Others at the Augsburg Diet advocate for dissimulation in specific moments because in 
the gaps, common law and canon law would have to be relied upon.36 So especially those of the 
old faith thought that any ambiguities would ultimately work in their favor. Also, in this context, 
“a decision [was] often divisive in social terms. Where there may perhaps have been vague 
consensus before, a decision [made] dissent visible.”37  
Perhaps most importantly, the Augsburg Recess “with its obscurities and ambiguities, 
fully reflected the fact that this was essentially an agreement between lawyers.”38 The word 
“dissimulieren” had a legal meaning to describe the specific process of squaring various text 
drafts—thus it was a principle of textual editing.39 Against the backdrop of the principle “quod 
                                               
30 Poscher, 128. 
31 Gotthard, 52. 
32 Gotthard, 53. 
33 Poscher, 144. 
34 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, 2008 (1928)), 84-5. 
35 Schmitt, 84-5. 
36 Gotthard, 52-3.  
37 Stollberg-Rilinger, Cultures of Decision-Making, 8. 
38 Whaley, Germany, 333. 
39 Gotthard, 52. Contrast this meaning of dissimulation with the kind discussed in Miriam Eliav-Feldon and 
 236 
omnes tangit” (whatever affects all, must also be approved by all), which was the basis for most 
workaday imperial assembly work, it was a habit of imperial assemblies to work and think in a 
dissimulative way in order to achieve this unanimity.40 Thus, dissimulation was one part of a 
“complex of intellectual instruments and institutional arrangements” that constituted the habitus 
of imperial public law jurists, who led the efforts.41  
Thus, the Peace was not a rational systemic unity, but a hard-chewed diplomatic 
compromise. It contained formal compromises, gaps, and intentional unclarities. As will be 
familiar from our study of protestations, parties tried to create constellations that would work to 
their advantage in future disputes over interpretation.42  
Heckel argues that dissimulation was both a cause of and a response to the divergent 
legal interpretations of the Peace that were coming from the two sides. On the one hand, every 
clause of the Peace that on its face was evidence of agreement contained at its foundation the 
seeds of latent dissent. Dissimulation was the response to these kinds of basic disagreements, an 
attempt to rescue legal and imperial unity by hiding and covering over contradictions and 
contradictory interpretations with general, ambiguous, or vague language. But in the process, 
dissimulation gave parties room to interpret the clauses in the way suited to them. So, there was a 
cyclical quality here.43 In the short term, it had a pacifying effect; but in the long term, it came at 
the cost of the truth-value of law, until the facially unified legal system could not sustain the 
breadth of interpretations held. Thus, in a way, “a crisis of legitimacy was ‘preprogrammed.’”44 
 
Uses of “Religion” in the 1555 Peace 
 
In Chapter 4, I showed how the literature treats the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
“religion” category in discussion of the Reformation cases. We saw that most historians have 
tended to assume either that this vagueness was an indication of an underdeveloped legal 
science, or that the term was used exclusively as a placeholder for pre-conceived political 
determinations. I argued against this view, by showing that the vagueness of the term was at once 
a cause and a result of the bricolage manner in which the category was produced. 
In this section, I return to the “religion” category. I argue that, just as the rest of the Peace 
was born out of the litigative pre-history of the 1520s, 30s, and 40s, so the religion category, as it 
was invoked in the Religion-Peace was born out of the tussle of these Reformation cases. And, 
just as the Peace was an attempt to stabilize a legal framework to replace the patchwork 
jurisprudence that characterized the previous decades when it came to matters of property, peace, 
and jurisdiction, so the Peace attempted to stabilize the “matter of religion” under its terms. More 
specifically, participants in the Augsburg Recess of 1555 decided that “religion” would be the 
term used to denote the kinds of issues covered under the Peace. Indeed, the Augsburg Peace 
refers to itself as a “Religion-Peace” (section 14) and a “Peace in Religion and other Matters” 
                                               
Tamar Herzig, Dissimulation and Deceit in Early Modern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
40 Gotthard, 53. 
41 Hunter’s main thesis in this article is that imperial jurists as a class held in the post-1555 order as “a duty 
of office” and as a matter of professional deportment (Hunter, 46) a particular understanding of confessions or 
religions as “juridical civil associations rather than mystical embodiments of Christ” (Hunter, 48); and of religious 
freedom as “the juridical recognition of a plurality of religions as legal entities under imperial law” (Hunter, 45).  
42 Martin Heckel, “Die Reformationsprozesse im Spannungsfeld des Reichskirchensystems,” in Die 
politische Funktion des Reichskammergerichts, ed. Bernhard Diestelkamp (Cologne: Böhlau, 1993), 24. 
43 Heckel, “Autonomia,” 167-190. 
44 Luebke, “Multiconfessional Empire,” 136. 
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(section 197).45 Henceforth, a “matter of religion” meant a matter governed by the terms of the 
Augsburg Peace. 
Knowing what we know about the fraught legal wrangling of the previous decades 
around this category, however, its usage here is not self-explanatory. Just as the sections dealing 
with property, peace, and jurisdiction, and with the nature of the Peace as a whole, harbored 
ambiguities, so did the conception of “matters of religion” that lay at the heart of the Peace. Far 
from defining the meaning of “matters of religion”—a term that, as we saw in chapter 4, had 
been the stuff of decades of legal wrangling and confusion—the Peace contained and enclosed 
the category without clarifying it. The production of the “religion” category in the previous 
decades represented natality in legal language; its use in the Augsburg Peace represented its 
containment.46 The imperial estates collectively settled the meaning of “religion” to mean “those 
issues handled under the terms of the Augsburg Peace.” But this containment did not entail 
greater clarity or definition. Rather, it was simply a decisional process of naming, the creation of 
classificatory boundaries. 
Its characteristic as a bricolage category remained, with all of its fraught ambiguities 
intact. Indeed, a close reading of the Peace itself shows how the term “religion” was made to do 
so much work in the text, and carried multiple valences. In short, in the Augsburg Peace, 
“religion” had an “excess of referents.”47 
There seem to be at least three usages of “religion” in the text. First, religion referred to 
the two parties in disagreement. More often, “religion” was applied to “those of the old religion” 
(i.e. Catholics); the Protestants were referred to as “those of the Augsburg Confession” rather 
than as followers of a new “religion.”48 Once, “religion” was used in a double formulation to 
refer to both groups.49 
                                               
45 Section 14: “of this present Religion- as well as general constitution of the established Land-Peace” 
(diesen nachfolgenden Religions-, auch gemeiner Constitution des aufgerichten Land-Friedens). Note that here 
Religion-Peace and Land-Peace are parallel constructions.  
Section 197: “the Court President and judges should adjudicate based on the above settled peace and 
resolution in religion and other matters” (Frieden und Fried-Stand in Religion- und andern Sachen).  
Excerpts of the Augsburg Religion-Peace are from “Augsburger Reichsabschied [Augsburger 
Religionsfrieden],” Internet Portal Westfälische Geschichte, accessed June 26, 2018, http://www.westfaelische-
geschichte.de/que739, digitized from Arno Buschmann, Kaiser und Reich: klassische Texte zur 
Verfassungsgeschichte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation vom Beginn des 12. Jahrhunderts bis zum 
Jahre 1806 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 215-283. For a critical edition of the text of the 
Augsburg Religion-Peace including draft variations, see Karl Brandi, Der Augsburger Religionsfriede vom 25. 
September 1555 kritische Ausgabe des Textes mit den Entwürfen und der königlichen Deklaration (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927). 
46 On natality, see Constable’s discussion of Hannah Arendt (Constable, 91).  
47 David Lieberman, phone conversation with author, September 5, 2018. 
48 Section 16: those Estates “who adhere to the old religion, spiritual and worldly” (der alten Religion 
anhängig, geistlich und weltlich); compare, in the same section “those Estates related to the Augsburg Confession” 
(die Stände, so der Augspurgischen Confession verwandt) 
Section 18: spiritual estates who “abandon the old religion” (von der alten Religion abtretten würden) 
Section 24: those “following either the old religion or the Confession of Augsburg” (der alten Religion oder 
Augspurgischen Confession anhängig) 
Section 106: by those “of both the old religion and of the Augsburg Confession” (von beyden, der alten 
Religion und der Augspurgischen Confession) 
49 Section 27: “both religions, namely, our old religion and the religion of the followers of the Augsburg 
Confession” (die beede Religionen, nemlich Unsere alte Religion und der Augsburg Confession-Verwandten 
Religion) 
Section 15: “the faith, church usages, ordinances, and ceremonies of the Augsburg Confession-Religion” 
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Second, religion was something about which the parties disagreed. They each had their 
own “religion, faith, church usages, ceremonies,” etc. It was a shorthand for all of the issues that 
defined what made the two parties distinct from one another, a shorthand for the core conflict 
and constellation of disputes that provided the impetus for the Peace.50 Inversely, “Christian 
religion and faith matters” referred to the ideal of Christian unity, which sat in contrast with the 
“division and split” that plagued it.51 In many clauses, the phrase “both religions” was used to 
refer to that which the two groups, Catholics and Protestants, adhered to, practiced, or were “of.” 
The groupings themselves were sometimes referred to as “estates” or “adherents”52 of a religion. 
                                               
(von dieser Augspurgischen Confessions-Religion, Glauben, Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien). 
Note the composition word: “Confessionsreligion.” 
50 Section 15: “and in order that such peace is respected and maintained despite the disputed religion” 
(damit solcher Fried auch der spaltigen Religion halben) 
51 Section 140: “because of the laying aside of the damaging division and split in matters of our holy 
Christian religion and faith” (daß von wegen Hinlegung der schädlichen Spaltung und Trennung in Unser Heil. 
Christlichen Religion und Glaubens-Sachen) 
Section 15: “the disputed religion shall only be brought to a complete, Christian agreement and 
compromise through Christian, friendly, and peaceful means” (soll die streitige Religion nicht anders dann durch 
Christliche, freundliche, friedliche Mittel und Wege zu einhelligem, Christlichem Verstand und Vergleichung 
gebracht werden) 
52 Section 17: “who are not adherents of either of the aforementioned religions” (so obgemelten beeden 
Religionen nicht anhängig) 
Section 18: “of both religion-estates” (beeder Religions-Stände) 
Section 20: “of both religion-kin” (beederseits Religions-Verwandte) 
Section 26: “on account of both of the aforementioned religions” (obbemeldter beeder Religion halben) 
Section 27: “for the imperial estates of both religions” (beeder Religion Reichs-Ständ) 
Section 32: “regardless which of the above-mentioned religion they may be” (ungeacht welcher der 
obgemeldten Religion die seyen) 
Sometimes “religion” stands alone as a generic term referring to that to which a ruler or subject adheres, 
such as: Section 23: “No estate shall induce another's subjects to accept his religion and abandon the other's” (es soll 
auch kein Stand den andern noch desselben Unterthanen zu seiner Religion dringen) 
Section 24: “on account of their religion” (ihrer Religion wegen) 
More often, when this generic meaning is intended, “religion” appears as one in a list, such as: Section 15: 
“will not make war upon any estate of the empire on account of the Augsburg Confession and the doctrine, religion, 
and faith of the same” (von wegen der Augspurgischen Confession und derselbigen Lehr, Religion und Glaubens 
halb) 
Section 15: “let them quietly and peacefully enjoy their religion, faith, church usages, ordinances, and 
ceremonies, as well as their possessions, real and personal property,” etc. (sondern bey solcher Religion, Glauben, 
Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien, auch ihren Haab, Gütern, liegend und fahren, Land, Leuthen, 
Herrschafften, Obrigkeiten, Herrlichkeiten und Gerechtigtkeiten ruhiglich und friedlich bleiben lassen) 
Section 16: let those who adhere to the old religion “abide in like manner by their religion, faith, church 
usages, ordinances, and ceremonies” (gleicher Gestalt bey ihrer Religion, Glauben, Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen 
und Ceremonien) 
Section 20: “against the Augsburg Confession-kin’s religion, beliefs, clerical appointments, usages, rules, 
and ceremonies” (wider der Augspurgischen Confessions-Verwanten Religion, Glauben, Bestellung der Ministerien, 
Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien) 
Section 20: “In other matters, however, which do not concern the religion, faith, usages, rules, ceremonies, 
and ministerial activities of the Confession of Augsburg's adherents […]” (aber in andern Sachen und Fällen der 
Augspurgischen Confession, Religion, Glauben, Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen, Ceremonien und Bestellung der 
Ministerien nicht anlangend) 
Section 27: “Neither party shall venture to abolish or force the other to abandon its religion, usages, or 
ceremonies” (des andern Religion, Kirchengebräuch oder Ceremonien). “On the contrary, according to the 
provisions of this peace, each party shall leave the other to maintain in a peaceful and orderly fashion its religion, 
faith, usages, ordinances, and ceremonies, together with its possessions” (bey solcher seiner Religion, Glauben, 
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Third, religion was something about which one may or may not make legal resolutions. 
“Religion” was used to refer to particular kinds of agreements, including the present Peace. It 
sometimes was used to refer to past, unsuccessful agreements.53 A “Vergleichung der Religion” 
(compromise, restoration of the religion) always referred to the future deliberations about the 
“main matter” (“Haupt-Sach,” Section 140) that they were postponing for a later assembly or 
council.54  
Thus, part of the ambiguity of the “religion” term arose from this excess of referents. But 
part of its ambiguity also had to do with one of the core issues that had characterized the legal 
wrangling about the “religion” term in the litigation of decades prior, namely, the relationship 
between matters of religion and worldly matters. As we saw in Chapter 4, it was always one of 
the contentions of the Protestants that “matters of religion” included not just issues generically 
associated with that term at the time—worship, ceremonies, and spiritual offices, for example. 
Rather, it also included disputes about temporal issues—such as property, peace, and 
jurisdiction—that “flowed from” or “had their origins in” disputes about worship, ceremonies, 
and offices. Old-faith litigants, lawyers, and judges often responded to this argument either by 
ignoring it and moving towards contumacy proceedings, or by expressing astonishment that the 
acts in question—like plundering and jurisdictional violations—could be given the honorific 
“religious.” The Augsburg Peace seems to have adopted the holding patterns of the Court when it 
came to describing the relationship between “matters of religion” and “profane and worldly 
                                               
Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien, auch seinen Haab und Gütern) 
Only one such list leaves out “religion” altogether: Section 9: final compromise on the “main articles and 
matters of our holy Christian faith, ceremonies and church usages” (Tractation über die Hauptarticul und Sachen 
Unsers Heiligen Christlichen Glaubens, Ceremonien und Kirchen-Gebräuchen) 
53 Section 7: “that the articles concerning the disputed religion made at previous imperial diets have been 
followed by breakdowns and tribulations” (daß der Articul der spaltigen Religion, daraus nunmehr eine gute Zeit 
allerhand Unrath, Unfall und Widerwertigkeit im Reich Teutshcer Nation erfolgt) 
54 Section 18: “a future Christian, amicable, and final compromise/restoration of the religion” 
(Vergleichung der Religion) 
Section 20: “until a final compromise/restoration of the religion is attained” (biß zu endlicher Vergleichung 
der Religion) 
Section 20: “until the final Christian compromise/restoration of the religion” (biß zu endlicher Christlicher 
Vergleichung der Religion) 
Section 25: “a compromise/restoration of matters of religion and faith” (ein Vergleichung der Religion und 
Glaubenssachen) “must be pursued, but without an enduring peace” (ohne beständigen Frieden) “a Christian, 
friendly compromise concerning religion” (Christlicher, freundlicher Vergleichung der Religion) “cannot be 
achieved” 
Section 25: “to assure the quick achievement of a Christian, friendly, and final compromise/restoration 
concerning the religious division” (desto ehe zu Christlicher, freundlicher und endlicher Vergleichung der spaltigen 
Religion); “until the Christian, friendly, and final compromise/restoration of matters of religion and faith” (biß zu 
Christlicher, freundlicher und endlicher Vergleichung der Religion und Glaubens-Sachen); “until the final 
compromise/restoration in matters of religion and faith” (biß zu endlicher Vergleichung der Religion und Glaubens-
Sachen) 
Section 139: “the necessary and beneficial compromise and unity in the disputed matters of religion and 
faith” (die nothwendige und heilsame Vergleichung und Einigkeit in der streitigen Religion und Glaubens-Sachen)  
Section 141: “at the next imperial assembly, the Christian compromise/restoration of our holy religion and 
faith matters will be prioritized” (von Christlicher Vergleichung Unserer H. Religion und Glaubens-Sachen)  
Also, “Tractation” refers to the same future assembly: Section 10: “that the discussion of these 
articles/points of the religion should be postponed to another set time” (daß die Tractation dieses Articuls der 
Religion auf andere gelegene Zeit einzustellen) 
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matters.”55 Slippages in the language of the text between “religion” and “profane and worldly” 
show that the Augsburg Peace at once saw itself as postponing discussion about matters of 
religion for a future Christian Council or imperial assembly, and at the same time assimilating its 
resolutions as to profane and worldly matters under the heading “religion-peace.” 
 
The Peace in the Court 
 
 One of the often-neglected aspects of the Augsburg Religion-Peace is that it was 
understood at its conception to formulate the legal regime that would be ruling in disputes before 
the Imperial Chamber Court. That is, rather than suing under the various sources of law—the 
patchwork jurisprudence—of the previous decades for disputes arising out of the Reformation, 
from then on, all suits on the grounds of the Augsburg Peace would be “matters of religion.”  
 This section is about the first religion case—that is, the first legal dispute adjudicated 
under the terms of the Augsburg Religion-Peace before the Imperial Chamber Court.56 A detailed 
reading of this case can tell us something about the impact of the Religion-Peace on litigation. It 
reveals that it stands out in contrast to the case files of the pre-1555 cases for the kinds of reasons 
it invokes and source texts it cites. This is especially remarkable as the case never made it to the 
litis contestatio stage. More specifically, unlike the dense particularism of the Reformation cases, 
the litigants in this case called upon some of the most foundational proof texts and legal sources 
with regard to the question of the two swords doctrine, and the relationship between temporal 
                                               
55 Section 13: “in the current division of the religion a complete discussion and treatment of peace in both 
religion, profane and worldly matters will not be undertaken, and these articles have been worked upon and 
compromised in all ways so that both religions might know what to finally expect from the other” (in währender 
Spaltung der Religion ein ergänzte Tractation und Handlung des Friedens in beeden, der Religion, prophan und 
weltlichen Sachen nicht fürgenommen wird, und in alle Wege dieser Articul dahin gearbeitet und verglichen, damit 
beyderseits Religionen, hernach zu vermelden, wissen möchten, weß einer sich zu dem andern endlich zu versehen) 
The emphasis is mine. It appears there is a missing “and” – so the terms “religion, profane, and worldly” 
appear as in a list, rather than as a binary. But having been preceded by “both” we are looking for a pair. Since 
profane and worldly are synonyms, we have to assume an “and” to separate “religion” from “profane and worldly.” 
The meaning of this part would then be that since a peace regarding both types of matters—of religion, and of 
profane/worldly concern—could not be had, therefore they agreed to come to a peace about worldly matters alone. 
But later, the very same group of terms—religion, profane, and worldly—was used differently, to refer to 
the set of issues that the Augsburg Peace itself addressed: Section 104: “according to the above settled, negotiated 
and ordered peace resolution in religion, profane and worldly matters” (nach dem obgesetzter verglichener und 
gebottener Fried-Stand in Religion, prophan und weltlichen Sachen) 
And in one place, it was said that this Augsburg peace resolution’s ability to address “the disputed religion” 
issue would help maintain the peace “even in other profane and worldly matters”: Section 33: “and so that in this 
now settled peace resolution about the article of the disputed religion, having been transacted and decided, along 
with the imperial Land-Peace, can maintain the common peace even in other profane and worldly matters, bringing 
it into more actual rightness/regularity” (und damit jetztgesetzter Friedsstand über den Articul der spaltigen Religion 
betheydingt und beschlossen, auch der gemeine Fried sonst in andern prophan und weltlichen Sachen neben und mit 
des H. Reichs Landfrieden desto beständiger zu erhalten, auch in mehr würkliche Richtigkeit zu bringen) 
56 I see no evidence of the Munich 264 case discussed in the existing secondary literature. I also see no 
evidence of an earlier case litigated at the Imperial Chamber Court under the terms of the Peace — but I am open to 
being corrected. According to Ehrenpreis, the earliest case about specifically monastery property in the Imperial 
Chamber Court after the promulgation of the Augsburg Peace was in 1556 about the Monastery Christgarten against 
Count von Öttingen. This case ended up one of the “Four Monasteries” cases. See Stefan Ehrenpreis, Kaiserliche 
Gerichtsbarkeit und Konfessionskonflikt: der Reichshofrat unter Rudolf II. 1576-1612 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2006). 
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and spiritual authority. I argue that, while none of these arguments were new, the fact that they 
constituted the first Augsburg Religion-Peace suit litigated at the Imperial Chamber Court 
suggests that the Peace, far from settling these fraught issues, simply reset the clock on debates 
about them. In other words, litigants and lawyers saw the Peace as a new opportunity to settle 
age-old questions about the two powers that had been at the heart of the Reformation, by shaping 
the Court’s jurisprudence of the Peace. 
 First a note on the parties. Both Duke Ottheinrich von Pfalz-Neuburg and Prince-Bishop 
Otto of Augsburg were uncompromising voices in their respective confessional parties. And they 
were both opinionated and outspoken about the 1555 Peace.57 Ottheinrich was known for 
colorfully expressing an expectation of a dramatic religious compromise with the “godless” by 
simply presenting them with the Confessio Augustana and watching as the veils fell from their 
eyes when confronted with its pure truth. A political compromise of the sort the Peace 
represented was, at least at certain moments, anathema to him.58 In 1556, the Duke became one 
of the Empire’s seven Electors. 
 Prince-Bishop Otto was likewise opposed to compromise. Records of the princely council 
during the Augsburg imperial assembly show that Otto had said that either a Christian Council 
would resolve the matters so that all would be required to come under the umbrella of the true 
Catholic religion, or, if this did not happen, then they should use military force to “fight Satan 
himself.”59 Already on March 23, 1555, Prince-Bishop Otto of Augsburg had his chancellor, 
Konrad Braun, submit a formal Protestation against the first princely council draft of the 
Augsburg Peace, and then submitted it several times in the months following. Finally on 
September 25, he submitted a Protestation against the entire Augsburg Peace.60 He and his 
successors for generations argued that this Protestation released them completely from the terms 
of the Peace, that it in no way touched the rights, jurisdiction, and properties of the Hochstift, 
which remained intact as they had been before the division of religion began.61 This leaves the 
fact that the Prince-Bishop sued in this case, in part under the terms of the Augsburg Religion-
Peace, remarkable if not confusing. We saw in Chapter 5 that a protestation would be invoked in 
litigation in order to be released from the terms of a law.62  
 I will refer to Duke Ottheinrich von Pfalz-Neuburg as “the Duke,” and Prince-Bishop 
Otto of Augsburg as “the Bishop.”  
 
Brief Overview of the Case  
 
 The Bishop alleged in this suit that the Duke broke the law when he ordered the parish 
priests of four villages, Schretzheim, Donaualtheim, Wittislingen and Reistingen to appear 
                                               
57 Gotthard, 336. See also Andreas Edel, “Ottheinrich,” in Neue deutsche Biographie, vol. 19, Franz 
Menges, ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 655-6, http://www.ndb.badw-muenchen.de 
58 Gotthard, 86-7. See also Axel Gotthard, “’Frölich gewest’: Ottheinrich, ein unpolitischer Fürst?” in 
Pfalzgraf Ottheinrich: Politik, Kunst und Wissenschaft im 16. Jahrhundert, ed. Barbara Zeitelhack (Regensburg: 
Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2002), 71-93. See also the genesis of his views on Freistellung (the right of a subject to 
believe differently from ruler in Gotthard, 103-4. 
59 Gotthard, 94. 
60 Gotthard, 277-8. See discussion of protestation in Chapter 5. 
61 Gotthard, 278-9; Heckel, “Autonomia,” 252. 
62 Such as the way in which the proto-Protestants invoked the 1529 protestation (see Chapter 5); or in the 
seventeenth century, the way in which the city of Strassburg invoked their protestation of 1555 in the Four 
Monasteries dispute (Gotthard, 279-80). 
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before his superintendent in order to perform a trial sermon and to be “examined” in line with the 
“new religion,” and threatened a loss of their offices should they fail to forego theirs willingly. 
These allegations were outlined in two key documents: first, the Bishop of Augsburg’s Petitio 
Summaria,63 and second, the Mandate sent out by the Court against the Duke on January 8, 
1556.64 The question in the case was: who had the right to regulate religion in those four 
villages? Given that the four villages were both within the Bishopric of Augsburg and within the 
principality of the Duke, what kind of authority had the right to regulate religion? Was the Duke 
in violation of the Peace by seeking to establish the new religion there, or was the Bishop in 
violation of the Peace by seeking to prevent him from doing so? 
 The Exception and Defense is the only substantive document we have from the 
defendant’s side.65 The production notation reads “Exception and Defense Document against a 
perniciously promulgated Mandate, Summons, and Inhibition, on the basis of the Religion-
Peace.” The Exception and Defense began by naming the cause: a mandate sent out against his 
principal, the Duke, in which he was “baselessly accused that by establishing the new teaching in 
those four locations, [...] he went against the old custom of the Holy Empire, as well as the laws, 
the constitution, and in particular intended the injury and detriment of the Religion-Peace 
recently established at Augsburg.”66 The intention of the document was to “provide honest 
excuse as much as necessary” and also to “reject the parts of the accusations that are unwarranted 
and unfair.” 
 The final document of the case file was the Response and Objection document submitted 
by the plaintiff’s side in May 1556.67 The longest document in the case file, it is also the final 
one, suggesting that the case never reached the litis contestatio phase. The purpose of this 
document was to answer the responses and allegations raised by the defendant side, and to 
provide appropriate objections to them. Its aim was to move the proceeding forward to the litis 
contestatio stage; hence the concluding sentences: “So, it is this lawyer’s request that you 
recognize that the other party is obligated to settle the litis.” 
 After listing the above-described documents, the Protocol reads that on October 21, 1556, 
the court announced that Dr. Deschler (the lawyer for the Duke) must submit a response to the 
plaintiff’s Response and Objection within fourteen days. Deschler sought on January 27, 1557 a 
fourteen-day extension. But no other documents from the litigants are to be found in the case file.  
 At the Imperial Diet at Regensburg, held in 1556 and 1557, both parties sought the 
mediation of King Ferdinand for the dispute. The now-Elector Ottheinrich von Pfalz-Neuburg 
said the Bishop was in violation of the Augsburg Religion-Peace by preventing him from 
introducing the Augsburg Confession there, and then for suing him for doing this at the Imperial 
Chamber Court. He asked that the King order the Bishop to stop hindering his rightful actions, 
and also to stop the Court case. In response, the Bishop wrote to the King complaining of the 
interventions of the Elector in his land-princely rights and the hassling of his subjects. He said he 
                                               
63 Munich 264, Q3, “Clagschrifft,” 1556. 
64 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556. 
65 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft wider ain ubel außbracht Mandat Ladung und 
Inhibition auf den Religion Frieden,” 1556. 
66 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “mit ungrund angezogen und 
beschuldigt worden, als sollten sy hochernants cardinals und Bischofes zu Augspurg mit vier flecken mit namen 
Schrezhaim, Wittisslingen, Thona Althaim und Reüsstingen mit aufrichtung irer neuen leer wider allt herkommen 
deß hailigen reichs und der recht constitution und sonderlich wider jungst zu Augsburg aufgerichten und publicirten 
religion friden, eintrag und irrung zuthun sich understannden haben.” 
67 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
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wanted to avoid a drawn-out legal proceeding, and therefore asked to arrange a goodly 
mediation, but in the meantime the Elector should cease the actions in question.68 
 Then, nothing happened until December 19, 1566. On that day, it seems that two 
documents were submitted to the Court, one an Informatio juris (legal opinion) on this matter by 
Graf Ulrichs zu Helffenstein, and one a Supplication by Dr. Samuel Brothagen.69 Both of these 
documents, supposedly Q7 and Q8, are not in the case file. No other entries are in the Protocol.  
 The plaintiff was represented by Licentiate Amandus Wolf, and the defendant was 
represented by Dr. Johann Deschler. 
 
The Mandate 
 
The mandate began, as was customary, not with the alleged facts of the case, but with the 
laws in question, spiraling in from the most general to the more specific:  
 
Whereas, according to both common spiritual and worldly laws, also inherited 
Christian order, it is proper for a bishop to follow the old Christian church order 
in his bishopric; moreover, it has been provided for in many of our and the 
Empire’s ordinances, recesses, and especially the constitution of the publicly 
promulgated Land-Peace, and in the recently established Augsburg Religion-
Peace, that in order to avoid the penalty mentioned within that Land-Peace, each 
ruler—spiritual and worldly—must let the subjects of the others remain 
undisturbed in their religion; and especially, that the estates of the Augsburg 
Confession should carry out no hindrance or violence to the other estates who 
follow the old religion in their religion, faith, rights, usages, ordinances, and 
ceremonies, also their subjects, dominions, domains, and properties; nor in any 
other way to do un-good against the same. Rather, each should let himself be 
sufficed vis-a-vis the others as is proper according to the law.70 
 
Also, the four locations Schretzheim, Donaualtheim, Wittislingen and Reistingen, 
in which the Cardinal, Bishop, and Collegiate Church at Augsburg have all high 
and low jurisdictional authority, with rule, taxation, command, and prohibition,71 
are also subject to him in matters of church governance and spiritual jurisdiction, 
and to him belongs all spiritual and worldly authority, except capital punishment 
of criminal matters; with the specific condition in criminal matters that the 
Collegiate Church’s personnel will deliver the criminals outside of the city 
enclosure to the Pfalz authorities. So, in those locations, the plaintiff, as spiritual 
                                               
68 See Josef Leeb, ed., Deutsche Reichstagsakten: Reichsversammlungen 1556-1662. Der Reichstag zu 
Regensburg 1556/57 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), Nr. 562, 1359-60. 
69 Brothagen became an advocate at the Imperial Chamber Court in 1556; perhaps he was by then working 
for one of the parties? See “Samuel Brothag,” accessed July 10, 2019, 
https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Samuel_Brothag#/Leben 
70 This is referring to Augsburg Religion-Peace sections 15, 16, and 23. At issue in this case was especially 
Section 23: “No estate should induce or force another’s subjects to accept his religion or abandon the other’s, or take 
such subject into his Schutz und Schirm (lordly protection) as against his orderly ruler.” 
71 The list repeated throughout the document is: rule/sceptre (Raiß), taxation (Steur, Zinß, Gulten), 
command (Gebot) and prohibition (Verbot). 
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and temporal ruler, alone is suited, and ordered, to make ordinances regarding the 
religion, and to maintain it.72 
 
Three layers of law were cited in this introductory paragraph, providing legal bearing to the 
accusations that followed. The first and most comprehensive layer was that of “common spiritual 
and worldly laws” which constituted the “inherited Christian order.” The second was imperial 
law, made up of its ordinances, recesses, the Eternal Land-Peace, and the Augsburg Religion-
Peace. Third were the specific rights (Gerechtigkeiten) assigned to the Bishop of Augsburg as 
regards jurisdiction. According to the first layer, Bishops should be able to carry out their duties 
fully in their Bishopric. According to the second layer: no ruler should disturb another ruler or 
his subjects in religion. According to the third layer: the Bishop of Augsburg had full secular and 
spiritual authority in the four villages in question, except criminal matters that involve capital 
punishment. 
Next, the Mandate narrated the facts, as alleged by the plaintiff. 
 
But, against all of this, you, on the 7th of October 1555, wrote to the Bishop of 
Augsburg, notifying him of your intentions to establish your new religion in those 
four locations, and demanding him to send the parish priests of those places on a 
certain day to Neuburg, to be examined and to do a trial sermon in front of your 
superintendent; and if such did not happen, then you would replace them with 
other priests, shaped and experienced of your religious order.73 
 
The mandate continued that when the Bishop heard about this from his deputy, he told him to use 
all means to not allow this to happen, and appealed to King Ferdinand, who then wrote to the 
defendant saying that such actions violated the Religion-Peace, and he should either desist 
immediately, or suspend those actions until the next imperial assembly, where they could be 
discussed. 
But the defendant did not heed this demand; on December 27, he wrote a letter to King 
Ferdinand saying he would not desist, but intended to write a report explaining the reasons for 
his action. Then, on the 4th of January 1556, an official for the defendant sent a summons to all 
of the parish priests of those four villages, ordering that they appear in Neuburg in five days to 
be examined and perform a trial sermon, or else to abandon their posts; and if they would do 
neither, then “they should expect further actions against them, which” said the Court mandate 
“went directly against the common laws, imperial ordinances, recesses, and especially the Land- 
and Religion-Peace.”74 
                                               
72 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556. 
73 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556: “doch dem allem zu wider dein lieb uff den 
siebenden tag Octobris nechstverschienen funffundfunfftzigisten jars ein schreiben an gemelten unsern freundt der 
Cardinal und Bischoffen zu Augspurg haltendt, in seiner freundtschafft abrufen inen statheltern und Rhaten 
uberschickht darin dein lieb sich vernehmen lasse das sie vorhabens sey in ermelten vier flecken ir new religion 
uffzurichten unnd derhalben an sein freundtschafft gesonnen(?) Die pfarherr derselben irer flecken uff ein 
bestimpten tag geen Neuburg fur deiner lieb super intendenten sich examiniren zulassen und probpredig zuthun 
zuschickhen und wo solchs nit geschehe das dein lieb fur sich selbst andere pfarrer irer religion ordnung geschickht 
und erfarn dahin ordnen wolte.” 
74 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556: “gemeinen rechten Reichs ordnungen abschieden 
und sunderlich dem ufgerichten landt und religion friden strack zuwider.” 
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The mandate ended by saying that these actions should cause the actualization of the 
highest penalty threatened in those laws, namely, the Acht (outlawry). 
 
Who Violated the Augsburg Religion-Peace? 
 
The Bishop argued in his petition that by summoning the four parish priests to give a trial 
sermon, the Duke violated the Peace.75 The language of the Mandate suggests that three sections 
were in question76: 
 
Section 15: Nor may any one make war upon any Estate of the empire on account 
of the Augsburg Confession, nor do violence to them, nor force them to abandon 
their Confession in the dominions where it has been established, and any violation 
of this would be considered a breach of the Peace. 
 
Section 16: Neither may those of the Augsburg Confession do any of the above-
mentioned acts to those who adhere to the old faith, and they should leave them 
undisturbed in their possessions and rights. 
 
Section 23: No estate should induce or force another’s subjects to accept his 
religion or abandon the other’s, or take such subject into his Schutz und Schirm 
(lordly protection) as against his orderly ruler. 
 
Deschler, the lawyer for the Duke, began the Exception and Defense with a generic protestation 
of non-consent, saying that he protested, publicly and formally, the Imperial Chamber Court’s 
jurisdiction, and did not intend through the submission of any document to indicate consent to 
the Court’s jurisdiction in this case, but was only doing what he was obligated minimally to do 
legally.77 Deschler then made the provocative statement that, far from violating the Augsburg 
Religion-Peace, the defendant would like to cite the Augsburg Religion-Peace in his own 
defense. While the Bishop, he wrote, cited the laws on his own behalf “as if this all […] might 
support and abet his unauthorized undertakings, or should protect” him, the lawyer for the 
Prince, “wants that those same all be repeated and laid bare, word for word and letter by letter, 
for the protection and defense of his principal—especially the Religion-Peace—[...] as a prince 
and obedient member of the Holy Roman Empire.”78 The violation, he said, had to do with the 
King’s letter, which entreated and commanded the Duke to cease his summoning of the four 
parish priests, or at least to suspend them until the next imperial assembly. “This lawyer,” began 
Deschler, writing in the third person, “received the letter not without astonishment.” Deschler 
                                               
75 Munich 264, Q3, “Clagschrifft,” 1556. 
76 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556. 
77 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc,” 1556. 
78 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc,” 1556: “Erstlich g.h., als der herr gegentail 
(wie das Mandat ausweist deß hailigen Romischen Reichs und gemeinen gaistlichen und welltlichen rechten, 
Constitution und sonderlich deß hailigen Reichs jungst zu Augspurg aufgerichten Religion friden fur sich anzeucht 
als ob dises alles zu furderung und furschub seines unbefuegten vorhabens angezogen konndt oder mochte worden 
oder ine den herrn gegentail bey seinem unbefügten vorhaben sollte beschüzen und vertheidingen mogen, Will 
fürstlicher anwald gleichfalls dasselbig alles zu schutz und defension seines gnedigen herrn von Wort zu Worten 
und wie der Buchstab allenthalben sonderlichdes gedachten Religion friden vermag hieher umb geliebter kurz willen 
repetiert unnderhollt [unterhöhlen] haben.” 
 246 
accused the Bishop’s side of seeking the King’s letter in order to fabricate corroborating 
evidence of wrongdoing.  
 
First and foremost [we] believe that the King’s letter was sent out with precisely 
the same reason (grund und fueg ausbracht) as the imperial mandate, so that the 
other party may draw on and refer to the King’s letter, attained in the absence of 
and without hearing the other party, [...] as though it was already shown that my 
principal had acted against the Religion-Peace and therefore is to be declared in 
the penalty of the Land-Peace and the Holy Empire’s Acht.79 
 
The accusation being made here is that the King’s letter, like the Court’s mandate itself, had 
taken the Bishop’s allegations at face value, and assumed what actually could not have been 
concluded without a full hearing of the defendant. There was an implicit accusation of bad faith 
manipulation of the proceeding; that the Bishop sought the King’s letter precisely in order to 
have it to “draw on and refer to,” as evidence that the Duke had acted against the Religion-Peace, 
when in fact, the King was only writing on the basis of the narration provided by the Bishop’s 
side. “Such a claim,” he continued, “would have been more properly made by my principal 
against the other party [the Bishop], since it was he who acted against the Religion-Peace.” He 
continued: 
The Religion-Peace conveys with clear words that you [judges] should not decide 
any proceeding or mandate […] that would go against the content of the Religion-
Peace.80 So, we ask that you recognize the mandate and inhibition as acting 
against the Religion-Peace, and that you abrogate the proceeding, and that you not 
allow any further hindrance of the princely rights and high jurisdiction that go 
against the Religion-Peace, the Holy Empire’s laws, ordinances, and statutes – 
neither through your own mandates and inhibitions, nor through the actions of 
others.81 
 
The Bishop, in other words, had violated the Religion-Peace precisely by launching this 
proceeding at the Imperial Chamber Court. Moreover, though the Imperial Chamber Court was 
the preferred court of first instance in disputes arising under the terms of the Augsburg Religion-
Peace, the Court violated the Religion-Peace through the mandate itself, and therefore had no 
jurisdiction in the case.82 Though he did not cite the sections specifically, he seems to be saying 
that by launching the suit in the Court the Bishop violated Sections 15, 20, and perhaps also 23: 
 
Section 20: Spiritual jurisdiction shall not be exercised vis-a-vis adherents of the 
Augsburg Confession with respect to the religion, beliefs, clerical appointments, 
usages, rules, and ceremonies they have established, but its jurisdiction still stands 
on other issues. 
 
And that the Court, by accepting the suit and sending out the mandate, violated Section 32, and 
therefore he rejects the Court’s jurisdiction, and declines the forum: 
                                               
79 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc,” 1556. 
80 Referring to ARP section 32. 
81 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc,” 1556. 
82 On the controversial nature of the mandate, see Chapter 2 on court procedure. 
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Section 32: The Imperial Chamber Court must conform to the terms of this 
resolution, and must inform parties of its relevant terms. 
 
It is likely that he was able to make this argument about the Bishop and the Court because this 
was a mandate case; it was the requirement that the Duke stop immediately his actions while the 
case was pending that he says inhibits his jurisdictional rights.  
For the Bishop, this claim by the Duke violated not only the Bishop’s jurisdictional 
rights, but also thousands of years of custom and spiritual and godly laws: 
 
This claim was presented by the other party, without any reason, against all law 
and propriety/equity, also against the Religion-Peace, how it is shown and 
deduced from godly and human, spiritual and worldly laws, and in particular 
would be clearly understood also from the Religion-Peace, in which it is ordered, 
set under the penalty of the Land-peace, that no authority shall convince away the 
subjects of another authority and pull to his religion, which, insofar as this 
concerns the true, old Catholic religion, was set and ordered for itself more than a 
thousand years ago in the holy Canons and also in imperial laws. Now however it 
can never be contradicted, for the residents of four locations, because my 
principal has all Raiß, Steur, Gebot and Verbot [rule, taxation, command, 
prohibition] are his true, undoubtable, praiseworthy, sworn, homaged subjects, 
and because no dominion nor ruler has power or authority to pull the subjects of 
another to his religion, so it follows undisputedly that such in no way stands to or 
is proper for the other party. 83 
 
Wolf dismissed Deschler’s protestation as one of “low worth” because according to the language 
of both the Eternal Land-Peace and the Religion-Peace, it is clear “that this present matter is 
subject to this Imperial Chamber Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore neither the alleged 
protestation nor any declining of the forum should, nor may, be given credence.”84 
Furthermore, Wolf denied that the laws of the Empire, including the Augsburg Religion-
Peace, would defend the other party.85 
 
The other party would like to draw on and base his Exception and Defense on the 
spiritual and worldly laws, the holy Empire’s constitution and order, and the 
established Religion-Peace, which this lawyer had cited properly in the Mandate 
and Citation, and alleges to defend himself thereby; but that would fail him 
completely. 
 
He continued: 
 
In the Religion-Peace it is clearly provided for that no estate of the holy Empire 
should convince away nor pressure or force the subjects of another estate to his 
religion. Insofar as this article [in the Religion-Peace] concerns the old, true 
Catholic religion, it is in accordance with the above-mentioned spiritual and 
                                               
83 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
84 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
85 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
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worldly, indeed even also the godly and natural laws, in which understanding also 
of that article the principal of this lawyer accepted at the imperial assembly at 
Augsburg.86  
 
In other words: what was there to be converted away from except the status quo? On his view, 
the article in the Augsburg Religion-Peace that restricted “convincing or forcing subjects of 
another estate to take on one’s own religion” was designed to limit the new religion, not the old 
religion. 
Therefore, the Religion-Peace in no way suits the wish of the other party to 
establish the new religion in the four locations, and thereby to pull away the 
subjects of the Cardinal and Bishop from the true Catholic [religion] onto his new 
religion.87 
 
He continued that if the defendant party would settle the litis then the Court could move onto the 
substantive part of the case in which all of the issues in question could be determined fully.  
 
Whether, however, the other party should act on such letter, or not, and with what 
reason that letter was sent out by the King, and whether it should be recognized or 
not that the other party’s violent, threatening, and violent actions were undertaken 
against all godly, human, spiritual and imperial laws, also the common Land- and 
especially Religion-Peace, leading to penalty of the Land-Peace – all of which 
would be found to be the case in the legal pleadings of this matter and the 
litigation, after the Litiscontestatio, through your legal [...] decision. [...] So, it is 
this lawyer’s request that you recognize that the other party is obligated to settle 
the litis.88 
 
 
Who Had Jurisdiction? What Kind of Jurisdiction? 
 
 The back-and-forth about jurisdiction in this case worked at multiple levels. First, they 
discussed the question: who had jurisdiction over the four villages? In part this was a question of 
presenting competing jurisdictional claims, as a matter of evidence. Even so, it turned out that 
this was not a straightforward question to answer, because each of the parties—the Duke and the 
Bishop—exercised a certain kind of jurisdictional authority with respect to the villages. But it 
was not clear, based on the terms of the Augsburg Peace, whose jurisdictional authority 
                                               
86 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
87 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Darumb geburt auch dem hern 
gegentail vermag angeregts Religion fridens mit nichten, sein Newe religion in vielgemelten vier flecken, 
anzurichten und also derselben underthanen hochermeltem Cardinal und Bischove von der waren Catholischen auf 
sein Newe religion abzuziehen.” 
88 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “ob aber der her gegenteil solchem 
koniglichen schreiben stat thuen sollen oder nit und mit was grundt auch dasselbig von irer Mat. außgebracht, und 
ob von deß hern gegenteils gwaltiger trewlicher und thätlicher handlung wegen, so durch sein f.g. wider alle gütliche 
Menschliche gaistliche und kayserliche Recht auch dem gmainen Land und sondern Religion friden furgenomen und 
geubt, in peen deß Landtfridens, erkent wurden soll oder nit, das alles würdt sich in rechtlicher ausfuerung dieser 
sachen und rechtfertigung, nach die Litis Contestation und rechtlichen beschlus, in der sachen auß e.g. erkantnus 
und urteil wol befunden.” 
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warranted the regulation of religion there. So, they are pushed from more particularistic 
discussions into a more wide-ranging discussion about what kind of jurisdictional authority, as 
such, has the duty and right to regulate religion.  
  The Bishop argued in his petition that he had “high and low jurisdiction” in the four 
villages, “except in criminal matters involving capital punishment.”89 As such, when the 
defendant Duke sought to regulate religion in the four villages, he violated the Bishop’s 
jurisdiction. 
  The defendant argued that the four villages in question were in fact within the Duke’s 
jurisdiction. The villages, he said, “lie directly within [his] land-princely higher dominion and 
territory.”  To prove this, he notes that he had “Geleit und Zoll,” which referred to the general 
authority and duty to regulate and facilitate trade, including keeping roads safe, managing 
customs and duties, “as well as other princely sovereign rights”; and in addition the right to tax 
on several of his enfeoffed properties there.90 The Bishop’s lawyer, Wolf, dismissed the Duke’s 
claim that his Geleit and Zoll rights corroborated his high jurisdictional authority there. 
  Most importantly, “to [the Duke] and no one else belongs the capital and criminal 
jurisdiction.” These rights, he said, have been possessed by his “forefathers of praiseworthy and 
blessed memory” for “more than a hundred years, without any disturbance or injury.” 
So, it is strange and astonishing to hear that the other party presumes to have the 
high and low jurisdiction (as the mandate claims), as he immediately thereafter, 
against his own self, conceded that the same high jurisdiction [belongs to] the 
Prince.91  
On the defendant’s view, “high jurisdiction” was synonymous with the ability to punish 
corporeally and capitally, so the person who had capital jurisdiction had high jurisdiction.92 
  In his Response, the Bishop’s lawyer repeated that in the four villages in question, the 
Cardinal and Bishop of Augsburg and his Collegiate Church there, had “all high and low civil 
jurisdiction, with rights of taxation, commanding and forbidding, completely; excluding only 
capital punishment, and that, indeed, with the above-mentioned limits and conditions.”93 Here, 
we see the Bishop’s lawyer specifying that the Bishop had “high and low civil jurisdiction” and 
                                               
89 Munich 264, Q3, “Clagschrifft,” 1556: “allein die hohenstraffen der malefizischen sachen 
außgeschlossen.” 
90 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc,” 1556. 
91 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “Wie dan ir f.g. und dero vorfarn 
loblicher und seliger gedechtnus dessen alles lanng zeit her und mer dann ainhundert jar in rwhiger posseß gewer 
und innhaben one menigclichs irrung und eintrag gewesst sind und noch. Allso das frembd und verwunderlich 
zuhorn ist dz sich der herr gegentail der hohen und nidern gerichtbarkait (wie das mandat mit bringt) sich alldo 
anmassen soll, so Er doch gleich darauf ime selbs zuwider dergleichen hohe Obrigkait hochernanten main gnedigen 
fursten und herrn der warhait noch bekantlich ist.” 
92 According to an historical dictionary, synonyms for “hohe Gerichtsbarkeit” or “Hochgerichtsbarkeit” are 
“Blutgerichtsbarkeit” (blood jurisdiction, iurisdiction sanguinis), “Halsgerichtsbarkeit” (neck jurisdiction), and 
“Blutbann” (blood sentence, vindicta sanguinis). See Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 2, s.v. 
“Hochgerichtsbarkeit,” 173-5. “Hochgerichtsbarkeit” is defined as “criminal jurisdiction” and “jurisdiction over 
capital crimes.” 
93 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Nun ist aber offenpar, und durch 
den hern gegentail unvernainlich, das obgemelte und in e.f.g. mandat bestimpte vier flecken, hochstgedachten 
Cardinal und Bischoven zu Augspurg und seiner f.g. loblichen alten stifft augspurg mit aller hoher und niderer 
burgerilcher gerichtbarkeit, als mit raiß, Steur, Rent, Zinß, Gült, Gebott und Verbott durch auß, allein die hohen straf 
der Malefizischen Oberkait, und doch mit angeregter massen ausgeschlossen zugehorig.” 
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that his criminal jurisdiction was only limited in his inability to carry out the capital punishment 
(emphasis mine); the Palatinate authorities were responsible for that, but there were limits on 
how they could go about accessing the criminals within those villages. Specifically, the Mandate 
stated that “in criminal matters, the Collegiate Church’s personnel would deliver the criminals 
outside of the city enclosure to the Palatinate authorities.”94  
 The Duke’s lawyer, Deschler, addressed the Bishop’s rather significant caveat on the 
Duke’s capital jurisdiction.  
The other party noxiously claims in the Mandate that my principal, though having 
the capital jurisdiction in those four villages, only has it to the extent that the other 
party’s personnel delivers the criminal in front of and outside of the enclosure [i.e. 
the village boundaries] [...] However, the Collegiate Church personnel are not 
merely obligated to do so; [rather,] if it does not happen within three days after 
my principal’s personnel send request, then my principal’s personnel have full 
power and authority, on account of the high jurisdiction, to take them out [remove 
the criminals by force] and even to punish the other party’s personnel for their 
disobedience. [...] From all of which it clearly follows that the principal has high 
princely jurisdiction without condition, unlike the other party whose privilege is 
not absolute.95 
 So, the defendant lawyer’s argument here was that the Duke’s capital criminal 
jurisdiction in the four villages was “absolute” to the extent that if the Collegiate Church 
personnel would not deliver hypothetical culprits outside of the village to Palatinate authorities 
within three days of a request, that the Palatinate authorities would have the right not only to take 
the culprits by force, but also to punish the Collegiate Church personnel who refused to 
cooperate.  
  The Bishop’s lawyer rebuffed these claims, arguing that the Palatinate Prince had no 
authority to punish Collegiate Church personnel for failing to deliver a culprit, that there had 
                                               
94 Munich 264, Q2, “Copia Mandati & Citationis,” 1556: “Wiewol auch die vier flecken schertzheim 
Ouolzheim wittilingen und Reisstingen ermeltem unserm lieben freundt und fursten dem Cardinal Bischoffen unnd 
Stifft zu Augspurg mit aller hohen und nidern gerichtlichen Obrigkeit als mit raiß, steur, zinß gulten gebot verbot, 
und sunderlich auch mit dem kirchensatz und der geistlichen jurisdiction unterworffen und seiner freundtschafft alle 
geistliche und weltliche obrigkeit zugehorn, allein die hohenstraffen der malefizischen sachen außgeschlossen.” 
welche deiner lieb doch mit dersondernn maß das die ubelichenn durch die pfaltzische in berurten flecken nit 
angegrifen sonder durch die stiftische ambt durch fur die Etter herauß geant- 
Wort werden sollen, zuestee und also in sollichen flecken sainer frunndtschafft als geistlicher unnd weltlicher 
obergkait allein die Religion zuordnen unnd zuerhalten gebuer und bevolhen sey.” 
95 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “Zum dritten gnediger herr, als durch 
den herrn gegentail unfürtreglicher weis laut deß mandats fürbracht ist, als sollte anwalds gnediger furst und herr die 
hoch malefizisch oberkait mit den bemellten vier dorffern allain mit ainer Maß zugehorn und gebürn, als nemlich 
das er der herr gegentail und seiner gnaden Ambtleut anwalds gnedigen principaln und ir f.g. ambtleutten etc. die 
ubelthater für die Etter heraues zuantworten schuldig sein […] Darneben aber seind deß herrn gegentails ambtleutth 
die ubelthater anwalds gnedigen principaln nit allain für die Etter heraus zu antworten schulldig 
sonnder da ir f.g. ambtleut solchs auf  ir begern, und ansinnen in drey tagen nit ervollgt als dann haben ir f.g. vollen 
mach und gewallt dieselbigen für sich selbs in krafft der hohenobrigkait heraus zunemen und deß herrn gegentails 
ambtleut umb iren ungehorsam darumben wie sich geburt zustraffen […] Aus welchem nu clarlich ervollgt, das 
anwalds gnedigen fursten und herrn die hohe Lannsfurstliche obrigkait der ennden gar nit mit ainer maß sonnder wol 
in gegenspil ime herrn gegentail und allen andern so dergleichen und noch merere als hofmarchsgerechtigkait haben, 
ir freihait nit absolute.” 
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been no single case in which the Palatinate authorities had had to do a raid to exercise their 
criminal jurisdiction (i.e. to seize a culprit that the Collegiate Church personnel were unwilling to 
deliver), nor any evidence that the Palatinate authorities had had reason to punish Collegiate 
Church personnel.96  
  The Duke’s lawyer said that it was not envisioned by the Peace that someone with low 
jurisdiction would have the right to regulate religion in a given domain. 
That however, the other party, on account of his lower jurisdiction (which other 
surrounding prelates, princes, and lords in the principality have) has the right to 
hinder my principal in establishing the Christian, true, catholic religion, or claims 
to give himself that right – this, we hope, neither you nor your other judges, nor 
anyone else of a correct, healthy reason, and especially who has experience in 
these matters, would ever consider fair, nor legal.97 
Deschler made the point here that someone with only lower jurisdiction (such as, on his view, the 
Bishop) could not exercise the right of establishing and governing religion in an area where 
someone with higher jurisdiction had that same right, because the lower jurisdiction existed at 
the will and allowance of the Prince. He said that it would be “against all fairness, as well as 
human sense, reason, and understanding” that the other party, who had lower jurisdiction, would 
be entitled to direct and establish his religion, because lower jurisdiction existed conditionally 
upon the grace of the territorial Prince.98 “It was neither provided for in the letter of the Religion-
Peace, nor much less was it the will, purpose or intention of the Roman Emperor, Kingly 
Majesty, and the Electors and Estates of the Holy Empire” that he with lower jurisdictional 
authority have power to establish his religion.99 
  Wolf responded that any claim that the Bishop’s jurisdiction over the four villages was 
derivative of, or existed conditionally by the permission of the Duke’s jurisdiction, was both 
legally wrong, and historically inaccurate. Appealing to origins and ancient provenance, and 
highlighting the way in which the Bishopric’s existence predated the princely status of the 
Palatinate rulers, Wolf stated that St. Ulrich (d. 973 C.E.)—the beloved consecrated prince-
bishop, who exemplified piety and loyalty to emperor—had, first by virtue of his family’s status 
as counts, and then through his appointment as bishop in 923, all jurisdiction in his domains, 
including the four villages.100  
For it is known and apparent that hundreds of years ago, at a time when the other 
                                               
96 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
97 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “Das aber ime herrn gegentail von 
wegen der Nidern gerechbarkait wie hieoben erzellt (welche annder mer umbligennd und ausstossent prelaten 
fürsten und herrn im fürstenthumb haben) zuostee und gebüre Anwalds gnedigen fursten und herrn ann aufrichtung 
irer f.g. christlichen waren Chatholischen Religion zuhindern oder ime selbs dieselbig zuzumessen das werden (wie 
anwald trostlich verhoff) weder eur gnad noch deren treffenliche beysitzer, noch niemandt annder rechts gesundes 
verstands.” 
98 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “wider alle billichait auch 
Menschlichen synn vernunfft und verstand.” 
99 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “Wie dann der Buchstab des Religion 
fridens ain solchs mit nichte vermag, noch vilminder der Romischen kayser und Koniglichen Maiestett und 
gemainer Churfursten und Stennden, des hailigen Reichs willen mainung noch intention gewesen ist.” 
100 See Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 39, s.v. “Ulrich, Bischof von Augsburg,” by Karl Uhlirz, 
215–21. 
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party’s domain was not yet a principality [was not yet in the princely estate], the 
four locations belonged to St. Ulrich as one of the holy Empire’s counts and the 
Bishop at Augsburg, with all higher criminal and civil, also lower authority and 
jurisdiction.101  
 At some point, he said, the capital jurisdiction was given to the Palatinate princes by the 
Bishop; that is, reversing the Duke’s alleged structure of jurisdictional gifting, he claimed that 
the capital jurisdiction of the Palatinate princes was a right they enjoyed at the pleasure of the 
Collegiate Church, not the other way around. 
The truth is and has been the common reputation among all the old, that 
beginning during the time of St. Ulrich, not only the high and low authority in 
civil matters, but rather also the high capital punishment belonged to the 
Augsburg Collegiate Church, and in those [matters], the Counts of Dillingen and 
Kyburg turned to the Collegiate Church, and the Palatinate Counts were permitted 
[to exercise capital jurisdiction]. [This right was given by the Collegiate Church 
to the Counts] on the basis of good neighborliness at that time and thereafter, 
when the bishops and worldly authorities were inclined toward each other, each 
not only not hindering the other in the administration of both spiritual and worldly 
authorities, but rather also, from Christian zeal, supporting [one another]. From 
which it follows without contradiction that my principal cannot be entitled to 
grace from the other party, rather, much more, the other party should gratefully 
recognize the Collegiate Church of Augsburg’s good deed, in permitting and 
installing the criminal jurisdiction [with them], and should be subordinate to my 
principal in his higher [status] and rights.102 
 More important for determining lordship were pledges of obeisance. “The residents [of 
these four villages] have done the pledge of obeisance to the Bishop,” so they were “the subjects 
of the Bishop and the Collegiate Church of Augsburg, and not of the other party nor of the 
Palatinate.”103 Further proof that the residents of the four villages were not the subjects of the 
Palatinate was the absence of representatives from those villages at Palatinate assemblies. 
                                               
101 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “kund und offenbar, das gemelte 
vier flecken vor viel hundert jaren und zu der zeit, da diß deß hern gegentails furstenthumb noch in furstlichem 
standt nit gewesen, S. Ulrich als einen deß heiligen Reichs Graven und Bischoven zu Augspurgk, mit aller hoher 
fraischlicher und Burgerlicher, auch niderer Oberkeit und gerichtparkeit zugehort.” 
102 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: So der ist die warheit und bei allen 
alten, das gemain geschrey gewesen und noch von S. Ulrichs zeitten herrurendt, das zu derselben zeit nit allain die 
hohe und nidere oberkeit in burgerlichen sachen, sonder auch die hohe Malefizische straff dem Stifft aufspurg 
zugehort, unnd auf denselben von den graven zu Dillingen und Kiburg gewendt worden sey Wie solchs hieoben 
auch angeregt, und volgendts den pfalzgraven, auß gueter Nachpaurschafft so derselben zeit und darnach die 
Bischove und weltlichen oberkaiten gegeneinander yedertail den andern in verwaltung beeder gaistlicher und 
weltlicher oberkaiten nit allein zuverhindern, sonder auch auß Christenlicher eyfer zufurdern genaigt gewesen, 
zugelassen worden, darauß dan unwidersprechlich volgt, das anwalts gnedigster her principal dem hern gegentail 
keiner gnaden gestendig sein kan. Sonder das der her gegentail vilmer das Stiffts augspurg guethat, in nachlassung 
und zustallung der Malefizischen oberkeit, dankbarlich erkennen und anwalts gnedigsten hern principaln an irer ober 
und gerechtigkeit nicht dermassen zubetrueben understeen solt.” 
103 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “auch allein seiner f.g. underthans 
pflicht und huldigung gethan.” 
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That, however, the other party has no land-princely authority over the four 
locations, and that also the residents of those places are not the subjects of the 
Palatinate, is however to be clearly deduced therefrom, that [no one from those 
villages] appeared in the considerably large number of Landtags (territorial 
assemblies) held by the other party and his ancestors, neither before nor within 
human memory, which otherwise is customary for Landsässen (subjects) and 
Hofmarkshern (lord’s stewarts) to do; nor sought the least amount of help, nor 
that the Palatinate carried any burden [with respect to them.]104 
The Duke also argued that if someone with only lower jurisdiction (such as, on his view, the 
Bishop) could order religion, then multiplicity of religion in one domain would potentially result.  
 
For if that should be provided for, there would [be] no greater confusion or 
disorder in Christendom, […] ; for from that it would follow finally that not only 
in a principality, duchy, or other domain, but rather also in one single village or 
small location, many kinds of religion and faith would exist and emerge.105 
 
Taking as a shared premise that multiplicity of religion and faith would pose a problem within a 
single domain – whether principality, duchy, or village – the Duke argued here that the plaintiff 
Bishop’s argument promised a path to achieving this unwanted outcome; if anyone could be 
entitled to authority to establish religion in a place where they exercised some limited form of 
jurisdiction, and since it was the case that those with lower jurisdiction possessed it, by 
definition, at the pleasure of another authority, then there was always the risk that these layered 
jurisdictional authorities could order religion in different ways within the very same domain. 
Responding to this, the Bishop’s lawyer said “rather, the contrary is the truth,”  
 
For it is known and obvious, that in the domains where the new religion is 
accepted, and the worldly authorities subdue/oppress spiritual authorities, and 
subordinate to themselves the administration of spiritual authority, until now all 
different and mutually repulsive, and fallen from the Common Catholic Church, 
sects have emerged – not only in cities and villages, but rather also in houses, yes 
even in marriage chambers and beds. So that on this day, in a city, hundreds of 
faiths, who indeed all want to have a name, are invented.  
 
All of which, with the old Catholic church from old times, was not the case, and 
still is not. Rather, what is believed in a principality, a city, a location, a village, a 
                                               
104 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Das aber der her gegentail, uber 
vielgemelten vier flecken khein landtsfurstlichen oberkait hab, und das auch derselben inwoner dieser pfalz 
landtsessen nit sein ist aber uber hinver(?) angezaigte grund, auß dem Lauter abzunemen, das der her gegentail den 
wenigsten vall oder puncten nit anzaigen khan, noch vilweniger probiren wurdet, das von dieses flecken wegen ye 
yemandts auf die Landtag so der her gegentail und seiner f.g. voreltern eben vor und bei Manß gedanckhen in 
zimblich grosser anzall gehalten, wie sonst mit den Landtsessen und hofmarcks hern gebreuchig, erfordert 
geschweigen erschinen, oder ye die wenigst hilff oder burdin dieser pfalz getragen, oder gelastet habe.” 
105 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “dann wann das wie erzellt gestattet 
werden sollte were kain grossere Confusion oder verwirrung der hailigen Christlichen Religion in der Christenhait 
nie gewesen noch konnfftigclich zu gewarten. Daraus enntlich volgen wurde, das nit allain in ainem furstenthumb 
Graven oder ander herschafften, sonnder auch in ain ainzichen dorf oder fleckhen mangerlay Religion und glauben 
entsteen und aufkommen wurden.”  
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house, or a room, that is all, in all kingdoms, principalities, cities, villages, 
locations, and houses, and among all of those places’ residents, of spiritual and 
worldly estate, high and low persons, men and women, young and old, in the 
Catholic Church, was always one single unanimous Christian and Catholic faith, 
and still is. And if some dared to make, against that, any splitting and division, 
that those same were excluded from all kingdoms, principalities, cities, locations, 
and villages, indeed from all of the Christian community, and in the entire Roman 
empire, according to common spiritual and imperial laws, not tolerated, rather 
driven out, and received their proper punishment.106 
 
In other words, the only risk of multiplicity of religion arising comes from domains that have 
taken on the new religion. 
 
Who Had Authority to Order Religion? 
 
 Wolf argued that delegates to the princely council “of both religions”107 at the Augsburg 
imperial assembly of 1555 undoubtedly understood the article of the Peace that prohibited 
inducing or forcing another’s subject to accept his religion or abandon the other’s (Section 23) as 
applying equally to subjects who happened to reside in domains where another ruler had capital 
jurisdiction over them. In other words, capital jurisdiction alone did not determine to whom a 
resident was subject. The only right that the Palatinate prince had over the four villages was the 
capital criminal jurisdiction, “and it did not follow that because the other party had high criminal 
authority over the four locations that therefore the residents of those four locations were his 
subjects.”108 
 The Duke argued that in fact capital jurisdiction did entail that kind of relationship and 
authority: 
 
                                               
106 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “sonder ist das widerspiel die 
warheit, dan kund und offenbar, das in dem oberkeiten, da die newe Religion angenommen und die weltlichen 
oberkeiten die gaistlichen verdrucken und sich der verwaltung gaistlicher oberkeit underziehen, bisher alle 
underschidliche und einander widerwertige, und von gmainer Catholischen Kirchen abgevallen secten, nit allein in 
Stetten und Dorffern, sonder auch in Heusern, ja auch in der ehleuth Camern und betten entstanden, Also das auf 
diesen tag in einer stat wol hunderterlay glauben, die doch alle ein Namen haben wollen, sein, und erfunden warden 
Welches alles bei der alten Catholischen Kirchen von alter her nit gewesen, auch noch nit ist, Sonder was in einem 
furstenthumb, Statt, Flecken, Dorff, Hauß, oder Kamer geglaubt, das ist alles, in allen konigreichen furstenthomben, 
stet, dorffer, flecken, und heusern und bey allen derselben inwoner, gaistlichs und weltlichs standts hohen und 
nidern personen, Mannen und weiber, jungen und alten in der Catholischen Kirchen alwegen ein einiger einhelliger 
Christenlicher und Catholischer glaub gewesen und noch, Also welche dagegen einiche spaltung und trennung 
zumachen understanden, das dieselben auß allen konigreichen furstenthumben, stetten, fleckhen, und dorffern, ja 
auß aller Christenlicher gemaind außgeschlossen und in dem ganzen Romischen Reich nach gemainen gaistlichen 
und key. rechten nit geduldet, sonder außgetrieben worden, und ir geburliche straf empfangen haben.” 
107 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “von den potschafften deß fursten 
raths baider religionen” 
108 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556. 
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[...] it makes sense that the Prince who has the merum et mixtum imperium and 
has power to judge over life and limb [also] has power to establish and command 
in the religion and faith matters, in which lie salvation and beatitude.109 
 
The term “imperium merum et mixtum” began to be used in the German lands in the twelfth 
century to describe complete jurisdiction (plena iurisdictio). Ulpian defined “imperium” to be 
either “merum” (simple) or “mixtum” (mixed).110 While “merum imperium” referred to high 
criminal jurisdiction, also known as blood jurisdiction (Blutgerichtsbarkeit), including the 
authority to punish capitally, “mixtum imperium” referred to high civil jurisdiction. Beginning in 
the fourteenth century and into the early modern period, when jurisdiction came to be seen as an 
essential part of territorial sovereignty, the formula “merum et mixtum imperium” became a 
description of territorial sovereignty per se.111 
The paragraph that follows made a fascinating argument as to why this was, linking the 
right to govern religion with the right to decide on matters of life and death. The defendant 
lawyer continued: 
 
For it is the case, that the primary and greatest motive of the Religion-Peace was 
so that (just as one has power to damn a thief to the gallows, a murderer to the 
wheel [torture instrument], and a heretic to fire), in the same way, the ordering of 
the holy Christian religion, which concerns the soul’s salvation and eternal life, 
according to godly and natural laws and all reason, would properly belong 
directly to the higher authority [the ruler with high jurisdiction] and not to the 
lower jurisdiction.112 
 
                                               
109 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “sollte vor dem Lannsfürsten der des 
merum et mixtum imperium unnd uber Leib und Leben zurichten macht hat inn der Religion und glaubenssachen 
darinn der Seelen hail und Seligkait gelegen, Sins gefalls zuschaffen und zu gebieten haben.” 
110 See Justinian’s Digest, 2.1.3: “Imperium aut merum aut mixtum est. Merum est imperium habere gladii 
potestatem ad animadvertendum facinorosos homines, quod etiam potestas appellatur. Mixtum est imperium, cui 
etiam iurisdictio inest, quod in danda bonorum possessione consistit. Iurisdictio est etiam iudicis dandi licentia.”  
Translation in Watson, ed. The Digest of Justinian, 40: “Imperium [authority] is simple or mixed. To have 
simple imperium is to have the power of the sword to punish the wicked and this is also called potestas [power]. 
Imperium is mixed where it also carries jurisdiction to grant bonorum possessio [see glossary in Watson]. Such 
jurisdiction includes also the power to appoint a judge.” 
111 Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 2, s.v. “Imperium merum et mixtum,” by Rudolf 
Hoke, 333f. Also see William Smith, ed., “Imperium,” in A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, (London: 
John Murray, 1875), 629: Simple authority is to have “the power of the sword to punish the wicked,” “a power that 
had no connection with jurisdictio” but was instead “conferred by a lex.” Mixed authority is imperium that “carries 
jurisdiction within it,” i.e. “an imperium which was incident to jurisdictio,” or “the power which a magistrate had for 
the purposes of administering the civil (not criminal) part of the law.” “The mixtum imperium was nothing more than 
the power necessary for giving effect to the jurisdictio. There might therefore be Imperium without Jurisdictio, but 
there could be no Jurisdictio without Imperium.”  
112 Munich 264, Q5, “Exception unnd Defension schrifft etc.,” 1556: “dann ainmal war und 
unwidersprechlich auch das furnembst und groß Motivum deß Religion fridens gewesen ist, das dem (so ainem dieb 
zum Gallgen ainen Morder zum Rad und ainen Kezer zum feur verdammen macht habe) gleichfals die verordnung 
der hailigen Christlichen Religion, daran der seelen Seleigkhait und das Ewig Leben gelegen von Gottlichen und 
Natturlichen rechten auch aller vernufft nach, one mittl als der merern und hochern Oberkait gebüre und nachvollgtt 
und gar nit den nidern gerichtbarkaiten.” 
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The argument the defendant was making here was that it made sense that the person who 
had control over matters of life and death – of the highest temporal concern – would also have 
control over matters of religion, salvation, and eternal life – of the highest spiritual concern. 
What were the precedents for this view? The defendant cited “godly and natural laws and all 
reason” in making his argument about the motive of the Religion-Peace.  
The plaintiff, for his part, rebuffed this claim with several arguments. First, he stressed 
the limited nature of the Duke’s capital jurisdiction in those four villages.  
 
It is a [poor] equivalence, when the other party brings together regulation of 
religion with the punishing of the life of a thief, that he is to direct also his 
religion in that place where the thief lives, for since the thief is delivered before 
the enclosures of those locations [i.e. outside of the village boundaries], [the 
Palatinate authorities] do not approach those locations anymore, because the civil 
community forfeited [the thief] […]. The other party in no way orders over the 
inhabitants of those locations, except when they on account of their evil deed are 
delivered out of the location to the criminal judge. So, he has nothing to order, 
also concerning the religion, as provided in the Religion-Peace, over those same, 
nor to give them any ordinance. It therefore appears strange, that the other party 
may provide such an equivalence, as though it is the primary fundament of the 
Religion-Peace, since it is the contrary that is expressly set out and provided for in 
the Religion-Peace, and it was also held by the imperial estates as an undoubtable 
case, and therefore not stated specifically in the Religion-Peace, as has been 
sufficiently explained here.113 
 
The Bishop’s lawyer’s argument was that the right to capitally punish did not entail the 
right to regulate religion in the locations in which a criminal was a subject; for when a criminal 
committed a crime, the civil community symbolically and literally delivered him outside of the 
village, forfeiting him to the ruler with capital jurisdiction. In other words, the Duke had a 
narrow form of jurisdiction over criminals, not a generalized high jurisdiction and lordship status 
over residents of the villages.  
The Bishop’s lawyer then responded to the “thief to the gallows” argument with a 
sweeping explanation, backed up with citations from civil and canon law, about the relationship 
between temporal and spiritual authority. 
 
                                               
113 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “So ist es auch ein ungerumbte 
vergleichung, da der her gegentail die ordnung der religion, also zusamen zupringen understeet, welcher ein dieb ain 
leben zustraffen hab, das er auch sein Religion an dem ort da der dieb gesessen ist, antzurichten hab, dan da der dieb 
fur die Etter berurter flecken geantwurt, geet er die flecken nicht mer an, dieweil die burgerlichen gemainschafft 
daselbst verwurckt und dem Malefitz richter bevolhen wurdt, und in solchem vall last der flecken oberkeit weiter nit 
bekhumern, was der malefitz richter mit solchen ubelthäter, der weitter gemelter oberkeit, underthan nit ist mit 
leibstraff gehandelt werde, und dieweil dan den her gegenteill uber vielgemelter fleckhen inwoner nicht ehe noch 
anderß zugebieten   dan so sy von irer ubelthat wegen auß dem fleckhen dem Malefiz richter uberantwurdt, So hat er 
auch der religion halben vermoge berurts religion fridens uber dieselben nicht zugebieten, noch inen einiche 
ordnung zugeben, Und ist derhalben wol zubefrembden, das der her gegentail furgeben darff, das angeregte 
vermeinte vergleichung das furnembst fundament deß religion fridens gewesen seye, So doch deß widerspiel im 
religion friden außtruckenlich gesetzt und versehen, auch durch die reichstende, fur ein untzweivelichen vall 
gehalten, und derhalben in specie, in den religion friden nit gesetzt worden wie hieoben gnugsam außgefurt ist.” 
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The mentioned equivalence was directly contrary to the criminal law ordinance 
and the religion-, godly, natural, also human, spiritual and imperial laws. For, first 
of all, there are two different authorities ordered by God: the spiritual and the 
worldly, as Emperor Justinian attests: “The leader says, sacerdotal authority and 
sovereignty are gifts from God’s supreme kindness, of which the former is 
devoted to things divine, and of which the latter governs human things. Both 
proceed from the same beginning, etc.”114 
 
This was citing the first sentences of the preface to Justinian’s Novellae number VI:115 
The greatest gifts among men, made by supernal kindness, are the priesthood and 
sovereignty, of which the former is devoted to things divine, and of which the 
latter governs human things and has the care thereof. Both proceed from the same 
beginning and are ornaments of human life.116  
The Bishop’s lawyer, after citing Justinian, wrote: 
And because the administration of these two authorities are differently divided, so 
that spiritual matters should be directed by spiritual authority, and worldly matters 
should be directed by worldly authority, insofar as the religion and the 
establishing of its things belong to salvation and beatitude, they are subject to the 
spiritual authority.117 
 
The Bishop’s lawyer then cited Gregorious Nazianzenus at length, in a letter allegedly written 
“to the Constantinopolian emperor” around 322.118  
                                               
114 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Zum andern ist auch gemelte 
vergleichung und zusamen verfassung der Malefiz ordnung und der religion gotlichen und naturlich, auch 
menschlichen gaistlichen und key. rechten stracks zuwider, dan erstlich sein zwo underschidliche oberkaiten von got 
geordnet die gaistlich unnd die weltlich, wie solchs Justinianus Imperatur bezeugt, Dux sunt inquit, potestates 
sacerdotium et imperium dona videlicet dei a suprema collata clementia, illud quidem divinis ministrans, hoc autem 
humanis presidens ac diligentiam exhibens ab uno eademque principio procedentia, in aut: quo. oportet epos. in 
princip. etc.” 
115 “Maxima quidem in hominibus sunt dona dei a superna collata clementia sacerdotium et imperium, illud 
quidem divinis ministrans, hoc autem humanis praesidens ac diligentiam exhibens; ex uno eodemque principio 
utraque procedentia humanam exornant vitam.” See “Nov. VI,” accessed September 25, 2017, 
https://droitromain.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/Corpus/Nov06.htm, digitization of Rudolf Schöll and Wilhelm Kroll, eds., 
Corpus iuris civilis (Berlin: Weidmann, 1954). 
116 Fred H. Blume, trans. Annotated Justinian Code: Justinian’s Novels, accessed September 25 2017, 
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/novels/index.html  
117 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Und wiewol die verwaltungen 
dieser zwayer oberkeiten underschidlich abgetailt, also das durch die gaistlich oberkeit, die gaistlichen und durch die 
weltliche die weltliche sachen verricht werden sollen, so sein sy doch also undereinander geordnet, das die weltlich 
oberkeit, sovil die religion unnd verrichtung deren ding, so zu der seelheil und seligkeit gehoren, der gaistlichen 
underworffen, wie solchs Gregorius Naziazenus zu den Constantinopolitanischen key. schreipt: Suscipitis ne inquit 
libertatem verbi libenter accipitis, Quod lex Chri. sacerdotal. vos subijcit potestati atq. istis triunalibus subdit. dedit 
em. et nobus potestatem, dedit et principatum multo prefectiore principatibus vestris, aut numq. d. justum vobis 
videtur sie cedat spiritus carni si et terrenis celestia superent. et si divinis preferant humana.” 
118 See Ernst Dümmler et al., eds. Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Epistolae Carolini Aevi, vol. 3 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1896), 229, accessed September 28 2017, 
http://www.dmgh.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb00000539_meta:titlePage.html?sortIndex=040:010:0005:010:00:00): 
“Suscipitisne libertatem verbi, libenter accipitis, quod lex Christi Sacerdotali vos nostrae subicit potestati, atque istis 
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The acceptance of the Christian faith subjects everyone including emperors to the 
sacerdotal power—“lex Christi sacerdotali vos (scil. imperatores) nostrae subicit 
potestati”—and to sacerdotal tribunals: “atque istis tribunalibus subdit.” For 
Christ had given the priests “potestas,” that is, a “principatus” so manifestly more 
perfect than the imperial power. It would run counter to the idea of justice if the 
flesh were to dominate the spirit, if the terrestrial were to oppress the celestial, if 
human matters were to be preferred to divine matters.119  
 
He then went on to cite a letter from Pope Gelasius to Emperor Anastasius. Dated 494, the 
“Famuli vestrae pietatis” or “Duo Sunt” letter was extremely influential in establishing the two 
powers doctrine120:  
 
There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, 
namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal power. Of these that of 
the priests is the more weighty, since they have to render an account for even the 
kings of men in the divine judgment. You are also aware, dear son, that while you 
are permitted honorably to rule over human kind, yet in things divine you bow 
your head humbly before the leaders of the clergy and await from their hands the 
means of your salvation. In the reception and proper disposition of the heavenly 
mysteries you recognize that you should be subordinate rather than superior to the 
religious order, and that in these matters you depend on their judgment rather than 
wish to force them to follow your will.121 
 
Summarizing the conclusions of these three key source texts, the Bishop’s lawyer wrote: 
 
And from this appears, how it belongs to the worldly authority’s office to 
maintain the common usage in temporal peace, to reward the good and to punish 
the bad; while it belongs to the spiritual authority’s office to order the religion and 
                                               
tribunalibus subdit? Dedit enim et nobis potestatem, dedit principatum multo perfectiorem principatibus vestris. Aut 
numquid justum vobis videtur, si cedat spiritus carni, si a terrenis coelestia superentur, si fivinis praeferantur 
humana.” 
119 Walter Ullman, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological 
Relation of Clerical and Lay Power (London: Methuen, 1955), 170. In citing this, Ullman writes that Pope “Gregory 
IV [...] puts into the mouth of Gregory Naziazenus statements which the latter never made” (Ullman, 170), citing 
Dümmler who simply says of the letter, “sed verba minime congruunt” (but the words coincide minimally). At least 
in the sixteenth century, this text was regarded as authoritative. 
120 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Idem testatur Gelasius papa qui 
ad anastasium imperatore ita scribit, duo sunt imperator Augustae […]” 
See Heinrich Denzinger, ed. Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et 
morum: Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen. Lateinisch – Deutsch, 44th 
ed., ed. Peter Hünermann (Freiburg; Basel; Vienna: Herder, 2015), 146: “Duo sunt quippe, imperator auguste, 
quibus principaliter mundus hic regitur, auctoritas sacrata pontificum et regalis potestas, in quibus tanto gravius 
pondus est sacerdotum, quanto etiam pro ipsis regibus hominum in divino reddituri sunt examine rationem. Nosti 
etenim, fili clementissime, quoniam licet praesedeas humano generi dignitate, rerum tamen praesulibus divinarum 
devotus colla submittis atque ab eis causas tuae salutis expetis, hincque sumendis caelestibus sacramentis eisque, ut 
competit, disponendis subdi te debere cognoscis religionis ordine potius quam praeesse, itaque inter haec illorum te 
pendere iudicio, non illos ad tuam velle redigi voluntatem.” 
121 James Harvey Robinson, Readings in European History, vol. 1 (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1905), pp. 72-3. 
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worship, and what attaches to those, and what belongs to the human soul and 
salvation. And just as the spiritual authority does not judge for himself over the 
blood, in the same way also the worldly authorities and magistrate in no way 
subjects the religion and what attaches to the same to himself. Rather, much more, 
he loyally carries out what the spiritual authority orders in the religion. Thus, an 
authority does not intervene into another, rather each should let the other remain 
undisturbed in their orderly office. 
 
And it has been the case since the old holy Councils of the Apostles time, that the 
religion ordinances are established not through the worldly authority but rather 
through the prelates and the spiritual authorities. And whatever is ordered in each 
time, the emperor and king loyally upheld, subjected themselves and their 
subjects to such order, and the bishops and the spiritual [estate] administered the 
practice and carrying out of the same – as the holy Councils’ acts and decrees, the 
emperors in their laws, the church histories from Constantine the Great, 
Valentinianus, Theodosius, Marciano, Justinian, the Constantinopolian emperors, 
also several kings in Spain and France, and then also Charlemagne, Louis the 
Pious and nearly all Roman emperors of the Germans, attest.122 
 
After summarizing these authoritative texts, the lawyer wrote that criminal jurisdiction and 
spiritual jurisdiction were distinct; the former did not entail the latter: 
 
And because now it has been sufficiently explained and proven, with godly and 
human, spiritual and worldly laws, also the true histories, that the criminal court, 
and the ordering of the religion and of all matters attaching to the religion, are 
distinct from one another, that the ordering of the religion belongs alone to the 
spiritual and not to the worldly, and the high capital punishment alone to the 
worldly and not to the spiritual authority; how can then the other party so 
incorrectly present, that the high criminal and worldly authority, from godly and 
natural laws and according to all reason, is to make, establish and allow the 
religion ordering? And it is all the more strange and remarkable to hear, that 
based on [the fact] that the worldly authority punishes the life of the thief, 
murderer and heretic, that it should therefrom be determined, that they also should 
                                               
122 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Unnd auß dem erscheindt, wie 
der weltlichen oberkeit ampt zugehört, den gemainen nutz in zeitlichen friden zuerhalten, die guetten zubelonen, und 
der bösen zustraffen, also gehort der gaistlichen oberkeit ampt zu, die Religion und gotsdinst, und was denen 
anhengig ist und zu der Menschen seel seligkeit gehort zuverordnen und wie die gaistlich oberkait fur sich selbs 
uber das pluet nit richten, Also sollen auch die weltlichen oberkaiten unnd magistrat , sich der Religion und was 
derselben anhängig ist, mit nichten underziehen, sonder vielmer was die gaistlich oberkeit, in der religion ordnet, 
getrewlich volnziehen, und also ein oberkeit der andern, nit fur noch eingreiffen Sonder ye eine die ander bei irem 
ordenlichen ampt unbetrüpt pleiben lassen soll. Und auf solche maß, sein in den alten hailigen Concilien von der 
Apostel zeit heer, der religion ordnungen, nit durch die weltlich oberkeit, sonder durch die prelaten und gaistliche 
oberkaiten aufgericht, und weß also yeder zeit geordnet, das haben auch die kayser und konig getrewlich gehalten, 
sich und die underthanen solcher ordnung underworffen, und die Bischove und gaistlichen in yebung und 
volnziehung derselben gehandthabt, wie solches der hailigen Concilien Acta und decreta, die kayser in iren rechten 
selbs und die kirchen historien von Constantino magno Valentinianus Theodosiis Marciano Justiniano den 
Constantinopolitanischen Kaisern, auch etlichen konigen in Hispania und Franckreich, und dan auch von Carolo 
Magno, Ludevico pio, und nahendt allen Rom. Kaysern der teutschen bezeugen.” 
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have the power to order the religion and to carry out its things that are necessary 
for salvation and eternal life.123 
 
Harkening back to the three layers of law described in the Mandate, and plaintiff’s initial 
complaint, the Bishop’s lawyer began with a discussion of what the “common spiritual and 
worldly laws” provide. Interestingly, he used some language here that was absent in the initial 
complaint. Instead of simply “common spiritual and worldly laws,” he now said “all godly as 
well as human common written spiritual and worldly laws, established thousands of years ago.” 
The addition of “godly” seems perhaps to have been picked up from the defendant’s Exception 
document. He wrote: 
 
All godly as well as human common written spiritual and worldly laws, 
established thousands of years ago, provide that the holy Religion be arranged not 
by worldly princes and authorities, but rather through the orderly spiritual 
authorities appointed in the holy Church, brought into a certain Christian church 
order, and, improving in each time according to the circumstances of the time; [it 
is the work of] common Councils to establish the outward ceremonies for the 
glory of God and the maintenance of the true worship, [then] carried out and 
agreed upon by the mentioned spiritual authorities. And whatever is ordered by 
such authority should be carried out by the worldly authority. So was it at the time 
of the holy Apostles, and has been maintained following that, through an 
unceasing succession through their following Bishops, up to this time, in all 
Christian nations, through the whole world. All of this would also be proven 
through the holy Councils’ Acts and Decrees, also the imperial law, and all 
Church histories, loudly and clearly.124 
 
                                               
123 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Und dieweil dan nun gnugsam 
mit gotlichen und menschlichen gaistlichen und weltlichen rechten, auch den waren historien außgefurt und 
bewiesen, das die Malefizische gericht und verordnung der Religion und aller sachen so der religion anhängig, also 
von einander angesöndert, das die verordenung der religion allein der gaistlichen und nicht der weltlichen unnd die 
hohe Malefizische straff allein der weltlichen und nit der gaistlichen oberkeit zugehort. Wie kan dan der gegentail so 
vermessenlich furgeben, das der hohen Malefizischen und weltlichen oberkeit, von götlichen und Naturlichen 
rechten auch aller vernunfft nach, in der religion ordnung zumachen, und aufzurichten, zugelassen sey, und sovil 
desto seltzamer und verwunderlicher ist es zuhoren, das auß dem das die weltlichen oberkeit die dieb, morder, und 
Ketzer am leben hat zustraffen beschlossen warden will, das sy auch die verordnung der religion und deren ding, so 
zu der seel hailen und ewig leben nott sein furzunemen macht haben sollen.” 
124 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Dan erstlich vermogen alle 
gotliche, auch menschliche gamine geschrieben gaistlich und weltliche recht vor tausent jarn ufgericht, das die hailig 
Religion nicht durch weltliche fursten und Oberkeiten, sonderlich die ordenlichen gaistlichen Oberkaiten, nach 
Christenlicher ordnung in der hailigen kirchen angericht, in gewisse Christenliche Kircheordnung gebracht, und was 
yeder zeit nach gelegenheit der zeit, in den eusserlichen Ceremonien zuordnen, zu der ehr gottes und erhaltung deß 
waren gotsdienst zubesserr ist, in gemainen Concilien, durch gemelte gaistliche oberkeit furgenommen und 
beschlossen, und weß also durch solche Oberkeit geordnet, durch die weltliche oberkeit volnzogen werden soll, also 
ist es zu zeitten der hailigen Aposteln und volgendts durch ein unaufhörliche succession bei iren nachkhomen 
Bischoven, biß auf diese zeit, bei allen Christenlichen Nationen, durch die gantz welt auß gehalten worden, Solches 
alles wurdt auch durch der hailigen Concilien Acta und Decreta, auch gemelte Key. Recht und alle kirchen historien 
lauter und unwidersprechlich bewisen.” 
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The paragraph went on to say that these same laws, beginning in the time of the Apostles, 
portioned out the authority amongst archbishops, bishops, and priests, and it was always the case 
that such portioning out happened also in worldly kingdoms and principalities,  
 
thereby not to deprive worldly authorities of governance of their land and people, 
but rather, with respect to the same, the archbishops and bishops, each in his 
appointed sector, have themselves been ordered [with] the pastoral care and 
maintenance of the religion and worship, not only with respect to the spiritual 
[persons] but rather also the emperor, king, princes, dukes, lords, and rulers. All 
apostolic and conciliar decrees, also imperial law and church histories, attest to 
this.125 
 
For the Bishop here, the portioning out (außteilung) of sectors in which spiritual authorities 
variously had responsibility to carry out pastoral care and maintenance of the religion did not 
interfere with the responsibilities of worldly authorities. Moreover, the pastoral care 
responsibilities extended to and included the salvation of worldly rulers themselves.  
This argument was concluded by pointing out that, like other bishops, the Bishop of 
Augsburg had, in his appointed sector, the pastoral care and spiritual jurisdiction, and, like other 
Bishops, had been in “peaceful ownership and possession” of it since “many hundreds of years 
ago.”126 
 
And from all of this it appears now clearly, that neither spiritual nor worldly law 
may give the other party support or any aid in his unfair actions, rather [those 
laws] reject and condemn his actions in every way.127 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Bishop argued that when the Duke summoned the priests of four particular villages 
to his superintendent in order to give trial sermons and to be examined in line with the new 
religion, at risk of losing their positions, he violated the Augsburg Religion-Peace. In particular, 
he violated the articles that proscribe the attempt by anyone to disturb any other estate in their 
                                               
125 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “So ist auch in denselben rechten 
versehen, das zu erhaltung solcher gemainer und Christenlicher ordnung gleich im anfang zu der Apostel zeitten, die 
Ertzbistumb und Bistumb, und die Pfarren, darin underschidlich außgetailt, und solche außteilung auch in die 
konigreich und weltliche furstenthumb geschehen, und damit den weltlichen oberkaiten an regierung irer landt und 
leuth nicht benommen, sonder in denselben, die seelsorg und erhaltung der Religion und gotsdienst, den 
Ertzbischoven und Bischoven, jeden in seinem zugeordneten gezirckh, nit allein uber der gaistlichen, sonder auch 
der kayser kunig, fursten, graven, hern, und obern personen, selbs bevolhen worden, das bezeugen abermals alle 
apostolische, und der hey. concilia decreta, auch die key. recht und der kirchen historien.” 
126 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Und auf die maß hat auch das 
Bistumb Augspurg sein geordenten gezirckh in dem einem yeden Bischove die seelsorg und gaistlich jurisdiction so 
weit solcher gezirckh geet, vor viel hundert jaren, angeregter massen bevolhen, und derselben wie auch andere 
Bischove in der gantzen Christenheit jeder in seinem diocesi und gezirckh, in ruwigem inhaben und possession 
gewesen.” 
127 Munich 264, Q6, “Replick und Exception schrifft Respective,” 1556: “Und auß dem allem erscheint nun 
lauter das dem herngegentaill weder gaistlich noch weltlich recht, in seinem vermeinten unpillichen furnemen, 
Steurn noch einichen behilff geben mogen, sonder solch sein furnemen in allweg verwerfffen und verdammen.” 
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possessions and rights on account of adhering to the old faith (section 16), or to force another 
estate’s subjects to accept the other religion (section 23).  
 The Duke argued that he did not violate the Peace because in fact he had the kind of 
jurisdictional authority over those villages that permitted management of religion and faith 
matters. In addition to certain types of taxation authorities, the Duke had capital jurisdiction in 
the villages; he had the authority to carry out corporeal and capital punishment of culprits there. 
Capital jurisdiction, he said, constituted high jurisdiction. And high jurisdiction entailed 
management of religion. If lower jurisdiction, which is derivative of and exists at the pleasure of 
higher jurisdiction, could also entail management of religion, then a multiplicity of religions 
would inevitably result in one territory, and this was not an outcome the Peace aimed for. More 
importantly, he who had authority over matters of the highest worldly concern should also have 
authority over matters of the highest spiritual concern in a given domain; authority over matters 
of life and death should entail authority over matters of salvation. 
 The Bishop responded, first, by qualifying the Duke’s capital jurisdiction over the four 
villages. He said that the Duke’s capital jurisdiction there was extremely limited. The Bishop had 
total jurisdiction over the four villages, except the type of authority that would require spilling of 
blood, which was delegated to the worldly authority. The Duke only had narrow jurisdiction over 
culprits who were handed over to him by the criminal judge. Second, he responded by arguing 
that capital jurisdiction itself did not entail authority over matters of spiritual concern. He cited 
authoritative texts from the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries from Emperors and Popes to state 
what he regarded as a foundational doctrine of the Holy Roman Empire: that spiritual authority 
governed matters of spiritual concern, and worldly authority governed matters of worldly 
concern.  
 The point of this chapter has been to ground the Peace in its litigative purpose. The Peace 
was drafted in large part in response to specific disputes that came out of the Reformation cases; 
and it was drafted with future litigation in mind.  
 This first case litigated under the terms of the Peace reveals a number of things. First, it 
shows us that the question of what counted as a “matter of religion” was no longer prescient. No 
longer did proto-Protestant litigants argue that the Imperial Chamber Court had no jurisdiction 
because the dispute had its origins in a matter of religion. Instead, the Peace assigned precisely 
such disputes to the Court as the preferred forum to adjudicate such disputes. Matters of religion 
became a category of imperial law to describe precisely the disputes that would be governed 
according to the Augsburg Peace. The radical, exceptional quality of the term was defanged as it 
became legible as a category of legal issue. 
 The case echoes pre-1555 litigation insofar as the Duke argued that the proceeding itself 
was illegal. But he did not make this argument on extraordinary grounds, to throw the case into a 
jurisdictional no-man’s-land; rather he made them on the grounds of the Peace itself, saying that 
the Bishop was in violation of the Peace precisely by seeking out a mandate against him at the 
Court, and the Court was in violation of the Peace by granting it. Still, this argument is a product 
of the jurisprudence of suspicion, described in the previous chapter. 
 The sources of law cited by the Bishop in his Response are remarkable. He used three 
foundational source texts for establishing the two powers doctrine. The citation of these sources, 
which I did not see in any pre-1555 Reformation case, suggests the kind of moment the litigants 
found themselves in. What were the conditions in which the Bishop and his lawyer, Wolf, would 
see the pre-trial stage as the place to invoke these well-known citations?  
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 The breadth of interpretations of the Peace present in this case suggests the natality of 
this legal moment, and the ambiguity of the Peace. The Peace was full of possibilities for 
litigants and lawyers eager to stabilize an interpretation of the Peace that would work in their 
favor. The Peace was ambiguous; it did not clarify or settle matters, but contained the terms of 
these disputes, setting the framework for conflict; it shunted the Court’s handling of these issues 
into a new holding pattern. This is not surprising when we realize that the Peace was precisely 
geared to a litigative context, and it was not primarily a broad declaration of anything, such as 
sovereign rights, or the legalization of the Lutheran confession—as it is often portrayed in the 
historiography.  
*** 
 
 The Peace was the final abrogation of the Worms Edict of 1521. While Protestants had 
long claimed that the Edict had been abolished by various terms of the resolutions and peace 
treaties of the previous decades, until the Lutheran confession became legal, the terms of the 
1521 Edict fundamentally stood. Nonetheless, the aspiration towards a final resolution and 
restoration of confessional unity maintained the Empire’s vision of itself as “Holy”; 
biconfessionalism was pragmatic but skin-deep. The 1555 Peace did not do away with the idea of 
“heresy” as such; it simply relocated authority to define and prosecute heresy, and to maintain 
religious singularity, at the territorial level rather than the imperial level.  
 In other words, the Peace says more about the dualistic constitutional order of the Holy 
Roman Empire at this moment, than it does about changing views of the relationship between 
spiritual and temporal authority. Thought of in this way, the Peace was the culmination of the 
reform efforts since the late fifteenth century which had worked to secure the power of the 
Estates vis-a-vis the Emperor. “The reform process begun in the late fifteenth century had ended 
in a monarchy fettered by German liberty.”128  
 Though, as discussed in chapter 2, it would be incorrect to bring modern statist 
assumptions about the effectiveness of legal events to apply to this period, nonetheless, there is 
no doubt that the Peace became a touchstone and a framework for conflict for the centuries 
following. It lasted until it fell apart in 1618, precipitated in part through the inability of the 
Imperial Chamber Court to resolve the Four Monasteries cases.129 It was renewed and revised in 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and it provided the scaffolding of political peace among the 
Empire’s churches until the end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.130  
 While the Peace was a touchstone and framework for conflict, it also led to the 
bifurcation of the imperial legal regime. This is because the vagueness and ambiguity of key 
clauses of the Peace, combined with a legal culture in which any attempts at legal change had to 
                                               
128 Whaley, Germany, 336. 
129 This refers to a set of four cases in the early years of the seventeenth century regarding confiscation of 
monastic property. In brief, the Court decided against the Protestants in all four cases, and this caused suspicion and 
anxiety among Protestant Estates that the Court was no longer abiding by the terms of the Augsburg Peace and was 
instead favoring the Catholics. See Whaley, Germany, 414-5; Ruthmann, Religionsprozesse, 553-66. 
130 Ruthmann, Religionsprozesse, 10. See e.g. Ruthmann, Religionsprozesse, in which he closely analyzes 
the Court’s jurisprudence concerning key articles of the Augsburg Peace between 1555 and 1648. Also see Blum, 
Multikonfessionalität, in which she looks at the implementation and impact of the Peace at the local level within one 
imperial city, Speyer. She asks: what did the Peace contribute to confessional coexistence at the micro level of the 
city? How did its application work in context? And how did general problems of the Peace become visible or 
emerge in the city context? Also see Luebke, Hometown Religion, which looks at “regimes of religious coexistence” 
in the archbishopric of Westphalia created in the shade of the Peace. 
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be described as mere efforts of legal interpretation,131 and the jurisprudence of suspicion, 
provided the stuff of the formulation of two distinctive, confessionally-articulated, approaches to 
legal interpretation. This “bifurcation” of the legal order became more and more pronounced and 
agonistic over the course of the post-1555 period of confessionalization; unresolved questions of 
faith and truth smoldered, as the governmental and institutional modes of establishing 
confessional difference proceeded apace.132 Some argue that it was the dissimulation and 
postponement in the 1555 Peace that led, as a direct consequence, to the Thirty Years War of the 
seventeenth century.133  
 Thus, 1555 was a moment of legal redirection. It aimed to speak law on a variety of 
tangible questions and disputes. In practice, prior to 1555, the Reformation was being handled at 
law through a patchwork jurisprudence of civil and public law resolutions through proxy issues 
of peace, property, and jurisdiction. Now, those matters of peace, property and jurisdiction were 
enclosed within imperial law under the heading of the “Religion-Peace.” Though the 
jurisprudence remained unclear and hotly debated, they were now tucked under a heading that 
had hitherto had no place in imperial law. This reflects law’s tendency to produce its authority, 
its sovereignty, its jurisdiction, through declaration, and to conceal the messy, “creative, 
performative aspect” which in fact produced its meaning and significance in the first place.134 
The Peace was responding to the specific kinds of issues that had been popping up in 
Reformation litigation. As a result, the Peace did not end or finally clarify these disputes; rather, 
it provided a new legislative basis for interpretation and disagreement about them. Thus, there 
was a continuity in the kinds of subjects and issues that had been discussed in Reformation-
related litigation. In the process, the Peace at once reproduced and contained the particular 
unresolvable nuances of law that Reformation litigation had stirred up under the heading “matter 
of religion.”  
  
                                               
131 Heckel, “Autonomia,” 161-6. 
132 Ruthmann, Religionsprozesse, 10. 
133 Heckel, “Autonomia,” 192 and the literature cited there.  
134 Richland, 214 quoting Douzinas. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
 
In the years following the circulation of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses in 1517, several 
high-profile efforts by the ostensibly most powerful offices of Western Christendom—the Pope 
and the Emperor—to quell the reform movement were largely ineffective. The Papal Bulls 
(Exsurge Domine, and Decet Romanum Pontificem) of 1520 and 1521 excommunicated Luther 
and his followers as heretics. The Worms Edict of 1521 declared in the Acht (outlawry) them or 
anyone who gave them support or cover. The lesser-known Regiment Mandate of 1522 was 
promulgated by the Imperial Regiment, a central government created by the Estates and 
Emperor, and it called on territorial rulers to prevent the “new worship” from being carried out. 
Together, these legislative acts portended a large-scale inquisition. Yet nothing like that 
followed. What were the conditions in which this was the case? 
In Chapter 2, I showed that in part, the ineffectiveness of these legal acts can be 
understood by having a greater grasp of the legal and constitutional culture in which they were 
promulgated. Unilateral acts of law-making were viewed with suspicion by the Estates because 
of the dualistic constitutional culture in which the power of the Estates and Emperor were co-
dependent. Even Estates who were concerned about the Lutheran movement were keen to guard 
the liberties of the Estates vis-à-vis the Emperor as well as the Pope. Furthermore, the 
distribution of authority in the German lands was such that individual Estates were more inclined 
to dissimulate and avoid open conflict, especially with neighboring rulers. More than unilateral 
legislation, it was the imperial recesses of 1526, 1529 and following that proved to be, if not 
more effective in terms of enforcement, nonetheless among the key sources of law tested in the 
Reformation cases.  
A discussion in Chapter 2 about why heresy was not more of a central category in 
disputes among rulers underlines the different status of the various evangelical groups then in 
formation. While this dissertation focuses primarily on Lutheran and Zwinglian princes and 
cities who were in a position to litigate about reform, Anabaptists and subjects of all persuasions 
were being persecuted under heresy and sedition laws. This differential treatment reminds us of 
the extent to which the Reformation was less about individual freedom and more about 
sovereignty and the constitutional consequences of the right of rulers to reform their domains.  
Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion about the constitutional importance of courts in the 
Holy Roman Empire, and the reasons courts were an important site of constitution-making in the 
sixteenth century. First, because there were so many types of courts in the German lands, 
questions of jurisdiction, and therefore of the distribution of authority that it implied, were 
almost always on the table at the start of litigation, whatever the subject matter. Second, because 
of the particular status that courts had had historically in settling conflicts among rulers as 
regarded authority and dominion, and the complicated relationship between courts and the 
institution of feuding, courts were one site in which matters on the boundary of public and 
private law were worked out. Third, the procedures of courtrooms—including public sessions, 
and the instruments and strategies familiar to judicial proceedings—felt, looked, and acted a lot 
like the procedures, instruments, and strategies available in imperial diets which were more 
explicitly about constitution-making. Thus, the constitution-making mindset was often turned on 
for litigants even as they were hashing out ostensibly private civil law disputes.  
The Imperial Chamber Court was particularly important in this context, for a number of 
reasons: it was the first imperial court that aspired to be independent of the personal justice of the 
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Emperor; it was the only entity besides the Emperor entitled to declare the Acht; its bench was 
constituted primarily of learned doctors of law; its judges’ appointments were distributed among 
Estates and the Emperor; it adjudicated primarily in matters concerning the Land-Peace; and for 
the most part at least one of the litigants in a given dispute was directly subject to the Emperor. A 
discussion of the Court’s role in the so-called “reception of Roman law” provides a framework 
for considering the fortuitous timing of the Reformation cases against that backdrop. At various 
points in the dissertation, I suggest that certain legal transformations in this period might have 
their origins in these proto-Protestant experimental usages, such as the changes in the way co-
litigation was conceived, the role of the state in recognizing particular forms of combination, and 
the shifting valence of protestations. 
 The discussion about the Court’s judicature provided a bridge into Chapter 3, which 
introduced the patchwork jurisprudence of Reformation litigation. Plaintiffs and the imperial 
Fiscal sued under the broad headings of peace, property, and jurisdiction laws, rather than the 
high-profile legislation of the 1520s. I begin the chapter by reviewing the historical development 
of peace, property, and jurisdiction laws. In the peace section, I discuss “peaces” as a legal 
typology, that had moved from an instrument having the character of a contract in the early 
Middle Ages, to one having the character of monarchical legislation, to one having the character 
of an institutionalized, constitutional status in the late medieval period. A Land-Peace violation 
had always initially involved the element of physical violence, its threat, or facilitation, but this 
changed during the Reformation. Initially, Land-Peace law was not seen as a way to deal with 
Lutheranism; the Worms Edict itself is evidence of the belief that a special legal basis was 
needed for prosecuting the new heresy in imperial law. The first time Land-Peace law was 
explicitly used to deal with the “division in the religion” came in the 1526 imperial recess, which 
noted that violence was transpiring in the Empire on its account. In the 1529 imperial recess, any 
act of violence, its threat or facilitation, done on account of matters of faith or religion was 
deemed a violation of the Land-Peace, but its terms were redundant because violence was still 
part of the definition of what constituted a violation. The 1530 Recess was a dramatic shift in 
that it defined certain acts as violations of the Land-Peace that involved no violence at all, but 
were explicitly connected to attempts to reform worship and governance according to the “new 
sect.” Each of these attempts—in 1526, 1529, 1530, and beyond—to revise the scope of a Land-
Peace violation to deal with the division in the religion was shot through with the ambiguities of 
the legal typology of an imperial recess (as discussed in Chapter 2)—in particular, the competing 
status of unanimity versus majority rule; the status of elements that were promulgated 
unilaterally by the Emperor; and the status of those sections protested by the evangelical estates. 
Another legal ambiguity was produced when in 1532 the Emperor promised an end to “matter of 
religion” cases in the Imperial Chamber Court (in the Nuremberg Settlement), while at the same 
time demanding that violence “in the matter of the disputatious religion” cease, at risk of 
punishment as a land-peace violation (in the Peace Mandate in the Regensburg Recess). Over the 
course of the 1540s, the language of a “Religion-Peace” began to circulate as a new kind of 
legislative form modeled on the template of the Land-Peace, culminating in the 1555 Augsburg 
Religion-Peace. The legal typology of the “Religion-Peace” did not mean religious 
rapprochement or reconciliation; rather, it was a kind of legislation that delineated the terms of 
relations between confessions. It was more akin to the public law on churches than the beginning 
of religious toleration or freedom of religion.  
In the property section, I summarized the evolution of the church property system from 
the third to the sixteenth centuries in order to highlight the complicated ownership, lordship, 
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proprietary, and patronage relations that were litigated in many of the Reformation cases. To 
some extent these practices were in tension with rules that prohibited the alienation of church 
property and that distinguished temporal and spiritual forms of wealth. I review the types of 
church wealth that were under dispute in Reformation cases, such as buildings, income-yielding 
real properties, tithes and offerings, precious and liturgical objects, benefices and offices, as well 
as fees, rents, and annuities. I concluded the discussion of property by looking at the methods of 
secularization and conversion of church and monastic property that pre-dated the Reformation, 
which provides a context for understanding how and why church and monastic institutions 
seemed so practiced in litigating church property disputes of the Reformation under the terms of 
existing laws.  
In the jurisdiction section, I show that jurisdiction meant not only the right to adjudicate 
disputes over certain peoples, places, and subjects, but also the whole range of rights and 
privileges that this implied. Jurisdictional disputes between temporal and spiritual jurisdictions 
were just one kind of jurisdictional claim made in the Reformation cases. More frequently, 
jurisdictional disputes had to do with issues of control over property, the authority to tax, to wage 
wars, to appoint preachers, to discipline personnel in spiritual or worldly institutions, to punish 
citizens, to provide protection (Schutz und Schirm), to change laws, or broadly to do things 
differently than they had been done before. More than the binary of spiritual and temporal, the 
important categories in these disputes had to do with lordship rights (both “high” and “low”), 
patronage rights, and the relative supremacy of different kinds of rulers including prince, prince-
bishop, bishop, abbott or abbess, provost, dean, capital, mayor and city council, among others. 
Jurisdictional arrangements were particularistic, but those particularistic arrangements were not 
sui generis but patterned, built into the legal norms and culture that ordered it. Matters of 
jurisdiction were variously settled through war and feud, imperial mandate or privilege, 
arbitration and treaties, custom and historical usage, or contracts. In this context, it was often 
more important for plaintiffs to settle their particular issue in court than to consider the ways in 
which the changes portended a large pious reformation, political movement, or major 
constitutional shift. 
In the rest of Chapter 3, I present through direct exposure to the cases the kinds of laws 
and norms cited in the Court’s judicature and more specifically in the Reformation cases. The 
sources of law cited were sometimes broad and constitutional or customary in nature, such as the 
Golden Bull and the “Holy Empire’s laws and ordinances”; sometimes they were very specific to 
the litigants involved, such as contracts, treaties, and customary usage that extended “beyond 
human memory.” As a case progressed, layers of law were added as violations of Court 
procedure added up. Because of the legal pluralism of the German lands it was essential to 
establish not only the validity of certain legal claims, but also their relative priority. Therefore, 
the narratio portion of a proceeding was of the utmost importance. Notwithstanding the heavily 
formulated forms of legal procedure in the Court (discussed in Chapter 1), the narrratio offered 
extensive opportunity for inserting language to make the Reformation context of a dispute 
legible. I argue that while the primary purpose of these insertions was to express rebuke towards 
the other litigants as a normalized form of affective speech in litigation, in the process, the Court 
became a site in which pious forms of accusation were declared—regarding clergy greed, for 
instance, or the apostasy of runaway monks and nuns—though the legal purpose of such 
utterances was often unclear. 
In discussing the role of the narratio and the laws and norms cited, I also considered the 
calculations involved in eliding the Reformation context in a given dispute—failing to mention, 
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for instance, that attacks on the clergy of a city were instigated by the promulgation of the 
Worms Edict. The reasons for eliding the Reformation context of a given dispute changed over 
our period. In the early 1520s, plaintiffs were continuing familiar legal strategies for peace, 
property, and jurisdiction disputes as they had been litigated before; at the time, the scope and 
scale of the events which in retrospect were the beginning of the Reformation in the German 
lands, were not fully understood, and the actions being undertaken in the name of reform 
probably felt like the kinds of actions that were being carried out by territorializing princes and 
self-confident cities throughout the late medieval period. Then, in the mid-1520s, as cities and 
princes became open converts, and as the 1526 Recess for the first time linked the “division of 
the religion” with various kinds of Land-Peace violations, plaintiffs became more likely to make 
the Reformation context of a dispute legible. By the early years of the 1530s, however, the 
calculations involved in eliding or making legible the Reformation context shifted dramatically, 
as evangelical litigants began to argue that any dispute concerning matters of religion did not 
belong within the jurisdiction of the Court. In this context, we see plaintiffs increasingly eliding 
the Reformation context to avoid the litigative black hole that this form of argumentation had 
become. 
The next two chapters focus especially on a period of litigative creativity on the part of 
evangelical litigants. In Chapter 4, I explored the reception and impact of the proto-Protestant 
“legal descriptive strategy”1 inherent in their argument that a dispute which had been brought by 
the plaintiff under peace, property, and jurisdiction laws in fact was a “matter of religion”; that 
therefore the Court had no jurisdiction over the matter; and that until a free Christian Council 
took place to resolve the underlying theological, liturgical, and ecclesiological disputes, the 
proceeding should stop. When evangelical litigants made this argument, plaintiffs, judges, and 
lawyers responded in a variety of ways: sometimes with outright rejection, sometimes with 
confusion and incredulity, and sometimes with a wait-and-see attitude. Even those with the 
authority to define the term—the Judges, and (perhaps primarily on the basis of being a party to 
the Nuremberg Settlement) the Emperor—repeatedly dodged or left the term’s meaning 
unsettled. Though the category’s meaning remained inconclusive, a set of tensions cleaved to the 
category as a matter of strategy, memory, and naming, indexing constitutional conundra born out 
of the Reformation, without resolving them. Leaning on the concept of bricolage described by 
Claude Levi-Strauss, I argue that “religion” became over the course of this period a bricolage 
legal category, the quality of its production at once heterogeneous, contingent, and retrospective. 
Three key tensions existed with respect to the matter of religion argument that constituted its 
bricolage character. First, concerning the term’s referent; second concerning its valence; and 
third concerning its scope. In terms of its referent, parties disagreed about the extent to which a 
“matter of religion” concerned conscience and beliefs alone, or the extent to which it would be 
entangled with material matters of property and jurisdiction. In terms of its valence, parties 
sometimes spoke about “matters of religion” as a generic moral category and honorific, and 
sometimes as a narrow legal category, referring to cases covered under the Nuremberg 
Settlement (and other agreements that promised a suspension of all cases concerning the 
religion). In terms of its scope, “matter of religion” had a classificatory and homogenizing effect, 
bundling a wide range of disputes under its terms, but it also relied on the description of 
particular details of disputes for its definition, rather than abstract principles. These three 
tensions inhered to the “religion” category beyond the period of the Reformation cases, 
constituting its bricolage character that persisted beyond the contingent context of its production. 
                                               
1 Teuscher, 77. 
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Chapter 5 continues the focus on the proto-Protestant litigative strategy, this time 
focusing on their experimental uses of three otherwise formulaic, mundane instruments of 
Roman law civil procedure: the protestation, the power of attorney, and the recusation. In an 
important way, the evangelical estates’ use of each of these instruments simultaneously bolstered 
and leaned on the religion argument discussed in Chapter 4—bootstrapping the category into 
legal existence. The protestation of 1529 set the tone and pattern for the kinds of protestations 
the evangelical litigants would use in cases in which they declined the forum on the basis of the 
Nuremberg Settlement and other agreements that likewise promised a standstill to “matter of 
religion” cases in the Court. The power of attorney defined their combination as co-litigants in 
terms of the kinds of disputes in which they would co-litigate: those “concerning the religion.” 
And the recusation accused the Court President and an unspecified majority of the judges of bias 
against the evangelical litigants, and recused its judicature only in cases “concerning the 
religion.” Each of these instruments presumed the religion category, though it had at the time no 
formal definition or legal meaning. 
In that chapter, I first describe the historical evolution of each of the legal instruments 
and how they were part of customary legal practice (to combine, to protest, and to recuse), and 
partook in long-established legal cultural traits of the Holy Roman Empire, while at the same 
time adopting the form specific to Roman-canonical procedure. I analyze them in this sense as 
performative legal speech acts with a long pedigree, that were also being used by the evangelical 
estates in ways that many others regarded and treated as invalid, extraordinary, or illegal. Each 
instrument leaned on the next in a circular kind of claims-making. 
I also analyze them as passionate legal speech acts, which gets at the dimensions of their 
use that went beyond the appeal to formal authority, the dimensions that could not be simply 
declared illegitimate or invalid. That is, in the process of combining through the power of 
attorney, in protesting, and in recusing, and in the particular ways in which they did so, the 
evangelical estates made “claims on their hearers to acknowledge their truth or their right.”2 
Simply by presenting the power of attorney, the evangelical litigants required the judges and the 
other parties— even as they were denying the validity of the power of attorney and the 
insinuation of the protesting estates into their civil dispute with a discrete party—to respond to 
their proposal to be legible as a group, and to speak about them as a group in order to respond to 
their claims. Similarly, the protestations—both in the 1529 and 1530 imperial assemblies, and in 
the form of the Exceptiones Declinatoria Fori in litigation—inserted claims even when 
proceedings were moving in a different direction. The fact that the name “Protestant,” which 
originated from this 1529 usage, continues to be a signifier of the evangelical movement within 
Christianity broadly, indicates the effectiveness of those protestations, even when they were 
rejected as invalid. Likewise, the recusation instrument raised the issue of confessional 
suspicion, and that suspicion, once articulated, could not be unthought or undone, even as the 
recusation was repeatedly rejected as invalid by the Court. 
Finally, I argue that each of these effects had long term consequences for the imperial 
legal order. First, the proto-Protestant usage of the power of attorney was the beginning of the 
idea of the “religious party” in imperial law, that is, of multiple confessions formed as “juridical 
civil associations rather than mystical embodiments of Christ”3; “not as congregations of truth-
                                               
2 Constable, 36. 
3 Ian Hunter, “Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology, Philosophy, and Legal Casuistry,” 
South Atlantic Quarterly 113, no. 1 (2014): 48. 
  270 
seeking individuals but as mutually hostile civil corporations.”4 This was part of a process I 
described in the section on combination, that by the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, as 
the capacious medieval League form was waning, and the purpose-driven chartered corporation 
was on the rise, combination was increasingly being achieved not through self-cohering 
processes of fellowship, but through recognition by state and law. With this argument, I am 
contributing to ongoing debates about the causes and methods of confession formation. Scholars 
have studied confession formation in terms of the formulation of creeds and confessional 
statements and the cohering of groups around them; the discursive and disciplinary processes 
that produced new conceptions of orthodoxy and heresy; the role of the state in exercising 
governmental mechanisms required for confessional consolidation; and the everyday social 
practices that contributed to distinctive confessional identities. I build on this by considering the 
role of law, litigation, and civil procedure in effecting a thin form of identification and “setting 
apart” at law, before formal legal recognition came to the Lutherans in 1555.  
Second the usage of the protestation facilitated a particular mode of linking law and 
conscience. Through this legal instrument, the evangelical estates sought to posit a 
“hermeneutics of the event,” narrating the truth of who they were and why they were doing 
certain things. Substantively, the point that they repeatedly pressed related to their desire to make 
legible the pious motives in their acts, and the ways in which all questions of truth, right, and 
law—especially in their capacity as rulers—returned to their conscientious duty to God, 
scripture, and the “pure teachings” of Christ. Procedurally, because of the way in which they 
were making these points within imperial institutions, they stabilized those institutions as 
meaningful contexts in which such utterances would be made. Consequently, the stakes for 
recognition in law of one’s claims about and in the name of religion—particularly as a ruler—as 
a normalized part of the imperial legal order became increasingly important. 
Third, the recusation structurally linked the “matter of religion” with an affect of 
suspicion. In other words, it became a normalized feature of imperial legal life to suspect that in 
issues concerning religion, the other party was insisting on an interpretation of facts and law that 
prioritized their confessional preferences over their fidelity to law. Put concretely, anytime 
anybody uttered “religion,” inevitably questions would arise about the referent, valence, and 
scope of that term. In answering these questions differently, and as the difference between the 
answers became more predictable, and increasingly associated with certain alignments and group 
formations, suspicion that the different answers to the questions were the result of these pre-
dispositions became more salient. Here we see the traces of a pattern that would persist into the 
post-Augsburg order, namely, the idea that certain legal interpretations, when it came to religion-
peace law and matters of religion, belonged to certain confessional parties as a matter of course. 
This paved the way for distinct confessionally-based jurisprudences of imperial law, which 
became a normalized feature of imperial legal life in the post-1555 period, and which have long 
been regarded as the roots of the breakdown of the Augsburg system.  
Chapter 6 centers around the Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555. First, I tie the Peace to 
its litigative pre-history, to show the ways in which its terms were crafted with Reformation 
litigation in mind, and with an eye to future litigation that would be adjudicated under its terms. 
This helps us shift the focus from familiar tropes that focus on its epoch-making quality as the 
hinge from the late medieval to the early modern, or that identify it as the headwaters of 
secularism, religious freedom, or sovereignty doctrine. Second, I highlight the ways in which the 
Peace was ambiguous—at the level of particular articles; at the level of its character, whether it 
                                               
4 Hunter, 53. 
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was more like a constitution or a contract; at the level of its purposes, whether it aimed to create 
conditions for religious reunification or the peaceful coexistence of multiple confessions; and in 
terms of timescales, whether it was a temporary emergency measure or an enduring basic law.  
Together, these two characteristics of the Peace—its litigative context and its 
ambiguity—prepare the way for understanding the significance of the term “religion” in the 
Peace. The term “religion” has multiple valences and an “excess of referents” in the text of the 
Peace itself, reflecting its bricolage character as it developed over the previous decades of 
litigation. Sometimes “religion” refers to the two confessional parties in disagreement—“those of 
the old religion,” for instance. Sometimes it is used as a shorthand for the whole set of issues that 
made the two parties distinct from one another—ceremonies, faith, and church usages, for 
instance. Sometimes “religion” is the thing about which legal resolutions are made, so that there 
are things like “compromises in the religion” or “peaces in the religion.” I argue that the Peace 
effectively contained the “religion” category without defining it, indexing all of its bricolage 
character without resolving the tensions inherent to it. 
Finally, I present the first legal dispute adjudicated under the terms of the Augsburg 
Religion-Peace before the Imperial Chamber Court. While parts of the case reflect the dense 
particularism we saw throughout the Reformation cases, the case also includes a remarkable 
discussion about the relationship between temporal and spiritual authority that cited foundational 
proof texts and legal sources—from the Church Fathers to Justinian—which sets it apart from the 
Reformation cases. I argue that this argumentation is suggestive that parties saw the Peace as 
interpretively open, and that they saw that the stakes of settling the Court’s interpretation of the 
Peace was nothing less than this most basic question of Christian governance, that had been 
asked anew of the Holy Roman Empire in the Reformation. 
In summary, this dissertation has made four core arguments. The first argument is that the 
legal significance of the Reformation is not only to be found in landmark legislation or in the 
writings of theologians, but in the “unfolding, unstable pragmatics” of civil litigation.5 My 
research shows how experimental uses of mundane, formulaic legal instruments of Roman law 
civil procedure fused with the legal culture and legal pluralism of the German lands, such that 
the litigation context became an unexpected proxy for the most pressing constitutional questions 
of the early Reformation. 
The second major argument revises a standard reading of the Reformation cases as 
legally unimportant because politically explosive. I argue that there is a legal history to be 
gleaned from the records of the cases themselves. The use of the court records of Reformation 
cases has focused on three areas of scholarship: (1) attempts to piece together important legal 
doctrines such as the meaning of a Land-Peace or Religion-Peace violation; (2) the Schmalkaldic 
League and its role in the Reformation cases and the political negotiations surrounding them; and 
(3) the institutional history of the Court, and the ways in which the Reformation cases 
contributed to or undermined the constitutional status of the Court. Through close readings of 
case files, I show how legal change came not only through deliberation, abstract formulation, or 
rational legislation, but rather through a collectivity of small actions that resulted in piecemeal 
movement in a particular, unforeseen direction.  
The third major argument has to do with the impact of Protestantism on modern law. I 
show that we have so far neglected the ways in which the proto-Protestant litigation strategy of 
the early Reformation impacted the imperial legal system and gave contour to a proto-Protestant 
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“legality.”6 ⁠ Historians who study the relationship between law and Protestantism tend to 
investigate it in terms of the writings of theologians like Luther or Melanchthon, or in terms of 
the legal orders that developed in Protestant territories and cities. My work, by contrast, tracks 
specific incarnations of imperial law, as effected at the hands of Protestant litigants and lawyers, 
which, through repetition, formed a nexus of usages we can call characteristically “Protestant.”  
 The final major argument is that in order to understand the use of “religion” as a terminus 
technicus in the Augsburg Religion-Peace of 1555—and, arguably, the meaning of “religion” as 
a secular legal category in the late modern period—we must analyze its litigative pre-history. 
Where scholars tend to adopt “religion” as an analytic for this period, tracking histories of 
tolerance, violence, or confessionalization, I concentrate on the work of classification itself. 
 
Speculations about Secularism and Religion 
 
 The Reformation has been a fixture in the doctrine of secularism since its earliest 
philosophical articulations in the eighteenth century. For John Locke, for instance, it was the 
religious wars of the post-Reformation that generated the need for a separation of religion and 
government.7  
 Modern expositors of the secularization thesis identify the Reformation as an important 
point of departure for other reasons. In his book A Secular Age, for instance, Charles Taylor 
describes the ways in which the Reformation inaugurated “the abolition of the enchanted 
cosmos, and the eventual creation of a humanist alternative to faith.”8 Brad Gregory argues that 
the pluralism that the Reformation unleashed resulted in the privatization of religion; in its wake, 
capitalism and consumerism became the “cultural glue that holds together the heterogeneity of 
Western hyper-pluralism.”9  
 Historians of religion likewise have long identified the Reformation as one of the key 
intellectual contexts in which “religion” gained its modern definition.10 Often, they point to the 
Augsburg Peace of 1555, in which “for the first time, ‘religion’ could be understood as a political 
and legal construct.”11 It was the first modern usage of “religion” as a “terminus technicus.”12 
The formulation commonly attributed to the 1555 Peace—cuius regio, eius religio (whose land, 
his religion)—indicates a move towards “objective formulation” of confessional difference.13 
This was a departure from the old ways of describing confessional difference in terms of truth 
and falsity, orthodoxy and heresy; this new formulation of “religion” cleared a space for nascent 
state neutrality and was a triumph for the rule of law. “Religion” also denoted a sphere of 
governance in the context of the emergent territorial sovereignty principle.  
 But there is more to the significance of the religion category, and its origins in the 
Reformation, than this. 
                                               
6 Christopher Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., The Many Legalities of Early America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 2-3. 
7 See John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
8 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 77.  
9 Brad Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 21, 23, 215. 
10 See literature review in Chapter 4. 
11 Harrison, 97. 
12 Feil, 270. 
13 Harrison, 97. On the formulation “cuius regio, eius religio” see footnote 60 in Chapter 4. 
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Talal Asad and others in the critical study of secularism often note that religion emerged 
coterminously with secularism in the Reformation and post-Reformation period.14 On its face, 
this seems to align with what was described in the paragraph above. But in fact, their argument is 
distinct. For Asad, secularism is a discourse that gives rise to a political and legal doctrine that 
relies on a set of oppositions under the headings of “the secular” and “religion”—between “belief 
and knowledge, reason and imagination, history and fiction, symbol and allegory, natural and 
supernatural, sacred and profane.”15 The efforts to demarcate a boundary between these sorts of 
objects—the “behaviors, sensibilities, and ways of knowing” that constitute those efforts and 
their consequences—constitutes secularism.16 Thus, central to secularism is not simply the 
separation of religion from the secular, but the work of constructing those two objects. 
Secularism “is not simply the organizing structure for what are regularly taken to be a priori 
elements of social organization—public, private, political, religious—but a discursive operation 
of power that generates these very spheres, establishes their boundaries, and suffuses them with 
content, such that they come to acquire a natural quality for those living within its terms.”17  
Agrama argues that this boundary work produces a particular kind of “secular impulse 
and anxiety, rooted in an increasingly felt inability to secure a domain of secularity.”18 The effect 
of this specifically secular impulse is to ask, again and again, where is the boundary between 
religion and the secular, and is that boundary being breached?  
This question sounds familiar; so much of Christian history has been preoccupied with 
the question of the proper boundary between the spiritual and the temporal. The question itself is 
not new, but the objects and stakes are.19 In the late modern period, the stakes of this question 
have to do with the distribution of fundamental rights and freedoms historically identified with 
liberalism, such as legal equality and freedom of belief and expression; as well as the extension 
of liberal power through colonialism and war.20 Furthermore, the question provides the late 
modern secular state with its raison d’etat—the intractability of the question, and the perennial 
suspicion that the boundary is being breached, makes the state’s duty to preserve the distinction 
through regulation enduring.21 
As we have seen, the stakes of the question—what is the boundary between the temporal 
and the spiritual—in the late medieval period had to do with jurisdiction and the distribution of 
authority, and it had consequences on the lives of those whose who were governed and 
adjudicated under its terms in various ways. 
This dissertation shows that in the Reformation, not only did the stakes shift, but the 
definition of the objects did, too. The Reformation cases are key to this story. In them, the 
spiritual/temporal binary was no longer prescient. Instead, central was what was a matter of 
religion, and what was not a matter of religion. As I have shown, the term referenced a problem-
                                               
14 Asad, “Construction,” 116; Mahmood, “Minority Question,” 421; Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 192. 
15 Asad, Formations, 23. 
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17 Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), 3. See also Russell T. McCutcheon, “They Licked the Platter Clean”: On the Co-
Dependency of the Religious and the Secular, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 19 (2007): 173-99. 
18 Agrama, 17. 
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University Press, 2006), 497-8. 
20 Agrama, 27-9. 
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space as it had emerged over the course of several decades of litigation, especially the way this 
redounded on the imperial constitution. This means that it was at once a question of group 
identification and legal legibility; a category of governance; a term that captured the ways in 
which temporal and spiritual matters were intertwined in ways that the old jurisdictional binary 
seemed inadequate to handle; a justiciable object and category of legal issue; a term whose 
valence evoked a suspicion of playing with the temporal/spiritual boundary in self-serving ways; 
and a shorthand for the core conflict and constellation of disputes that had provided the impetus 
for this Peace.  
When the Peace used the term “religion” in its name and terms, it contained that 
category. As I showed in Chapter 6, “containment” did not mean clarity; “religion” was a 
placeholder, a signifier for a “problem-space.” I would argue that the “origins” story here is not 
about objective formulation of confessional difference—a prerequisite of modern secularism as 
facilitator of religious freedom and separation of church and state—but rather about the way in 
which the indeterminacy and ambiguity itself incessantly raises the question of the category’s 
boundaries, and obliges the state to provide an answer—underlining the state’s power to both 
police and question.22 Here are the origins of secularism not as a form of government 
characterized by the separation of church and state, but as a “questioning power.”23 More than 
anything, the “matter of religion” term denoted a question, the question of whether this or that 
thing counted as a matter of religion. This is the dominant refrain in its invocation in the cases, as 
well as in deliberations among the judges, and correspondences and protocols among those who 
were negotiating treaties and recesses concerning them. In part, this dissertation attempts to 
describe and analyze the socio-legal and constitutional conditions in which this form of 
questioning and agonism could be sustained. And it suggests that this questioning and agonism 
cleaved to the category even past the time and place that were the conditions of its production. 
To the extent that we see the origins of secularism in the early Reformation, perhaps it looks 
more like this than the origins stories provided by the standard liberal accounts (a la Locke) or 
the standard secularization thesis accounts (a la Taylor). Perhaps a legal phenomenology of the 
“matter of religion” in this period helps us to understand not only the intractability of the 
“religion” category as it is with us today, but to historicize that intractability. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
22 Agrama, 27-30. 
23 Agrama, 33. 
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APPENDIX: TIMELINE 
 
1495 – First Imperial Diet (Reichstag) at Worms; founding of Imperial Chamber Court  
 
1517 – Martin Luther sends letter to the Archbishop of Mainz, outlining the problematic 
theological implications of the sale of indulgences; followed by publication of Ninety-Five 
Theses 
 
1518 – Luther receives summons to Rome; Luther meets with Cajetan in Augsburg instead 
 
1519 – Miltitz meets with Luther; Emperor Maximilian I dies; election of Charles V; first 
electoral capitulation (Wahlkapitulation) for a new emperor 
 
1520 – Papal Bull “Exsurge Domine” describes Luther’s heresies; Luther publicly burns it and 
publishes three consequential texts 
 
1521 – Papal Bull “Decet Roman Pontificem” excommunicates Luther; Luther at the Diet of 
Worms; Worms Edict outlaws Luther and his followers; Luther flees to Wartburg castle 
 
1522 – Imperial Regiment Mandate calls on rulers to outlaw innovations in worship in their 
domains; Nuremberg Diet does not discuss Luther or Reformation questions 
 
1524 – Nuremberg Diet with famous section confirming Worms Edict but for rulers to 
implement its terms “as much as possible”; in Edict of Burgos, Emperor contradicts this by 
ordering that the Worms Edict be enforced unconditionally 
 
1524/5 – Peasants’ War 
 
1526 – Speyer Diet; its Recess forbids innovations in worship and usages, but states in Article 4 
that until the convening of a Christian Council or national assembly, each of the Estates has 
authority to “live, govern, and behave with their subjects in matters of the Worms Edict, as each 
hopes and trusts himself to answer to God and the Emperor”; definition of Land-Peace violation 
is explicitly linked to Reformation-related conflicts; the first time that an imperial law besides 
the Worms Edict is promulgated to manage the Reformation’s conflicts 
 
1529 – Speyer Diet, summoned in part to quash reforms that 1526 had unleashed; its Recess says 
that any violent act impinging the rights of another estate, if done for reasons of faith and 
religion, could be considered a violation of the Land-Peace. But because the acts listed could 
already be considered Land-Peace violations, the mentioning of the faith conflict added nothing 
new; if anything, the Recess made it clear that faith reasons were no escape from the 
consequences of a Land-Peace violation. The evangelical estates protested these portions of the 
1529 Recess. 
 
1530 – Augsburg Diet, at which the evangelical estates present the Augsburg and Tetropolitan 
Confessions. Its Recess aims to undo evangelical reforms by defining a wide range of acts done 
against old-faith worship and institutions as “Land-Peace violations,” even those that did not 
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have a violent quality, which had hitherto been a prerequisite of a Land-Peace violation. The 
evangelical estates protested these portions of the 1530 Recess. 
 
1530/1 - Founding of the Schmalkaldic League of evangelical princes and cities; drafting of the 
combined power of attorney as part of their co-litigation strategy 
 
1532 – Nuremberg Settlement promises an end to “matter of religion” litigation in the Imperial 
Chamber Court. But it is secret, and the public Peace Mandate promulgated at the Regensburg 
Diet that same year simply reiterates the sentiments of the 1530 Augsburg Recess, leaving the 
legal status of both in doubt. 
 
1534 - Recusation of the Court’s President and a majority of its judges by the protesting estates 
in matters of religion; Treaty of Kaaden promises end to cases concerning the religion in the 
Imperial Chamber Court 
 
1535 - Estates of all confessional inclinations join forces to quash the Anabaptist Kingdom in 
Münster; Treaty of Vienna promises end to cases concerning the religion in the Imperial 
Chamber Court 
 
1539 - Frankfurt Settlement promises end to cases concerning the religion in the Imperial 
Chamber Court 
 
1541 - Regensburg Diet (first since 1532); first time a suspension of Reformation cases is 
promised in the form of a Recess, but still no change in Court's judicature. 
 
1542 - Speyer Diet; promise of suspension of Reformation cases; protesting estates declare 
general recusation of the Court in all of its jurisdiction, not just in matters of religion 
 
1544 - Imperial Chamber Court effectively shuts down for lack of financing 
 
1546 - Regensburg Diet; Emperor declares Landgrave of Hessen and Elector of Saxony in the 
Acht 
 
1547 - Schmalkaldic War; Landgrave of Hessen and Elector of Saxony captured and imprisoned 
 
1548 - Augsburg Diet; Imperial Chamber Court reopened; beginning of Emperor's “interim 
politics” in which he proposes specific theological and ecclesiological compromises until the 
convening of a Council; this, in addition to other apparently authoritarian moves, unlocks 
resentment among the Estates 
 
1551 – Princes’ Rebellion 
 
1552 - Passau Treaty  
 
1555 - Augsburg Religion-Peace 
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